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ABSTRACT

CPAC: THE ORIGINS AND ROLE OF THE CONFERENCE IN THE EXPANSION AND
CONSOLIDATION OF THE CONSERVATIVE MOVEMENT, 1974-1980
Daniel P. Parker
Rogers M. Smith

The Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) is an annual event that brings conservative
politicians, public intellectuals, pundits, and issue activists together in Washington, DC to discuss
strategies for achieving their goals through the electoral and policy process. Although CPAC
receives a great deal of attention each year from conservative movement activists and the news
outlets that cover it, it has attracted less attention from scholars. This dissertation seeks to
address the gap in existing knowledge by providing a fresh account of the role that CPAC played
in the expansion and consolidation of the conservative movement during the 1970s. Audio
recordings of the exchanges that took place at CPAC meetings held between 1974 and 1980 are
transcribed and analyzed. The results of this analysis show that during the 1970s, CPAC served
as an important forum where previously fragmented single issue groups and leaders of the Old
Right and New Right coalitions were able to meet, share ideas, and coordinate their efforts.
Through their discursive exchanges at CPAC, these actors united behind a common set of policy
positions and political strategies. As they engaged with each other and shared their grievances,
they also developed a stronger sense of collective identity rooted in opposition to a common
enemy – modern liberalism.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
The Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) – an event sponsored by
the American Conservative Union (ACU) with the cooperation of a diverse array of
political action groups – brings a large crowd of conservative activists, political leaders,
pundits, and public intellectuals together in Washington, DC every year to discuss
politics and strategy. Although CPAC is a national spectacle that always dominates
media coverage during the single week in February when it is held, CPAC has, to date,
received only modest attention from scholars working in the discipline of political
science. Conference speeches and presentations are often quoted by political scientists
and historians in order to document the ideas and concerns of the conservative politicians,
public intellectuals, and activists who are in attendance.1 However, at present, there is no
definitive, theoretically grounded account of the historic role that the conference itself
played in the life of the early conservative movement or in the reshaping of the
Republican Party and its priorities.2
CPAC has, in fact, played a very important role in the life of the conservative
movement and the contemporary Republican Party. The conference was created in
conjunction with conservative movement-building efforts during the 1970s – at a time
when the diverse coalition of politicians, public intellectuals, and political activists who
now work comfortably together as part of the conservative movement were still learning
to understand the nature of the common ground – and the common enemy – that they all
shared. As the movement grew during subsequent years, the conference expanded along
with it and continued to function as an important forum where a proliferation of
conservative action groups convened to exchange ideas and coordinate their efforts.
CPAC thus served as one site where important relationships were forged among
conservative policy actors and where the discourses of various conservative
constituencies were cross-pollinated and blended together.

1

Donald T. Critchlow, The Conservative Ascendency: How the GOP Right Made Political
History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 199; Donald T. Critchlow, Phyllis
Schlafly and Grassroots Conservatism: A Woman’s Crusade (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2005), 273
2
James C. Roberts, “CPAC Over 30 Years: Conservatives Have Come a Long Way” Human
Events (2003), accessed March 15, 2015. http://humanevents.com/2003/02/03/cpac-over-30yearsbrconservatives-have-come-a-long-way/ This short article by James C. Roberts, who served
as the Political Director of the ACU in 1974 and then as its Executive Director from 1975-1977,
is one of the most comprehensive accounts published to date. In the article, Roberts provides a
chronological history of CPAC.; For a comprehensive history of the American Conservative
Union, see: L. Tom Perry Special Collections, “Register of the American Conservative Union:
Biographical History,” n.d., accessed March 15, 2015,
http://files.lib.byu.edu/ead//XML/MSS176.xml
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Analyzing CPAC Conference Proceedings, 1974-1980
In this dissertation, I seek to elaborate upon these points and establish in greater
detail the role that CPAC played in the life of the conservative movement during the
critical era of the 1970s. I aim to do so by investigating the history of the conference and
by tracing the role that it played in bringing conservatives together, helping them to
develop a sense of collective identity, and helping them to navigate the political
opportunities and obstacles that they faced as they worked to expand their ranks and
“transform the Republican Party into a vehicle for implementation of conservative ideas
in government.”3 The study begins with the founding of the conference in 1974 and ends
with the conference held prior to Ronald Reagan’s election in 1980.
I also seek to document and analyze the substantive content of the discourses at
CPAC during its early years. Through a discourse analysis of recordings that were made
of conference proceedings between 1974 and 1980, I seek to identify the problem and
solution frames, characterizations, narratives, and other ideas that were central
components of the conservative discourses of the day. By examining recordings of
unscripted dialogue from CPAC panels and question and answer sessions, I argue that it
is possible to capture the ideas that were critical for helping actors relate to each other
and make sense of the political situation that they faced. Of course, the blending of
groups that happened at CPAC meetings was just part of a process of coalition formation
that spanned many years and played out at many different sites of discourse. Since
CPAC was an integral part of that ongoing process, an investigation of its proceedings
also sheds light on the nature of broader trends.
Finally, through an analysis of the discourses at CPAC, it is possible to discern
with greater clarity how the conference as an institution structured the expression and
flow of ideas among those actors who were involved and to generate fresh hypotheses
about the role that action conferences play in processes of coalition formation generally.
These insights are particularly pertinent to current politics, given the creation of new
action conferences in recent years that are loosely based on the CPAC model. Examples
include the Values Voter Summit for Christian conservatives, the Liberty Political Action
Conference for libertarians, and the Netroots Nation action conference for progressive
bloggers.
Core Findings
Looking ahead, the results of this analysis yield a number of fresh insights about
the importance of CPAC as an institution and about the ways that ideas and discourse

3

John S. Buckley, in discussion with the author, November 2014. Buckley, who was actively
involved in the planning of CPAC 1978 as the Chairman of Young Americans for Freedom,
describes the goal of the conservative movement at that time as an effort “to transform the
Republican Party into a vehicle for implementation of conservative ideas in government.” I have
adopted his definition, which is broadly consistent with the way that most conservatives who
were active in movement politics during the 1970s describe their primary goal as a movement.
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helped to unite the conservative movement during the 1970s. My core findings may be
summarized as follows.
CPAC as an Instrument
By 1974, the conservative movement had become badly fragmented. CPAC was
designed to remedy this problem by bringing leading conservative politicians, public
intellectuals, coalition-builders, strategists, and issue activists together and by providing a
forum in which they could coordinate their efforts and unite behind a common policy
agenda and strategic plan for achieving their political goals. The conference can
therefore be described as an instrument originally created by the political and intellectual
leaders of Old Right in order to encourage cooperation, coordination, and communication
among a select group of politicians, intellectuals, and activist communities and in order to
also structure discursive exchanges among those actors.
During the 1970s, conservative leaders also used CPAC to advance four
interrelated coalition-building tasks. Specifically, they used it to purify, expand,
rationalize, and guide the development of the conservative movement. When I say that
leaders used CPAC to advance these four tasks, I do not mean to suggest that they
necessarily established the conference with the goal of achieving them. I am making a
more limited claim that the conference came to serve these purposes over the years as the
actors who were involved in planning it made a series of choices.
Purifying the Movement First, during the 1970s, I argue that CPAC helped to
purify the conservative movement– to cleanse it of actors (and, by extension, ideas) that
leaders feared could derail it and/or lead it down pathways that were not constructive.
For instance, the John Birch Society, which had become associated with support for
certain conspiracy theories not shared by Old Right conservative leaders, was not invited
to serve as a CPAC sponsor.4 Conference organizers also decided not to invite libertarian
4

William Rusher, Rise of the Right, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: National Review, 1993). In his
autobiography, Rusher includes a lengthy description of the John Birch Society, the views of its
founder, Robert W. Welch, and the conscious steps taken William F. Buckley and the National
Review to disassociate themselves from the organization. This mentality carried over to CPAC
planning sessions, as well, and it is reflective of broader efforts undertaken by conservative
leaders to carefully include and exclude groups from participation in movement activities. Also
see: Congressman Philip Crane, letter from Dawne Cina, n.d. MSS 176; Register of the
American Conservative Union; 20th and 21st Century Western and Mormon Americana; L. Tom
Perry Special Collections, Harold B. Lee Library, Brigham Young University, Series III, Box 6,
Folder 6; John S. Buckley, letter to ACU/YAF CPAC Steering Committee. MSS 176, LTPSC,
Series III, Box 6, Folder 6. The letter from Dawne Cina, who worked in James L. Buckley’s
office, included a list of possible sponsors for the CPAC conference. The list was then evaluated
by ACU staff, and a select group of those listed were invited to serve as conference sponsors.
The John Birch Society, libertarian groups, and the Christian Crusade were among the many
groups on the original list from Cina that conference organizers ultimately decided not to invite.
The letter from John S. Buckley documents the groups that were approved and who received
invitations. By cross-referencing the lists, it is possible to determine the groups that were
considered and rejected.
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groups. The Libertarian Forum, the Libertarian Party, the Liberty Amendment
Committee, Reason magazine, and the Society for Individual Liberty were all considered
but never given the opportunity to register as conference sponsors. Right-wing groups
that adhered to racist ideologies, such as the Christian Crusade, were also excluded.5
Expanding the Movement In contrast, emerging New Right and New Religious
Right political action groups, as well as newly elected conservative leaders in the House
and Senate, were actively recruited to attend the CPAC conference, serve as sponsors,
and deliver addresses. By 1980, the Christian Voice and the Moral Majority were both
on the invitation list, and speakers and thought leaders affiliated with the Christian school
movement, such as Rev. Robert Billings, were recruited to participate in CPAC
proceedings alongside the economic and foreign policy conservatives of the Old Right.
Newly elected conservative leaders such as Orrin Hatch were invited to give keynote
CPAC addresses in February only a few weeks after they first entered Congress.
Thought leaders from the National Review and American Enterprise Institute, as well as
Catholic scholars and attorneys who provided thought leadership to the New Right
coalition, were invited to speak about matters that were of concern to them. Although
CPAC was mostly a conservative Republican gathering, it was also used to bring
conservative southern Democrats into the movement. For instance, Senator Russell Long
of Louisiana and Congressman Phil Gramm of Texas were both invited to speak during
the 1970s (see appendix).
Thus, CPAC was used not only to purify but also to selectively expand the
conservative movement and encourage a merging of elements from the Old Right with
the distinct New Right coalition that developed around Richard Viguerie and Paul
Weyrich. This happened gradually, and there were some differences of opinion between
conservative leaders along the way. Paul Weyrich was disappointed with the strategies
that were emphasized and pushed for a greater emphasis on coalition-building.6 Some
5

Robert Heckman, in discussion with the author, February 2015; James C. Roberts, in discussion
with the author, October 2014. Heckman, who was the Executive Director of Young Americans
for Freedom in 1980, recalls that groups that were racist were consciously excluded, as were
groups that were staunchly libertarian. Roberts recalls that groups that were considered to be
racist were excluded from sponsorship.
6
Paul Weyrich, letter to Ross Whealton, February 6, 1980. MSS 176, LTPSC, Series III, Box 9,
Folder 9; Robert Heckman, letter to Paul Weyrich, February 20, 1980. MSS 176, LTPSC, Series
III, Box 9, Folder 9. In his letter (copied to Heckman), Weyrich complained that his suggestion
for a CPAC panel on coalitions had been dropped from the conference agenda. He wrote: “I am
more than a little disappointed in the way CPAC’s schedule has turned out…planners said the
main thrust of CPAC was to brief people on the issues and coalitions have been covered in other
conferences …As you know, I feel coalition politics will have a profound effect on conservative
politics during the 1980’s and therefore deserves close examination. Frankly, I don’t think it will
be worthwhile for CSFC, Inc. to participate in future CPAC’s since our input is obviously limited
to a monetary donation.” In his reply, Robert Heckman wrote: Some people did not choose to
take advantage of [the] opportunity to effect the [CPAC] agenda. Some did. Connie Marshner of
your office was one of the latter. She made several concrete suggestions, all of which were
incorporated into the agenda…Indeed, one veteran CPAC attendee chastised me for the heavy
emphasis of the program on social and educational matters. Thursday’s agenda covered in great

5

Old Right CPAC attendees balked at the fact that two social issues panels rather than one
were included on the agenda at CPAC 1980. They felt the movement should emphasize
economic and foreign policy issues and questioned whether New Right groups should be
treated as part of the conservative movement at all.7
Still, these squabbles were byproducts of positive steps that were being taken to
bring different types of conservatives into a dialogue with each other, and although
conservatives sometimes disagreed over matters of emphasis and strategy, progress was
certainly made toward greater unity. Writing in 1976, M. Stanton Evans, who served as
Chairman of the American Conservative Union at the time, wrote with great satisfaction
that CPAC demonstrated “the rising level of co-ordination among various elements
loosely identified as conservative but not previously noted for working in common
harness.” He added that they were beginning “to see the common thread that binds them
all together… [resulting in] the development of a tentative new consensus among …
previously … fragmented interests.”8
Rationalizing the Movement CPAC did more than simply bring diverse groups
of conservative policy actors together in the same room. It also structured their
deliberations, encouraged dialogue on issues that were important for the expanding
coalition, and encouraged the development of greater unity among the participants.
The panel discussions held each year at CPAC represented the planks of what
may be described as an unofficial platform for the conservative movement. For instance,
at the first conference held in 1974, separate panel discussions were planned to address
the budget, national health care legislation, energy issues, détente, busing, taxes, and
detail issues dealing with the schools and the American family; issues that I have found to be the
major topics of discussion during the Friday morning meetings which you host in your office.”
7
Robert Heckman, in discussion with the author, February 2015.; Also see: William A. Rusher,
The Making of the New Majority Party (Ottawa, IL: Green Hill Publishers, 1975). According to
Heckman, there was some debate as late as 1980 regarding whether the New Right was “part” of
the conservative movement. Some Old Right conservatives, who preferred to focus on economic
and foreign policy issues, complained about their increased involvement and stressed that CPAC
was “their conference.” Heckman recalls that there were objections to the inclusion of an extra
social issues panel on the CPAC agenda. As the planner in charge of the 1980 conference,
however, Heckman felt that it was important to include social conservatives in the planning
stages of the conference. He visited the small meetings held in the Weyrich offices where New
Right leaders gathered and invited them to attend CPAC planning sessions. Some did, and both
of the panel sessions that were held in 1980, as well as the speakers who were scheduled to
address the conference during those panel sessions, were specifically recommended by
representatives from the Weyrich offices. It is important to note that social issues were also
addressed in earlier years, though they were not prioritized to the same degree as economic and
foreign policy issues. M. Stanton Evans and William Rusher, who exerted a significant degree of
influence during the early years, were also coalition-minded and realized that conservative
principles needed to be extended and applied to the social issues in order to develop a message
that would appeal to detached Democrats and Independents. Rusher wrote about his views in The
Making of the New Majority Party. In chapter 3, there is an expanded discussion of the
relationship between the CPAC conference and the New Right conservatives.
8
M. Stanton Evans, “Getting Together,” Battle Line (February 1976): 12. MSS 176, LTPSC,
Series XV, Box 109, Folder 9.

6

women’s issues (see appendix). The issues slated for deliberation during CPAC panels
spoke to the grievances of the diverse coalition of actors involved in the conference
discourses as well as to the diverse grievances of the constituencies that conservatives
recognized would be important for expanding their coalition, speaking to voters, and
achieving political victory. In 1974, conference leaders recognized and stated explicitly
that they needed to have a coherent stand on busing because it was important to voters.9
Experts on busing were therefore scheduled to speak at CPAC and reinforce the requisite
policy positions in terms that resonated with and relied upon core conservative principles.
Through the collection of panel discussions held at each CPAC, a comprehensive
platform of positions on contemporary policy issues was developed, and select arguments
and patterns of thinking were reinforced for the audience by the thought leaders who
were assembled to speak.10
The way that the conservative movement platform emerged and was rationalized
through panel discussions at CPAC differed in important respects from the way that party
platforms are constructed. Party platforms almost always have a strong central focus,
formally allocate influence among participants, and result in an explicit statement of
positions that are codified in a written document. There was very little bargaining of this
type on display at CPAC meetings. The key issues were decided far in advance, and
influence was disproportionately allocated to those individuals who were pre-selected to
address the audience. Also, no written movement platform was ever created. In 1975,
attendees were asked to vote on a series of resolutions, but the resolutions that were
proposed were drafted by leaders before the conference began.11 Thus, while CPAC
served as a forum for the exchange of ideas, the parameters of the discourse were set in
advance by leaders, and the positions and arguments that were reinforced were not
spontaneously selected. The discourses at CPAC were shaped to a substantial degree by
the decisions that were made by leaders during the conference planning sessions. Of

9

M. Stanton Evans, Remarks at CPAC 1974, MSS 176, LTPSC, Box 113, Tape 11. During the
panel session entitled “Strategy for ’74,” Evans noted: “We have got to start speaking to the
American people about those issues… to get some kind of articulate presentation of our view on
the energy crisis, busing, welfare, taxes, abortion, the whole litany of issues which have people
out there steaming and about which we aren’t saying anything so far as they can tell…” Evans’
comments are quoted at length in chapter 4.
10
Frank Donatelli, in discussion with the author, July 2014. Frank Donatelli, who was involved
in the planning sessions for CPAC 1974 as the Executive Director of Young Americans for
Freedom, recalls that a great deal of attention went into determining the individuals who would be
invited to speak. He also recalls that an important role of the conference was to “clarify thinking”
on the important issues of the day. This is an important insight. Through their selection of
speakers for panel discussions, the groups that sponsored CPAC sought to “clarify thinking.”
Beyond that, they were able to selectively decide which issues would be addressed and which
ideas and arguments would be reinforced at CPAC gatherings.
11
“Resolutions Passed by 75 CPAC Participants,” February 16, 1975. MSS 176, LTPSC, Series
III, Box 3, Folder 26
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course, bias of this type is unavoidable within any conference structure that requires
organizers to decide what topics will be discussed and who will speak.12
The pathways through which CPAC panel discussions encouraged unity are
further clarified when considered in theoretical context. Scholars who study ideas have
long noted that policy conflicts are often “frame conflicts” and that the ways that
communities of actors choose to frame policy problems determine to a great extent which
policy solutions they come to support. Over time and through repeated interactions,
communities of actors can tend to settle upon a standard set of problem and solution
frames.13
In this context, I argue that during CPAC issue panels, conference attendees were
exposed to a select blend of problem and solution frames as they listened to the panelists
and absorbed the rationales offered by the thought leaders who had been recruited to
speak. In the process, common understandings of what was wrong with government, of
what was wrong with the policies of modern liberalism, and of what should be done to
create a better society were cultivated.14
Collectively, these frames helped to connect positions across a diverse range of
issue areas to the core, underlying themes of freedom, ordered liberty, and personal
responsibility. They also helped to tighten the coalition and make its members less
susceptible to outside influence. Once members of a coalition have come to accept a
specific collection of problem and solution frames, the policy solutions proposed by
outside actors and coalitions that frame problems differently can seem foreign, irrelevant,
and misguided.15 The members of a tightly knit community who come to see problems in
a particular way are therefore unlikely to be persuaded to join rival coalitions.
Arguably, the greatest example of this was and still is conservatives’ insistence
that liberal policy solutions– which emphasize a positive role for government in
correcting for inequalities and trying to improve the health of the economy through
government intervention– are not actually solutions but are rather the root cause of the
12

Throughout the dissertation, I use the term “organic” to describe the ideational developments
that happened through the discussions at CPAC. By organic, I mean that in the context of
deliberations at CPAC, the ideas of diverse conservative constituencies were connected together
in natural ways as the actors who were assembled shared ideas and reacted and responded to each
other. At the same time, I argue that these organic discursive developments at CPAC were also
structured, since the speakers and sponsoring groups were screened in advance.
13
Frank Baumgartner, Agendas and Instability in American Politics (Chicago, IL: The
University of Chicago Press, 2009); Jal Mehta, “The Varied Roles of Ideas in Politics; From
‘Whether’ to ‘How’,” in Daniel Béland and Robert Henry Cox, eds., Ideas and Politics in Social
Science Research (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011), 23-46; Donald A. Schőn
and Martin Rein, Frame Reflection: Toward the Resolution of Intractable Policy Controversies
(New York, NY: Basic Books, 1994).
14

Mark Blyth Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth
Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 38-39. Blyth notes: “[ideas] allow
agents to define the solutions to their problems, and perhaps more importantly, to define the very
problems that agents face in the first place.”
15
Mehta, Varied Roles; Schőn and Rein, Frame Reflection
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problems that Americans face. As Reagan famously put it, “government is not the
solution to our problem. Government is the problem.”16 Because liberals see
government as a solution and principled conservatives see it as the cause of most
problems, the two sides do not compromise or relate to each other easily. Conservatives
made these distinctions at CPAC conferences during the 1970s and spoke openly about
the competing definitions of problems and solutions espoused by liberals and
conservatives.
Guiding the Movement Finally, I argue that thought leaders used CPAC as a
forum to provide strategic guidance to the conservative movement–to build common
understandings of the challenges conservatives faced in the political arena and of the
long-term strategies that would help them to win. Each year at CPAC, leaders worked to
identify current ideological and institutional obstacles to the movement’s success, explain
changes in the structure of political opportunities that the movement faced, and chart the
path that they felt conservatives needed to follow in order to restructure the party system
and build a lasting electoral majority.
Through their interpretations of ideological and political context at CPAC,
conservative leaders helped to define and characterize the friends, enemies, and target
constituencies of the expanding conservative movement, and they helped to paint a rich
portrait of the political landscape for conference participants that was replete with
characterizations of the party system, of outside elites, and of other factions, movements,
and political coalitions. They helped to elaborate narratives that explained how the
various actors and institutions were related to each other, and they recommended political
strategies that were based upon those narratives.
In doing so, leaders contributed to the organic development of a shared coalition
identity based upon shared perceptions of the political world, and, by extension, they
helped to further reinforce the movement's existence as a discrete entity.17 Discussions of
strategy and context produced a dynamic that was complementary to the dynamic created
by discussions during CPAC issue panels. Both cultivated a private language among
participants and united them by reinforcing shared perceptions of the political world and
shared understandings of the ways that core principles applied in a series of important
issue areas.
Leaders also used the conference to guide the movement in very specific
directions. In 1975, the leadership of the American Conservative Union sought to
encourage the formation of a new party, and so they specifically scheduled discussions of
the issue at CPAC and invited speakers who favored a break from the GOP to explain
how it could be accomplished. In addition, leaders sought to position Ronald Reagan as
the candidate of choice for the conservative movement. They consciously used the
conference to reinforce Reagan’s stature by asking him to serve as the keynote speaker at

Ronald Reagan “Inaugural Address,” January 20, 1981, accessed March 12, 2015
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1981
16
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CPAC 1974-75 and CPAC 1977-79. They also emphasized the importance of a Reagan
candidacy repeatedly during conference proceedings.18
CPAC as a Mechanism
As I already noted, CPAC served as a forum for discussions of strategy and the
development of an unofficial conservative movement platform. It is important to add that
it allowed these discussions to take place specifically outside of formal Republican Party
channels. At CPAC, conservative leaders and activists could openly discuss their
approach toward the party without having to bargain with other competing factions and
coalitions. For instance, they could have discussions about whether they wanted to
remain in the party at all or leave it, and they could openly debate strategies for
transforming the party and ousting current Republican leadership. It would have been far
more challenging to hold these types of discussions at a formal party convention.
Discourse Analysis: Interpretations of Context
As I noted earlier, my objective is not just to explain the instrumental role played
by CPAC in the development of the conservative movement. It is also to examine the
content of the discourses at CPAC and to establish the ideas, frames, narratives,
interpretations, and strategies that were actually discussed during meetings from 19741980. This exercise in discourse analysis yields several fresh insights.
Periodization First, I find that the 1974-1980 period may be divided into two
segments. The first extends from 1974-1976 and the second from 1977-1980.
During the first (which, if the data were available, would likely extend backward
into the 1960s), conference discourses were oriented around opposition to liberalism and
the policies of big government as represented by Republican presidents and Republican
leaders in Congress. This was important because it focused attention upon the intra-party
roadblocks created by moderate and liberal Republicans and emphasized the need to
transform the Republican Party into a vehicle for conservative ideas.
During the second segment, extending from 1977 until 1980, this dynamic
gradually shifted. Conference discourses became more strongly centered around
opposition to liberalism and the policies of big government as represented and supported
by Democrats, liberal interest groups, the courts, and the bureaucracy.19 This shift, which
18

Frank Donatelli, in discussion with the author, July 2014. According to Donatelli, who served
as the Executive Director of Young Americans for Freedom from 1974-1977, an important goal
of CPAC 1974 was to position Reagan as the candidate of choice for the conservative movement.
He was the first speaker recruited to appear at the conference. As I note in chapter 3, an earlier
attempt to hold CPAC in 1969 was cancelled when Reagan was unable to appear.
19
Baumgartner and Jones, Agendas and Instability; Martha Derthick, The Politics of Deregulation
(Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1985). Baumgartner and Jones persuasively argue that
ideas can become lodged in the institutional networks that are created to support and implement
them. I argue that as conservatives became the dominant voice within the Republican Party,
expressions of opposition became strongly targeted not only at liberals within both parties but
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was precipitated by the departures of Gerald Ford and Nelson Rockefeller and the
reshaping of the Republican Party’s platform by Reagan supporters at the 1976
Republican National Convention, was an important one. It was ushered in by favorable
changes in opportunity structure that weakened the influence of the northeastern GOP
establishment, gave conservatives a more conservative platform to which they could
point as a symbol of the party’s conservative commitments, and allowed conservatives
greater latitude to re-define the party and its priorities without the conflicting signals
from the White House that had been common during the Nixon and Ford administrations.
It also coincided with a major shift in which conservatives moved away from criticizing
the Republican Party as an institution under Nixon and Ford toward claiming ownership
of the party and working to re-brand it as the natural home of conservatism during the
Carter years.
The Conservative Majority Thesis Second, I find that the characterization of
the American electorate as containing within it a “conservative majority” played a critical
role and structured conference discourses throughout the entire period. Although the role
of the conservative majority idea has been recognized by other scholars, I argue that it
played an even more important and multi-dimensional role in structuring 1970s
conservative discourses than has hitherto been acknowledged.
The conservative majority concept was important because it justified the efforts of
conservatives. It framed conservatives’ fight as one made on behalf of a majority of the
American people.20 It helped to structure discussions of strategy, since it guided
discussions of the target groups that were conservative but not yet attached to the
Republican Party and that conservatives should therefore work to mobilize. It also came
to structure explanations of the pathways through which conservatives would succeed
and the reasons why the Republican Party was so poorly represented in Congress. In the
also at the institutional networks that were seen as bastions of the liberal ideas and the policies of
modern liberalism (including the courts and the bureaucracy). Although criticisms of the courts
and bureaucracy were certainly evident in conference discourses prior to 1977, expressions of
opposition to these institutions grew in intensity after the 1976 election, as expressions of
opposition shifted away from the intra-party roadblocks posed by Nixon, Ford, and the
northeastern establishment of the GOP. Events also encouraged this discursive shift. The IRS
attack on private school tax exemptions in 1978 drew the ire of social conservatives and targeted
their anger at liberal regulators seeking to engineer social change and reshape educational
curricula. As religious conservatives became increasingly mobilized into politics in the late
1970s, they became active participants in the discourses at CPAC and voiced strong criticisms of
social engineering initiatives pursued by the IRS, the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare, and the coalition of liberal interest groups such as the National Education Association
(NEA) that were seen as being strongly aligned with those bureaucratic networks. Of course,
there was a broader push toward de-regulation that was embraced by neoliberals and that was
manifested within the Democratic Party, as well. See the discussion extended discussion of this
issue in chapter 8.
20
Jeane Kirkpatrick, “Why the New Right Lost,” Commentary (February 1977): 39. Kirkpatrick
makes this argument. The article includes a critical examination of the conservative majority
thesis, including its core assumptions and assertions. I describe her arguments extensively in
chapter 6.
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discourses at CPAC, the failure of the GOP was linked to the stranglehold on the GOP by
moderate and liberal leaders. As the reasoning went, because these moderate and liberal
factions failed to articulate bold conservative stands, they were unable to harness and
mobilize the conservative majority. They allowed Democrats to preempt it, and so they
were directly responsible for Republican losses. In a similar vein, the importance of
nominating a strong, principled conservative candidate was defended on the grounds that
such a candidate was essential in order to send a strong signal necessary to reach and
mobilize the latent conservative majority and bring it into the Republican Party as the
support base for the platform of ideational and policy commitments represented by the
conservative movement.
Today, conservatives often repeat Reagan’s call for language emphasizing bold
colors and not pale pastels at CPAC 1975 and stress the fact that it is a tried and true
method for winning elections.21 In fact, this strategy was not of Reagan’s invention at all.
It was a strategy that was commonly recited in movement discourses throughout the
1970s. In that context, it was also inextricably linked to the conservative majority thesis,
was strongly rooted in interpretations of trends in 1970s public opinion, and implied
taking bold stands on the specific platform of issues on which the public supported
conservative policy positions during the 1970s. Today, public attitudes have shifted,
important aspects of the conservative majority thesis are no longer repeated in movement
discourses, and yet the associated “bold colors” strategy that grew from it is still recited
with regularity.
The conservative majority thesis also came to structure interpretations of electoral
outcomes during the era and, by extension, to serve as the organizing basis for narrative
descriptions of events. In situation after situation, the conservative majority was
characterized by leaders as shifting back and forth between the parties in response to the
signals sent to it by various party elites and presidential contenders.
What exactly was the conservative majority? Within the discourses at CPAC, the
conservative majority in essence came to be characterized as consisting of voters who
were united in their opposition to big government. When discussions of the idea are
carefully analyzed, it becomes clear that any form of opposition to big government was
treated as sufficient for classifying a particular voting bloc as conservative and including
it as a part of the conservative majority. Leaders glossed over the fact that voters who
oppose government in some areas very often support it in others.22 In hindsight, the
conservative majority– as depicted in conference discourses– was quite obviously full of
moderates. Nevertheless, I argue that the perceptions of politicians and activist leaders
are ultimately all that mattered. They treated the construct as if it were a cohesive bloc of
voters that could be mobilized as a cohesive whole by articulating the right platform and
the right language, and that philosophy and approach strongly guided their words and
actions.23
In short, I argue that the characterization of the electorate as conservative was an
idea that lived within the discourses of the expanding conservative coalition. It was
21
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repeated over and over again by the speakers at CPAC throughout the entire 1974-1980
period. In that time, it was used often and extensively to characterize and explain
political context, interpret events, and chart a path forward for the coalition. As a widely
accepted idea, it became an integral part of the coalition’s language and collective
identity.
Explaining Events and Updating Narratives Third, I find that by examining
conference discourses from year to year, it is possible to discern at an even greater level
of specificity how events were explained by leaders and how the conservative majority
thesis was applied in order to preserve and build unity.
In order to do so, I trace conservative reactions at CPAC to important events of
the era– Watergate, Nixon’s resignation, the Republican Party’s devastating defeat in the
1974 election, Ford’s ascension to the Presidency, the bitter intra-party nomination battle
between Reagan and Ford in 1976, and a string of electoral defeats delivered to the
Republican Party throughout the decade. An important insight that grows out of this
analysis is that an important task of speakers at CPAC every year was to develop
elaborate, ideologically tinted interpretations of these events and to preserve the notion
that the people really were as conservative as they claimed (even though this did not
always register in election results). Changes in historical context thus disciplined
conservative discourses--- they forced conservative leaders to use flexible logic to
continually update movement narratives, clarify why recent developments were
consistent with the strategies and predictions that they made in the past, and reinforce the
ways that strategies applied to new realities. In doing so, conservative leaders relied
upon various elements of the conservative majority thesis to structure their explanations
and recommendations, and the idea became even more strongly embedded in
conservative movement narratives. Of course, as I noted earlier, these were activities in
which leaders were constantly engaged. An analysis of the discourses at CPAC therefore
offers a window of insight and suggests the nature of work in which public intellectuals
and politicians were involved in the broader field of coalition discourse.
Discourse Analysis: Platform Development
A Common Enemy I also seek to characterize the substance of the policy
discussions that took place during CPAC issue panels. My primary finding is that
through conference discourses, an image of modern liberalism was socially constructed
through the separate contributions of multiple speakers representing multiple branches of
the conservative movement. The image that emerged was of an entity that did bad
things– to individual freedoms, to the economy, and to the traditions of society.
The general notion that big government as conceived, constructed, and managed
by liberals was a bad thing was so pervasive that it was even invoked to support
aggressive, anti-Communist foreign policy and– in the tradition of fusionism– the defense
of a large national security state. Communist regimes were cast as big, oppressive states–
more extreme versions of the liberal state that conservatives opposed on the domestic
front– that were hostile to freedom. In this vein, the fight against Communism abroad
was an extension of the domestic fight against big, oppressive government. Support of

13

those fighting for freedom from government abroad was cast as an extension of the fight
against liberal big government policies at home.
I do not find that this frame was the only one coursing through conference
discourses. I do find, however, that it was this broad image of big government as
supported by liberals as a bad and dangerous thing that was consistently reinforced and
painted with rich detail as multiple actors expressed their grievances at CPAC
conferences. It was a frame that was, in retrospect, extraordinarily effective. This was so
because it spoke to the grievances of a wide range of activist constituencies, all of whom
had diverse types of complaints, and it focused them upon a single, common enemy.
Precisely defined, the enemy was not government itself. Rather, it was big government
and the series of big government policies supported and advocated by liberals.
In this vein, M. Stanton Evans wrote of CPAC 1976: “...issue groups appearing
on the program… have focused in the past on single-issue areas of major concern to their
members, and of course will continue to do so. But they seem increasingly aware these
days that they confront a common adversary and are thus embarked upon a common
venture--- whether the issue up for discussion be forced busing, limited government,
objectionable textbooks, abortion or so-called ‘child development.’’24
It is significant that in the discourses at CPAC, blame was very rarely placed on
individuals for their shortcomings. For the most part, individuals who were dependent
upon government were cast in the role of victims of liberal policies designed to mislead,
take advantage, and create dependency.
The Transformative Aspects of Modern Liberalism Finally, I argue that at an
even deeper level, there was a common thread that linked various conservative arguments
against modern liberalism together. This was the notion that it was transformative.
Liberal tax and welfare policies were opposed on the grounds that they were intended to
redistribute income and eradicate natural inequalities. Liberal social engineering
initiatives were opposed on the grounds that they were intended to transform gender roles
and make everyone the same. Liberal social policies were opposed on the grounds that
they sought to redefine the traditional family and impose a state religion of secularism.
In a similar vein, a strong anti-communist foreign policy was justified on the grounds that
communism was a dangerous ideology that sought to transform societies.
While I recognize that freedom was the core theme that tied together free market,
traditionalist, and anti-communist strands of conservatism, I argue that it was actually this
negative frame oriented around opposition to the transformative aspects of modern
liberalism (and communism) and the threats to tradition and order that were posed by
them that were just as essential for bringing different kinds of conservatives together.
Theoretical Framework
Before proceeding with an empirical analysis of CPAC proceedings, I argue that
it is first necessary to first take a step back and develop a strong theoretical foundation
that will help to contextualize the role of the conference and explain where it fits in a
broader theory of coalition formation. Specifically, what is needed is a theoretical
24
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framework that suggests: 1) the role that ideas and discourse play in the life of a political
coalition; 2) the conditions under which institutions such as CPAC are likely to be
created by a coalition; and 3) the ways that institutions such as CPAC structure discursive
interactions. I propose such a framework in chapter 2.
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CHAPTER 2
Political Coalitions: A Framework for Analysis
To a person who… insists upon preoccupying himself with principles, working within
either major party must necessarily be irrelevant at best and, at worst, self-defeating.
Such people (I will call them “political activists” for want of a better name) simply
cannot expect to prevail politically until and unless there is a major change in public
opinion. Their only sensible course is to work for such a change–not within the
Republican Party, where they will forever be forced into enervating compromises, but in
the field of pure opinion, through journals like National Review. It may well be that, if
and when such a massive change in public opinion occurs, it will manifest itself in both
major parties, and that one or the other will succeed in absorbing the new viewpoint–as
the Democratic Party, in and after 1932, transformed itself in order to become the vehicle
of the triumphant leftists. But such an event is an effect, rather than a cause. I have
never heard that Debs, Villard, etc. spent long years in the Democratic Party, trying to
pull it leftward. They built their better mousetrap; and when they had built it, the
Democratic Party bought it.1
–William Rusher
Memo to William F. Buckley
October 10, 1960
In this chapter, I propose a broad theory of coalition formation that emphasizes
the role of ideas in holding diverse groups of interests together. I suggest that the
strength of political coalitions – as measured by their ability to facilitate the election of
the candidates that they openly support – is shaped in important ways by the alignment,
configuration, and flow of ideas within them.
Political Coalition: A Definition
I define a political coalition as an organized group of elites and activists who
cooperate with each other on a repeat basis in order to achieve common goals through the
electoral and policy process. Under this definition, a political coalition is not an alliance
that is narrowly or opportunistically constructed for a specific tactical purpose. Its
members cooperate with the expectation that their alliance will continue in the future and
that it will extend to include collaboration policy issues that are not yet salient.
Elites include: politicians, public intellectuals and pundits, businesspeople (as
well as their proxies and representatives), and the leaders of movement organizations,
interest groups, and other organized communities of issue activists. Activists are nonelites who work in roles that shape and support the development of a political coalition's
1

William Rusher, Memo to William F. Buckley (October 10, 1960). William A. Rusher Papers,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Box 121, Staff correspondence
and memoranda, 1957-1960, 1966-1969
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electoral and policy agenda. This includes the rank and file members of interest groups
and movement organizations.
A political coalition is a distinct discursive community. Its members interact and
communicate with each other, and they do so through distinct channels and in the context
of distinct organizational settings that are specific to the coalition.2
As a coalition's members interact within the context of distinct organizational
structures, they naturally engage with each other and learn to coordinate their efforts.
The substance and terms of a political coalition's discourse are therefore shaped in
important ways by the structure and configuration of a coalition's organizational
structures and by the mechanisms that are established by members to facilitate their own
cooperation and coordination. Organizational structures also influence the flow and
transmission of ideas among various coalition partners and, consequently, influence the
degree of cohesiveness that develops among the various actors who are cooperating as
part of a single coalition.
The Incorporation of Groups into Political Coalitions
For elites and activists, membership in a political coalition is easily obtained.
Membership is simply dependent upon active participation and engagement in the
coalition's discourse. Coalitions soak up new groups of actors in a highly organic way by
simply interacting with them and involving them in their coalition's collaborative efforts.
Political coalitions are heterogeneous. They consist of multiple groups, factions,
and/or movements which may also be organized coalitions and whose members may also
have their own highly developed discourses.3 As distinct movements and factions
become connected together within the context of a single political coalition, the
frequency of the shared discursive interactions among their members in
faction/movement-specific settings relative to the frequency of shared interactions with
partners at the coalition level and in coalition-specific settings comes to be of great
importance.
Vivian A. Schmidt, “Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and
Discourse,” Annual Review of Political Science (2008): 310. Schmidt uses the term “discursive
community” in her writing, as well. She notes that “coordinative discourse may be the domain of
individuals loosely connected in ‘epistemic communities’ in transnational settings on the basis of
shared cognitive and normative ideas about a common policy enterprise…alternatively, it may
consist of more closely connected individuals who share both ideas and access to policy making.
Examples include ‘advocacy coalitions’ in localized policy contexts…‘discourse coalitions’ in
national settings across extended time periods…[and]‘advocacy networks’ of activists in
international politics focused on issues of human rights…” She also notes that “the coordinative
discourse may also contain ‘entrepreneurs’…or ‘mediators’…who serve as catalysts for change
as they draw on and articulate the ideas of discursive communities and coalitions.”
3
I argue that movements are coalitions. Movements can become integrated into larger political
coalitions and still retain their organizational and discursive distinctiveness. As I explain in the
text, the extent to which a movement or faction retains its distinctiveness when it joins a broader
coalition depends upon whether the community maintains a separate infrastructure and separate
lines of communication to coordinate its efforts.
2
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The more that a faction or movement's members become engaged in a coalition's
discourse, the more strongly their ideas and beliefs are likely to become dispersed and
transmitted throughout the coalition. Also, the coalition identity is likely to become more
salient for them than their sense of identity as a distinct faction or movement.
Over time, as the diverse groups within political coalition interact and coordinate
with each other over and over again, the flow of ideas between them tends to enhance the
salience of the coalition identity formation at the expense of faction-specific identity
formations that pre-dated their entry into the coalition.
Discursive interactions (which also include all coordinative and collaborative
interactions, not just the exchange of language or ideas) with coalition partners can also
serve as a powerful impetus for primary identification with the coalition and for the
development of a sense of unity among coalition partners. As the boundaries between
factions break down in shared settings and as ideas flow predominantly through coalition
rather than faction-specific channels, this can greatly encourage the ideological
homogenization of a coalition.
In the section on intellectuals, found later in this chapter, I expand upon this
argument by emphasizing that the locus of discursive interactions and the relative degree
to which groups are engaged in a discourse can have a powerful influence on the very
substance of political ideology. Philosophical principles and idea chains that are
assembled by intellectuals are refined and altered as they are articulated by elites and
activists who are engaged in organic discursive interactions. Popularly understood
definitions of ideologies, as well as the popularly understood meanings of political
philosophies, are shaped and refined organically through a coalition's discourse. Changes
in the various actors who are engaged in a discursive community (as well as changes in
the extent to which various actors are engaged) can have the potential to shape the
contours and understood meanings of the principles to which participants in that
community subscribe.
Political Coalitions vs. the Mass Electorate
As I have defined the term, a political coalition is composed exclusively of elites
and activists. It does not include voters. Voters are passive participants in the electoral
process. They simply choose how to allocate their votes among the various alternatives
that are presented to them. Unlike elites and activists, they do not try to actively
influence the agendas of parties or candidates, nor do they work to actively support
campaign efforts.4 That said, expectations about the behavior of voters are foremost in

4

John Aldrich, Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), 21. Citing Popkin, Aldrich makes a related
argument that ‘voters…are neither office seekers nor benefit seekers and thus are not a part of the
political party…they are critical as the targets of party activities. Parties ‘produce’ candidates,
platforms, and policies. Voters ‘consume’ by exchanging their votes for the party’s product…”;
Jeffrey Green, The Eyes of the People: Democracy in an Age of Spectatorship (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2010)
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the minds of all members of political coalitions. Voter decision-making and turnout are,
after all, the variables that ultimately shape the outcome of election contests.
Political Coalitions vs Party Coalitions
In America, a majority of the electorate is organized into groups by the two main
political party labels– Democratic and Republican. Most voters relate to politics through
their perceptions of those party labels and the platforms that they represent. If a discrete
political coalition wants to achieve influence and representation in government, it
therefore cannot easily invent a separate name for itself and appeal directly to voters as a
separate organization. Instead, it must decide to work within and through one or more of
the established political parties in order to achieve ballot access.5
When a political coalition chooses to work within and through an established
political party in order to field candidates in primary and general election contests, it may
be said to be part of that party’s coalition. In America, party coalitions are broad in scope
and include diverse political coalitions and interests with diverse ideas and policy
agendas.
Under what circumstances is a political coalition distinguishable from a broader
party coalition of which it is also a part? A political coalition can be said to be
distinguishable from a party coalition when it retains its own organizational structures
and mechanisms to facilitate cooperation and coordination among its members. When a
segment of a party's elites and activists retain membership in distinct organizations and
associations in which they alone participate and meet to coordinate their actions, this is
an indication that they are functioning as a distinct political coalition. Organizational
structures and mechanisms can serve as invisible barriers between coalitions and
facilitate their continued existence, even as they also collaborate with other party
members for ballot access.6 Of course, in a similar vein, a political coalition remains
distinctive as long as it functions as a separate discursive community.
5

There are exceptions. The Republicans, for instance, emerged as a new party in the 1850s to
replace the Whigs. However, such instances are rare. In a system with winner-take-all elections,
where strategic voting strongly discourages the formation of third parties, working through the
existing parties is typically the only way that a political coalition can achieve access to the
general election ballot. Also see: Gary Cox, Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the
World’s Electoral Systems (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Cox explains why
winner-take-all electoral laws encourage strategic voting and discourage third-party formation.
6
Marty Cohen, David Karol, Hans Noel, and John Zaller The Party Decides: Presidential
Nominations Before and After Reform (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2008).
Like the authors, I recognize that activist groups form organizational networks that control
resources, mobilize behind candidates, and seek to shape the direction of party politics. I differ
from these scholars, however, in that I do not classify group networks as being components of
“the party” and instead argue in favor of drawing sharp distinctions between elite-activist
coalitions and party institutions. In this vein, I argue that political coalitions have the potential to
develop their own distinct discourses, their own distinct platforms, and their own distinct
strategies that are unlike those of the party that they seek to influence and that are also unlike
those of other coalitions working to influence the same party. Thus, more than one distinct
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Coalition partners may be engaged in both coalition and party discourses that
occur through different channels and in different venues at different times. Just as is the
case within a political coalition relative to its constituent groups, the relative engagement
of actors in coalition vs. party discourses determines to a very significant extent which
identity formation is the most salient for those involved and the most likely to structure
behavior. Depending upon which identity formation is strongest – coalition or party– this
can affect levels of party cohesion and factionalism.
As forums that facilitate discursive interactions, party institutions can potentially
have strong, homogenizing effects. As coalitions, movements, and factions coordinate
with each other collectively as part of a single party, party can grow in salience as an
identity formation and cause political coalitions that have been absorbed to fade as their
ideas and concerns are incorporated into the agenda and platform of the party. A shift in
the locus of discursive interactions from coalition-specific channels and venues to shared
party-wide channels and venues is the strongest indicator of this effect. It is also the
primary mechanism that produces change.
That said, while parties have the potential to dissolve the boundaries that exist
between factions and political coalitions by offering groups broad settings in which to
collaborate (such as national party conventions), the infusion and incorporation of a
distinct faction or political coalition into a party can have a powerful and transformative
effect. When the scope of discursive interactions broadens beyond the lines of a faction
or coalition, the ideas of the faction or coalition spill out. They have the potential to
become diffused and absorbed into the party’s platform and discourses and to transform
the party and the ideas and principles for which it stands.
Of course, the extent of the transformation is determined by the size and strength
of the faction or coalition that is absorbed and the extent to which that faction or coalition
becomes involved in party-wide collaborative efforts, settings, and channels of
communication. This includes the number, skill, and success of candidates who represent
the ideas and platform of the coalition or faction in party settings. If many
representatives of a coalition run in party contests and are elected, then the ideas and
platform of the coalition will become more strongly infused into party discourses and into
the party’s platform.

network of groups may compete for control of a party at a given moment in time. These
coalitions may be at odds with each other and may compete for the right to shape the party’s
agenda. These complex dynamics are most easily seen when coalitions and parties are viewed as
separate entities. In addition, I argue that the authors go too far by arguing that groups, rather
than politicians, are fundamentally in control of party institutions. As I argued in the
introduction, my research indicates that politicians may harness, capture, and manipulate political
coalitions and their resources in order restructure political parties and make them more to their
liking. Often, influential groups are influential precisely because somewhere along the line,
politicians have been involved (at the very least in a collaborative capacity with other elites) in
seeding and guiding the development of those groups. I am therefore uncomfortable with
characterizing politicians only as “managers’ of groups. In my view, they just as often work as
engineers who build, harness, manipulate, bond with, and steer coalitions in ways that are
intended to serve their own strategic purposes.
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Movements, pressure groups, and interest groups can of course form and exist
outside of the party system and outside of the realm of any organized political coalition.
There is an incentive, however, for organized elite-activist coalitions to capture
movements, pressure groups, and interest groups that have no coalitional affiliations and
to incorporate them into their electoral and policy efforts as well as the party coalition to
which they are tied. The need to achieve ballot access and the need field competitive
candidates in national election contests also tends to draw outside groups, movements,
and factions into party coalitions.
Homogeneity and Heterogeneity within Party Coalitions
The distinctions expressed above are consistent with various works of political
science that distinguish between the various wings and factions of party coalitions. I am
simply confirming that distinctive political coalitions may exist within a single party, and
I am seeking to characterize the terms and boundaries of their existence.
To reiterate the point, distinct political coalitions exist when they display distinct
organizational characteristics, when they have distinct internal mechanisms to facilitate
the coordination of their members, and when they are the sites of distinct discursive
interactions that take place in unique venues and through unique channels of
communication.
For the purposes of this analysis, I wish to avoid distinguishing among party
factions based strictly upon sectional, cultural, and socioeconomic divisions. I view the
presence of distinctive discursive interactions (not affiliations as defined by cultural or
economic distinctions, per se) as the relevant factors for parsing party coalitions and
distinguishing among their distinct groups. It is also possible that movements and
factions may be simply absorbed directly by a party and become directly loyal to it
without also being absorbed into a coalition.
Depending upon context, those coalitions and factions that retain their
organizational, coordinative, and discursive distinctiveness once incorporated into parties
may cooperate and interact with other party factions in an entirely cordial way, or they
may alternatively compete in a more adversarial way with other coalitions and factions
for control of a party's institutional apparatus.
From the standpoint of elites – especially from the vantage point of presidential
contenders – breaking down invisible organizational, coordinative, and discursive walls
that isolate coalitions and factions within a party from each other is typically an important
part of fostering greater party unity. When boundaries break down and the lines between
a single political coalition and party coalition are blurred – when party identity
predominates over distinct coalitional identities – this can suppress factionalism and
infighting and facilitate higher levels of cooperation and unity at a party-wide level. This
unity is inextricably linked to the diffusion of ideas and enhanced cooperation that
accompany an upward shift in the locus of discursive interactions.
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Coalitions and Parties in an Era of Candidate-Centered Elections
The ideas of a political coalition may be transmitted and infused into the
discourses of a political party when a coalition fields candidates under a party's label in
primary and/or general election contests. In the modern era of candidate-centered
elections, any candidate who meets basic qualifications may participate in a major party's
primary and, depending on election results, ultimately go on to represent that party in a
general election contest. The barriers to entry are low, and a candidate can succeed in
capturing a party's nomination without the support of party elites. In the era of candidatecentered elections, a candidate may take his case directly to voters.7
In this vein, it is important to note that a political coalition may actually build its
own campaign fundraising, recruiting, training, and staffing infrastructure to support its
candidates in party election contests– essentially supplanting the role of the party
organization as a provider of resources. This infrastructure may be effectively used to
support candidates who inject alternative ideas into party communicative and elite
discourses. Party nomination battles may become contests between candidates
representing rival political coalitions or between a candidate representing a political
coalition and a candidate who is more strongly sanctioned by entrenched establishment
party elites. The important point here is simply to note that the rules of the game lessen
the control of the party itself and make it possible for discrete political coalitions to field
and support outsider candidates in party nomination contests.8
Even when a coalition's candidate does not win, his candidacy can still facilitate
the transmission of ideas from coalition to party. A primary election campaign is an
important party setting, and events held to support a party's candidate in a general
election campaign can also be classified as party settings. The campaign process serves
as an opportunity for the candidate of a political coalition to express and articulate the
ideas of his coalition. By simply participating in the process, a coalition candidate has
the opportunity to inject the ideas of his coalition into party discourses, prompting other
candidates who are also engaged in the campaign to react and respond to those ideas.
Over the course of an election campaign, party discourses emerge, expand, and develop
in response to the ideas expressed by the candidates who are involved in the electoral
process. Of course, if the candidate of a political coalition wins a nomination contest and
goes on to run in the general election, this represents an even stronger opportunity to
connect the ideas of the coalition into party discourses.
Another important party setting is the party in government. If a candidate who
strongly represents the ideas of a political coalition succeeds in being elected to office,
Aldrich, Why Parties, 241-274; John Aldrich, “Presidential campaigns in party and candidatecentered eras,” in Matthew McCubbins, ed. Under the Watchful Eye: Managing Presidential
Campaigns in the Television Era (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1992), 59-82; Byron Shafer
Bifurcated Politics (New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation, 1988)
8
Cohen, Why Parties. The funding for this type of infrastructure is often provided by wealthy
businesspeople. Russ Bellant The Coors Connection (Cambridge, MA: Political Research
Associates, 1991); Theda Skocpol The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2013)
7
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then he/she enters more prominent elite party settings in which he/she can also express
the ideas of the coalition and advocate for policies that reflect the ideas of the coalition
with which he/she is associated. An elected representative gains the rare opportunity to
express the ideas of a coalition in high level party meetings and caucuses and to
command media attention. He/she may have the opportunity to introduce legislation and
to articulate the views of the coalition before a national audience while also connecting
those ideas in the public mind to the party label with which he/she has chosen to become
affiliated. Of course, at the same time, he/she may also experience cross-pressures to
adhere to dominant ideas within the party that conflict with those of the coalition that
he/she represents.
If a political coalition fields many candidates under a single party label, and if
those candidates win, then the potential for the ideas of the political coalition to become
permanent fixtures within party discourses grows incrementally over time. Many
successive (and successful) attempts by a coalition to field candidates under a single
party's label can promote the gradual infusion of the ideas of the coalition into party
discourses. When the ideas of a coalition become strong features of a party's discourses,
then the coalition is likely to lose some of its distinctiveness as members come to identify
more strongly with the party label and as they increasingly cooperate, coordinate, and
communicate as members of a party and in party settings rather than as members of a
discrete, independent coalition. To refine a point made earlier, then, the flow of ideas
from an institutionally bounded discursive community into a political party via the
fielding of candidates can facilitate the process by which coalition members come to
identify more strongly with that party and are ultimately absorbed by it. It may also alter
public perceptions of the commitments of the party and prompt a reshuffling of partisan
attachments at the mass level.
That said, strong institutions may serve as a brake on the absorption of a political
coalition by a political party. If a coalition has formed a network of institutions to
facilitate its own cooperation, coordination, and communication, then those institutions
may prevent members of that coalition from being fully absorbed by a political party,
even as they move into party settings and exercise greater control over public perceptions
of the party and its ideological and policy commitments. As long as the institutions set
up by a coalition continue to serve as distinctive centers of cooperation, coordination, and
communication, they can help a political coalition to retain a degree of distinctiveness
even as it becomes more strongly attached to and associated with a political party.
Over time, a political coalition's distinct organizational infrastructure may come
to support and work directly with the party organization to support party efforts and party
candidates. Party and coalition institutions may pursue many of the same goals. No
matter how much support a coalition's institutions may provide to a single party,
however, they will also tend to limit the incorporation of the groups who manage them by
the party as long as they also serve as distinctive centers for cooperation, coordination,
and communication. Because of these effects, the absorption of a political coalition by a
political party can be partial but incomplete and the two can coexist in a symbiotic state
for an extended period of time.
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Political Coalitions Deconstructed
A political coalition is, by its very nature, an organized but heterogeneous group
of elites and activists. The actors who work within a coalition tend to play different but
complementary roles that are shaped and determined in important ways by: 1) the
motivations that lead them to engage in the political process in the first place, 2) the
resources that they possess; and 3) the resources that they lack and therefore need to
obtain from fellow coalition partners. These factors form the basis for the formation of
collaborative alliances and for collective action at the elite-activist level. It is useful to
consider each of the major kinds of actors in an elite-activist coalition separately, paying
careful attention to these factors.
Politicians
Politicians are driven, in part, by a desire to be elected, and they seek to build
political coalitions that will enable them to achieve that goal. Most also go to office
because they want to achieve some public good and because they have their own beliefs
about the ways that government should be managed and the services that it should
provide to the public. Generally speaking, then, politicians have policy preferences that
are shaped by a combination of two factors: 1) what they believe is right; and 2) what
they believe will help them to secure re-election.
Unlike other actors, politicians can effectively promise to have a direct and
measurable impact upon the course of public law, and they can use this institutional
leverage to build a coalition of elite and activist supporters who wish to have their policy
demands met. They have the potential to translate the views of intellectuals into public
policy, to serve the interests of the business leaders who support their campaigns, and to
deliver policies to activist leaders and their supporters who help them to win office. They
also have the potential to market their ideas to a mass audience and build a base of loyal
supporters– that is, to make promises and use their institutional leverage in Congress to
actually deliver tangible benefits.
Although politicians command vast institutional resources, it is nevertheless
possible to identify very clear reasons why politicians need and have reason to cooperate
with the other constituent parts of elite-activist coalitions and lean on other actors for
support. They draw upon the ideas and policy proposals that are formulated by
intellectuals. They pick up and recycle those ideas in their appeals to activists and voters.
They also rely upon intellectuals to recommend policy ideas and proposals and to
indicate the implications that various proposals are likely to have. In this vein, presidents
recruit intellectuals to serve as advisers and to recommend courses of action along with
the rationales for pursuing those courses of action.
Politicians rely upon the resources of businesspeople to fund their campaigns, and
they rely upon the leaders of activist movements and interest groups to help mobilize and
channel financial and human resources into their campaign organizations. They also rely
upon cadres of rank and file activists to staff their campaign organizations and assist with
on the ground efforts. Activists also help to build support for politicians and the political
coalitions with which they are affiliated among a mass audience that is poorly informed
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and only passively engaged in the political process. Politicians need all of these things in
order to win and maintain power.9
Since politicians have a strong need for all of these resources, they tend to take a
very hands-on approach in connecting together other groups of elites and helping to
shape and guide the development of the elite-activist coalitions with which they are
affiliated. Politicians may be found reaching out to groups of intellectuals whose ideas
they admire and recruiting them to serve as advisers. They may be found regularly
meeting with and building support among members of the business community. They
may also work extensively to build relationships with activist leaders who speak to and
influence large groups of activists and voters, and they may help to cultivate and
strengthen ties between groups of elites and activists whose support they need and whose
cooperation and coordination within the context of the coalition benefits and serves the
interests of politicians. Politicians facilitate cooperation among these various actors
primarily by linking together ideas and positions in combinations that bring the actors
together who they need to be together for their own strategic purposes.
Thus far, I have framed the process by which political coalitions achieve
representation and advance their views as a bottom up process. In this vein, I argued that
political coalitions can and do field representatives in election contests. But this is
certainly not the only way that the arrows may be drawn. The reverse can also be true.
Political coalitions can be captured, harnessed, and manipulated by strategic politicians
for their own constructive purposes.
In fact, politicians who are already in office often tend to survey the electoral
landscape and identify coalitions that are growing which–when properly harnessed– offer
a body of potential resources in the form of votes, labor, vocal support, funding, and
power over election outcomes.10 In order to effectively capture a political coalition, the
strategic politician must convince a community that he/she stands for its interests and that
he/she is willing to serve as a representative of its ideas in government and in party
settings.
Depending upon the motivations of a politician, his relationship with a political
coalition may take different forms and produce different effects. There are many
possibilities, and so I will only consider a few. For instance, a politician may: 1) seek to
use the resources of a political coalition for personal gain in order to advance to higher
office; 2) seek to harness and influence the deployment of the resources of the political
coalition in order to promote the election of like-minded representatives to government;
3) help to expand, strengthen, tighten, and maintain the coalition; or 4) harness the
coalition and usher it into party settings, thus breaking down the barriers that enable it to
exist as a separate entity.
The second and third points demand further elaboration because they both hold
the potential to significantly alter the expression and representation of the ideas of a
coalition within the party system and within government generally. By harnessing and
9
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influencing the deployment of the resources of a political coalition, the strategic
politician can effectively promote the election of others to office who are like himself and
who are also aligned with and representative of the coalition to which he has become
attached. If a politician wishes, he can bolster a coalition and work to strategically boost
its size, influence, and impact in electoral contests. He can help it to find additional
resources and recruit and speak on behalf of other candidates who are also associated
with it. He can also bond with and influence the coalition by joining with it and working
to steer its discourse in ways that serve his own purposes.
This can be desirable for a variety of reasons. Depending upon his motives, a
politician may harness a political coalition and encourage it to support his political party.
The politician who is perceived by the party leadership as mobilizing and leading on
behalf of the party can receive special benefits and assignments. Politicians also have a
general incentive to engage in coalition-building for the party because increases in party
representation mean new opportunities to control policy-making and exercise power.
Alternatively, a politician may choose to bond with and harness the resources of a
coalition in order to tip the overall distribution of preferences represented within
governing institutions. Such a move holds the potential to shift equilibrium policy
outcomes in the direction of the politician's own policy preferences. The politician who
achieves policy outcomes closer to his own preferences is one who accumulates more
victories for which he/she can claim credit in the home district in order to secure reelection.11
Politicians can also harness political coalitions and use them to engage in attempts
to restructure their parties from within. Parties are broadly based coalitions, and it is not
uncommon for groups of politicians within the same party to be at odds with each other.
Politicians who are at odds may bond with different political coalitions and harness their
resources to compete with each other for the control of party institutions. Politicians can
and often do harness coalitions and the resources they offer to promote the election of
government representatives who have preference distributions that are closer to their
own. In the modern era, political parties in government are strong. In the domain of
candidate-centered politics, however, party organizations tend to be weak, and political
coalitions are the organized entities (with their well-developed infrastructures) that wage
battles for the control of party institutions in government.
Turning to point three, another important role that is sometimes played by the
strategic politician is to help expand, tighten, and maintain a political coalition. In this
process, politicians tend to work as partners with public intellectuals. Together, the
politicians and intellectuals who choose to bond with a political coalition and who have
an interest in keeping a coalition together will work to actively steer coalition discourses
down constructive pathways.
There is a constant need for work by politicians and intellectuals at the discursive
level. As new policy issues emerge and rise in salience on the public agenda, it is the role
of politicians and intellectuals who seek to hold a coalition together to frame positions on
those issues which speak to the constituencies involved in a coalition and which reinforce
11
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the basic, foundational logic that unites a coalition. New issues must be rationalized in
terms of core principles upon which the members of a coalition generally agree.
Politicians and intellectuals also often play an agenda-setting role by selectively
speaking about and raising awareness of a select group of policy issues that will unite a
coalition's various members and reinforce the ideological bonds that brought them
together. Elites help to actively stake out positions that resonate with the core principles
shared by a coalition's members. In cases where there is ideological diversity (or at least
differences of emphasis and concern) among the activists in a single coalition, it may also
be the task of politicians and intellectuals to formulate and place multiple frames around
a single issue position so to as to bring all of the coalition's members around to the same
basic conclusion or position. Differently worded ideational frames may resonate in
different ways with the value systems of different coalition partners. They may also be
necessary to create unity and suppress tendencies toward factionalism. As long as the
collection of frames placed around a single issue are not fundamentally incompatible with
each other and as long as those frames have the potential to lead various coalition
partners to all reach the same end conclusion, then the formulation and dissemination of
multiple issue frames can help to tie a diverse coalition together and help its members to
coordinate and fight together in support of the same goals. When deployed effectively,
multiple frames can prevent sub-surface differences in the patterns of logic represented
within a single coalition from resulting in factionalism.
Intellectuals
Public intellectuals are also elites, but they bring different motivations and
resources into the political process than do politicians. Intellectuals have the unique
mental faculties and levels of awareness necessary to formulate, manipulate, and
articulate complex combinations of ideas and to reassemble ideas in new ways that are
justified through reason and logic. As men and women who think broadly and deeply
about politics, intellectuals have the ability to link ideas together in sophisticated and
complex ways that have the potential to serve as a basis for complete and coherent
governing philosophies.12
Some public intellectuals seek to maintain distance from politics and instead
proffer critiques that will influence the course of public debate from afar. The
detachment of some intellectuals from practical politics is evidenced by their use of
theoretical and abstruse language in the books and articles that they write. They do not
write for a mass audience but rather to each other and to a relatively narrow demographic
of people who think and read deeply about political and philosophical issues.
This is not universal. Some intellectuals are also activists. Activist intellectuals
often choose to enter politics as advisers. They interface directly with politicians and
advocate support of their ideas and proposals in a very direct manner. Many intellectuals
12
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also seek opportunities to express their views through print and broadcast news media
and through speaking engagements. In doing so, they tend to rephrase and condense
ideas for popular consumption that are more easily received and digested than those who
write from a more removed perspective.
At any moment in time, there are many different normative versions of the
direction American politics ought to take being articulated by many different public
intellectuals in books, magazines, and the news media. While these versions may be
similar, they are also typically distinctive and reflect the various idea combinations and
views of their individual proponents with regard to the factors and considerations that
ought to drive public policy, to what the ends of government ought to be, and to the most
appropriate means of achieving the normative outcomes that they prescribe.
Public intellectuals whose views and ideas are relatively consistent and
compatible with each other tend to carry on extensive dialogues with each other through
various media. They also tend to collectively build critiques of the ideas and actors who
are perceived as common adversaries. Their philosophical views, along with the practical
applications and critiques that they derive from them and promulgate, are then digested
by politicians, businesspeople, activist leaders, and rank and file activists.
The ideas of the various intellectuals associated with a political coalition are
picked up, digested, processed, and integrated to varying degrees into the parlance of the
non-intellectual members of an elite-activist coalition. The extent to which certain ideas
and critiques achieve primacy and become integrated into the thinking of coalition
partners has much to do with: 1) the level of coverage that various intellectuals receive–
that is, the extent to which certain idea elements and packages are amplified and
successfully passed through various filters (such as magazine editorial boards, news
producers, and the selective attention of other intellectuals associated with a particular
discursive community); 2) the ability of the various other members of the coalition to
comprehend and integrate the idea configurations and critiques to which they are
exposed; and 3) the complicated, psychological processing of ideas by all of the nonintellectual elites and activists within a political coalition.
These points bear further elaboration. While intellectuals shape and define idea
combinations that ultimately flow throughout and influence the various members of a
coalition, there are many different streams of ideas and idea combinations constantly
flowing through various media at once. There is no arbiter, nor is there any definitive
source for the official ideas of a political coalition. Those that are picked up and
repeated– either because they are published in widely circulated magazines, repeated in
political television and radio programs, or infused into the rhetoric of prominent
politicians– are ultimately selected and amplified over others. The combinations that
survive the various alembics through which they pass are ultimately, therefore, those that
also tend to be the most socially and politically acceptable, those that are expedient for
staking out popular positions on the issues of the day, and those that have resonated in
meaningful ways with the belief systems and ideas of elite coalition members (especially
politicians). They are useful and salient. The idea configurations and critiques that are
expressed and ignored die because they were poorly constructed or because
environmental conditions were inhospitable.
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The idea combinations that are articulated by various public intellectuals within a
coalition's discursive community therefore get re-combined, processed, and refined as
they are debated and used over and over again for rhetorical and constructive purposes by
elites and activists. They become infused within a coalition's discourse, and in the
process they are refined, elaborated, and reshaped. The combinations that ultimately
survive, and the formulations that become widely shared and popularized, are
amalgamations that are produced through organic discursive exchanges.
The defining and widely accepted principles that ultimately guide and pervade the
thought of a coalition– that come to define the essence of liberalism, conservatism,
libertarianism, and so on– are unlikely to be a carbon copy of any single intellectual's
views or of any single document or book. Rather, the ideas that emerge and achieve
prominence in a coalition's discourse are likely to be an amalgamation of the organically
filtered and processed idea blueprints crafted by public intellectuals. They are ideas that
have been amplified and that have survived and become central organizing principles and
concepts within a political coalition's discourse.
In this vein, political ideologies are organic, evolving systems of ideas that are
derived but ultimately distinguishable from the work of intellectuals. In a political
coalition's discourse, the ideas that come to be regarded as immutable and defining
principles are really just ideas and idea combinations that have been organically
packaged, emphasized, and cited over and over again.
Once dispersed and ingrained through this organic process, and once used to
rationalize the various policy planks that hold an electoral coalition together, such
principles are likely to be regarded as eternal truths that are refined but ultimately
perpetuated relatively intact and rarely discarded. Still, the process is organic, and, in this
light, political coalitions tend to be held together by ideologies that may shift over time as
the discursive communities from which they arise also evolve.
Businesspeople
Due to the unequal distribution of wealth in society, a comparatively small
percentage of wealthy businesspeople and corporations control vast portions of the
nation's wealth. These actors' financial resources provide them with a unique kind of
potential to significantly shape and influence the political process through the sheer
volume of their financial contributions. Typically, when they choose to do so, wealthy
businesspeople seek policy benefits in the form of favorable tax and regulatory policies
that will help the enterprises that they oversee to grow and that will help them to maintain
and expand their own wealth.
The donations of businesspeople and corporations are of great value to politicians,
who need them to support campaign organization efforts, political advertising, and other
campaign activities. In this vein, it is common to see politicians reaching out to
businesspeople and corporations, building ties with them, and ultimately accepting their
contributions. Many businesspeople and corporations provide money to a variety of
political actors and campaigns and sometimes even opt to support both sides in a political
race. Generally, however, businesspeople tend to contribute the most resources to those
contenders who are expected to support policies that will benefit them the most.
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These are just a few of the obvious avenues through which businesspeople can
seek to influence the political process. Businesspeople can also seek to influence the
political process by funding the growth and development of specific political coalitions.
Indeed, some align themselves closely with a single political coalition's network and
devote all of their resources to strengthening its development.
When businesspeople integrate with a particular political coalition, they may help
to fund the efforts of its activist leaders, activist organizations, and affiliated interest
groups. They may also fund the efforts of intellectuals who are aligned with the same
coalition and who help to influence and shape its discourses.13
To the extent that businesspeople fund these various non-political actors and
groups, they are most likely do so because they judge the efforts of these actors as
providing assistance to candidates that they prefer and as helpful for promulgating ideas
and policy proposals that will serve their strategic interests. Businesspeople may
therefore use their resources to not only fund campaigns (in the obvious way) but to also
strengthen political coalitions by supporting all of the non-political elites and activists
who collaborate within them. In doing so, they can amplify the impact of these actors'
efforts and exert a multi-dimensional but highly targeted ideological impact on the
development on the political process. Because these contributions fund the private
efforts of unelected actors who merely help to elect affiliated politicians, the
contributions move through channels that are entirely unregulated and unaffected by
campaign finance laws.
This point bears further elaboration. Businesspeople may function as critical
backers of political coalitions. By integrating with political coalitions and funding the
efforts of their various members, they can support the development of the coalition's
organizational, coordinative, and ideological infrastructure. By doing so, they can
amplify the impact of their contributions and funnel them toward efforts that are
guaranteed to support affiliated politicians who are aligned with the coalition and who
advocate for the policy proposals that are also supported by group members. The
implication is also that the intellectual elites, activist leaders, and even activists within a
political coalition can become as beholden to their financial backers are politicians.
Businesspeople can therefore exert indirect influence over the backing of certain
candidates, ideas, and policies by the network of actors within a coalition because they
fund and support the maintenance of important coalition infrastructure.
For example, businesspeople can and often do choose to fund think tanks so as to
amplify the ideas of certain intellectuals and the creation of policy alternatives that favor
them.14 They also channel resources to support efforts for interest groups, movements,
and other activist organizers who march in support of and promise to help elect the
candidates that are likely to advocate for policies that will be favorable to them. From
the standpoint of business elites, the ideas, efforts, and causes advocated by the groups
and organizational efforts that they support financially are likely to matter only insofar as
they direct support to candidates who are, in the end, likely to support the right
Kim Phillips-Fein Invisible Hands: The Businessmen’s Crusade Against the New Deal (New
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candidates. In practice, for financial interests, the ends are likely to matter far more than
the means. They may care little about cultural or social issues but can go along with
ideas and issues that are useful for holding the coalitions they support together.
Political Discourse, Institutions, and the Dynamics of Coalition Formation
In this section, I attempt to define and characterize the causal mechanisms that
lead political coalitions to become tied together at the discursive level. The first step in
this direction is to recognize that institutions filter and structure the flow of ideas. In the
world outside of any institutional constraints– let us call this the arena of "public political
discourse"– there is a vast, unconstrained, heterogeneous mixture of ideas floating around
about public policy.
Ideas in the Arena of Public Discourse One framework that is useful for
analyzing discourse in the public arena is to actually think of it as consisting of many
distinct and subsidiary policy discourses. For the sake of analysis, I argue that around
every policy issue that is debated in the arena of public political discourse, there is a
distinct policy-specific discourse. For example, there is a public discourse on education
policy. There is a public discourse on energy policy. There is a public discourse on
national security policy, and so on. Collectively, public political discourse therefore
consists of an amalgamation of many separate policy-specific discourses.
As I am using the term, a policy-specific discourse forms naturally around a
policy issue as political elites, intellectuals, activists, the media, and others who are
engaged in public political debate talk about that issue, take positions on it, and defend
those positions. At the public level of discourse, a policy-specific discourse begins to
take shape at the moment that a policy issue first emerges. As that issue is picked up and
debated in public forums, that policy discourse expands and evolves to contain an
extremely heterogeneous mixture of conflicting ideas about that policy issue. For
instance, the public discourse on national security policy includes all of ideas about
national security policy that are in circulation within the polity at a fixed moment in time.
It includes the ideas expressed by defense hawks, isolationists, liberals, and conservatives
alike.
Institutional Constraints Next, it is important to consider what happens inside of
an institutionally bounded discursive community. As I have argued, a discursive
community is characterized by a set of mechanisms which are set up by members to
facilitate cooperation, coordination, and communication.15 By its very nature, then, a
discursive community does not include all of the actors who are contributors to the broad
arena of public political discourse. It contains only a subset of those actors.
Consequently, inside of an institutionally bounded environment, the flow and
substance of ideas represented is structured and limited. 16 Only certain ideas are
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represented and supported. A great many of the ideas that have advocates in the vast
arena of public discourse will have no advocates at all within an institutionally bounded
environment. Certain ideas simply may not be discussed or debated at all, while others
may only have strong opponents but no advocates.
Thus, within the confines of an institutionally bounded discursive community,
only a subset of the policy discourses that are discussed and debated within the arena of
public discourse will be featured at all. Every institutionally bounded discursive
community will also be characterized by its own distinctive policy discourses that are
distinguishable from public discourses on the same set of issues. To continue the earlier
example, in a community where members discuss and debate the issues of energy,
education, and national security policy, three distinct community policy discourses will
emerge. Distinctive community discourses will emerge around energy policy, education
policy, and national security policy.
Each of these community discourses will be characterized by a mixture and
stream of ideas that is specific to the community itself. The ideational content of these
discourses will include only the mixture of ideas represented by those elites and activists
who have joined the community by cooperating, coordinating, and communicating with
other members.
These points have several implications. First, as a result of all of these factors, the
various policy discourses that emerge within a distinct discursive community will be
subject to distinct evolutionary forces that are produced by the conditions within the
community itself. Certain ideas that are strongly represented within a community may be
emphasized, reemphasized, and linked together in distinctive ways through community
channels as the members of the community cooperate, coordinate, and communicate with
each other.
Second, ideational developments that occur within the confines of an isolated
discursive community may not be fully transmitted into the broader political arena.
Institutions may indeed not only keep certain ideas out of coalition channels– they may
also serve as barriers that isolate and hold ideas in. If community members talk
extensively through private channels and in private settings that are isolated from the rest
of the political world, new ideas and discursive developments that arise, find expression,
and evolve in those settings can essentially be cut off from the political world, even as
they flourish in a small but hospitable environment.
Of course, this is rarely by choice. By definition, the representatives of a political
coalition are highly engaged political elites and activists who have a strong motive and
desire to push their ideas aggressively in the public marketplace. Often, it is the case that
the members of a coalition will broadcast their ideas as loudly as they can to anyone who
will listen. However, if conditions are not hospitable– if the media, the current political
parties, and other channels of communication shut out certain actors and do not provide a
medium for them to disseminate their ideas effectively and translate them into the
The institutional setting, moreover, constitutes both that which structures agents’ ideas, discourse,
and actions and that which is constructed by agents’ ideas, discourse and actions…” In short,
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political process– then the actors will be more likely to exchange ideas and cooperate,
coordinate, and communicate within small, bounded institutional environments and
channels of communication that are more isolated.
Political Coalition vs. Party Discourses These points are somewhat abstract, and
so it is useful to consider a concrete example. Suppose that a political coalition is nested
within a political party. The members of the coalition participate as members of the
party, but they are also sectioned off from the rest of the party because they have set up
separate mechanisms to facilitate cooperation, coordination, and communication among
themselves as a group. Members of the political coalition have private meetings to which
other members of the party are not invited. Also, the coalition's leaders schedule private
strategy planning sessions among themselves to which other party leaders are not privy.
In these separate settings, the coalition's leaders discuss their views on certain policy
issues among themselves.
As coalition members discuss the policy issues that are of the greatest concern to
them, distinct coalition policy discourses will almost inevitably emerge and evolve that
are distinct from broader party discourses. To again continue the earlier example,
suppose that the chief policy concerns of a coalition are education, energy, and national
security. Three coalition policy discourses may emerge around these issues as they are
discussed and debated in coalition settings. These distinct discourses will be shaped by
the ideas supported by the members of the coalition who participate in the isolated
discussions. The mixture of ideas flowing through these coalition discourses will be
distinguishable from the mixture of ideas represented in party discourse and from the vast
sea of ideas circulating in public discourse. Of course, a political party is also a
community of discourse. Party discourse is therefore also structured, though it is
typically much more visible, and changes in party discourse will typically spill out into
the arena of public discourse more quickly and easily than the ideas of a coalition.
In this hypothetical world, then, multiple discourses form and evolve along
distinct evolutionary paths. In the field of education policy alone, there will be a
coalition discourse on education policy, a party discourse on education policy, and a
public discourse on education policy. These multiple layers of discourse may overlap in
certain respects exist as subsets of each other.
The Impact of Coalition Expansion I have also argued that in order to join a
political coalition, actors must begin participating in the discourse of that coalition.
Putting this into context of the points that I have just made, it follows that the addition of
new members to a coalition can produce changes in that coalition's discourse.
New actors who join a coalition because of its stand on one particular issue may
care about a number of other issues that were not previously emphasized in that
coalition's discourse at all. Once new coalition members raise their own concerns in
coalition forums, new coalition discourses will begin to immediately form and evolve
around those distinct policy issues.
In addition, new actors who join a political coalition may carry new ideas into
coalition settings that were not represented beforehand. In joining the coalition, new
members may actually cause several developments. First, they may promote the
development of new coalition policy discourses in the way I just described. Second, they
may bring new ideas into coalition settings, thereby changing the substance of coalition
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discourses that had taken shape prior to their entry. Finally, they may represent certain
ideas more strongly than others, thereby strengthening the degree to which certain ideas
are represented and expressed relative to the degree to which those same ideas were
represented and expressed prior to their arrival. This can result in a process that I term
"rebalancing." By rebalancing, I simply mean that the degree to which certain ideas are
expressed relative to others has changed in intensity.
In short, the point I am arguing is that the distinctive policy discourses that exist
in institutionally bounded environments necessarily change in subtle but important ways
when new groups of actors enter those environments. When new factions join a political
party, party discourses necessarily expand and evolve. When new factions join a political
coalition, that coalition's policy discourses necessarily expand and evolve. Typically, the
entry of new actors into a discursive community will result in the infusion of new ideas
and an inevitable increase in ideational heterogeneity within that community.
As I have previously argued, it is possible for political coalitions to collapse
and/or for the invisible walls that hold ideas within them to weaken and break down.
This happens when there is a change in the locus of cooperation, coordination, and
communication of actors who participate in a coalition. If the members of a coalition join
and increasingly participate in party settings and through party channels rather than
coalition channels– if they repeatedly field candidates in elections and establish a
foothold within party institutions– then the ideas of their coalition will tend to spill out.
This happens as distinct coalition discourses (with their distinct balance and mixture of
ideas) become infused into the party's discourses, thereby changing the substance and
balance of ideas in the arena of party discourse. Even when this happens, however, a
coalition may continue to maintain its own infrastructure. In the era of candidate
centered elections, political coalitions tend to be permanent fixtures, with the lines
between party and coalition looking blurred or sharp at different times depending upon
political context.
Linking Discourses With all of these points in mind, it is possible to bring the
coalition-building role played by elites into sharper focus. It is also possible to state that
changes in a coalition's discourse will follow ineluctably from changes in that coalition's
membership base.
As I have argued, within the context of a political coalition, the mixture of ideas
represented within each policy discourse is necessarily only a subset of the ideas
represented in the broad field of public discourse. Nevertheless, coalitions are by their
nature still heterogeneous, and not all actors who choose to cooperate with each other
agree on all issues. At least some of the ideas that are represented within a coalition may
conflict or potentially conflict with each other. From the standpoint of elites who
associate themselves with a coalition, it is therefore important to deemphasize ideas that
are contradictory to each other and to emphasize ideas that are consistent with each other
or which (when framed in the appropriate ways) can be made to sound consistent with
each other.
The more that the ideas represented by various actors are brought into harmony
and linked together rhetorically, the more comfortable those actors will be with each
other and the more likely they will be to cooperate and coordinate with each other
effectively and efficiently as a tight, cohesive coalition. The task of elites who want to
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create unity, then, is to select from the variety of ideas streaming through each of a
coalition's policy discourses and to construct and articulate thematic frames that link
those various ideas together and make them seem logically consistent with and
complimentary to each other. In a similar vein, elites must simultaneously deemphasize
and find ways of minimizing the expression of ideas that conflict with others.
In this vein, the maintenance of unity within a coalition is a never-ending task. If
elites wish to expand the size of the coalition, they must find ways of linking a select
group of ideas represented by the actors inside of the coalition to issues that are of
concern to actors who are not yet active participants in the coalition. They must make
some kind of appeal to outside groups to entice them to join the community.
At the same time, when new actors enter a coalition, they bring new ideas and
new concerns into coalition settings. This process can weaken the effectiveness of
frames that have already been constructed and emphasized or introduce latent fault lines
that, while they not create any instabilities in an immediate sense, may make the coalition
more likely to destabilize in the future if and when cross-cutting issues emerge that
expose those fault lines. Linking discourses that were formerly effective for tying groups
together may need to be adjusted and expanded in order to accommodate the infusion of
new ideas into the coalition and correct for changes in the balance with which various
ideas are represented.
In time, then, over the course of a coalition's lifespan, an increasing web of
linking discourses and corrective, discursive bridges may tend to be elaborated in order to
tie in new groups and to resolve and minimize complications that have been created by
the incorporation of new groups, new ideas, and new issues. Also, while linking
discourses are effective for building unity, it is important to note that they do so by
selectively emphasizing certain ideas over others and delicately connecting the policy
discourses of a coalition together at certain ideational nodes. Beneath the surface,
conflicting ideas may build up within a coalition, and, as new groups are mobilized and
assimilated and as policy issues change over time, these changes can bring settled
tensions back to the surface and require additional work on the part of intellectuals who
seek to hold the coalition together.
Surface Discourse vs. Sub-surface Tensions Before moving on, it is necessary
to differentiate between “surface” level discourse and “sub-surface” ideational tensions.
Within a political coalition, I argue that there are two different ideational levels ––
the surface and the sub-surface. The surface level has to do with the substance and
balance of ideas that are exchanged within the public discourses of the coalition. It
includes not only the ideas that are exchanged among coalition partners but also the
degree to which various ideas are voiced and the ways that those ideas are applied to
issues that are currently under debate in coalition settings.
The sub-surface level has to do with the substance and balance of ideas within the
belief systems of coalition members. Belief systems are complex and vary from
individual to individual.17 An individual’s belief system is the product of his
environment, life experiences, and level of exposure to political debates and news
coverage. Members of a coalition may hold many complimentary ideas that help them to
17
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work together and coordinate their efforts, but they may also hold many other ideas that
conflict with each other. In a similar vein, members of a coalition may attach different
degrees of centrality to certain ideas, have different underlying motivations for
subscribing to certain ideas, and have different degrees of philosophical constraint and
sophistication if their underlying belief systems could be compared to each other
objectively. Since belief systems are complicated and part of individuals’ psychological
makeup, these comparisons can never be made. It is simply important to note that at the
sub-surface level, there may be many differences in ideational emphases, motivations,
and levels of philosophical constraint among the members of a coalition that are not
evident within public, surface-level discourse.
Indeed, at the sub-surface level, there may be great ideational cleavages and
differences between coalition partners that carry the potential to rip a coalition apart if
they were ever exposed. These sub-surface differences are inevitable within all coalitions
since coalitions are by definition heterogeneous and since, by definition, belief systems
vary from individual to individual. The stability of a coalition therefore rests upon the
maintenance of a surface discourse that maintains harmony and that suppresses the subsurface differences that are inherent within the belief systems of the coalition’s members.
There are several theoretical implications. First, it is important to note that when
coalition expands in size, politicians and public intellectuals may do a great job of
controlling and steering surface discourse so as to maintain harmony among new and
established coalition partners. However, since belief systems do vary from individual to
individual, the mobilization and incorporation of additional groups of actors into a
coalition will invariably contribute to a buildup of greater ideological diversity among
coalition members at the sub-surface level. When politicians work to mobilize new
groups and expand the size of a coalition, they therefore sow seeds that make the
coalition more susceptible to derailment in the future when policy issues change.
Second, on that note, it is important to recognize that when new policy issues do
emerge on the public agenda, they have the potential to alter the surface discourse of the
coalition and bring unsettled and perhaps hitherto unnoticed tensions to the fore. This
can create additional work for the politicians and public intellectuals who endeavor to
hold a coalition together. It creates a need for them to either suppress the discussion of
issues that risk causing conflict or, failing that, to frame and advance arguments that help
to rationalize positions on newly raised issues in terms that will reinforce the ideational
common ground shared by coalition members and the logic that holds a coalition
together.
Third, an important question concerns the extent to which not only elites but also
activists who participate in the discourses of a coalition may be aware of unseen
ideational differences and potential cleavages at the sub-surface level. To the extent that
they are aware of these differences, the members of a coalition may work to preserve
stability by simply avoiding issues that they know are “too hot to handle” and/or by
refusing to express ideas openly that they know would upset fellow coalition partners.
To the extent that coalition partners do engage in this type of self-monitoring, it is
possible that the surface ideational configuration of discourse may be artificial and that
rhetoric in coalition settings may be instrumental. That is, surface discourse may be the
product of a kind of unspoken consensus to use certain frames and talk about issues in
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ways that are safe and capable of building a broad consensus while avoiding those that
could incite conflict. At times, outside political developments may challenge such an
unspoken consensus by forcing the deliberation of controversial issues and/or by
prompting actors to voice unspoken frames and rationales. Also, the mobilization and
incorporation of new interests may have a similar effect by altering the substance,
balance, and flow of ideas in surface level discourse.
Discourse and the Process of Identity Formation
In this section, I build upon these arguments and begin to outline my theory of the
role of discourse in coalition identity formation. The first step is to take a step back and
develop a more precise definition of the term discourse. I define discourse as the
interactive medium through which ideas are exchanged and communicated among a
community of politicians, intellectuals, activist leaders, and activists. Discourse is
ongoing, institutionally bounded dialogue. The content of this dialogue evolves as new
actors join a community, begin to participate in its discussions, and begin to express their
ideas and opinions.18
What is the relationship between a coalition’s discourse and the formation of a
sense of shared identity among a coalition’s members? The first step toward
understanding the connection is to recognize that within the ongoing dialogue within a
community of actors, certain actors in the community tend to naturally pick up on the
things that they have heard other members of the community say. In turn, these actors
tend to selectively react, respond to, and repeat the ideas that have struck a chord with
them (or a nerve), while also contributing their own caveats, criticisms, and additions as
they express their own particular viewpoints. Thus, within the dialogue of a bounded
community of actors, an idea or series of ideas may be introduced into the community’s
dialogue by one actor or series of actors for one reason, and then those same ideas may be
picked up, recombined, repeated, and/or refuted by other actors as those individuals
express their own opinions.
Discourse is therefore a medium of exchange through which ideas, narratives,
characterizations, and frames are transmitted, received, processed, repeated, and
recombined.19 Within a community of actors, ideas and combinations of ideas move, or
18
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circulate. In the process, they are naturally extended, applied, recombined, and
transformed in unpredictable ways as they are recited by different actors to express
different perspectives. To reiterate a point that I made earlier, discourse is an organic
medium of exchange where ideational permutations happen through natural processes
and are outside of the control of any single actor or group of actors. Because ideas
constantly circulate within a community of actors and because they are continuously
being picked up, recited, and recombined, discourse may be described as a medium
where certain ideas live and are perpetuated for extended periods of time as they are
bounced around and processed by many different policy actors.20
The next step is to understand that constituencies who are part of a community of
discourse can be tied together through the organic ideational developments that happen
through the medium of discourse. As I noted above, ideas are deposited into an ongoing,
institutionally bounded dialogue by the participants in community, and they are
assembled and changed organically as they are picked out of the stream, reassembled,
and expressed by various actors as they react and respond to each other publicly. Over
time, certain ideas, narratives, and interpretations can survive and be perpetuated (while
others that are not repeated can simply die out). Through discourse, ideas may become
linked together, rise in salience, and become functionally central organizing concepts
with which many actors in a coalition are versed and conversant.
As scholars in the field of discourse analysis have long noted, ideas play a critical
role in the definition of public policy problems as well as in the development of proposed
solutions to policy problems. The nature of the solutions that are proposed and widely
accepted depends almost entirely on how the problems have been defined. Within a
bounded community of discourse, actors who interact and exchange ideas through
discourse can come to settle on a commonly accepted bundle of problem definitions and
solutions.
As certain ideas, interpretations, narratives, and principles achieve widespread
circulation and common acceptance within the discourses of a community of actors, they
can come to serve as the foundation for structured, shared perceptions of the political
world and, by extension, as the foundation for a sense of collective identity among the
members of a coalition.
The Field of Discursive Institutionalism
By arguing that discourse is a medium through which political identities are
forged, I am situating myself within the growing field of “ideas in politics” or, to use a
term for the field coined by Vivien Schmidt, “Discursive Institutionalism.”21 Like other
scholars in this field, I argue that in order to understand ideational change– in order to
understand why we have the policy coalitions (and by extension, the policies) that we
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have today– it is necessary to look not just at the role of ideas but to also look upon
institutionally bounded and interactive discourse as a key variable.
Elites who wish to shape identity and build cohesion within a coalition cannot do
so directly–that is, they cannot magically influence a coalition’s identity or degree of
cohesion by simply shouting what they think at everyone they see who will listen.
Instead, they must seek to exert influence indirectly by influencing discourse. They can
do so making contributions to a broader stream of ideas and exchanges within a
community, by seeking to recruit new actors to engage in discourse who share their views
(therefore bolstering those views), and/or by creating new institutions in order to
encourage more discourse and boost the circulation of ideas that they care about most.22
In her writing, political scientist Vivien Schmidt has identified two broad
categories of discourse: “coordinative discourse” and “communicative discourse.” The
former involves discursive interactions among political elites, intellectuals, activists, and
other policy actors. In the realm of coordinative discourse, policy actors collaborate in
order to work out a consensus regarding what they stand for, as well as the details of
public policy proposals that they wish to enact. This is the type of discourse that is
common within party coalitions and political coalitions as I have defined them.
Meanwhile, communicative discourse involves the dialogue that is used by policy
actors and other informed publics (including elites, activists, intellectuals, the media, and
informed voters) to explain policy proposals to the general public and, by extension, to
build public support and/or opposition to those policies. In essence, the function of
communicative discourse is to translate a subset of the ideas and considerations tossed
around in coordinative discourse into a language that is digestible by the less informed
and philosophically less sophisticated public.23 This is the type of discourse through
which ideas are packaged by coalition members and presented to voters.
Rhetorical Instruments: Characterizations, Narratives, and Interpretations
As I have just defined it, a political coalition is a distinct community of discourse
with its own organizational infrastructure and its own distinct body of discourses. As a
distinct community, a political coalition can also come to have its own distinct friends
and foes, as well as its own body of narratives and political strategies. In the context of a
coalition, characterizations of friends and foes as well as narratives and political
strategies are typically defined as the ideas and platform of the coalition are juxtaposed to
the ideas and platforms of other actors, parties, and bounded communities of discourse
Schmidt, Discursive Institutionalism, 312. Schmidt notes: “The interactive processes of
discourse may also exert a causal influence beyond what discourse does in representing ideas.
Most generally, discourse serves not just to express one set of actors’ strategic interests or
normative values but also to persuade others of the necessity and/or appropriateness of a given
course of action.” Like Schmidt, I argue that actors seek to persuade through discourse; however,
I argue that leaders may do so not only by engaging in discourse themselves but also by setting up
institutions to encourage discourse and by recruiting other actors to engage in discourse so as to
boost the circulation of the particular ideas that they represent.
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operating within the polity. Politicians and intellectuals who are associated with a
political coalition exert a strong influence over a coalition's discourse, and elite
interpretations and explanations of context are therefore especially critical components in
the construction and refinement of a coalition's narratives and strategies.
Within a community of discourse, shared understandings and perceptions of the
political world and of other actors working within it– particularly understandings that
breed hostility and a sense of identity and "otherness"– can build cohesion, cultivate
strong impulses to engage in collective action, and erect invisible walls around a
coalition. This is precisely why patterns of discourse are so useful for parsing the
political world. Bounded communities of discourse tend to develop not only a unique
blend of policy-specific discourses but also other linguistic formations that channel those
ideas and shape perceptions and the behavior of coalition participants in distinctive
ways.24
Before proceeding, it is useful to elaborate upon these arguments by defining with
greater precision three rhetorical instruments that politicians employ to shape perceptions
of the political world: the characterization, the narrative, and the interpretation.
Characterization As I define the term, a political characterization is a stylized
description of an idea, an actor, or an institution that has embedded within it one or more
ideational frames.25 A characterization imposes some kind of value judgment on the
object that is being described. The following is a characterization of liberals taken by a
speech by Robert Bauman at CPAC 1977.
…the liberals in Congress want their minorities that they champion
grateful and dependent on them. That's their theory and that’s the way
they get elected to office. They don’t want them self-sufficient and proud
as free enterprise would allow them to be.26
In this quote, Bauman characterizes liberals as savvy politicians out to take advantage of
the little guy and determined to intentionally build dependence upon big government. He
also clearly defines them as opponents of the important conservative concepts of selfsufficiency and free enterprise and, by extension, pegs them as the enemies of
conservative principles.
The following is an example of a characterization of conservatives taken from a
speech delivered by Elizabeth Warren at the Netroots Nation conference held in 2014:
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When conservatives talk about opportunity, they mean opportunity for the
rich to get richer and the powerful to get more powerful. They don’t mean
opportunity for a young person with $100,000 in student loan debt to try to
build a future. They don’t mean opportunities for someone out of work to
get back on their feet. They don’t mean opportunities for someone who
worked hard all their life to retire with dignity.27
In the next part of her speech, Warren added:
This is a fight over economics, a fight over privilege, a fight over power.
But deep down it is a fight over values. Conservatives and their powerful
friends will continue to be guided by their internal motto, “I’ve got mine.
The rest of you are on your own.” Well, we’re guided by principle, and
it’s a pretty simple idea. We all do better when we work together and
invest in building a future.28
Here, Warren juxtaposes the attitude of conservatives (who she characterizes as
indifferent and uncaring) to the principle espoused by progressives who, in her
view, believe in working together.
Characterizations are thus important carriers of ideas. When articulated in
coalition settings, characterizations can help to shape perceptions of actors and objects in
the world outside of the coalition, and they can help to define the relationship between
those outside actors and objects and the internal ideas and logic of the coalition being
addressed. In a similar vein, characterizations can be employed to impose friend/foe
designations and to cultivate positive or negative feelings toward other actors and entities
within the polity.
A more positive example and use of a characterization (provided below), is taken
from John Ashbrook’s address at CPAC 1977. Here, Ashbrook characterizes
conservatives as “productive people.” He also applies a friend designation to certain key
identity groups who he also defines as “productive” and therefore as conservative
constituencies.
Somehow, some time, we have to return the control of government to
productive people, and we all know it'll only be done through
conservatives, because we are the productive people: The
businesspeople, the self-employed, the factory workers, the farmers, the
retired people who've worked– we are the productive people.29
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Narrative Another important discursive tool and carrier of ideas is the political
narrative. As I define it, a political narrative is a stylized explanation of a sequence of
political developments. A narrative delineates a complex, interactive relationship
between ideas, interests, and/or institutions. It also incorporates and builds upon
commonly recited characterizations (including the ideational frames inherent within those
characterizations).30
For example, the following is a narrative explanation of the rise of liberalism
delivered by James Buckley at CPAC 1977. It weaves together characterizations of the
New Deal, liberalism, interest groups, economic context, and liberal politicians, and it
also delineates a complex, interactive relationship between multiple variables in order to
define, frame, and explain a series of political developments. Of course, all of the
characterizations encapsulated within Buckley’s narrative explanation are also heavily
laden with ideational frames that also juxtapose the philosophies of liberalism and
conservatism. The last line of this narrative also perfectly incorporates a variant of the
characterization of liberals as intent upon building permanent constituencies and is
similar to the one by Bauman (quoted above). Buckley stressed:
In political terms, the most dramatic [revolution in attitudes] in modern
American life has been the subtle shift that has occurred in the relationship
between government and the individual. The federal government had
been viewed by the Founders as a necessary evil, but during the New Deal
years, it increasingly took on the role of benevolent provider– intent on
freeing us from every care, from every risk. As a result, a doctrine has
evolved that imposes on the federal government the obligation to provide
for its citizens in areas where they could better provide for themselves.
And during the past few decades, the number of special interest groups
asserting special claims on the public treasury has grown far beyond the
government's ability to respond. In the process, we have seen a gradual
shift from the position in which the state was viewed as deriving its just
powers from the people to one in which the people are increasingly
deemed to be entitled to live their lives and return their earnings only at
the tolerance of the state. The results have been catastrophic. People have
been damaged by promises easily made but seldom kept, the economic
structure of our nation teeters on the edge of fiscal chaos. But most
serious of all is the damage that has been done to the human spirit.
Politicians out to build permanent constituencies have encouraged people
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to retreat from self-reliance by singing the old siren song of total
security.31 (emphasis mine)
The following is another example of a narrative. This one is an excerpt
from a speech delivered by Hillary Clinton at the 2008 meeting of the Democratic
Leadership Council. In this portion of her speech, Clinton describes the
prosperity that existed at the end of the twentieth century as a product of the
Democratic Party’s leadership during the 1990s, and she blames the decline in
economic prosperity of the Republican Party’s policies. She also incorporates
characterizations of the Republican agenda, including the notion that it is
“focused on helping the strong get stronger and the rich get richer:”32 Clinton
noted:
We ended the last century with America’s economic might at its peak,
with Americans at their most optimistic, and with opportunities for almost
everyone who wanted to work hard to make the most of their God-given
abilities. We got there in large part because of the Democratic Party’s
philosophy of governing. We asked individuals to take responsibility for
themselves and also chip in and help in their communities, and, in return,
we expected, and we asked people to expect, that their government would
take responsibility for spending those hard-earned tax dollars and ensuring
the underpinnings of fairness and opportunity for all. Now, I don’t need to
tell you that over the past five years, we’ve gone in a very different
direction. A policy of fiscal discipline and budget surpluses was
abandoned for one that racked up debt and proclaimed that deficits don’t
matter, and a policy that focused on helping the middle class get bigger
and stronger was replaced by one that helped the strong get stronger and
the rich get richer, in the mistaken belief that the rest of the country would
eventually get their share. For the first time ever, we’ve had four straight
years of rising productivity and falling incomes. Americans are earning
less, while the costs of a middle class life have soared. College costs, up
50 percent in five years. Health care, 73 percent. Gasoline, more than 100
percent. Rising home costs have pushed people farther and farther from
their work. A lot of Americans can’t work any harder, borrow any more,
or save any less, and those same costs of health care, retirement,
transportation, energy-- are impacting our businesses, as well. It’s time
for a new direction.33
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Interpretation I define an interpretation as a stylized explanation of a political
development. An interpretation includes an ideational component, but it differs from a
narrative in that it does not necessarily link multiple political developments together or
delineate a complex relationship between them. An interpretation often takes the form:
“x happened, and here’s why.”34
That said, an interpretation may draw heavily upon commonly understood
relationships between variables that are established within existing narratives, and it may
draw upon and incorporate frequently recited characterizations of other actors and groups
of actors operating within the polity. It is rare for an elite to offer an interpretation of
context that does not have at least some roots in existing political discourses and rhetoric.
Interpretations thus simultaneously arise from existing narratives and characterizations
and also serve as the building blocks of narratives and characterizations.
These points bear further elaboration. Within a community of discourse, there is
a tendency for interpretations of current events to build upon and ultimately become
permanently incorporated into established narratives.
For example, following the remarks cited above, Buckley proceeded to define a
strategy for assembling an electoral coalition of citizens who had been damaged by and
who he characterized as being fundamentally opposed to the philosophy of modern
liberalism. Buckley’s subsequent discussion of strategy included important
characterizations of the desires of the electorate– who he depicted as having “had
enough” of liberalism– and of the national media. He also offered an interpretation of
Carter’s election that reinforced the belief that conservative ideas were critical for
mobilizing and speaking to voters.
James H. Kuklinski and Norman L. Hurley, “It’s a Matter of Interpretation,” in Diana Mutz,
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In the context of Buckley’s remarks, characterizations, narratives, and
interpretations were thus woven together so as to frame context and chart a path forward
for the conservative community. These rhetorical elements were also subtly infused with
ideology and established ideational relationships between the electorate, the conservative
elite-activist coalition, and a series of opposing interests. Buckley noted:
The American people have had enough of the debasement of their hard
earned dollars, of confiscatory taxation, of increasing federal interference
in their lives and in the lives of their families. It is therefore ironic in the
extreme that they elected to the presidency and to the majorities in the
Senate and House last year, men and women who represent the very
philosophy that is falling into disrepute among free people everywhere in
the world…Part of the answer lies in the political traumas of the last
decade. Part of it is simply a problem of political image. Part of the
problem lies in the national media which is not given to putting
conservatives in the best possible light. But part of the blame, I fear, rests
with us…Last year, we saw a Democratic presidential primary campaign
succeed because the candidate stirred his audiences by speaking over and
over again such words as decency, honesty, compassion, faith, morality,
values, and love. Now for those of us who were brought up to prize
reticence in ourselves and others as a virtue, it is not easy to utter those
words from a political platform. But we live in a period in which those
words are what millions of Americans are yearning to hear. For what
those words connote is something larger than mere politics and
economics. They connote nothing less than that total system of beliefs
and values that we call the Judeo-Christian tradition– the system which
structures our society and orders our lives and gave us political freedom.
We, too, should be using those words, for the beliefs and values they
represent are central to every conservative thought and principle. We
must not allow our political opponents to preempt that high ground which
by very definition belongs to conservatives. But it is we who must
demonstrate that it is we who belong on that ground.35
The Organic Nature of Characterizations, Narratives, and Interpretations
At any time, elites may craft fundamentally new characterizations, narratives,
and/or interpretations of context that are of their own design and that have no precursors
in discourses of the past. This is rare. More often than not, the task of elites is not to
construct radically new characterizations, narratives, and interpretations but rather to
amend, build upon, and/or simply repeat those already in circulation and to use those at
their disposal in fresh ways in order to explain recent events and to capitalize upon the
possibilities of the moment in which they are situated.
35
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Over time, characterizations, narratives, and interpretations can develop and
evolve as they are recited and applied by multiple actors within a community of discourse
and as a body of generally accepted strategies that are derived from the relationships
defined in reference to these features are delineated and repeated.
As multiple actors within a community recite and build upon the
characterizations, narratives, and interpretations expressed by others and as these features
become bound up within the discourses of a political coalition, original authorship tends
to become lost in the shuffle. Core characterizations, narratives, and interpretations that
are used over and over again can live within the discourses of a coalition for an extended
period of time, and they can even become rhetorical fixtures around which other
narratives, characterizations, and interpretations form and evolve. Narratives may be
extended over time or may be recombined as they are retold and reused.
Narratives, characterizations, and interpretations that live within the discourses of
a coalition can evolve in an organic fashion as they are repeated, embellished upon,
extended, and applied by multiple actors. From a normative standpoint, the staying
power of discursive elements within the discourses of a coalition can be constructive for
the purposes of coalition-building and maintenance. Over time, political actors can tend
to become increasingly familiar with and saturated within the discourses of a coalition.
Frequent exposure to the characterizations, narratives, and interpretations of a coalition as
well as the ideational components encapsulated within them can enhance the salience of
core ideas and boost feelings of identity and cohesion. Put differently, a coalition can
develop its own language, and members of a coalition can become saturated and fluent in
that language over time. These discursive instruments are carriers of ideology that help
actors to make sense of the political world. They become lenses that help to facilitate the
growth of ideological unity and cohesion.
In this vein and before putting this theoretical discussion aside, it is interesting to
compare a recent characterization of the Democratic Party made by Rush Limbaugh with
the characterizations of liberals made by Bauman and Buckley some thirty-five years
prior. The policies are different (Limbaugh’s words are taken from a broader discussion
of the Affordable Care Act), but the underlying characterization of liberals that he
employs is essentially the same. It is not difficult to imagine similar characterizations
being scattered throughout the intervening thirty-five years of conservative political
discourse, and, in that time, to also imagine these characterizations as being applied to a
diverse mixture of liberal politicians, activists, and policy initiatives. It is, in that sense, a
characterization that has lived within the discourses of the coalition and that has survived
many changes in context:
This is the party that celebrates free riders. This is the party that devotes
itself to creating even more free riders. This is a party that could not
survive without free riders and freeloaders. This is a party that does
everything it can to make people as dependent as possible on the
government. Free riders, freeloaders. Isn't their goal to get more and
more people dependent on the government? Didn't they spend millions
advertising for more people to take free handouts from the
government? Isn't there a big advertising campaign on right now to
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expand the scope of food stamps to the food free riders? Hell's bells,
folks, the Democrat Party is the free rider party. 36 (emphasis mine)

Bringing it all together: 6 Postulates About the Role of Ideas in Coalition
Formation
1. Ideas have the potential to rationalize coalitions.
In their most basic form, coalitions are groups of organized interests with
heterogeneous policy goals and positions. When deployed in certain ways, ideas have the
potential to connect the disparate platform of policy goals and positions together in ways
that seem logical, natural, and obvious to those involved– even when the assorted
positions have no absolute or required connections to each other from a purely objective
standpoint. Coalitions are rationalized by connecting assorted ideas and issue positions
of the coalition to a tightly bound set of underlying ideas or principles. The underlying
ideas or principles to which various positions are linked may, in turn, be tightly
connected to each other via idea chains and developed into comprehensive public
philosophies. 37
Core principles have a significant impact on the behavior of politicians and
intellectuals, who are the actors that are most likely to understand them, relate to them,
and think in terms of them. The degree to which a group of elites will work together in
coordinated fashion to maintain a coalition is greatest when all of the politicians and
intellectuals within the coalition subscribe to and think in terms of the same basic set of
Rush Limbaugh, “Liberals Claim ‘ObamaTax’ Punishes ‘FreeRiders,’” July 2, 2012, accessed
March 13, 2015.
http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/daily/2012/07/02/liberals_claim_obamatax_punishes_free_riders
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conservatives.
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core principles. Sources of tension and conflict emerge when elites within a single
coalition subscribe to distinct combinations of ideas with distinct and disconnected sets of
underlying principles.
2. Ideas have the potential to tighten coalitions by smoothing out differences and
minimizing points of conflict among diverse coalition partners.
Ideas can be used to stake out some common ground (either real or falsely
constructed) among a diverse group of coalition partners and to heighten the salience of
that common ground in the minds of those who are involved. Common ground may be
found by linking the grievances of disparate groups to common enemies, thereby
generating and inducing feelings of solidarity among coalition partners, uniting their
focus, and pushing potential sources of conflict into the background.38 Common ground
may also be found by identifying common policy goals that are perceived as good and
just and that are cast as common remedies to the grievances of various coalition partners.
Ideas may also be used to frame or package diverse issue positions in ways that
make them resonate with the belief systems of various coalition partners and therefore
seem more salient. Diverse positions may be woven together into thematic narratives that
are heavily laden with overlapping idea frames which make an assortment of policy
stances seem broadly salient to diverse and large groups of actors. One way that this can
happen is through the addition of multiple idea frames to a single issue that rationalize a
single position in multiple and overlapping ways.39
Ideas can also be differentially deployed to create distorted and idiosyncratic
perceptions of reality among different interests within a coalition and therefore obscure or
erase potential sources of tension. Coalition partners may be led to develop different
perceptions of the core ideas for which the coalition ultimately stands and to hold
different understandings of the logical chains that tie various ideas together (1). Different
combinations of ideas may be salient and operational in the minds of different coalition
partners at any given time, depending upon their belief systems and levels of political
sophistication and awareness.
The diffusion and acceptance of ideas in different combinations by different
actors within a coalition is practical and beneficial. Differential rationalization enables
different actors to perceive the logic of the coalition in ways that resonate on a very
personal, psychological level. This can enhance loyalty to the coalition and its purpose,
prevent cognitive dissonance, and hide or minimize awareness of interests and goals that
would be sources of conflict if the logic holding the coalition together were viewed from
38
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the standpoint of elites or viewed from the vantage point of other coalition partners.
Differential rationalization can therefore produce beneficial tightening effects.
It follows that the political philosophies and logical chains that are used to tie
positions and principles together (1) are critical for politically sophisticated elites, but
may only be partly or minimally active in the minds of other coalition partners who have
different ways of thinking, limited political awareness, and fragmented belief systems.
Outside of the realm of political elites and intellectuals, distortions of the formulations
and philosophies with which they identify are common, and are, from the standpoint of
elites, most ideal.
The key to successful framing is the constructive usage of idea frames that speak
to the idiosyncratic perceptions of various coalition partners and that resonate with their
unique understandings of the logic that holds the coalitions to which they belong
together, as well as with the ways that they perceive and interpret their own roles and
reasons for participating.
Finally, ideas have the potential to produce what political scientists call
polarization, or conflict extension. When ideas are used to tie positions together logically
and when they are deployed to frame positions such that combinations of positions
become salient to many different groups of actors all at once, the implication is a kind of
tightness whereby groups of interests all find themselves united on the same side of many
issues and with more intense preferences than they would otherwise have.40
3. Ideas have the potential to enhance the durability of coalitions.
Ideas may used to frame coalition agendas in ways that produce strong emotional
reactions and feelings of attachment by coalition partners. Some of the most powerful
frames are those that cause agendas to resonate with highly entrenched, static belief
systems that derive from class, race, political culture, and other relatively static identity
formations (2). As long as frames that activate these identities remain operative parts of a
coalition's discourse, the feelings of attachment by coalition partners that they generate
may persist over very long periods of time and add stability to a coalition.
Over time, coalition membership may ultimately become bound up as a part of
coalition partners' class-based, racial, and/or cultural identities. In the case that coalition
partners come to tie coalition membership to relatively static, apolitical identities, this can
promote the continuation of certain ideas and frames within a coalition's discourse over
an extended period of time. Paradoxically, this can also allow for greater flexibility and
change at the discursive level, since coalition partners with strong attachments are less
likely to react to small to moderate discursive shifts and adjustments by changing their
coalition loyalties.
It is also important to note that the alignment and configuration of ideas in the
polity can actually prompt the formation of new discursive communities and the
formation of institutions to bind those new communities together. If ideas are configured
in such a way that actors do not have strong representatives in existing institutions, then
Geoffrey C. Layman and Thomas M. Carsey, “Party Polarization and ‘Conflict Extension’ in
the American Electorate,” American Journal of Political Science 46, No. 4 (October 2002): 786
40
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those actors will have an incentive to erect new institutions in order to facilitate their own
cooperation, coordination, and communication. In other words, they will have an
incentive to not only create but to also institutionalize a new discursive community to
serve their needs.
The alignment, configuration, and flow of ideas within institutions may thus
produce conditions which favor the creation of new institutions, and these new
institutions may, in turn, enhance the durability of newly minted coalitions. Once a
political coalition has formed its own institutional infrastructure, there will be a tendency
for that infrastructure to persist over time and to thus institutionalize within it a certain
configuration and alignment of ideas. This tendency is reinforced by the rise of
candidate-centered elections, which tends to weaken parties and create incentives for
groups to engage in the creation of additional layers of extra-governmental institutions
that work independently from party organizations. This is only a tendency. As I have
argued, coalitions and their infrastructures can break down if the ideas of the coalition
become strong features in a party's discourses and if this diffusion of ideas encourages
actors to more strongly identify with the party and abandon more isolated channels of
cooperation, coordination, and communication.
In short, while I am suggesting that ideas can lead to the creation of institutions, I
am also recognizing that ideas always emerge within and are structured by preexisting
institutional arrangements.
4. Ideas have the potential to expand coalitions.
Ideas are effective tools for mobilizing new groups of interests. They can be used
to target latent or new cleavages at the mass level, heighten the salience of those
cleavages, and attach political relevance to them, thereby mobilizing people and bringing
them into the political process. Ideas deployed in this way may then be rationalized and
incorporated via logical chains that connect them to the set of core ideas to which a
coalition's platform of other political positions are also tied (1).
Mobilization efforts may be followed by tightening and by the distortion of ideas
in ways that are necessary to minimize sources of potential conflict among new and old
coalition partners. This may be achieved through the creation and infusion of additional
frames (ideological packaging) around ideational constellations that have been recently
reconstituted or tweaked and through adjustments to coalition narratives and discourse
(2). New frames may be necessary if new coalition members have different belief
systems and different perceptions of the coalition and its commitments.
5. Ideas have the potential to restructure coalitions.
When ideas are deployed to mobilize new actors (4), this can result in a process of
ideational reshuffling and rebalancing. In cases where coalitions are not ideologically
homogenous at the elite level (1), ideas can become the instruments of intra-coalition
elite warfare and can be deployed to reshape and reconfigure the ideational balance of
coalitions via the mobilization of new interests (4). If two politicians are members of the
same coalition but differ in important respects, one can enhance his power in the coalition
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relative to the other by seeking to mobilize additional activists and political candidates to
join the coalition who share his own perspective.
The linking of ideas and principles with discursive chains (via the mechanisms I
outlined earlier) may also lead to the ideational restructuring of coalitions through less
antagonistic means. The rationalization of a coalition via the incorporation of new
principles and idea chains can create pathways through which interests who espouse
those ideas can express their ideas more vocally or with suddenly greater impact relative
to other coalition partners.
Once ideas have been connected to deeply embedded and shared systems of ideas
(1), this can serve as a powerful resource for those who espouse those ideas to then
express, spread, and popularize them. Newly infused or vocalized ideas are also more
likely to be adopted and incorporated into the belief systems of other coalition partners
(2). The increased vocalization of certain ideas relative to others and their popularization
among actors within a coalition can, in turn, enable those ideas and the core principles
that underpin them to rise in salience and centrality within the broader flow of ideas
within a coalition's discourse.
The restructuring of the salience of certain ideas relative to others within a
coalition's discourse (whether by strategic design or systemic causes) can enhance the
position of the actors who espouse those ideas and can increase the centrality their policy
objectives relative to others. This can, in turn, damage the effectiveness of certain frames
and narratives, expose distortions in the perceived logic of the coalition, and incite fresh
tensions among actors who may no longer feel that they stand on equal or common
ground with other coalition partners. Problems may also arise when interests who are
suddenly empowered begin to vocalize their own idiosyncratic versions of coalition
principles and commitments, since these may differ profoundly from the sophisticated
rationales held by elites and intellectuals and from the various other versions espoused by
fellow coalition partners. This can also create a strong need for efforts to facilitate
tightening through the incorporation of new frames and narratives (2).
If rationalization and tightening are effectively achieved, so that balance and
harmony are restored, then a consequence of ideological rebalancing and restructuring
may be further polarization and conflict extension (2). It is possible that ideological
restructuring can therefore lead to conflict, to the detachment of certain interests from a
coalition, and ultimately to conflict extension–- all at the same time. The incorporation
of new groups can have multiple and reverberating effects as configurations of ideas shift
and as a variety of actors react and respond.
Due to the series of chain reactions that result from the mobilization of new
interests and the rebalancing of ideas within a coalition's discourse, it is impossible to
predict exactly how a coalition will look after new groups are mobilized. It is best to
simply recognize that whatever the outcome, it is likely to be the product of multiple,
interactive effects and adjustments by multiple actors.
It is also important to note that changes in the balance and flow of ideas within
existing institutional arrangements can actually push actors out of some discursive
communities and into others. For example, the restructuring of a party's discourse may
alienate some of the actors cooperating within it and push them out of the party. If
alienated and suddenly detached from a coalition or party, those actors may join an
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existing political coalition– thereby expanding that coalition's size and influence and
contributing to the organic development of its policy discourses– or they may break off
and form their own community.
6. Ideas have the negative potential to break apart, or destabilize coalitions.
Ideas may destabilize coalitions when policy issues emerge that are important to
certain partners but which cannot be rationalized ideationally (1) or when the frames that
are placed around new ideas come into conflict with the logical chains that connect other
ideas together.
Although the differential deployment of ideas can tighten coalitions by easing
tensions among diverse interests and by staking out common ground (2), this process also
sows potential seeds for a coalition's demise. As I argued in the earlier discussion of
surface discourse vs. sub-surface tensions, changes in historical and environmental
context can exacerbate latent or suppressed tensions and expose hidden distortions when
groups of interests who think and perceive the world differently are confronted with new
issues. New ideas may strike at coalitions in ways that are cross-cutting and expose
latent fault lines.
It follows that the fewer unique distortions that are necessary to produce the
illusion of homogeneity and tie a coalition together in the first place, the more impervious
the coalition will ultimately be to changes in environmental context. Unfortunately, the
expansion (4) and restructuring (5) of coalitions usually promotes the development of an
inevitable buildup of ideational distortions in order to create and propagate the illusion of
common ground and to suppress mounting sub-surface inconsistencies as a coalition
expands. The differential deployment of ideas (2) can produce coalitions that give off the
illusion of cohesion but which are, in reality, filled with delicately resolved contradictions
and which are therefore quite volatile and susceptible to the instigative effects of
historical change.
Ideas may also be intentionally adopted or reconstituted for the purposes of
coalition construction and expansion (4) only to destabilize pre-existing idea
configurations and alienate existing coalition partners. They may also be deliberately
harnessed by opponents to incite division and steal away certain groups of interests.
Indeed, in a two party system, there is a natural tendency for each party to pick
strategically at the ideological bonds of the opposing party's coalition by reconstituting
and deploying ideas in new ways. Doing so, however, can lead to a reverberating series
of adjustments in the ideational configurations within their own coalition as well as
among the opposition (5).
On a related note, the mobilization of new interests (4) may also possibly lead to
structural imbalances in the awareness and identification of coalition partners with the
narratives that are used to tie together ideas and give them salience (2). In a coalition's
discourse, narratives may often be used to justify ideas and positions via allusions to
shared experiences. Recently mobilized or absorbed groups of coalition participants are
unlikely to be as aware of or responsive to the discursive cueing of experiences that were
forged among coalition partners prior to their arrival. This can lead to a buildup of
varying levels of collective consciousness over time and varying degrees of receptiveness
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to and identification with the narratives and idea frames that are used to carry and express
ideas within a coalition's discourse (2). Groups that are not sufficiently socialized or as
receptive to the narratives that bind a coalition together – typically a coalition's newest
members– are therefore likely to be the most susceptible to capture by opposing
coalitions.
Efforts to try to adjust ideology and reframe coalition narratives to prevent
capture therefore always carry risk. Changes can have unintended and disruptive effects
which can expose inconsistencies and weaken the discursive bonds that hold coalition
partners together. Ideas may also lead to the breakdown of institutions and, in the
process, weaken barriers that hold certain configurations of ideas in place. Changes in
the configuration of ideas (such as the infusion of ideas of a coalition into a party's
discourses via the mechanisms outlined earlier) may actually weaken and destabilize the
institutions created to hold the political coalition together, thus leading to the breakdown
of the coalition and its incorporation into a political party or more broadly based
coalition.
The Importance of Context
In closing, it is important to consider the role of context in the life of a political
coalition. Context structures the developmental path followed by a coalition from the
moment of its inception. It determines the interests and ideas that are likely to become
bound up within a coalition. It structures the ways that ideas are assembled and
connected together within a coalition's discourse. Also, precisely because context
structures the environment in which ideas are picked up and assembled by a coalition,
this means that significant changes in context can have potentially harsh and destabilizing
effects upon the bonds that hold a coalition together over time.
Elites who are affiliated with an established political coalition and who wish to
hold it together must therefore be constantly vigilant. As history unfolds and as new
issues inevitably emerge in the public space, the elites who attach themselves to a
coalition and who seek to harness and maintain it must formulate and advance arguments
which rationalize positions in terms that speak to and resonate with the established
concerns and emphases of a coalition's diverse members. Elites also typically work as
the agenda-setters of a political coalition– steering discourse so as to focus emphasis
upon a platform of issues that have the potential to expand and reinforce the logic of the
coalition while minimizing cross-cutting issues that have the potential to expose its
internal cleavages.
As I have argued, the irony of all of this is that the forces which drive a coalition
to form and expand in the first place also inevitably contribute to a buildup of fault lines
which make a coalition more susceptible to the winds of historical change. Political
coalitions exist in a constant state of evolution, but their underlying ideational bonds and
fault lines tend to be established in their early history and become partially frozen at that
moment in time. The historical context in which a political coalition is initially forged
tends to leave an indelible mark or imprint that forever shapes that coalition's
developmental trajectory and makes it perpetually susceptible to derailment by the same
types of policy issues and ideas over and over again.
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At the same time, forces can also arise within a coalition which push in the
opposite direction and promote a fading of these differences. The formation of discursive
linkages between the ideas of a coalition and the pursuit of repeated efforts to cooperate,
coordinate, and communicate can prompt coalition partners to adopt some of the ideas of
their coalition partners. Institutions can also have homogenizing effects. The residual
impact of the historical context in which a coalition is forged thus tends to be lasting but
have only partial, tempered effects. Sub-surface tensions that are frozen in place when a
coalition forms will tend to surface or fade in unpredictable ways as history unfolds and
as the elites who seek to hold a coalition together perform their work with varying
degrees of proficiency and success.
It is also possible to take a different perspective and examine the political
landscape from the perspective of the elites who are opposed to a particular political
coalition and wish to destroy it. An effective opponent will tend to raise and force the
deliberation of wedge issues that expose and inflame the sub-surface tensions inherent in
a coalition. Because sub-surface tensions do tend to persist in at least subtle ways over
time, it may be possible for discerning opponents (either from rival parties or political
coalitions) to pick relentlessly at the bonds that hold a discursive community together and
to weaken it via successive political attacks at the pressure points where it has been
stitched together. Precisely defined, wedge issues are those which drive various members
of a coalition toward different conclusions and which produce irresolvable paradoxes
when viewed from different angles by different coalition members.
For example, modern progressives have supported same sex marriage for their
own reasons, but this issue has had the added advantage for them of driving a wedge
between the traditionalist and libertarian factions of the opposing segments of the
conservative coalition. The issue has destabilizing qualities for conservatives precisely
because it drives two segments of their coalition which emphasize different conservative
principles to arrive an array of different and sometimes conflicting policy positions. As a
social issue, the fight for traditional marriage is therefore not "constructive" for
conservatives in the same way as abortion. Abortion is an issue for which strong
individualistic and moralistic arguments can be made in defense of the same policy
position.
When viewed through this lens, the conservative coalition is currently being
pulled apart by changes in historical context. Issues have emerged on the public agenda
which (at the urging of liberals) are picking at the latent fault lines cemented into place
within the conservative coalition decades ago during its early stages of development. As
I will show in the chapters that follow, the social issues that were on the agenda at the
moment of this coalition's formation were more easily rationalized with a series of readily
available, overlapping idea frames. In the modern context, elites have simply been
unable to isolate and reinforce a collection of frames to stave off and suppress the
destabilizing effects of cross-cutting issues such as marriage, immigration reform, and, to
a lesser extent, counter-terrorism. In the face of historical events beyond their control
and in the face of insurgent factions emphasizing contradictory systems of logic, elites
have been unable to fully shift the dialogue away from contentious issues toward a
platform of issues that promotes unity and reinforces the internal logic of their coalition.

54

CHAPTER 3
The Conservative Movement and the Roots of CPAC

In this chapter, I provide a brief history of the conservative movement from the
late 1950s until the early 1970s. I argue that by the mid-1970s, there were actually two
developing conservative political coalitions in America– the Old Right and the New
Right. In this context, during the 1970s, CPAC was poised to become a mechanism that
would facilitate cooperation, coordination, and communication between the two
coalitions. By extension, it was also poised to become a site of coalition discourse where
the ideas and policy concerns of multiple communities could be expressed and linked
together.
The National Review
Like many histories of the rise of modern American conservatism, my account
actually begins with the founding of the National Review by William F. Buckley. The
first step toward understanding the significance of the National Review and Buckley in
the development of modern American conservatism is to recognize that three distinct
strands of conservatism existed in the post-war era. These were libertarianism (which
was rooted in the principles of classical liberalism), traditionalism (which was rooted in
the principles of Burkean conservatism), and anti-communism.
Prior to the 1950s, these different strands of conservatism were not tightly
connected together. Enter Buckley. During the 1950s, Buckley worked to forge those
connections. He brought thinkers from the different intellectual traditions together on the
editorial board for his journal of opinion and encouraged them to engage in open and
spirited public debate with each other.1
Although a consensus was never reached, during the late 1950s and early 1960s, a
small group of conservative intellectuals based at the National Review– led by Frank
Meyer and M. Stanton Evans– played an especially important role in trying to minimize
the differences between the various strands of conservatism and in trying to explain how
they were consistent with and complimentary to each other. Together, Meyer and Evans
sought to bring free market conservatism, traditionalism, and anti-communism into a
single philosophical synthesis which they called “fusionism.”2
1

For background on the National Review and the role of conservative intellectuals in the
construction of the modern conservative coalition see: Jeffrey Hart, The Making of the American
Conservative Mind (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2005); George Nash The Conservative
Movement in America Since 1945 (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 1996); Hans Noel, Political
Ideologies and Political Parties in America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013);
William Rusher, Rise of the Right; Kevin Smant Principles and Heresies: Frank S. Meyer and
the Shaping of the American Conservative Movement (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2002).
2
Frank S. Meyer, In Defense of Freedom: A Conservative Credo (Chicago, IL: Henry Regnery,
1962); Frank S. Meyer “The Twisted Tree of Liberty” National Review (January 16, 1962): 25;
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Fusionism
In the fusion conservatism elaborated by Meyer and Evans, freedom was a central
organizing concept that was used to tie together disparate strands of libertarian, anticommunist, and traditionalist thought.3 According to fusion political philosophy, the
state was considered to be essential, but its proper role was limited to the enforcement of
law and order and the protection of the freedom of individuals. Since crime and
Communism both posed serious threats to the ability of individuals to exercise their
natural freedoms, combating them was treated as being a necessary and proper function
of the state. Strong national and domestic security states were classified as being
essential in order to secure an environment in which individuals could enjoy their
freedoms without fear that others would infringe upon them.
Beyond the protection of individual freedoms through maintenance of a safe and
free society, however, the state was not viewed as properly having many additional
regulatory functions, nor was it viewed as properly having any redistributive functions
whatsoever. Governing authority exercised outside of the protection of individual
freedoms was depicted as only infringing upon and curtailing the exercise of freedoms.
In addition to limited government and strong defense, the third element of fusion
thought was traditionalism. This included a belief in the supremacy of God, a belief in
the existence of economic, racial, intellectual, and hereditary hierarchies within society,
and a belief that the purpose of man was to pursue Christian morality and virtue. In
keeping with traditionalist thinking, Meyer, Evans, and other fusionists believed in the
inevitability of a hierarchical social order. In the fusionist line of thinking, it was not the
responsibility of the state to attempt to correct the differences that inevitably emerged
within a free society, nor was it the responsibility of the state to level the playing field by
correcting for economic imbalances. Economic, racial, intellectual, and other disparities
were regarded as inevitable.
Traditionalism was linked to the libertarian and anti-communist strands of
conservatism via the theme of freedom. In the thought of Meyer and other fusionists, the
state’s role in promoting and facilitating the pursuit of morality by individuals was to
maintain an environment in which individuals were free to pursue morality and their
transcendent destiny on their own terms. Toward that end, the only functions of the state
were to prevent men from infringing upon others’ rights and to prevent foreign powers
from invading and thus infringing upon the rights of citizens. The latter point, of course,
justified the maintenance of a strong national security state.4 But that was all. In
fusionist thought, the state did not have the kind of authority to legislate morality or to
force individuals to act in virtuous ways, as the traditionalists really believed that it
Frank S. Meyer “Why Freedom” National Review (September 25, 1962): 223; M. Stanton Evans
“Techniques and Circumstances” National Review (January 30, 1962): 58
3
Meyer, Why Freedom. The state’s function was simply to “preserve the freedom of men from
infringement by other men through domestic or foreign force or fraud; and to settle the disputes
that occur when rights clash with rights.”
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should. In fact, state regulations intended to encourage moral behavior were believed by
Meyer and Evans to only prevent the pursuit of true morality and virtue. This was so
because the pursuit of morality was considered to be most meaningful when practiced in
an environment in which there was an element of “volition.”5 In Meyer’s words, if
citizens only act in moral and virtuous ways because they are coerced into doing so by
the policies of a benevolent state, then this is merely the “simulacrum” of virtue.6 The
pursuit of virtue in an environment in which the individual ultimately chooses that path
himself was considered by to be the one of far greater significance. Salvation, Meyer
claimed, simply cannot be forced.
To summarize the main points, then, freedom was the core theme that was used to
tie together the three strands of conservatism in fusionist political philosophy. It
connected support for a small, limited regulatory state with support for a large national
and domestic security state and support for traditional views of morality, hierarchy, and a
belief in God. A national security state and a domestic security state were necessary to
protect freedom, as were severe restrictions on other functions of government that might
prevent the exercise of economic and moral freedoms. Freedom was also an essential
component for the pursuit of Christian virtue, since virtue could only be achieved in its
most meaningful sense in a society in which the state did not impose virtue and in which
individuals could make the free choice to pursue morality on their own terms. In
fusionist thought, freedom was important, but it was only a means toward the end of
creating an environment in which individuals could make the free choice to behave
responsibly and pursue a path toward morality and virtue.
Meyer, Evans, and other fusionists based at the National Review made important
contributions by helping to show how conservatives with different philosophical concerns
and emphases could work together and find common ground. That said, they never
perfectly resolved the tensions between traditionalism and libertarianism. At heart,
Meyer, Evans, Buckley, and many of the other thinkers based at the National Review
were libertarians, and the philosophical synthesis that they tried to work out tilted in
favor of libertarian principles. This was obvious–particularly in the fact that they refused
to embrace the traditionalists’ willingness to use state authority to legislate morality– and
the writings of fusionists drew pointed criticisms from traditionalist scholars. The most
notable criticisms came from two traditionalists also based at the National Review–
Russell Kirk and Buckley’s brother-in-law, L. Brent Bozell. Both disagreed with the
libertarian-leaning fusions with respect to their understanding of the proper role of the
state. Unlike the libertarians, they were perfectly willing to use the instrumentalities of
the state in order to preserve and cultivate a Godly, virtuous society through laws
regulating immoral behavior.7
Another problem was that the generalizations made by fusionists skirted the
complicated political realities and dilemmas that surfaced when their principles were
actually applied to real world policy questions. In fusionist philosophy, the role of
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government was to create an environment in which individuals were free to practice their
freedoms without having their rights infringed upon by others. But conservative thinkers
did not work out fully the lengths to which government should go to preserve that
environment. Was it the responsibility of government to protect individuals from
powerful corporations and employers with the resources to take advantage of them? Was
it the responsibility of government to protect members of minority racial groups from
infringements upon their rights by the majority? Traditionalism involved an acceptance
of hierarchy within society and an acceptance of the fact that different classes naturally
emerge along economic, racial, intellectual, and hereditary lines. In the real world,
however, such disparities can tend to lead down a path toward infringement upon the
individual rights of minorities by members of the majority.8 Were those infringements
natural byproducts of hierarchy and of a free society, or were they deleterious to
individual freedoms and therefore sufficient reason to warrant governmental
intervention? In the real world, the protection of rights leads down the path toward an
increasingly expansive regulatory state, which is, of course, something to which
conservatives are opposed in principle.
Beneath the broad, meta-level analysis that was used to tie core principles
together, then, there were deep, unresolved dilemmas and difficult tasks ahead. There
was a need for conservatives to rationalize a political coalition. This meant extending
and applying the system of core principles that had been assembled at the National
Review in ways that would rationalize a series of positions on current policy issues, that
would satisfy the coalition-building needs of the day, and that would suppress rather than
exacerbate the unresolved tensions between the ideas of libertarians and traditionalists.
In the years ahead, the key to these critical tasks, I will argue, involved the framing of the
social and moral policy positions that were of concern to traditionalists in individualist
terms.
Ideas, Discourse, and the Conservative Movement
Ideas that are developed in journals of opinion must ultimately make the leap
from the printed page into active politics. During the late 1950s and early 1960s, the
ideas developed by intellectuals in books, editorials, and journals of opinion were read,
absorbed, and debated by conservative politicians and activists, and, in the process, they
fueled and shaped the discourses of a growing conservative political movement.9
8
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During the early 1960s, conservative activists who were avid readers of the
National Review and Human Events exchanged ideas at meetings, conferences, and
“Draft Goldwater” rallies, and, as they became organized, they increasingly learned to
cooperate, coordinate, and communicate with each other. The key conservative
movement organizations during this era included the National Review, Human Events,
and Young Americans for Freedom (YAF). Conservatives were also active in the Young
Republicans (YR) and in the Young Republican National Federation (YRNF), though
conservatives often clashed with moderates and liberals who were also active in party
organizations that were not organized along strictly ideological lines.
The conservative news publication Human Events played a particularly important
role in building the conservative movement during the early 1960s. Between 1960 and
1963, the periodical organized a series of meetings called the “Human Events
Conferences” in Washington D.C. The meetings, which would later serve as a model for
CPAC, were intended to bring conservative intellectuals, politicians, and activists
together and to unite them in support of the shared goals. At the conferences,
conservative leaders addressed large crowds and spoke out about the perils of
communism, about the burdens imposed on society by the New Deal state, and about the
importance of electing Goldwater as the Republican nominee for President in 1964. The
speakers at the conferences included not only prominent conservative politicians but also
intellectuals from National Review and Human Events who engaged in the discussions
and, in doing so, served as missionaries and representatives of their own ideas.10
The development of the conservative political movement during the early 1960s
was critical because it was this political coalition that mobilized around Barry
Goldwater’s candidacy and that succeeded in pushing for Goldwater’s nomination on the
Republican Party’s ticket in 1964. The Goldwater campaign effort gave conservative
activists a common cause around which to rally, cooperate, and coordinate. During the
election, the expanding coalition captured control of the Republican Party’s institutions.
In the process, many new political activists discovered conservatism and became
involved in politics. Alliances among different kinds of conservatives were strengthened,
a sense of identity was forged through shared experiences, and conservatives developed
methods of communicating with each other. In 1968, M. Stanton Evans noted:
The Goldwater enterprise helped create…intercommunication…by
fostering among conservatives their own circuits of communication. The
upshot is that conservatives, once rather isolated, not knowing each other
very well or even being aware of one another’s existence, now form
something like a coherent movement. The interior lines of
communication, which did not exist to speak of in 1960, are now
organic way and that those ideas were ingrained into their “intellectual DNA” when they
occasionally gathered at meetings and interacted with each other. I have adopted the term
“organic” and used it much more broadly to also describe the nature of the ideational changes that
happen through discourse as multiple actors interact and share ideas.
10
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established; the common discussion of ideas is an accepted and welcome
practice…11
As the conservative movement came together during the Goldwater campaign, the
process was aided by the philosophical groundwork laid by intellectuals at the National
Review. In speaking to conservatives, Goldwater took stands in support of strong
national defense and strong internal security, limited national government, and free
market capitalism. He also appealed strongly to social conservatives in the South on the
issue of race by strongly opposing forced integration policies administered by the federal
government. Overall, his platform was broadly reflective of the blending of conservative
strands that had been achieved at the National Review. It was fitting that one of his
speech writers and the ghostwriter of his famous tract, The Conscience of a Conservative,
was National Review columnist L. Brent Bozell.12
Of course, Goldwater failed miserably, and conservatives were devastated.
However, during the Goldwater campaign, a movement took shape, expanded, and was
institutionalized. The intellectual, political, activist forces that mobilized by Goldwater
would continue to be actively involved in Republican Party politics in subsequent years
and would come to serve as the center of a larger conservative political coalition that
would develop and mobilize behind Ronald Reagan’s candidacies in 1976, 1980, and
1984.
The Conservative Movement After 1964
In the wake of the Goldwater campaign, conservatives lost their grip on party
institutions, and they retreated to continue their work through an expanding network of
conservative movement organizations. In his book, The Future of Conservatism, M.
Stanton Evans noted:
Symptomatic of the post-Goldwater sense of conservative community was
the founding of several new conservative organizations–among them the
American Conservative Union, the Free Society Association, the
Conservative Book Club, Arlington House Publishers, the Philadelphia
Society, Constructive Action, Inc., the Constitutional Alliance, Triumph
and Rally magazines and other groups. All these came into being and/or
reached major organizational status after 1964 supposedly obliterated the
conservative movement of which they are a part.13
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Of course, it is important to note that many of the organizations cited by Evans in
the above passage were publishing houses and journals of opinion that were devoted to
the discussion of ideas rather than to political action on a grand scale comparable to what
had been achieved during the Draft Goldwater crusade. The Philadelphia Society, too,
was intended to encourage scholarly discussion and debate among conservative
intellectuals rather than to cultivate organized political action.
In fact, during the latter half of the 1960s, conservatives devoted comparatively
less time and attention to the task of political organizing. The American Conservative
Union (ACU) was the organization designed for this purpose. It was formed in 1964 to
encourage conservative political action within the Republican Party; however, its
activities and accomplishments were modest during the 1960s. Between 1964 and 1974,
there were no political action conferences on a scale comparable to those that had been
held by Human Events in earlier years of the conservative movement. There were no
mass rallies like those that attracted thousands of activists seeking to draft Goldwater.
It is possible that this was due– at least in part–to Nixon’s victory in 1968 and to
conflicting responses by conservatives to his administration and his policies. During his
presidency, Nixon went from having the tepid support of the conservative movement to
inciting hostility from some prominent conservative leaders by 1971. Nixon was not a
leader who inspired the same kind of enthusiasm and turnout from conservative activists
as Goldwater had or as Reagan would in the coming years. After 1968, Reagan was
serving as the Governor of California and, since Nixon was in office, he was not yet a
presidential candidate around whom the conservative movement could yet rally and
generate enthusiasm. As a result, while the conservative movement persisted during the
Nixon years, it also lost some of the momentum that it was able to generate when it
mobilized behind Goldwater and Reagan.
The first rumblings of an idea to resurrect the grand conservative political action
conferences of the Goldwater years came in 1969. In that year, David Jones of YAF,
who had been involved in the Human Events conferences of earlier years, collaborated
with Buckley, Rusher, and a small group of leaders to plan an action conference for
conservatives. The conference was to be sponsored by four organizations– the National
Review, Human Events, Young Americans for Freedom, and the American Conservative
Union. It was to be chaired by William F. Buckley, and it was to include eight panel
discussions– four devoted to discussions of the issues and four to discussions of political
action. Speakers for the conference were to include Barry Goldwater, Ronald Reagan,
Strom Thurmond, and William F. Buckley. Buckley, who was a part of the organizing
effort, committed to speak at the conference. When Goldwater and Reagan both declined
to attend, however, the entire conference idea was shelved because it was believed that
both of those leaders were also needed in order to attract a sufficiently large crowd.14
In place of the action conference, the same four organizations decided to hold a
conservative awards dinner in October 1969 to honor conservative lawmakers in
Congress, journalism, and other fields. According to an internal memo from Jones, the
dinner was intended to serve as “morale booster” for conservatives. Approximately 400
14
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invitations to the dinner were extended to conservative leaders selected by the four
sponsoring organizations. At the dinner, William F. Buckley served as the Master of
Ceremonies, James Jackson Kilpatrick delivered the keynote address, and John Ashbrook
made a series of award presentations.15
A second Conservative Awards Dinner with a similar format was held on
February 4, 1971. That event was twice as large as the first. According to its planning
documents, approximately 800 conservative leaders were invited to attend.16
Although the conservative awards dinners were borne out of the failed attempt to
hold a political action conference, the idea of holding the action conference was never
entirely discarded. In 1971, ACU Executive Director John Jones– the brother of David
Jones, who had collaborated on the plans for the failed 1969 event–was asked to develop
a proposal for Buckley and Rusher concerning a “Conservative Political Action
Conference.” The event would be sponsored by the same four organizations that had
collaborated on the 1969 event and that had sponsored the two conservative awards
dinners. In an internal memo to Rusher written in 1971, Jones described his vision of
CPAC. It would be:
…a high-level conference of perhaps 200 leaders. Purpose of the
conference would be to develop a basic strategy for 1972 covering areas
such as, issues, Senate and Congressional campaigns and the Presidential
campaign.17 [sic]
In the memo, Jones added, “I would also hope that the political action conference could
develop a conservative platform for 1972.” It was all for naught. For unknown reasons,
the action conference idea was again shelved.18
The original motivation for CPAC was thus to create a mechanism for
conservative leaders to discuss strategy, to coordinate their political efforts, and to
develop a platform for the conservative movement. The fact that early attempts to
organize CPAC failed and that no similar conferences were held by any other
conservative organizations during the same period are indications of the broader trends
toward decline in the realm of political action that I have noted. The conservative
movement was still active, but it was also stifled by Nixon’s presence as a first term
Republican President.
As further evidence of this, I will show in the next chapter that by the time that
the first CPAC was finally organized in 1974, M. Stanton Evans would write that many
believed the conservative movement had become badly fragmented. In that year, CPAC
was actually framed as an effort to correct what had become a serious shortcoming of
conservatives in the realm of organized political action. Indeed, in an article written
about CPAC 1974, National Review columnist Daniel Oliver would ask pointedly,
15
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“where have the conservative leaders been? Not regrouping regularly for battle, though
certainly not without their successes. Not meeting often enough to organize their
pressure on and support of conservatives in Congress.” He would go on to describe
CPAC as an effort to “remedy the failure in leadership” that had existed during the years
after the Goldwater campaign.19
The Old Right vs. the New Right
I refer to the political coalition that was borne out of the remnants of the
conservative movement of the early 1960s and the Goldwater campaign as the Old Right.
It was a political coalition that was forged through shared experiences of those years, and
it was held together by the network of leaders and institutions that I have mentioned so
far, the most important which were the National Review, Human Events, YAF, the ACU.
Beginning in late 1973, a distinct conservative political coalition began to emerge
which I–in keeping the label assigned to it by its leaders and by many other scholars of
conservatism– will refer to as the New Right. Among the leaders who worked to build
this new political coalition were such well-known conservatives as Paul Weyrich,
Richard Viguerie, Morton Blackwell, Terry Dolan, Howard Phillips, and Reed Larson.
Many of leaders of the New Right were traditionalists who had been active in
conservative politics during the 1960s. Indeed, many of them had been supporters of
Goldwater and had participated alongside leaders of the coalition that I have termed the
Old Right (who were at that time just conservatives). Regardless of their political
backgrounds, what the leaders who formed the New Right shared was a belief that it was
important to encourage political action by social conservatives. As conservatives who
believed in basic traditionalist principles, leaders of the New Right were concerned about
the social issues, and they saw the social issues as keys that would be useful for
mobilizing a mass voting coalition that would help conservatives to achieve political
power.
As a result, the group of leaders that I have mentioned began working to build
institutions, mobilize and assemble groups of conservative activists, encourage
cooperation, coordination, and communication through a separate set of institutions and
channels of communication, and orient a new political coalition around the blend of ideas
and strategies that they preferred. In an essay published in the Robert Whittaker’s 1982
volume, The New Right Papers, William Rusher reflected on the emergence of the New
Right. Rusher noted:
During the 1970s a certain difference, first in philosophical emphasis and
then in operational style, began to appear between more orthodox
conservatives and the group centered around Richard Viguerie, who by
this time established himself as perhaps the leading exponent of directmail political warfare. The latter group (which included such activist
organizations as Howard Phillips’s Conservative Caucus, Terry Dolan’s
Daniel Oliver, “What are Conservatives Telling Each Other” National Review (March 1,
1974)
19
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National Citizens’ Political Action committee, Paul Weyrich’s Committee
for the Survival of a Free Congress, Woody Jenkins’s American
Legislative Exchange Council, and Viguerie’s own Conservative Digest)
was in favor of appealing far more explicitly to social conservative voters
on the basis of social issues (right-to-life, anti-gun-control, antipornography, etc.) than some of their colleagues, who preferred to
continue to stress such economic issues as balancing the budget. This
philosophical preference rapidly produced operational differences as well:
Viguerie and his allies, who now began to be called the New Right, were
broadly sympathetic to my own 1975 call for a new party to
institutionalize the majority coalition of economic and social
conservatives….20
In the same volume, Paul Weyrich wrote at length about the philosophical
differences between the New Right and the Old Right. He especially distinguished the
New Right from the Old by noting that its members placed greater emphasis upon social
issues than upon economic issues and by noting that its members also saw a positive role
for government in encouraging morality and protecting the traditions of society.
These distinctions are reflective of the distinctions between libertarian fusionists
and traditionalists that I delineated earlier. His remarks also note that the coalition was
more strongly organized around principles originating from the doctrines of Christianity.
According to Weyrich:
…the blue-collar, middle class origins of the New Right help explain its
philosophical motivations. The New Right differs from the Old in its
value-orientation, which translates to the “social issues” in the current
political jargon. The Old Right gives a primacy to laissez-faire
economics. To be sure, we of the New Right believe strongly in free
enterprise and individual initiative, and we oppose the expansion of
government interference with individual lives. However, the New Right
also believes that the individual as an individual does have personal
responsibility to society and that each individual has intrinsic moral worth.
The Old Right’s “live and let live” idea is not reflective of Christian social
teachings. A common assumption of New Right activists is that
government should support certain moral truths. Having experienced life
in working class America, the New Right leadership realizes that people
have come to expect certain things of their government, and that it is
possible to give those things to people without destroying the free
enterprise system. Christian social doctrine teaches that, just as
individuals have a certain responsibility to individuals, so does
government. We reject the total indifference advocated by libertarians,
just as we reject the extremes advocated by liberals. I would, for instance,
William Rusher, “The New Right: Past and Prospects” in Robert W. Whitaker, ed., The New
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want to see government–through churches and private institutions–ensure
care for the helpless. I want to see government by law protect the
helpless, be they unborn or senile, against the self-interest of others.
Culturally destructive government policies–racial hiring quotas and busing
come to mind as examples–are to the New Right more immediately
important in the realm of action, since the damage they can do is
enormous and practically irremediable. Given a choice between focusing
attention and effort on the defeat of a pork barrel public works bill, and
focusing effort on the defeat of an abortion funding bill, the New Right
would work to defeat the abortion bill.21
It is especially important to note the emphasis placed upon Christian principles
and traditional morality by the New Right. During the late 1970s, New Right leaders,
who placed great emphasis upon upholding Christian principles and upon limiting
funding for abortion, were the individuals who would actively reach out to Jerry Falwell
and other religious leaders and who would encourage the formation of the Moral
Majority and mobilization of the Religious Right into politics.
The New Right and The Christian Right
There were modest attempts by evangelical Christians to build a distinct political
movement during the early 1970s; however, major efforts were not undertaken until later
in the decade. In 1976, Rev. Jerry Falwell organized a series of “I love America” rallies
on the steps of state capitols, at which he assembled groups of evangelical Christians and
sympathetic politicians and called for a “moral America.” In 1977, Falwell participated
in the campaign led by Phyllis Schlafly against the Equal Rights Amendment, and in
1978 he helped to fight a gay rights ordinance in Florida as well as a proposal that would
have legalized betting in Virginia.22
In 1978, the Rev. Robert Billings formed the National Christian Action Coalition
(NCAC) to oppose interference by the federal government in private school education. In
1978, the organization Christian Voice was formed to organize evangelical Christians and
encourage them to engage in political action. Its organizing efforts were advertised and
conducted partly through Rev. Pat Robertson’s television program, the 700 Club. The
program was featured on Robertson’s own Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN). 23 In
1979, Falwell formed the Moral Majority, and Billings joined the organization as its
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Executive Director. In 1980, Billings would go on to serve as an adviser to the Reagan
campaign and assist with Reagan’s outreach to religious groups.
The Religious Roundtable was formed in 1979 by Ed McAteer of the
Conservative Caucus (the latter of which was a New Right action organization that had
been formed in 1974). During 1979 and 1980, the Roundtable came to serve as a central
organization for coordinating the efforts of the growing Christian Right movement. As
Robert Liebman has noted, the Roundtable served as a “trade association.”24 It brought
leaders of the Christian Voice, the Moral Majority, and the Campus Crusade together
with “individuals such as Richard Viguerie, Phyllis Schlafly, Paul Weyrich, and Adrian
Rogers, former president of the Southern Baptist Convention.”25 The Conservative
Caucus and the closely affiliated Religious Roundtable therefore served as critical
organizational infrastructure and played an important role in the life of the New Right
coalition that was somewhat analogous to the one played by the American Conservative
Union in the life of the Old Right coalition. Religious Roundtable meetings were one
forum through which New Right and Christian Right leaders worked to coordinate their
efforts. The Religious Roundtable also organized its own conferences and seminars.
Writing in 1982, Robert Liebman noted:
Roundtable organized a series of national seminars for political discussion
and education which included workshops to teach participants how to
mobilize their congregations on behalf of conservative causes. The most
successful of these events was August, 1980 Dallas National Affairs
Briefing where thousands of clergy and laymen heard from leading New
Right figures, many of the nation’s prominent televangelists, Southern
Baptist President Bailey Smith, and presidential candidate Ronald Reagan.
After the election, Roundtable shifted its efforts to the formation of local
affiliates.26
These events were primarily gatherings for Christian Right leaders and clergy. The
Moral Majority was the primary organization that was responsible for grassroots political
organizing and for conducting voter registration drives through the churches.
It is important to note the timing of these developments. It was during 1978,
1979, and 1980 that the New Right expanded to include the Christian Right. The New
Right coalition had its own leaders– Viguerie, Schlafly, Weyrich, Falwell, Billings, and
others– who provided leadership and guidance for the coalition in a capacity that was
comparable to the leadership that Rusher, Evans, Ashbrook, and other leaders provided
for the Old Right. It also set up its own mechanisms to facilitate cooperation,
coordination, and communication among its members, such as the Roundtable, and there
were large gatherings like the National Affairs Briefing that were at least roughly
analogous to CPAC and that were attended by associated activists.
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A brief excerpt from the 1980 Dallas National Affairs Briefing hints that the ideas
expressed and exchanged in the discourses of the New Right/Christian Right were also
quite different in substance and balance from those at the Old Right meetings led by
Rusher, Ashbrook, and Evans. At the Dallas National Affairs Briefing, televangelist
James Robison, shouted:
If the righteous, the pro-family, the moral, the biblical, the Godly, the hard
working, and the decent individuals in this country stay out of politics,
who on this earth does that leave to make the policies under which you
and I live and struggle to survive? I’m sick and tired of hearing about all
of the radicals, and the perverts, and the liberals, and the leftists, and the
communists coming out of the closet. It’s time for God’s people to come
out of the closet, out of the churches, and change America. We must do
it.27
The reference to coming of the closet was, of course, also a reference to Robison’s
opposition to homosexuality. As a minister and televangelist, Robison spoke very openly
about the fact that he considered homosexuality to be a sin. It is implausible to imagine a
scenario in which Buckley or Evans would have expressed similar sentiments.
The intellectual leadership of the Christian Right was also quite different from the
Old in that it was provided by pastors rather than by Princeton and Yale-educated
conservative public intellectuals. But certainly, many ministers–especially those with
large followings–were and are highly educated and espouse deeply sophisticated
philosophical worldviews. Falwell founded his own university in 1971!28 There were
“National Affairs Briefing” YouTube Video, 25:58 Posted by “Life Today,” August 1980.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lH1e0xxRRbk
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also other affiliated intellectuals who provided guidance to the growing Christian Right
movement. As I will show, several of the constitutional law scholars who worked closely
with the Christian school movement were invited to attend CPAC conferences during the
late 1970s. These were individuals who thought deeply about constitutional law from a
conservative perspective and who helped to articulate sophisticated constitutional
arguments that supported the ideas and grievances of the Christian school movement and
of the New Right generally.
In short, it is important to note that the New Right was cultivated and steered by a
different group of political and activist elites than the Old Right. It consisted of different
networks and different channels of communication. The discourses of the New Right
were also home to a different balance (but not necessarily incompatible blend) of ideas
and policy concerns. In both form and function, then, the New Right thus developed into
a second and distinct conservative political coalition during the 1970s. Some
conservative leaders, such as Phyllis Schlafly, kept one foot in institutions of both the Old
Right and the New Right and sought to merge the two together. Some institutions, such
as the American Conservative Union, made efforts to bring Old Right and New Right
activists together (as I argue in the next section). But throughout the late 1970s, the Old
Right and the New Right developed separate infrastructures and mostly coordinated their
political efforts through separate institutions. The fact that they did meant that they
retained a degree of distinctiveness (particularly in the areas of emphasis, strategy, and
the ways that they framed problems), and they therefore did not operate as a single,
tightly knit community.
Two Political Coalitions and the Role of the American Conservative Union
In this context, it is possible to define with greater precision the role and
importance of CPAC as an institution. CPAC was founded by YAF, ACU, Human
Events, and National Review in 1974 in order to unite the conservative movement behind
a common agenda and behind common strategies for political action. It was thus founded
by the core organizations of the Old Right, and, indeed, at the time of its founding,
although New Right leaders were active in conservative politics, the New Right had not
fully come to fruition as a separate political coalition.
It was also in 1974, however, when the New Right did begin to separate and
evolve along its own path, and once it did, it rapidly started to grow. As the New Right
developed, CPAC was quickly transformed into a site where the two coalitions– the
YAF, ACU, Human Events, and National Review community (Old Right) and the New
Right– were brought together under the aegis and stewardship of the former. Every year,
CPAC organizers extended invitations to all of the emerging New Right political action
groups, and they sought to include many of the socially conservative leaders and activists
who became involved in New Right politics as speakers on the CPAC program of events.
At CPAC, then, representatives of diverse activist constituencies with diverse concerns
evaluate how the theologically based worldviews of religious leaders shaped New Right
discourses when those groups became active in New Right coalition politics and compare the
impact on New Right discourses to the impact on discourses in coalition settings such as CPAC.
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and diverse discourses were thus brought together to talk about their ideas and policy
concerns.
CPAC therefore became an important instrument–an important mechanism– for
facilitating and encouraging coalition-building efforts. This was deliberate. The Old
Right, coalition-minded fusion intellectuals who guided the formation CPAC (led by
William Rusher and M. Stanton Evans) looked fondly upon the new conservative forces
emerging within the GOP. They recognized (as did Reagan) that the foundational
principles of fusion conservatism needed to be extended and applied more forcefully to
the social issues and that the groups associated with those issues would be critical to
victory in 1980. By inviting members of the emerging New Right into the fold, they
were able to foster discursive connections and to partially tear down the boundaries
between two sprawling communities of discourse, each with its own distinct communities
and discourses.
As the two coalitions expanded, the discourses at CPAC each year reflected
changes in the size and diversity of the two coalitions. At CPAC 1974, religion was not
discussed in any significant way. At that time, CPAC was primarily the domain of
economic, libertarian conservatives of the Old Right. Just four years later, at CPAC
1978, social conservatives at CPAC would speak about the dangers of social engineering
in educational curricula. Just five years later, at CPAC 1979, the Rev. Robert Billings,
who was soon installed as the Executive Director of the Moral Majority, would stand
before the crowd at CPAC and state his belief that evolution was wrong. Over time, then,
CPAC came to serve as a coalition setting where different ideational streams were
merged and blended and where ideas were shared and transmitted among various
branches of the conservative movement.
That said, throughout the decade, CPAC remained under the control of the Old
Right-dominated ACU and its board. At CPAC, the crucial narratives, strategies, and
interpretations of context provided during major addresses were shaped much more
strongly by the coalition-minded fusion intellectuals from the National Review and by
political elites who were affiliated with the Old Right. The key addresses at CPAC were
delivered by Ashbrook, Crane, Buckley, Rusher, Evans, Reagan, and their
contemporaries– not by Bryant, Falwell, Weyrich, Viguerie, or Phillips. Schlafly was an
annual speaker at CPAC along with pro-life activist Mildred Jefferson, but she and
Jefferson were always confined to a single "social issues" panel. The Old Right leaders
thus sought to tie constituencies together by encouraging the merging of different
discourses and streams of ideas while also continuing to keep discussions of context and
strategy more strongly oriented around those that they preferred.
In sum, during the transitional era of the late 1970s, ideational and institutional
connections were forged even as the two conservative communities of discourse were
also rapidly expanding in different directions. Rather than defining the Old Right and the
New Right as two sharply defined political coalitions, I therefore define them as two
partially overlapping but distinct coalitions that elites were actively working to merge
together. As one site where this merging process happened, CPAC proceedings help to
demonstrate and reflect the nature of the efforts that were being taken by the Old Right to
steer discourses and build unity at a critical and formative time in the lifespan of the
conservative movement. It is also useful for capturing the broader spectrum of ideas
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flowing through the discourses of both political coalitions and for identifying the
common themes and ideas that helped to bring diverse conservative constituencies
together.
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CHAPTER 4
CPAC 1974

I do not have the Nixon monkey on my back. That tired, tergiversating tramp never
impressed me for a moment as a conceivable instrument for any useful end, even in an
order inherently inadequate for a serious purpose. Voting for him was… horsemeat…
Goldwater, whose enthusiasm for his own candidacy [in 1964] had been, if anything,
smaller than Bill’s… proclaimed for Nixon early in 1965, and promptly set about
delivering the conservative movement to him. Among his early converts were Jerry
Milbank and Bill [Buckley] (with whom his personal friendship was now intensifying).
Reagan, of course, was not yet Governor of California; even his entry into the primary
was a year away. When Reagan did win the governorship, and thus became a really hot
conservative presidential prospect in his own right, the discomfiture in the Goldwater (i.e.
pro-Nixon) camp could have been cut into chunks and served as a high-protein dish at
state prisons. The rest is history–though it is only fair to note that Bill’s own preferences
as between Reagan and Nixon fluctuated during 1967 and 1968, and finally settled down
to little short of neutrality at Miami Beach. It was, I think, not nearly so much Bill as
Barry Goldwater who scotched the conservative drive for Reagan and thus nominated
(and elected) Nixon….Where all this leaves Bill today is, to be sure, a proper question.
He probably has higher hopes for Nixon than I do, if only for the mordant reason that I
have none worth mentioning.1
-

William Rusher in private a letter to L. Brent Bozell
March 6, 1969

Even before he became president, Richard Nixon was a polarizing figure within
the conservative movement. In 1968, Nixon ran on a relatively conservative platform,
and he won the GOP nomination with tepid support from many conservatives, including
Goldwater, Buckley, and the National Review.
As Nixon’s presidency unfolded, however, levels of support for his administration
dropped among the leaders who headed the four main conservative movement
organizations. In 1971, a group of conservatives calling themselves the “Manhattan
Twelve” published an article in the National Review announcing that they were officially
withdrawing their support of the Nixon administration. The group included Buckley and
Rusher as well as James Burnham and Frank Meyer (all from the National Review). It
also included Alan Ryskind and Thomas Winter (the editors of Human Events), Randal
Teague (the Executive Director of YAF), and John Jones (the Executive Director of the
American Conservative Union (ACU)). M. Stanton Evans of the National Review and of
the ACU drafted the Manhattan Twelve’s declaration, although he ultimately refused to
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sign the document when Buckley softened the language by removing some of Evans’
objections to Nixon’s domestic policies.2
How deep did the opposition to Nixon go? In a manuscript entitled “A Manifesto
for Conservatives” penned in 1971 but ultimately never published, William Rusher went
so far as to suggest that conservatives should work to ensure that a Democrat would be
elected in 1972 instead of Nixon. Rusher reasoned that Nixon’s domestic and foreign
policies– which embraced deficit spending, wage and price controls, the family assistance
program, a reduction in American military capabilities, and détente with Red China–
were every bit as liberal as those that could be expected from a Democratic President.
Because Nixon was a Republican, however, Rusher lamented that he was able to
advocate for liberal policies far more effectively than any hypothetical Democratic
president ever could. This was so because Nixon was able to squelch opposition from
conservatives within the GOP who were reluctant to criticize a sitting Republican
president.3
Rusher theorized that the problem would be resolved if only Kennedy or
Humphrey were elected in 1972 instead of Nixon. With a Democrat in office,
conservatives in the GOP would be free to go on the attack–to express strong opposition
to the same policies they were pressured to accept under Nixon and to mobilize behind a
true conservative candidate like Barry Goldwater or Ronald Reagan in the presidential
election of 1976.4
The Conservative Challenge to Nixon in ‘72
In 1972, the same group of conservative leaders took things one step further. In
that year, William F. Buckley offered his support to an effort organized by Rusher and
Evans to recruit a candidate– ultimately Congressman John Ashbrook of Ohio– to
challenge Nixon during the 1972 GOP primaries. Ashbrook’s candidacy was endorsed
by the National Review, and the unstated goal of the effort was to voice strong opposition
to Nixon’s policies.
Of course, there was never any real chance that Ashbrook would be able to unseat
Nixon. He received only a little more than 5% of the overall vote in 1972. As a result,
the Ashbrook candidacy drew opposition from many within the GOP, including Ronald
Reagan, who felt that conservatives should stand behind Nixon as their president and that
the intra-party squabbles could only aid the Democrats.
In any case, by 1972, the lines were clearly drawn between the conservative
movement and Nixon. The core network of conservative organizations– the ACU, YAF,
the National Review, and Human Events, as well as their leaders– had established
2
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themselves as being staunchly and publicly opposed to Nixon and his policies, even
though many other conservative Republican leaders still opted to support him.
The Manhattan Twelve, Ashbrook, and CPAC
This history is critical to an analysis of CPAC because, as it turns out, the
conference was created and organized by the National Review, Human Events, Young
Americans for Freedom, and the American Conservative Union. That is, it was founded
and planned by the exact same tightly knit network of leaders and organizations who had
publicly withdrawn their support of the Nixon administration in 1971 and who, in
keeping with that pledge, had also refused to back him in 1972.
Because they were the four sponsoring organizations, the same group of
conservative leaders also helped to determine the speakers who would appear on the
CPAC program. The President of the American Conservative Union (ACU) at the time–
the person who exercised a great deal of influence over the selection of speakers at CPAC
1974– was M. Stanton Evans. As I noted in the last chapter, along with Frank Meyer,
Evans had been one of the primary architects in the early 1960’s of the strain of fusion
conservatism developed at the National Review. Of course, he had also written the first
draft of the declaration against Nixon issued by the Manhattan Twelve.
Under Evans’ leadership, a broad array of conservative intellectuals, politicians,
and policy experts were invited to appear at CPAC. According to one ACU leader who
helped to plan the event, a great deal of care and thought went into the selection of the
policy issues that should be discussed and into the selection of individuals who were best
suited to address the audience on those issues.5 Among the politicians invited to appear
at CPAC 1974 were: Rep. John Ashbrook, Rep. Robert Bauman, Rep. Ben Blackburn,
Sen. James Buckley, Rep. John Conlan, Rep. Phil Crane, Sen. Carl Curtis, Rep. Marjorie
Holt, Rep. Jack Kemp, Rep. Trent Lott, Gov. Ronald Reagan, Rep. Floyd Spence, Rep.
Steve Symms, Gov. Meldrim Thomson, Rep. David Treen. Many conservative activist
leaders were also featured, including: Morton Blackwell, David Keene (who would later
serve as President of the NRA), Howard Phillips, Phyllis Schlafly, Richard Viguerie, and
Paul Weyrich. Among the invited conservative scholars and strategists were Pat
Buchanan, Lee Edwards, Phil Gramm (who at the time was not yet an elected
representative), John Lofton, Lyn Nofziger, Kevin Phillips, William Rusher, F. Clifton
White, and Dick Wirthlin. Planning documents indicate that a number of other
prominent conservatives such as John McCain and Daniel Oliver (of the National
Review) were also in attendance. Sen. James Buckley and Gov. Ronald Reagan were
featured as keynote speakers. The selection of Reagan for the featured slot was designed
to build his image and reputation as a spokesman for the conservative movement.6
The conference was therefore ecumenical. A broad array of conservative leaders
were in attendance, including social conservatives such as Phillips, Schlafly, Viguerie,
and Weyrich, who had been active in movement politics since the 1960s and who were
just beginning to coalesce as part of the distinct New Right coalition. That said, the latter
5
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were placed on panels focused upon campaign technology and specific issues rather than
on the panels devoted to discussions of the Nixon Presidency or overarching movement
strategy. Those important panels were reserved for Ashbrook, Evans, Phillips, and
Rusher. This placement ensured that the particular interpretations and strategies
advocated by the Old Right leaders were featured and reinforced.
For all of these reasons, the process of creating CPAC, structuring the program of
events, and recruiting the speakers to headline the event involved actions that not only
encouraged the expression of ideas and deliberation of issues but also determined in
advance what the substance and flow of the ideas at CPAC would be. For example, it is
crucial to note that among those selected to speak about the Nixon Presidency were: 1)
Rusher– the man who in 1969 privately called the president a “tergiversating tramp” and
who wished for him to lose the 1972 election and 2) Ashbrook, the man who had been
backed by CPAC sponsors in his challenge against Nixon during the 1972 GOP
primaries. With Rusher, Ashbrook, and their friends standing in front of the
microphones, the conference was bound to take on a harsh and decidedly anti-Nixon
tone.
In analyzing the discourses at CPAC during this era, it is therefore important to
treat the discussions of strategy not as an indicators of the overall balance of ideas and
opinions streaming through conservative discourses of the era but rather as part of a
structured environment that privileged the representation and expression of certain ideas
and strategies over others and that structured the flow of ideas. It can also be seen as an
effort to unify the conservative movement behind the goals and strategies supported by
the National Review, Human Events, YAF, the ACU, and their partners in the
conservative movement. These points are not unique to CPAC. All conferences are
biased to some extent because they do inevitably require that hard choices be made about
who will speak, who will be invited to attend, and what topics will be discussed. But this
only reinforces the point that the conference format itself can be an effective mechanism
for selectively reinforcing certain ideas and positions over others.
The Original Purpose and Structure of CPAC
The goals that conference organizers hoped to achieve by creating CPAC are
further documented in the letters that were sent to invited speakers and to potential
conference attendees. These letters have been preserved in the ACU archive in Provo,
Utah. For instance, the version of the letter that was addressed to conservative members
of Congress stressed the importance of uniting the conservative movement behind a set of
common goals. In the letter, ACU Executive Director Ronald Dear wrote:
Many conservatives believe that our forces across the country have
become fragmented, having no unified goal. It is our hope that this
conference will serve to bring us into common alignment. Your
participation will be invaluable in helping us to achieve this goal…7
7

Ronald B. Dear, Untitled Letter, January 18, 1976 MSS 176, LTPSC, Series III, Box 2, Folder
19

74

Meanwhile, the invitation letter that was to be sent to conservative activists was drafted
by M. Stanton Evans. It was mailed to 21,000 people on Richard Viguerie’s conservative
mailing list. In that letter, Evans noted:
The 1974 PAC affords us a unique opportunity to assess our political
situation, define positions on important issues and plan our strategy for
this year’s elections…the PAC will provide training in all the vital
techniques of modern political campaigning. Participants will also be
given campaign ammunition on hot topics such as the “Energy Crisis,”
“Taxation,” “Détente,” and “the Nixon Presidency,” etc… We cannot
permit the Conservative Movement to be badly fragmented now. This
conference will be the first of its kind since the early 1960s. It will give us
the much needed chance to re-unite, renew our commitment and re-focus
our energies on common goals.8
The conference was organized with a two-track structure. Meetings in the first
track were designed to address current policy issues and political topics. Meetings in the
second track were designed to address campaign management and political organizing
techniques.
The Purpose of CPAC
Overall, then, the goal of CPAC was to mobilize conservatives behind a particular
set of goals, to clarify thinking on important issues of the day, and to steer the movement
in the direction that Evans, Rusher, and their closest political allies felt would lead to
success in the years ahead.
In early 1974, clarity was a commodity that was in high demand. At the time, the
Watergate scandal was a national spectacle. It dominated the news cycle, and there was
an intense, ongoing public debate about whether Congress would impeach Nixon or
whether he would be able to continue in office. Many important questions were swirling
around in conservative activist circles. How had Watergate affected public perceptions
of the Republican Party and of conservatives? How had it affected the ability of
conservatives to mobilize the coalition of voters that had supported Nixon? How would
impeachment affect the prospects for Republican candidates in the 1974 midterm
elections? If Nixon were forced out of office and Ford were to become President, then
how would this affect conservatives? What opportunities and constraints did the
conservative movement face in the years ahead due to Nixon’s presidency, and what
strategies would be necessary in order to achieve the goal of electing more conservative
candidates to office?
At the time, there was no uniform consensus about the answers to these questions,
and, as I have noted, in the broad spectrum of conservative discourse, opinions of Nixon
varied widely. At CPAC, the conservative politicians, intellectuals, and strategists who
8
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were assembled by conference organizers talked about these questions openly and at
length. They provided answers to all of them, and, in doing so, they voiced their own
strategic recommendations regarding what conservatives ought to do in order to survive
the Watergate scandal and achieve their goals as a movement. They also helped to chart
a path forward for the years ahead.
Through their definitions of the political situation facing conservatives, the
leaders at CPAC thus did more than simply talk about conservative ideas and policy
issues. They used ideas to frame and articulate elaborate, ideationally laden narratives
and interpretations of political context, to define the friends, enemies, and target
constituencies of the growing conservative movement, and to recommend political
strategies that were based upon those interpretations of context. Through their answers to
the major questions of the day, they helped to draw sharp boundaries between the ideas of
the conservative movement and the ideas of the moderate-liberal factions of the
Republican Party that were aligned with Nixon, and they managed to stoke the
ideological tensions that formed those boundaries. In doing so, they also contributed to
the development of a sense of collective identity for the conservative movement rooted in
shared perceptions of the causes and implications of current political events.
Discourse Analysis
With this background firmly in hand, it is now possible to analyze the content of
the discourses at CPAC 1974 and to evaluate the substance of the discussions there in
context. To reiterate the point, I argue that the provision of the rich, ideologically tinted
descriptions of political context that I document here were part of an ongoing process
(that extended beyond the CPAC conference itself) through which elites sought to unite
conservatives around shared understandings of political context.
My purpose in analyzing the speeches at CPAC is therefore not so much to
document the words of various speakers as it is to identify the common themes and ideas
that were expressed and developed through exchanges of multiple speakers and to capture
the nature of the broader flow of ideas at the conference. What seems like a great deal of
thick description is actually a part of the extended process of identity construction that I
am seeking to document. The dissemination and absorption of long-winded
characterizations, narratives, and interpretations of the current political situation were the
mechanism through which elites sought to create unity and steer everyone in the room
toward similar conclusions and modes of thinking.
In this vein, in the case of discussions of the Nixon Presidency (provided below),
I am less focused upon capturing the opinions of Ashbrook and Rusher than I am upon
capturing the aggregate impression of Nixon and of moderate Republicans created for the
audience by Ashbrook, Rusher, and the other speakers and upon capturing the fact that
these impressions were encouraged by the selection of speakers and the organization of
the conference itself. Again, my contention is that discourse is a medium of exchange
structured by institutions and that the ideas that survive and are articulated over and over
again by multiple speakers are those that have the greatest potential to be received,
processed, and re-circulated and to thus strengthen levels of cohesion.
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The Nixon Presidency
Under the stewardship of the members of the Manhattan Twelve and their
political allies, the discussions of the Nixon Administration at CPAC 1974 assumed an
extremely hostile tone. In his opening address at the 1974 CPAC conference, William
Rusher addressed the audience in the midst of the Watergate crisis. He advised
conservatives not to take any "mea culpa" in Watergate or in Nixon's downfall, stressing
that Congressional Republicans and conservatives had been pushed out of his
administration and the White House decision-making process and therefore had no hand
whatsoever in any of its wrongdoings. He cast the Nixon administration as one run not
by Republicans or conservatives but rather by a new managerial class of "thin lipped,
able, and essentially apolitical men" interested primarily in achieving "power for its own
sake" and committed to "loyalty to the leader” (Nixon) above all else.9
According to Rusher, this mentality led Nixon and his staff down the road toward
instances of illegality and an emphasis on "screwing" their opponents. In this vein, he
also drew a sharp contrast between the conservative hero, Barry Goldwater, and the
managerial Nixon administration. Rusher added that while he had no affection for
Nixon, he felt that Nixon had done nothing inherently deserving of impeachment.
Referencing Mark Twain, he said that he "really didn't care whether he [Nixon] went to
Heaven or Hell because he had friends in both places."10
In a similar vein, John Ashbrook criticized Richard Nixon not for the Watergate
crisis but for turning his back on conservatism and conservative principles. He argued
that Nixon and "supposedly conservative" Congressmen had rejected and damaged the
reputation of conservatism by rhetorically identifying themselves with the conservative
label while ultimately rejecting conservative principles and governing as liberals once in
office. He stressed that because of the rhetorical posture of Nixon and other
Congressional Republicans, however, the public tied conservatism to the policies and
positions of Nixon. Consequently, his failings fostered serious doubt among the public
about conservatism and about the ability of conservatives to govern effectively.11
It was within the context of a lengthy diatribe leveled against Nixon that
Ashbrook paused to define and elaborate upon his own definition of conservatism.
Ashbrook stressed that the "bedrock of conservatism" involved support for the following
principles: 1) a sound currency; 2) a balanced budget; 3) free enterprise; 4) limited
government; 5) advocacy of the private sector over the public sector; 6) strong defense;
and 7) anti-communism. Ashbrook then elaborated upon the meaning of these principles
through a lengthy critique of the Nixon Administration and Republicans in Congress. 12
He ridiculed Nixon's statement that he was "a Keynesian in economics" as
unbefitting of a conservative and stressed that America's sound currency was being
assaulted by deficit spending and the "ruse" of a "full employment budget." He labeled
the full employment budget as nothing more than a mask for Keynesian deficit spending
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and called for conservatives to fight "Keynesian concepts" which brought about the
debauching of America's currency. He also criticized Nixon's support of wage and price
controls and a guaranteed annual income program. In this vein, he warned of potential
increases in government power in the fields of energy and trade. He also discussed
foreign affairs, stressing the dangers of expanded foreign aid, providing trade and aid to
the Soviet Union, détente, an insufficient buildup of the military, and Nixon's support for
the SALT treaty.13
Ashbrook then criticized the Nixon administration for supporting poverty and
legal services programs and the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), ending his
speech on the note that conservatives must "oppose rather than support the liberal policies
the president is advocating." He also referenced and reinforced Rusher's analysis of the
Nixon administration, stressing that "big government, centralization, and crisis policies"
strengthened the Nixon administration's “managerial liberal approach.” On multiple
occasions during his speech, Ashbrook criticized Republicans in Congress, who
identified themselves as conservative but who ultimately supported Nixon's policies, for
turning their backs on the conservative principles in which the "grassroots conservatives"
of "America's heartland." His prescription was for conservatives to oppose Nixon and to
speak out against and oppose liberal policies. The implication of his recommendations
was also that conservatives could win and be effective if and when they sent a strong,
undiluted signal to the electorate that they stood for the true conservative principles he
had outlined.14
It is important to note that Ashbrook defined and elaborated upon the meaning of
conservatism through a diatribe targeted at unprincipled Republicans in Congress and at
the Nixon administration. As a result, the panel, as well as Ashbrook and Rusher's
speeches, heightened the salience of ideological tensions simmering within the
Republican Party and of the ideological battle for control of the party that would reach a
boiling point in 1975. Rusher, Ashbrook, and other leaders of the CPAC conference
strongly doubted the viability of the Republican Party as a vehicle for conservatism, and,
in the following year, they would use CPAC as a mechanism to try to steer conservatives
in the direction of abandoning the GOP altogether. As a site of conservative discourse,
CPAC was a space where Rusher, Ashbrook, and fellow ideologues could express their
opinions and subtly drive discourse in directions that stoked tensions within the party and
amplified a pure, dogmatic version of conservatism.
As a counterfactual, it is interesting to imagine what the flow of ideas would have
been had a similar panel been led by Pat Buchanan, a Nixon aide who was also present at
the conference. Had Buchanan led the discussion, it would have unquestionably followed
an entirely different course and set an entirely different tone for subsequent debate.
Indeed, when Buchanan spoke at a later panel on the media, he added an unplanned coda
to his speech, warning conservatives that "the worst mistake conservatives could make is
to be stampeded by the liberal press into joining the lynch party… forming on Capitol
Hill.” He noted that "conservatives should not let themselves be stampeded into doing
the liberals' dirty work for them," and that political opponents were interested in
13
14

Ibid.
Ibid.

78

"discrediting the political verdict of December 1972." He added that his remarks were
more "serious than he had hoped to make" but that when he looked in the back of the
room and saw Jeffrey Bell and Alan Ryskind (members of the Manhattan Twelve), he
wanted everyone to know that it was "good to know that not all of the members of the
Manhattan Twelve were missing and unaccounted for." The subtle implication, of
course, was that the surprisingly strong anti-Nixon thrust of the conference prompted
Buchanan to try to push back against it. He was a lone wolf in a sea of voices against
Nixon. Ryskind followed by light-heartedly commenting, "I don't know if I should thank
you Pat, or not."15
Following Ashbook and Rusher's speeches, the climate in the room was so filled
with hostility toward Nixon and Republicans in Congress that the discussion prompted an
objection from an audience member. The exchange is worth quoting at length because it
was an impromptu exchange that was truly generated by the panelists' speeches and by
the environment in the room. It is a perfect example of how the climate at a particular
site of discourse frames and structures the flow of ideas. It is also significant because, in
his response, William Rusher openly affirmed that the terms of the discourse were
influenced by the purpose and conditions at CPAC itself.
Female Audience Member: Don't you think we have enough things to
criticize the liberals for, though, that we don't need to continuously allow
ourselves to be in the position of having to criticize people who may not
be as conservative as we want them to be, but are certainly not as liberal as
George McGovern. But we seem to get ourselves in the position that
we're always defending those people and never complaining about the ills
of the more liberals. (sic)
William Rusher: I'm not sure I agree. I think, that's alright, if this were a
meeting of either party, Republican or Democratic, there would be a lot of
soundness to your point. But this is a conservative gathering, and our
concern, therefore, without in any sense being I hope fanatical or let alone
kook, is with principle. And if we are to make ourselves felt, we are going
to have to stick to principle and certainly complain, perhaps complain the
more loudly, when wage and price controls are brought in by, for heaven
sakes, an allegedly, relatively conservative administration. When détente
with Russia and the opening of relations with Red China upon bases that
have been opposed by both Republican and Democratic administrations
for nearly a quarter of a century, is brought in by a relatively conservative
Republican administration and then hailed as the principal achievement of
the administration. For us to sit around in silence while that is going on,
on the grounds that McGovern is, after all, still out there, is, I think, a
wrong approach.

15
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John Ashbrook: I would agree 100% with that Bill, and I think again you
get to the matter of basic principles. You touched on several. I've been
very close to the whole matter of national security for the last decade, and
the fact that George McGovern was going to destroy internal security
doesn't really warm me up very much when I see what this administration
has done. President Nixon moved to take the Internal Security division of
the Justice Department, he let the SACB die by the actions of his
subordinates, he's completely, in the public mind, undermined the FBI, the
Justice Department, the CIA, as far as National Security instrumentalities
are concerned. If you think of National Security and Internal Security
throughout the country now, and try to promote it, most people think of
raiding the Democratic Headquarters and going into the Ellsberg Office.
So it doesn't make me feel too good to feel that if McGovern had been
elected, that would have been one of the things he would have
accomplished directly, when our people, supposedly conservative, did it
indirectly and sometimes hail it as an accomplishment. In talking on
principles, it doesn't do us any good to just attack the other side and say
we're better than they are, if we're not doing what we should do.”16
These general characterizations of the Nixon administration continued throughout the rest
of the conference, as well. During a different panel, Political Strategy for 1974,
conservative strategist Kevin Phillips was asked what issues conservatives be could used
during the upcoming election. He noted:
I don’t think there are very many issues that will make any difference.
The President, when he is under pressure, tends to move left. He did this
in 1971 when everything seemed to be falling apart. That’s when he
wanted busing in Austin, Texas. That’s when the Family Assistance Plan
was still the flagship of the rattered, tattered fleet. This stuff is all
warming on the back burner right now to serve as a mass offering to the
liberal media. We’ve got the welfare program taking shape, health
insurance, more liberal services approaches, all sorts and forms of détente,
all sorts of deals for the Russians on natural gas, you name it they’re
thinking it up right now…they tend to neutralize their own potential issues
to appease the liberals programmatically.17
After the event, press coverage of the CPAC conference reflected the strong antiNixon sentiments that had been on display. Various headlines included: “Major
conservative groups cold-shoulder support of Nixon policies,” “Nixon Support Dwindles
Within GOP Right Wing,” “Ford Calm; Conservatives Upset,” “Many Conservatives at
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Parley Appear Ready to Abandon Nixon,” and “Don’t Join Lynch Mob, Buchanan Urges
Right Wing.”18
The Conservative Majority
Of course, the conservative leaders who spoke at CPAC did more than simply
express their opposition to the policies of the Nixon administration. They also sought to
chart a path forward for the conservative movement–to unite conservatives behind
common goals and to define the strategies that would enable conservatives to retake
control of the Republican Party. Significantly, despite the specter of Nixon, Watergate,
and the looming 1974 mid-term elections in which conservatives were expected to be
crushed, leaders argued that there was considerable hope for conservatives in the future.
They emphasized that hope could be found in the fact that the American people were
basically conservative and that Americans were becoming even more so. The path
forward for conservative activists was therefore to move past Watergate, to identify ways
of speaking strongly to the concerns of the American people, and to, in turn, harness
various forms of popular opposition to the liberal policies of big government that were
embraced by Nixon, unprincipled Republicans in Congress, and the Democrats.
Certainly, the most powerful idea that structured conservative discourses during
the 1970s was a characterization of the electorate as containing within it a latent
conservative majority. The idea had been developed significantly by conservative
columnist and strategist Kevin Phillips. In his 1969 book, The Emerging Republican
Majority, Phillips argued that the Republican Party was poised to eclipse the Democratic
Party and become the new majority party in the United States. According to Phillips, the
GOP could reach majority status by strongly embracing conservatism and by cultivating a
base of support among blue collar workers and social conservatives rooted in the South
and West.19
Phillips’ thesis wasn’t entirely original. Republican candidates had been making
inroads in the South since the 1950s. In 1964, Barry Goldwater had made strong appeals
to southern voters on the basis of his conservative stance on Civil Rights. Nixon
appealed to southern conservatives in 1968 and then again 1972, and he won in both
years with strong support from elements of the coalition described by Phillips. Still,
Phillips validated old claims with fresh statistics, and he made the case for the
ascendance of conservative Republicanism in a more powerful and convincing format
than had ever been made before.
During the 1970s, the idea that there was a latent conservative majority at the
mass level thus grew to be an extraordinarily powerful rallying point for the expanding
conservative coalition. It was a powerful idea because what it carried was enormous
potential. It offered hope that conservatives could achieve real political power. It also
suggested a path toward that end. To win, it would be necessary for conservatives to
18
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appeal to voters on a series of emerging policy issues. In addition, it vindicated the
efforts of conservatives– they were nobly fighting against the liberal elite factions that
created and propagated big government on behalf of an unorganized majority of the
American people.
It is not at all surprising, then, that the task of characterizing and evaluating the
contours of the latent conservative majority became a focal point of the politicians at
CPAC who sought to chart a path forward for conservatives. One after one, politicians,
intellectuals, and analysts reinforced the familiar characterization of the electorate as
consisting of a growing conservative majority. In speaking to the activists, campaign
managers, politicians, and candidates who were present, politicians and intellectuals
explained the need to apply conservative principles in strategic issue areas, and they
offered hope for mobilizing a vast conservative constituency that could help
conservatives to overcome the problems imposed by the Nixon Administration and
Watergate and to achieve political power in 1976.
Conference organizers actively recruited a team of speakers who reinforced this
characterization and who helped to update and apply it to the circumstances of the day.
In fact, Kevin Phillips himself was invited to speak and was introduced to attendees as
“the author of the most important book ever written by a Republican.”20 In a panel on
election strategy, Phillips repeated his basic thesis and stressed that, despite Watergate,
the appeal of conservative ideas was “substantially undiminished” by Watergate. He
noted:
I think the potential is enormous. Here you have this basic drift to the
right…I’ve seen in the Wall Street Journal quite recently their chief
political writer was quoting Walter Dean Burnham of MIT on the
possibility of a big right wing shift that could even lead to a man on
horseback. Even Roscoe Drummond, who is not known for electrifying
analysis of a potential movement to the right, said that every politician he
spoke to recently said the trend was to the right. William S. White, the
same thing. It would be possible to cite a number of additional analyses in
this sense, so I don’t think the underlying potential of 1972 has been
destroyed [by Watergate]. What I think has been destroyed is Richard
Nixon’s ability to mobilize it. I think the old new majority is dead, but
there’s a possibility of a new new majority that could make the liberals
wish they had the old one back.21
Other speakers echoed this view. During his remarks on the Nixon Presidency,
John Ashbrook noted: “part of my concern is the apparent inability of conservatives to
capitalize on what quite clearly is a conservative trend in the country.”22 During the same
session, William Rusher noted, “I think the Democrats would be making, in addition to a
terrible mishmash for the country, a great mistake for themselves to suppose that
20
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somehow they had at last derived a national mandate to be more liberal or leftist…the
New York Times… survey of New York City… showed that one third of all the peoplemore than think of themselves as moderates, more than think of themselves liberals–
think of themselves as conservatives… There's no question that the mayor, the candidates
in the Democratic primary there, were not running on a notoriously leftist platform.”23
During his keynote, James Buckley further echoed these sentiments, emphasizing
that “a clear majority of the American people have rejected Liberalism and opted for
Conservatism.” Buckley quoted statistics which indicated that in a recent poll, 61% of
the public had favored strengthening local government while only 32% favored
strengthening the federal government.24
These same sentiments were also echoed by the conservative intellectual, M.
Stanton Evans, who stressed that reaching out to the conservative majority and
mobilizing it was the key to overcoming the difficulties of Watergate and leading the
Republican Party back in a more conservative direction. Evans stressed:
We have been without articulate conservative leadership at the national
level for quite a while, at a point where the constituency is waiting there to
hear from such leadership. Our job, it seems to me, and the answer to how
to get out of this bind in which we find ourselves–that is, the whole
Watergate conundrum in which you are hurt whatever you do, it’s a totally
no-win situation, as long as we remain in that box, we are going to be hurt
very badly indeed– but because of the authentic and spontaneous concern
of the American people about all of these other issues, the very clear
answer is that we have got to start speaking to the American people about
those issues… to get some kind of articulate presentation of our view on
the energy crisis, busing, welfare, taxes, abortion, the whole litany of
issues which have people out there steaming and about which we aren’t
saying anything so far as they can tell… the White House isn’t the whole
of government…we have excellent leaders…Governor Reagan, Senator
Goldwater, Senator Thurmond, Senator Tower…if these people will come
forward decisively on these issues and hit them hard, I think that majority
can be reached even now.25
During his opening remarks, Rep. Robert Bauman made a similar point. He noted:
… the American people are learning out of the experience of the last few
months, and out of the more specific experience of gas pumps that are
empty and fuel bills that are going up. If they are learning anything, they
are learning something that Stan Evans has for years said in his columns in
such an articulate manner– that the government of the United States is not
23
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the panacea, cannot solve the problems, is indeed the problem causer in
this country.26
Reaching the Conservative Majority
The idea that there was an expanding conservative majority at the mass level and
the idea that this majority offered great potential for conservatives to remake the GOP
prompted extensive discussions of the ways to reach and mobilize that majority. Despite
Evans’ suggestion that Republican senators and governors could play an important role in
reaching the majority by articulating conservative positions, it was equally clear that
having a conservative Republican as the leader of the party and hopefully as president
instead of Nixon was a critical step, as well.
After all, part of the vehement opposition to Nixon was rooted in the fact that he
was in the seat of power, that he was identified in the public mind with the GOP, and that
he was identified as a conservative. As a result, the president confused the electorate
about the nature of conservatism and damaged public perceptions of the ability of
conservatives to govern.
In order to solve the problem, an important key for conservatives would therefore
be to build up a leader (and hopefully a president) like Reagan who would be able to
change those perceptions. That was part of the impetus for making Reagan the featured
speaker at CPAC. It was an effort to position him to assume that role. In fact, the goal of
getting a conservative back into the White House was so important that it led Evans (who
loathed Nixon and his policies) to recoil at the idea of Nixon leaving before the end of his
term. This was because Nixon’s exit would allow Ford to ascend to the Presidency.
Evans noted:
If we base our analysis on what it takes to get through the 1974 election, if
we improvise something to get past that crisis, but then find ourselves with
a permanent situation that is itself deleterious in the long run, it seems to
me we’ve made a very bad bargain, and this, in essence, is what is being
suggested when we talk about deposing Nixon and replacing him with
Ford so we can get by 1974, but then we have another vista of years to
contemplate in which we have another centrist in office for many, many
years to come, and I think that is a radical vice of political analysis and a
radical vice of much conservative participation in the political process in
recent years to surrender the long perspective to the short one. I think this
is indeed what led to the ’68 calculation. We found many people in the
conservative community who said well, we had our ideological orgy in
1964, and we were trounced, and now we’ve learned our lesson. We’ve
got to get smart and pragmatic, and not try to push our principles so hard
in the political marketplace, and I think that, in retrospect, it is very easy
to see that the Republican Party and the conservative interest were
healthier after the defeat of 1964 than they are after the victories of 1968
26
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and 1972. I think it is time that we re-infused these considerations of
principle.27
In addition to winning the presidency, the leaders at CPAC also worked to define
with greater precision the issues that would be effective for mobilizing the conservative
majority, and they discussed the institutional roadblocks that conservatives would need to
overcome in order to achieve power. They did not, however, discuss the ideological or
ideational roadblocks associated with assembling diverse blocs of voters. A significant
feature of the conservative majority idea was that it characterized an enormous chunk of
the electorate as being broadly conservative in its outlook and as being opposed in a
nearly monolithic way to big, activist government in a wide range of issue areas. It
therefore steered discussions away from the complex realities of public opinion. It did
not encourage discussions of the multi-pronged rhetorical strategies that would be
necessary for reaching and assembling diverse blocs of voters with diverse policy
concerns. Instead, it suggested that sentiments could be harnessed through general
statements that spoke to the public’s opposition to the policies of big government.28
Following his comments on the Nixon Presidency, Ashbrook noted:
The issues are still there for a conservative to identify with a majority of
voters in his district… Inflation, less government. Myself, as I go
throughout the country, the one big issue I see that isn't used enough: the
average person feels the government's invading his home. Invading him in
many ways– in education, in what he can do, getting into his moral
decisions, wants to control his gun, wants to bus his children, this whole
concept that the government is trying to push itself into my door as to how
much gas I can have, what kind of car I can have, seatbelts have to be on.
The average person is sick and tired of this type of government. I think
he's sick and tired of this kind of action, and I think for somebody to say
you ought to be able to own gold, you ought to be able to do these things,
you ought to have a degree of your own freedom and freedom of choice in
education and across the board, I think can get elected because that is the
temper of the American people, and I don't think there's any doubt about it
myself.29
Of course, in order to link various forms of anti-statism together so fluidly and to
make them seem so tightly connected to each other, it was necessary to apply frames that
made the issues seem to line up rhetorically and have a singular problem and a singular
solution.
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In the context of these remarks, the frame that Ashbrook applied in order to
achieve this was one that emphasized government intrusion. This was an effective frame
because it harnessed opposition to the social issues–such as busing and abortion– and it
connected that opposition neatly to various forms of opposition to government action in
the economic realm.
For example, in this particular instance, Ashbrook’s reference to interference in
moral decisions was likely a nod to the social issue of abortion. A frame used frequently
at the first few CPAC conferences was one that connected the issue of abortion to family
planning programs and depicted abortion as a tool used by big government to interfere in
the choices of individuals and to engage in social engineering by encouraging population
control. The idea that abortion was a tool used by big government to interfere in the
choices of individuals was effective precisely because it skirted potential contradictions
that would have been created had a moralistic frame been applied. If abortion had been
framed as a purely moral issue, this would have potentially conflicted with the libertarian
principle that government should not legislate morality. It also would not have connected
the issue as strongly into a chain that emphasized the problems created by government
interference in the economic realm. The “interference” frame was effective because it
flipped the issue position around and depicted liberal supporters of abortion– not
conservatives– as the actors attempting to use the instrumentalities of the state to control
people and to take away freedoms. It allowed Ashbrook to make a nod toward the issue
and to connect it into a diatribe against big government that connected a range of
grievances together as a single package. As I noted in the introduction, the way that
problems were framed and understood within coalition and, in this case, conference
discourses was key to connecting various issue positions together and building a master
discourse that united diverse communities of issue activists with diverse policy concerns.
It is also revealing to analyze Ashbrook’s characterization of the so-called
conservative majority. Upon close inspection of his words, it is clear that at its core, the
majority– as characterized by Ashbrook– included a large conglomeration of people who
were opposed the regulatory policies of big government. In order to characterize the
people as broadly conservative, this required the bundling many different strands of
public opposition to big government and the classification of a majority of voters as
supporters of the entire bundle. A major problem with the picture painted by Ashbrook,
however, is that voters are not ideologues. Voters tend to be moderate, and those who are
opposed to certain aspects of big government often tend to simultaneously embrace other
aspects of big government.30 Most voters are uninformed and have many conflicting
views about public policy. Characterizations of the electorate as conservative therefore
conflate various forms of opposition to government, gloss over differences and complex
opinion dynamics, and create an entirely false construct.31
That said, even though the conservative majority idea conflated and distorted the
complex realities of public opinion, I argue that the construct was nevertheless powerful
and important. It was powerful (and used often) because it linked the many different
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types of anti-statism expressed by conservative activist constituencies together, it painted
the American people as broadly supportive of the entire package, and it therefore
characterized the coalition as fighting for the preferences of a majority of the American
people. As a result, it vindicated the political efforts of conservatives and made their
cause a righteous one.32
It is therefore not at all surprising that the conservative majority idea worked its
way into many conservative speeches and strategic formulations. There are many
examples of this that can be taken from the discourses at CPAC. Buckley made this leap
in logic on several occasions. He spoke broadly and characterized “the public” and “the
American people” as a whole as being strongly opposed to a range of big government
policies advocated by liberals.33 At one point, Buckley noted:
We are told that the public’s undeniable disillusionment is solely due to
the fall-out from Watergate. But the fact is that if the Watergate idiocies
had never occurred, the American people would still be exasperated to the
point of outrage with the ever-growing intrusion of government into their
lives: with the Legal Services horrors and the wage-price fiasco and the
Affirmative Action quotas and all of the big brother programs ranging
from ignition-interlock auto seat-belts– and I cite a proposed rule devised
by H.E.W.— a proposal to ban bicycles as a hazardous substance! The
Liberal intellectuals and bureaucrats have caused more fundamental
damage to this nation in a lazy afternoon of policy making than the entire
Watergate crew did in a year of bungling and burglaring.34 (emphasis
mine)
In these remarks, the term “conservative majority” is not used, but the idea is
present. What is perhaps most striking about these remarks is that the policy issues listed
by Buckley are very diverse in scope and in the various types of state authority that they
represent. In the context of these remarks, redistributive, regulatory, and affirmative
action policies are connected together, described as instances of government intrusion,
and characterized as a conglomeration of policies with which the American people as a
whole are exasperated.35 This is consistent with the frame emphasized by Ashbrook
(cited above).
In other portions of his keynote, Buckley continued to argue the same basic points
again and again. He characterized the American people as broadly opposed to a wide
range of big government policy initiatives, and he characterized the people as being
32

Ibid.
James Buckley, Address to CPAC 1974, William A. Rusher Papers, Manuscript Division,
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Box 13, Folder: Buckley, James L. 1972-1975
34
Ibid.
35
The “legal services horrors” are a reference to the movement of legal assistance services to the
poor from the Office of Economic Opportunity to the newly formed Legal Services Corporation
(formed in 1974).
33

87

broadly open to the rollback of government authority in a wide range of policy areas. In
Buckley’s view, the conservative message was thus the one that “the public” wanted to
hear. The people–in the broadest sense– were opposed to liberalism across the board and
were ready for government to be completely remade in accordance with an entirely new
conservative public philosophy. Buckley noted:
I am convinced that the missionary field has never been so ready to hear
the Conservative gospel…If we will translate our principles into specific
approaches to concrete problems, we will find ourselves on most issues in
harmony with the concerns and aspirations of a solid majority of
Americans of every background, who at base want nothing more than to be
allowed to work out their own lives, set their own priorities, and achieve
for themselves such happiness and contentment as is given man to enjoy in
this life…I believe, too, that the public is ready to understand that it is the
Conservative who truly believes in and trusts the common man. We reject
the elitism that is at the heart of so much of Liberal policy…we are a
scandal to the liberals because we really believe that Americans are
intelligent enough to lead their own lives, and that they are competent of
responsible self-government at levels less olympian than the federal. We
do not speak of the ‘masses’ or ‘minorities’ or of any other quantitative
misrepresentations so popular in liberal rhetoric. Instead, we focus our
attention on the individual. We dare to hold the heretical idea that
Americans irrespective of station or origin should be treated as citizens
and not as ciphers. Our people have had their fill of condescension on the
part of big brother government. They have seen the failure of all those
shiny promises that each one of our problems could be solved if only the
federal government adopted the necessary programs and spent the
necessary billions. Americans are ready now for a new approach that will
offer common sense solutions to very real problems, that will seek to
return real responsibilities to state and local governments, that will prefer
freedom to regulation, that will once again treat the ordinary American as
a person capable of making his own decisions without the guidance or
dictation of a benevolent state… at a time when America seems to have
lost its moral moorings, Americans are hungry for a sense of commitment
to an ideal higher than the satisfaction of their appetites. We are there to
fill the void with our passionate concern for individual freedom… any
political party that forthrightly builds its platform on the bedrock of
Conservative principle and insight will be the majority party of the
1980s.36 (emphasis mine)

36

James Buckley, Address to CPAC 1974

88

The State vs. the Individual
It is important to note that in these remarks, Buckley does more than characterize
the people as being opposed to the liberal policies of big government. He also
characterizes them as having a character, a mindset, and a work ethic that is conservative
and that is much more strongly compatible with the conservative vision for American
government and society than with the liberal vision. In other words, as Buckley puts it,
the American people aren’t just conservative because they are opposed to big
government; they are conservative because they want the opportunity to be free, to make
achievements, and to be responsible. They are, at heart, conservatives in a positive sense
because they yearn to take care of themselves without the aid of government.
In this vein, Buckley indicates that the purpose of government is not just to create
freedom for freedom’s sake. It is to create a free environment that will provide citizens
with the opportunity to act responsibly. He expresses confidence in the individual to take
care of himself, and he notes that citizens want the opportunity to govern themselves and
to find ‘a sense of commitment to an ideal higher than the satisfaction of their appetites.”
In these comments, Buckley also makes an implicit reference to the policy of
colorblindness when he mentions that conservatives oppose the use of terms such as
“minorities” and “masses.” The passing reference is tied to an emphasis upon a selfdescribed “idealistic” confidence in the potential of the individual, who presumably
should be fine on his own without special assistance. Again, the theme of responsibility
and self-reliance is implicit. The implication is that conservatives have confidence that
individuals are capable of taking responsibility and providing for themselves. This vision
of the nature of man as capable and self-reliant is juxtaposed to the liberal viewpoint,
which is framed as lacking confidence and trust in the abilities of the individual to care
for himself without the support of the state.
Also, this faith in the superiority of the colorblind approach is cast as an extension
of a much broader worldview which emphasizes not just faith in the individual but also
protection of the individual from the damage caused to him by liberal policies. Here, the
implication is that race sensitive policies are opposed not because they are unfair but
because they are damaging to the individuals that they ultimately seek to help. In the
language here, these policies are condescending, and they ultimately mistreat the
individual by undervaluing his potential.
These remarks also hint at a broad, recurring theme prevalent in conservative
discourses and in many of Buckley’s speeches– that is, an emphasis upon the importance
of the dignity that an individual derives from taking care of himself and from acting
responsibly and a concern for the damage to that dignity that is caused by wellintentioned policies of the liberal state. In this vein, racial distinctions hurt the individual
in a very profound and personal way. They take away his dignity by taking away the
opportunity to step up, take care of himself, and act virtuously and responsibly.
The theme of the dignity of the individual is one that ran throughout other
portions of the speech, as well. At another point, Buckley noted:
It was the late, beloved and unforgettable Frank Meyer who best summed
up why we have to present a common front against the great heresies that
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still dominate our times. I want to quote Frank Meyer at some length
because he so clearly understood the absolute necessity for Conservative
unity. He wrote: “In opposition to this image of man as neither free nor
inspired by a transcendent dignity, the differences between libertarian and
traditionalist are thrown into their true perspective: differences of
emphasis, not of underlying opposition…The desecration of the image of
man, the attack alike upon his freedom and his transcendent dignity,
provide common cause in the immediate struggle. As with our ancestors
who laid the foundations of the Republic, the challenge to our common
faith inspires us, without surrendering differences of stress, to create a
fundamental unity of doctrine with which libertarian and traditionalist,
respecting each other, can mutually vindicate the true nature of man, free
and responsible, against the arid, mechanistic, collectivist denial of man’s
nature which transitorily prevails…”37
When these remarks are coupled with those opposing racial categories and redistributive
policies generally, Buckley’s views come into even sharper focus. He suggests that
conservatives oppose these policies because they are damaging to the dignity of the
individual. They take away from the individual the opportunity to ultimately be
responsible and to pursue his “transcendent dignity” on his own terms.
This is highly consistent with the blending of traditionalism and libertarianism
that is prevalent the earlier description of fusion political philosophy. In this vein, the
benevolent state may try to solve the problems of society, but ultimately, for Buckley and
for fellow ideologues, this kind of government intervention was ill-advised because it
destroyed the ability of individuals to take responsibility and find their own path toward
morality and virtue. This is not a coincidence. CPAC was organized by M. Stanton
Evans– one of the founders of fusionism– and under his leadership, other fusion
intellectuals like Buckley were recruited to lead the dialogue. Through their leadership
and participation in the discourses at CPAC, Evans, Buckley, Rusher, and others helped
to connect their ideas into the discussions and debates of the coalition.
At the end of his speech, Buckley returned to this theme of the assault upon the
individual by the liberal state. In his final comments, Buckley delicately wove the
themes of libertarianism and traditionalism together and reinforced the fact that the
individual’s conscience and dignity were under assault by the liberal state. He also
brought in the theme of anti-Communism by connecting the assault against individual
freedoms in the United States to the assault on individual freedoms posed by Communist
states in other parts of the world:
Conscience. That strange, atavistic word, the word that sends shivers up
the spines of materialists and those who can think only in collectivist
terms. It has the ancient, honorable connotations of spiritual virtue and
intellectual integrity about it. And from time to time in history a single
event reminds us all precisely what conscience means and what it can
37
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achieve. Fourteen years ago, the publication of Barry Goldwater’s book
was such an event for America. On a wider scale, embracing not only
America, but the world, the recent publication of Alexander
Solzhenitsyn’s Gulag Archipelago is such an event for today. Here, in the
last quarter of this cruel and bloody century, from the heartland of
despotism…we have heard the ringing, defiant, unconquerable voice of
the human conscience. That voice is now heard, incredibly, above the
grinding, hideous sound of the machinery of the totalitarian state. It has
pierced the soothing reassurances of a policy of détente. It is heard when
all that we have ever known about power has taught us the impossibility
for such a voice ever to be heard. But Solzhenitsyn in a transcendent act
of courage has sounded the voice of conscience and that sound will grow
in volume until even the most spiritually deafened leaders of the West
must hear its message. That voice is really what this conference is all
about: for it speaks of man’s unquenchable thirst for freedom. That voice
is threatened at every instant by the brute totalitarian force which
Solzhenitsyn has described in such horrifying detail. The language in this
case is Russian but the message is universal. Listen to what Solzhenitsyn
had to say in the Nobel Prize address he was never allowed to deliver: “In
order to mount this platform…I have climbed not three or four makeshift
steps, but hundreds and even thousands of them, unyielding, precipitous,
frozen steps, leading out of the darkness and cold where it was my fate to
survive, while others… have perished…” My friends, let us resolve that
the climb made by Alexander Solzhenitsyn and others up those
unyielding, precipitous, frozen steps shall not have been in vain. Let us
resolve that we will never take our freedoms so lightly that we will make
less than a total commitment to their preservation.”38
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CHAPTER 5
CPAC 1975

I personally believe that we are in an axial period in American politics. I think that the
enormous discrepancy between the level of conservative affirmation in the country,
which is a high and rising level, and the level of Republican affirmation, which is a low
and declining level, suggests that there is an enormous opportunity here for some new
political entity to reach out without all of this inherited difficulty from Watergate, without
all of the policy confusions that have been imposed upon the Republican Party by these
last two administrations– to reach out to that latent constituency, to transform that latent
majority into an actual majority, and lead us as conservatives and as Americans on to
victory in 1976.1
- M. Stanton Evans
Remarks at CPAC 1975
In this chapter, I analyze the discourse at CPAC 1975. In doing so, I seek to
document what conservative elites and activists were saying to each other in that year and
to establish what forces were effectively uniting them as a coalition. I argue that there
were two primary forces at work that structured coordinative discourse and brought
conservative elites and activists together. The first was a shared desire to achieve power
and to enact the policy platform of the conservative movement. The second was a shared
ideology that rationalized that platform by connecting the grievances of diverse elements
of the movement together into a single, tightly woven package. I argue further that
intellectual and political elites influenced the coordinative discourse at CPAC through
two corresponding mechanisms. First, just as they had in 1974, they organized and
moderated discussions of the strategies that would lead conservatives to power. During
these discussions, they promoted unity by providing their own highly stylized
descriptions and interpretations of political, institutional, and ideological context. In
doing so, they helped to build and reinforce common understandings of the situation
faced by conservatives and of what ought to be done in order to win. Second, elites
initiated a process of clarification and refinement at the ideological-discursive level.
They did so by selectively reinforcing themes and ideas that expanded, rationalized, and
sharpened the platform of the growing conservative movement.
This remainder of this chapter is organized into two parts. The first examines the
way that discussions of strategy were shaped by elite explanations of political,
institutional, and ideological context and the way that these discussions of strategy
promoted unity in the field of political action. In this section, I also explore the notion
that discussions of strategy and context both structured and were structured by
discussions of ideology.
1
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Part two examines the process of ideological refinement that took place at CPAC
in greater detail. Through a discourse analysis of the CPAC issue panels, I attempt to
isolate the common ideas and themes that were effectively used to tie the planks of the
movement's platform together and build ideological unity.
In this chapter, I take a much more in-depth look at the ideas expressed by various
intellectual, political, and activist constituencies than I did in 1974. This is not to say that
the ideas and the problem and solution frames I document here were not also expressed at
the CPAC issue panels held in 1974 or that they were first expressed at CPAC 1975.
Rather, it is because a majority of the issue panels at CPAC 1975 were recorded and
available for analysis. Because the historical record of the 1975 conference is more
complete than any other, it is an optimal year to conduct an in-depth analysis of CPAC
issue panels and to consider their significance in theoretical context.
At the same time, it is unnecessary to preface an analysis the discourses at CPAC
1975 with as much background and historical information as was necessary for an
analysis of the 1974 conference. It is sufficient to note that the general purpose was the
same and that conference organizers continued to exert the same kind of influence over
the flow of ideas through their influence over the conference’s structure, agenda, and list
of invited guests. In fact, in this chapter, I will argue that M. Stanton Evans, William
Rusher, and other leaders who were most actively involved in the planning of the 1975
conference had a very specific agenda. Specifically, they sought to encourage the
conservative movement to break away from the Republican Party and to form a New
Party. They set the conference up as a forum that would present and build momentum for
the New Party idea and that would lead to a “decision” on the part of conservatives to
explore the possibility of forming a New Party. Although speakers with diverse
viewpoints were included on the CPAC program, a disproportionate number of speakers
were recruited and featured who favored the New Party idea and who helped to guide the
conference toward its pre-ordained conclusion. Just as in 1974, then, I argue that CPAC
was more than just a forum where conservative discussed their ideas and debated the path
that they should follow. It was an instrument that was used to steer the coalition in the
direction its organizers thought best.

I. Framing Context and Defining Strategic Goals

The first feature to note about the 1975 conference– particularly in relation to the
1974 conference– is that leaders took much more obvious and overt steps to position
Ronald Reagan as the leader of the coalition and as the candidate that would lead
conservatives to political power. From the vantage point of conservative leaders in the
mid-1970s, a Reagan presidential candidacy was a critical step toward winning their
extended struggle to gain control of the Republican Party and remake it as the party of
conservatism in the United States. They therefore reinforced the point repeatedly for
attendees at CPAC in a variety of ways.
A Reagan candidacy was important for two primary reasons. First, Reagan was
perceived by many as having the personality, the character, and the rhetorical skills
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necessary to make him an effective presidential candidate. By 1975, Reagan was the
candidate preferred by a majority of the conservative movement– including a majority of
its leadership and its activist base. During his opening remarks at CPAC 1975, YAF
Chairman Ron Docksai told the audience:
We must say out loud early and often what we all privately know to be
true, and that is that in our present predicament, operating in an
atmosphere similar to 1968, we are faced with the potential of one and
only one candidate of extraordinary stature with the ability, the character,
and the willingness to be president, and that man is Ronald Reagan
(cheers and extended applause). Though we may each individually defer
on the tactics to be deployed, all of us here, I think, share a common vision
as American conservatives.2
In fact, the audience at CPAC did overwhelmingly share that vision. At the conclusion of
Reagan's featured speech that weekend, the entire auditorium would break into a chant,
shouting "We Want Reagan, We Want Reagan." The cheers and applause for Reagan at
CPAC were so overwhelming that it prompted National Review publisher William
Rusher to return to the stage and comment, "I think I speak for everyone here when I say
that we got your message, and I suspect you have gotten ours."3
A second reason that a Reagan candidacy was so important was that Reagan was a
principled conservative with a track record of effective governance. He had successfully
implemented conservative policy solutions as Governor of California, and, as a result, it
was believed that he could make a credible and convincing case to voters that
conservative principles worked in practice.
At CPAC 1975, Reagan's record as a successful conservative governor was put on
full display. Daniel Oliver of the National Review organized a panel on welfare reform
and invited the director of Reagan's welfare reform effort in California, Robert Carlson,
to speak. Carlson spoke at length about the Reagan administration's battle with the
federal bureaucracy, the California state legislature, the court system, and supporters of
the welfare system generally. He explained how Reagan had invited in a team of citizen
experts into his administration as governor to analyze the welfare system, root out
inefficiencies, and invent creative ways of finding and eliminating fraud. He also
depicted at length the success of Reagan's reform effort. Carlson noted:
In every month for eight straight months the welfare rolls dropped. They
leveled off in December 1971, they dropped again in January '72, they
went up in February and March of '72 because we lost a case which we
won at the US Supreme Court level or they wouldn’t have gone up even
during those months, and then they continued on downward through the
rest of '72, and with the exception of just a few months, they've been going
down virtually ever since. Today there are well over 300,000 fewer
2
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people in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program in
California than there were when we started our effort. Even according to
the most conservative estimates, during the first two years of the welfare
reform, we spent 1 billion dollars less than would have been spent without
the welfare reforms, and half of that billion dollars was federal money…
After the first year, 42 of California's 58 counties reduced their property
taxes all at the same time. That had never happened before because of
savings and welfare. The state, instead of having to have a gigantic tax
increase which was being pressed so hard in the last legislature during the
welfare reform battles, found itself with an 800 million dollar surplus in
the treasury. And Governor Reagan battled to see that the legislature and
he returned that to the taxpayer in the form of a tax rebate instead of
spending it on something else. In addition to that, there was a cost of
living increase for the Aid to the Blind and the Disabled … and in
addition to that… the ones who … are really in need, received an
immediate 20 percent increase in their benefits to bring them up to the
standard of need that existed in California at that time. All of that was
financed out of the savings because of the reductions in the welfare rolls.4
Reagan had been popular among movement conservatives since he had delivered
his famous speech at the 1964 nominating convention for Barry Goldwater, but it was
this track record for cutting welfare and rolling back government that made him the hero
of the conservative movement and fueled the perception that he was the perfect candidate
to run for president. James Buckley, who was tasked with the job of introducing Reagan
on the day after Robert Carlson's presentation, noted:
…we are acquiring a track record, and much of that record is directly
attributable to the man who I am privileged to introduce to you… I could
spend a few minutes talking about him as an articulate spokesman for
conservative principles, or as a personal friend many of us have grown to
admire and respect, but within the context of this weekend's conference, I
think it more appropriate to introduce him as a symbol of the successful
fusion of conservative principle and political action. Ronald Reagan has
just completed a major undertaking in his eight years as governor of our
largest state (applause). During that period, he has proved himself an
adroit politician, an efficient administrator, and an imaginative reformer.
Those eight years stand as a monument to the ability of conservatives to
do more than talk. Ronald Reagan is living proof that we conservatives
can govern and govern effectively. Earlier, I compared him to a great
artist, and I think the analogy is a good one. In California, he inherited a
shapeless mass of liberal chaos. He quite literally reformed what he had
been given through the application of political creativity, intelligence, and
imagination. Just look at the record. Ronald Reagan left Sacramento
4
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more popular than ever. More important, he left the state with a budget
surplus, a decreasing welfare population in which those in need receive
more help, and a bureaucracy that hasn't grown in eight years' time in spite
of the introduction of new programs. He left, in short, as a successful
conservative governor who dealt with the issues confronting him. He has
proven that we conservatives offer the alternative that the American
people seek. He is the man who has proven conservatism works…the
Conservative Movement's Rembrandt, Ronald Reagan.5
During the speech that followed, Reagan would further describe in detail his record in
California, and he would reinforce the fact that it discredited liberal arguments made in
defense of the welfare state. Reagan noted:
The legislature let us present the case to them, but they insisted the
reforms wouldn’t work, the needy would starve in the street, the load
would be dumped on the counties, the property taxes would go up, and
we're run a deficit of at least 750 million dollars that year. That was four
years ago. Today, the needy have had a 43 percent increase in their
welfare grants, the taxpayers have saved 2 billion dollars, the case load is
400,000 less than it was four years ago, more than 40 of our 58 counties
have reduced their property taxes two years in a row, and most of them
three years in a row, and the 750 million dollar deficit became an 850
million dollar surplus. (cheers and applause).6
The Importance of Mobilizing a Latent Conservative Majority
Of course, from the perspective of movement leaders, a Reagan candidacy was
only part of the strategy for achieving victory. As I argued in the last chapter, a second
and equally crucial component of movement strategy involved assembling and
mobilizing a vast conservative constituency at the mass level– by some accounts the
exact same constituency mobilized by Richard Nixon in 1972. In his comments at CPAC
1975, M. Stanton Evans clearly articulated the coalition-building task that lay ahead:
The problem before us, although it is technically difficult, conceptually is
not difficult at all. The problem is very simply stated. There is a latent
conservative constituency in the country shown in every opinion survey
available to us, it doesn't matter what it is: Harris, Gallup, Sindlinger, you
name it. All of these polls shows that the American people are
increasingly conservative and that that conservatism consists, although it
consists of many things, but it consists in major part of discontent with the
mounting social costs of the liberal welfare state, the taxes, the inflation,
the intrusion into personal life, the mounting difficulties that everyone is
5
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encountering because of the big government system that is simply not
working, not solving their problems. Our job is to reach that constituency.
To reach out to it in comprehensible terms and to energize it on behalf of
conservative officeholders and conservative programs in the federal
government.7
At a later point during the conference, conservative strategist F. Clifton White would
characterize the project in much the same way. White noted:
One of the real ironies for those of us who have been fighting this
particular battle for the last 25 or 30 years is we finally are getting to the
point where the majority of the American people are identifying
themselves as conservatives, and we don't seem to be able to get a
conservative public policy… I think what we have to worry and concern
ourselves with is how we do get to these people who identify themselves
as conservatives in this country, and communicate with them and take
their desires and their interests and aspirations and translate them into the
electoral process and therefore into public law.8
This mass conservative constituency was critical because it would provide the
base of support necessary to facilitate Reagan's election. It would also serve as a
foundation for the election of conservatives to Congress and the other institutions of
government.
In movement discourse, the importance of the coalition-building project, the
importance of a Reagan candidacy, and the importance of remaking the GOP as the party
of conservatism were all inextricably linked. As a principled conservative candidate,
Reagan would be able to attack liberal policies forcefully and directly. He would be able
to communicate and represent conservative ideas in a way that would effectively speak to
and energize the all-important latent, mass conservative constituency. As a Republican,
he would send a signal to that constituency that the GOP represented its interests and its
policy preferences and therefore help to transform it into the base for an ideologized
Republican Party. At the same time, once energized, that conservative majority would be
available to elect Reagan and to advance the conservative effort to wrest control of the
party apparatus away from the GOP's moderate and liberal elite factions. Once
conservatives pulled control of the party away from moderates and liberals, the party
would be positioned to attack liberalism with greater force and clarity.
In this vein, just prior to his introduction of Reagan, James Buckley made the
following remarks:
For the Republican Party … it cannot plausibly attack the Democratic
record unless it is prepared to attack the liberal Democratic policies that
have created that record. This means that unless the Republican Party
7
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brings itself to stand for a coherent philosophy of political alternatives, it
will continue along its current decline. Republicanism of the kind that
accepts in the name of moderation half the liberal democratic loaf holds no
appeal to those conservative minded Independents and Democrats who
were essential to the sweeping Republican victory in the presidential
election of 1972. (applause) Liberal Republicans cannot hope to resurrect
Republican fortunes. The one chance for the Republican Party to become
the majority party is for it to do what ought to come naturally, and that is
to identify itself fully and forthrightly with the conservative alternative to
the liberalism that now dictates Democratic policy. Otherwise, the
Republican Party may have no future. This, then, is the problem that
conservatives and Republicans face. It is also their opportunity. But the
opportunity is one which is by nature different than opportunity knocking.
It is the opportunity to go to work, to be missionaries, if you will. For, in
the last analysis, ideas uncommunicated are ideas that will not be of use to
the practical affairs of man.9
It was in this context that Buckley turned to introduce Reagan– the great communicator,
or, as Buckley so eloquently put it, the Rembrandt of the conservative movement. It was
Reagan who had proven conservatism could work in practice. It was he who would be
able to effectively communicate and represent conservative principles in a way that
would energize conservative-minded Independents and Democrats. It was he who was
positioned to help the Republican Party identify itself "fully and forthrightly with the
conservative alternative" and lead it away from a path of decline toward a brighter future
as the party of conservatism.
The Aftermath of Watergate
When Richard Nixon was besieged by the Watergate crisis and when he
ultimately resigned in August 1974, this caused a chain reaction of events that
complicated the plans of movement conservatives on several different levels. First,
Gerald Ford, who was not a movement conservative, advanced to the presidency. He
quickly proved to be a willing advocate of deficit spending and of the Nixon policies of
détente that were firmly rejected by movement conservatives. In his opening remarks at
CPAC 1975, Congressman Robert Bauman helped to frame the political context that
conservatives faced in the wake of Watergate and argue that conservatives should not
support Ford’s moderate policies. He noted:
Today we are confronted with an administration which in a short six
months has frittered away potential national support by adopting policies
of amnesty for draft dodgers and deserters, the biggest budget deficit in
peacetime history, relentless pushing of détente, a succession of
presidential appointments culminating in the elevation to the high office of
9
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vice president of the single most unacceptable nominee one might
contemplate– Nelson Aldrich Rockefeller (cheers, shouts, applause). I ask
you, is this what we are to stand and fight and die for in elections to come?
Not me brother! The day of compromise and appeasement within our own
ranks is over. We have compromised once too often and the result has
been rampant national liberalism.10
Jeffrey Bell, an aide to Reagan and a fellow at the Hoover Institute, would echo concerns
about Ford's acceptance of deficit spending, noting that "President Ford gave away the
game at the outset by saying… yes; I agree with you we need a huge deficit. It becomes
very hard for Republicans to rhetorically and substantively support him, because they're
only talking about details by that time."11
In a characteristically fiery speech, movement icon Buz Lukens, who had
famously led the charge for Goldwater forces when they faced off against Rockefeller
supporters at the 1963 meeting of the Young Republican National Federation (YRNF),
delivered a blistering critique of the Ford Administration. In his speech, he linked the
record of the Ford administration to the Nixon administration and linked both, ultimately,
to liberalism:
We've had histrionics coming out of the White House now for the last ten
years. I've had a piece of nothing ever since I became a Republican, and
I'm tired of it (extended applause)! It's true, it's really true (speaking over
applause)! … He [Ford] has not named one conservative to one position of
policy in the time he's been in there, and I'm disappointed in him. I'm
really disappointed in him (extended applause).12
Remarks such as these echoed throughout the conference and contributed to a tone that
was hostile to the Ford-Rockefeller Administration. There were a few exceptions–
notably, words of support from the Chairman of the Mississippi Republican Party, Clarke
Reed– but for the most part the tone was negative.
At the same time, as a newly sworn in president, Ford was gifted with an
opportunity that Nixon in his second term did not have– that is, the option to run for the
Republican nomination in 1976 as a sitting President. The seat that would have been
"open" for Reagan was suddenly occupied. Given the perception that Ford was not a
committed conservative and was leading the Republican Party further down the road
toward liberalism, this generated serious concern. M. Stanton Evans would explain the
difficulties posed by Ford's accession during his remarks:
…while I would agree with my good friend Clarke Reed that there are
some specific things that Mr. Ford has done. … the thrust of this
administration is not a conservative thrust. It is a continued drift in the
10
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same confused direction that the Nixon Administration was following,
which was, in turn, an extension of what the Kennedy and Johnson
administrations were doing, and I can't support that. You are going to
have one or the other of those gentlemen [Ford or Rockefeller] as your
candidate in 1976 for the Republican Party.13
Indeed, to complicate matters further, when Ford became President, he had
appointed Nelson Rockefeller as Vice President. Although Rockefeller had famously
moved to the right in his later years as the Governor of New York, he was still regarded
by movement conservatives as a symbol of the Republican Party's liberal, northeastern
wing. Robert Bauman's comment that Nelson Rockefeller was "the single most
unacceptable nominee one might contemplate" drew extended cheers from the CPAC
crowd.
The Ford-Rockefeller team was therefore more than just a roadblock to a Reagan
candidacy in 1976. They also posed a threat to the second component of conservative
movement strategy– the coalition-building project. As a team of moderates, Ford and
Rockefeller were incapable of articulating the all-important platform that conservatives
believed needed to be articulated in order to associate the Republican Party with
conservatism, credibly speak to the concerns of conservative Democrats and
Independents, and facilitate desired and anticipated shifts in mass partisanship. In fact,
they complicated the task by further associating the Republican Party with a moderateliberal policy agenda. This was the same objection that movement conservatives had
expressed with regard to the policies of the Nixon administration at CPAC 1974.
In this vein, Buckley's remarks are worth repeating. Again, he stressed to the
audience, “Liberal Republicans cannot hope to resurrect Republican fortunes."14 During
his remarks at CPAC, Senator Jesse Helms also explained in detail how the policies of
Nixon, Ford, and Rockefeller damaged the Republican Party and seriously complicated
the conservative coalition-building project:
The people all too often correctly understand what the leadership of the
Republican Party is doing. No amount of communication specialists can
hide the soaring federal deficit, or the failure of the Republican
Administration to respond to the social issues upon which we were
elected. We cannot preach honest economics, and then bring forth a
budget proposal calling for a 52 billion deficit that optimistically assumes
spending cuts of 17 billion that a Democrat-controlled Congress will never
approve– a budget that fails to mention another 10.6 billion in agencies
that are separately funded for a total deficit of 75.5 billion... Is there any
reason why, under a Republican administration, foreign aid is projected to
rise from 3.6 billion in Fiscal Year 1974 to 6.3 billion in Fiscal Year
1976?... Is there any reason why, under a Republican administration, food
stamps are presently costing 4 billion a year and are projected to go up to
13
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8 billion a year? Is there any reason why, under a Republican
administration, we should be negotiating to give away strategic US
territory in the Canal Zone to a country that has less population than
metropolitan Washington? Is there any reason why we should be
proposing billions to develop energy resources in Siberia when we cannot
even agree on unleashing private enterprise to develop our own resources?
I know that we have a Congress that is opposed to the President's program.
But too often the President's program is so bad that even Republicans have
difficulty supporting it. Under the Republican Party's present course, the
Party is out of tune with its own rank and file membership and out of tune
with the growing conservative majority. It is out of tune with the majority
that is fed up with both parties and is looking for politicians who will
stand on issues and deliver what they promise. 15
In this context, the notion that Gerald Ford was nevertheless well-positioned to be the
Republican nominee in 1976 instead of Reagan was extremely difficult for many
conservatives to accept. As long as Ford remained in the White House, the Republican
Party would not be able to associate itself with the platform necessary to speak to and
energize the conservative majority.
To make matters even worse, in the 1974 election following Nixon's departure,
the Republican Party lost forty-eight seats in the House of Representatives, and it lost
three seats in the Senate. This was framed by both the media and by conservatives as a
catastrophic defeat. Interestingly, in movement discourse, the defeat of Republicans was
not tied exclusively to the wrongdoings of the Nixon White House or to Watergate.
Instead, a prominent interpretation provided by movement leaders at CPAC was that the
Nixon majority had refused to support Republicans because it had been alienated by
Nixon and the party's collective failure to implement the conservative platform of 1972.
Criticism for the disastrous election result therefore extended past Nixon and Watergate
to moderate and liberal Republicans in Congress for their support of deficit spending,
détente, the Family Assistance Program, and other big government policies of the Nixon
years.
In this context, the accession of Ford and Rockefeller to the White House in
August 1974 was not cast as a development that would greatly improve Republican
fortunes or correct the problems that had led to defeat in 1974. In fact, due to its
perceived affiliation with the moderate-liberal wing of the party, the Ford-Rockefeller
administration promised only to extend and exacerbate the very trends that had led to
defeat by further alienating the conservative majority. Discussions of the party's defeat at
the polls therefore became connected to criticism of the policies of the new Ford
administration.
This interpretation of the 1974 election result also served another functional
purpose. It focused responsibility for the defeat at the polls upon the Republican Party
as an institution and upon the liberal policy agenda supported moderate and liberal
Republicans while absolving conservative ideology and the Nixon platform of 1972 from
15
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any of the blame for the drubbing at the polls. In movement discourse, the perceived
mandate for conservatism that had been delivered by voters in 1972 had not been
rescinded or diminished at all by the election results of 1974. Support for conservative
policies at the mass level remained as strong as it had ever been, and the conservative
constituency remained intact. Only the Republican Party as an institution had been
refuted and discredited, and this had occurred precisely because it had failed to boldly
stand for policies consistent with principled conservatism and therefore energize and
mobilize the coalition of voters that had supported Nixon.
During his comments at CPAC, M. Stanton Evans would touch on these points
directly. In response to a comment regarding the root causes of the Republican defeat in
the 1974 Congressional election, he noted:
The country is indeed fed up, as I think we've all remarked in one way or
another, and people are looking for some kind of redress to all of these
social costs, however you want to define them… the recession, inflation,
taxes, and the rest of it. One difficulty is that the Republican Party for the
last six years, having been elected to the White House on the supposed
basis of doing something about those concerns, has failed to deliver– not
only in terms of legislative action where … they didn't control the
Congress, but even in the proposals. A president who said I am now a
Keynesian in economics, a president who ran up billions and billions in
deficits. Another president proposing 50 billion in deficits. How can you
communicate to the American people that you have a concern for what
bothers them if you're talking more of the same thing that bothers them?
So I think that that is one essential cause of the Republican shortfall. This
is why conservatism goes up, Republicanism goes down.16
James Buckley would echo these same themes during his comments, noting that
"as we survey the shambles of last November's elections, certain facts become
increasingly clear. The electorate did not reject political conservatism in 1974. Rather,
by their votes or by staying home, they delivered a stinging political defeat to the
Republican Party."17 Jesse Helms' comments are also instructive and reinforce the same
key points. In Helms view, conservative voters rejected the Republican Party because it
had not lived up to expectations and because it had not taken principled stands on the
issues of concern to voters:
In 1974, the voters stayed home! They stayed home in droves–
Republicans, Democrats, and Independents. Only 38% came out to vote,
and they were angry. The hopes of 1972 had not been vindicated. The
image of rectitude had been shattered and the issues which had influenced
the voters to vote for Nixon in 1972 never found fulfillment. They felt
twice-cheated– and they either became disillusioned and stayed home, or
16
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they took revenge by voting with those who never wanted Nixon anyway.
Does this not indicate the final collapse of the two party system? With no
issues-candidate in a national forum, the voters stayed away in droves,
disappointed with both parties, with broken promises, and with broken
illusions. Only the left wing Democrats came out in substantial numbers,
confirming that the Democratic Party, by and large, was operating largely
as a cohesive liberal faction– a liberal party as it were– while the regular
Democrats– the Democrats by geography– joined the Republicans and
Independents in apathy.18
Gallup polls at the time indicated that levels of voter identification with the Republican
Party dropped to an all-time low– below that of both Democrats and Independents.
A New Majority Party?
In this context, the debates at CPAC 1975 revolved around extensive discussions
of how to break through the institutional roadblocks created by intra-party ideological
heterogeneity, facilitate a Reagan candidacy in 1976 despite Ford and Rockefeller's
presence in the White House, and energize the mass coalition perceived as being such a
critical component of a Reagan victory.
As I noted in the introduction to this chapter, the organizers of CPAC represented
a growing faction of the conservative movement that– in the wake of the 1974 election–
came to increasingly see the Reagan candidacy and coalition-building project as goals
that simply could not be achieved by working within the institutional framework of the
Republican Party. Instead, they believed that a new party was required to replace the
Republican Party, and they structured CPAC 1975 as a forum for the discussion of the
new party issue. The ACU Board of Directors meeting held on December 15, 1974 was
devoted to planning for CPAC. The minutes from the meeting provide insight into their
thoughts and intentions regarding the new party alternative and the upcoming conference:
A general discussion of CPAC followed, focusing on what outcome was
expected or desired. Mrs. Schlafly suggested offering attendees two
choices– New Party or working within traditional parties–- at some point
during the conference. Mr. Keene suggested, sentiment willing, that the
conference resolve to appoint a New Party exploratory committee. It was
felt that the conference must end on the note of 'having taken a step;
putting the conservative movement into a course of action.' Various
suggestions for panels were noted by the conference planning staff. Mr
Evans' suggestion that a 'Committee for a New Majority' result from the
conference was approved in principle, as was the general use of this
vehicle as a fund-raising, organizing, and communications vehicle prior to
the actual establishment of a New Party. Mr. Winter urged the heavy
involvement of State ACU organizations in this effort. The CPAC
18
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program will be as specific as possible. Mr. Evans agreed to meet
Governor Wallace at his earliest convenience to discuss political
cooperation with his constituency and organization, particularly in the
vexing area of legal roadblocks to New Party efforts.19
In keeping with these goals, the CPAC planners featured several strategists and activists
who supported the new party option, and they scheduled panels to debate various aspects
of the process of party formation. During a panel entitled, "The Republican Party: Does
it Have a Future," David Keene, an Assistant to James Buckley who would later go on to
serve as a political strategist for the Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Dole, and Romney
presidential campaigns, posed the question before conservatives in the following way:
Do we stick with the Republican Party, or do we break out on our own to
form some sort of a new party or coalition? As I indicated, the answer to
this question is basic to the answers to the other questions we've been
discussing here this weekend… The problem is obvious. Most
Americans describe themselves as conservative, as conservative on a wide
variety of public issues. But we conservatives have not been able to
transfer that broad, albeit big consensus into either government or policy
or electoral success. We as conservatives dominate the Republican party
numerically, but certainly don't control it in any substantive sense.20
Kevin Phillips strongly favored the new party option, stating emphatically: "I
think the total opportunity in American Politics today lies in the hand of a new party that
will arise to combine the thrust of conservatism on one hand and elements of populism–
Wallace– on the other hand and make it into a viable new majority party in the United
States."21 He went on to say that the notion that the Nixon Majority of 1972 was
"harnessable in the Republican harness is just out of the question." He argued that the
Watergate debacle combined with inflation and economic decline under Republican
leadership had damaged the party's reputation beyond repair.
Phillips also argued that the party's decision to "straddle all the issues" was a
source of its decline.22 This reinforced the common theme (also emphasized by Buckley
and Evans) that the party's failure to identify itself strongly with the conservative
alternative prevented it from credibly attacking the liberal policies of the Democratic
Party and was a primary cause of declining levels of voter identification and support for
the GOP. In Phillips' own words:
…it's just not going to go anywhere. It's pathetic, and it's just nothing that
you can advertise to people anymore as having any real soul, to use that
American Conservative Union “Minutes of the Board of Directors Meeting,” (December 15,
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word. I just don’t think there's anything there. I think it's the twentieth
century Whigs at this point, trying to straddle all the issues. They had a
conference of state chairmen in January where they brought in some
pollster that said you want to get away from national issues, you want to
stress things like prevention of local burglaries and checking out
supermarkets for price fixing or something. Well, this is the sort of
breadth of imagination that makes you think of Millard Fillmore. In fact,
if you look at the White House, there's a hell of a lot that makes you think
of Millard Fillmore.23
Ron Docksai, National Chairman of Young Americans for Freedom, also spoke on the
panel and reinforced many of the same points:
….should another party appear with the image of one which can
potentially govern, and potentially represent the attitudes and the interests
of the larger, popular middle class, the popular middle class described by
Kevin Phillips, it will once again become the century's successor to the
experiment of 1856, as the Republican Party of today follows the way of
the Whigs. So the real question to be answered as I pose it is not where is
the Republican Party going, but how long is it going to take until we get
there? William A. Rusher has contributed more toward answering this
question perhaps than many, and in his upcoming book, The Making of the
New Majority Party, he says as follows: "In state after state, as I've found
it, the Republican Party hardly exists at all. In part, this is due to the longterm shift of the national support from the party to the individual
candidates, but this, in turn, is the result of the essential meaninglessness
of the party. No one can effectively lead or even look to the Republican
Party today, because no one can possibly say what the Republican Party
stands for. It simply defies categorization. It defies it, moreover, not like
the Democratic Party in the interest of opportunism in which nothing
human is alien, but in the Republican Party's sterile and futile effort to
avoid hostility of blocs that have no intention of voting Republican
anyway." Mr. Rusher concludes by calling for the formation of an
Independent Party…24
For Kevin Phillips, Ron Docksai, William Rusher, M. Stanton Evans, and other
advocates, the appeal of the third party option was that it solved key problems that stood
in the way of effective execution of the conservative coalition-building project. First, it
solved the problem posed by ideological heterogeneity within the GOP. Without
moderate and liberal factions supporting a diverse range of liberal policy planks,
conservatives would be able to stake out a bold ideological platform consistent with core
conservative principles. Consequently, conservatives would be able to send a strong
23
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signal to the latent conservative majority that would speak directly to its alleged
opposition to big government policy initiatives and therefore more effectively mobilize it.
In a similar vein, the party's candidate for president would be able to take strong,
principled stands on issues rather than weakened, middle of the road stands that were
perceived as so often necessary in order to win the Republican Party's nomination and
support. Indeed, complaints by individuals such as Ron Docksai, William Rusher, and
Kevin Phillips that the Republican Party stood for very little were tied to the fact that
Republican candidates were often forced to take safe and moderate stands on issues and
straddle ideological lines in order to satisfy all of the party's diverse factions.
Second, a new party solved the problem of reputation. To reiterate, this band of
conservative leaders believed that a considerable amount of blame had been heaped upon
the Republican Party by voters (as evidenced by the 1974 election result) for its failure to
live up to the mandate for conservatism delivered by voters in 1972, for its tacit and, at
times, willing support of liberal big government policy initiatives, for its support of
détente, and for its culpability in the decline of the American economy and rise in
inflation. In their view, a great deal of this blame was deserved. Nixon and moderate
and liberal Republicans were, in fact, responsible for the economic decline and for a
severe weakening of American superiority on the world stage under their watch. In this
context, Watergate only added to the party's already terrible reputation for policy failure,
and it was this reputation that had contributed greatly to the GOP's defeat in 1974. A
new party would be free to throw off this yoke, repudiate all of these policy failures, and
to speak with greater clarity, credibility, and force to the conservative constituency.
M. Stanton Evans' comments are worth quoting at length because they reinforce
all of these points. Evans noted:
I personally believe that in 1976, we need a new political party at the
presidential level. (Applause and cheers) How one goes about doing that,
what the options are in terms of candidates, these are things that need to be
discussed. I realize, talking to my Republican friends, that this presents
many terrible difficulties… This is something not to be lightly considered.
The whole project is one of immense significance, not only in an
immediate political sense, but historically. I personally believe that we are
in an axial period in American politics. I think that the enormous
discrepancy between the level of conservative affirmation in the country,
which is a high and rising level, and the level of Republican affirmation,
which is a low and declining level, suggests that there is an enormous
opportunity here for some new political entity to reach out without all of
this inherited difficulty from Watergate, without all of the policy
confusions that have been imposed upon the Republican Party by these
last two administrations– to reach out to that latent constituency, to
transform that latent majority into an actual majority, and lead us as
conservatives and as Americans on to victory in 1976.25
25
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Senator Jesse Helms shared this vision and strongly identified with the fundamental goal
of creating a conservative party, but he differed in that he did not absolutely preclude the
possibility of transforming the Republican Party into a party of conservatism. He stated
that he favored the "realignment of political action into philosophically consistent
parties," emphasizing that it was "not of primary importance… what these parties would
be called." 26 In Helms' words:
… we must be prepared long before the filing dates have passed, long
before it is too late for us to get on the ballot in each state, to have
acceptable candidates ready and able to run for office, not excluding the
Presidency itself, in the event that major parties continue in the direction
they are now going. Thus, there will be no new party unless one is
necessary. And if we see that a new party is necessary, we will be ready.27
Certainly, the American Conservative Union Board and the group of
activist leaders who spoke in favor of the new party alternative at CPAC
represented only a segment of the American conservative movement. Even
among speakers at CPAC, there were clear differences of opinion about the
prudence of the new party alternative. Buckley remained cautiously optimistic
and urged conservatives to work within the Republican Party in order to transform
it, as did Clarke Reed, Representative Phil Crane, and, most importantly, Ronald
Reagan. Strom Thurmond, who spoke at the conference, did not address the issue
and did not criticize Ford. Republican strategist F. Clifton White and
Representative John Ashbrook refused to take a position either for or against the
new party alternative, stressing that it remained unclear which would serve as the
best institutional vehicle for conservatism.
A young Karl Rove, then president of the College Republicans, was perhaps the
most strongly outspoken opponent of the idea due, in part, to what he considered the
impossible logistical tasks of creating a viable new party structure, getting onto the ballot
in all fifty states, and raising the money to execute a campaign for the presidency under
restrictive campaign finance laws that were extremely unfriendly to third parties. Rove
also stressed that a split within the conservative movement's ranks would only reinforce
the likelihood of a Democratic victory in 1976.
Rove's case was strong. However, while his views may have been consistent with
the views of many conservatives still committed to working within and transforming the
GOP, they went against the grain at CPAC 1975. In a moment that gave particular
insight into the emotions of the crowd, a member of the audience criticized Rove,
bringing up the fact that he had selected a liberal national vice chairman in his capacity as
President of the College Republicans and asking pointedly, "why are you here?" The
meeting descended into disorder as some members of the audience cheered loudly and
shouted in approval. When Rove began to defend himself, the audience member again
interrupted, asking whether the College Republicans would also support Rockefeller were
26
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he nominated for the presidency. When Rove answered in the affirmative and stressed
that the College Republicans would support the Republican nominee no matter who was
ultimately selected, murmurs of disapproval from the crowd grew even louder, and the
discussion became even more disorderly.28
Eventually, an unidentified audience member shouted that he could testify that
Rove acted as a solid conservative in the Rule 29 fight (also prompting applause from a
segment of the audience). Keene brought the meeting to order, closing the panel by
noting, "we came in here with an unresolved debate, we heard some various viewpoints,
and I'm sure that not all of us have been convinced of the correctness of either of those
viewpoints."29
Speaking near the end of the conference to the crowd that had gathered to hear
Reagan, National Review publisher William Rusher attempted to frame the verdict of the
conference as being largely in favor of the new party alternative. He remarked:
One cannot help sensing that we are approaching here in this year 1975–
approaching some kind of crossroads in political action– some decisions
of perhaps a major and historic type. I know how eager many of you are
for quick and spectacular action in such a direction. I know not merely
because I have observed how you feel. I know because I feel that way
myself, and have testified to it myself by writing that book, the order
forms for which are right out there in the hall! It would be nice if we
could have, without paying the price and political consequences of
prematurity and bad timing, the great thrill of saying here, now, tonight,
this very moment– let us make history … Let me assure you that none of
the conservative leaders I have met and spoken to here, and I have met and
spoken to most of them, are in a mood to waste any time... but as Senator
Helms said in that wonderful talk of his last night, there are many, many
things to do, many constituencies to talk to, many negotiations to be
entered into, many preparations to be made, and I count on you, and I
know I do it without any hesitation or without any doubt, to continue to
act in this conference firmly and responsibly and not merely recklessly or
precipitately.30
Since Rusher was the most ardent supporter of the new party alternative, his assessment
of the conference verdict was certainly biased. Also, the conference itself was
undoubtedly biased in favor of new party formation relative to the climate of opinion in
the conservative movement as a whole. After all, the ACU Board supported the new
party approach and recruited friendly speakers to express favorable viewpoints during the
panel sessions. The new party option's most vocal critic– Rove– had, in fact, been a last
minute replacement for another panelist who had cancelled.
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In fact, the size of the elite faction of the conservative movement pushing for a
true break from the Republican Party was modest. However, it was powerful, and, in the
context of the coordinative discourse at CPAC, it was disproportionately represented and
disproportionately vocal.
CPAC 1975 Speakers and the New Party Option31
In Favor
Ron Docksai
M. Stanton Evans
Thomas Ireland
Buz Lukens
Serphin Maltese
Kevin Phillips
William Rusher
On the Fence
John Ashbrook
Robert Bauman
Jesse Helms
Phyllis Schlafly
Meldrim Thompson
F. Clifton White
Opposed
James Buckley
Philip Crane
Phyllis McGraff
Ronald Reagan
Clarke Reed
Karl Rove
As I argued in chapter 2, the conditions at a site of discourse need not mirror
conditions in the outside world. The planning committee favored the new party option
and gave speaking time to Helms, Evans, Rusher, Docksai, Phillips, and Bauman, who
were amenable to the idea. As such, they amplified and strengthened the expression of
that viewpoint within the context of the conference itself and therefore strengthened its
salience and circulation in movement discourse. By simply expressing they idea, they
forced other prominent speakers such as White, Ashbrook, Crane, Buckley, Rove, and
Reagan to react and respond to it. It guided and structured the comments of these elite
actors, even though they took neutral or opposing positions.
These debates were not specific to CPAC. Discussions of the new party
alternative both predated and postdated the conference and were therefore amplified by it.
31
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Rusher had contemplated the idea for years and had already written a book on the
subject.32 The ACU and movement leaders associated with the idea would seek to build
additional momentum behind the new party effort at CPAC to add credibility to the
efforts they planned to undertake in the following months. As pre-ordained by the ACU
planning sessions during December 1974, the conference was presented with and
approved the appointment of a Committee on Conservative Alternatives (COCA) to
further investigate the new party option. The individuals selected for the Committee
included:
Representative John Ashbrook
Representative Robert Bauman
Ron Docksai, Chairman, Young Americans for Freedom
M. Stanton Evans, Chairman, American Conservative Union
Senator Jesse Helms
Eli Howell, Former Assistant to George Wallace
Cyril Joly, Maine Republican National Committee
James Lyon, Harris County (Texas) Republican Finance Committee
J. Daniel Mahoney, Chairman, New York Conservative Party
William Rusher, Publisher, National Review
Phyllis Schlafly, Chairman, Stop E.R.A.
Representative Steve Symms
Governor Meldrim Thomson of New Hampshire
Robert Walker, former political aide to Ronald Reagan
Thomas Winter, Editor, Human Events33
Not long after CPAC, a meeting was also convened by James Buckley in
February 1975 at St. Michaels, Maryland. According to author Timothy Sullivan,
Buckley, who did not favor the new party option himself, sought to harness the unrest
within the conservative movement and use it to exert greater pressure on the Ford White
House to pay attention to the policy demands of the conservative movement. It is unclear
exactly what transpired at the St. Michaels meeting, and it is equally unclear what
viewpoints were represented there, since a diverse guest list was intentionally prepared.
According to Sullivan, the majority opinion at the meeting was to continue to work to
transform the Republican Party.34
Still, the list of those who attended the meeting speaks to the significant level of
attention attached to the debate by prominent conservative leaders of the day. Also, it is
important to note that the new party idea, however contentious it may have been,
prompted collaborative strategy meetings among high ranking leaders of the conservative
movement that were focused upon solving the problems of intra-party ideological
32
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heterogeneity and of party image. Prominent participants at the St. Michaels meeting
included: James Buckley, Clarke Reed, Jesse Helms, Karl Rove, John Ashbrook, Patrick
Buchanan, Phil Crane, Joseph Coors, Marjorie Holt, M. Stanton Evans, Jack Kemp,
Jeremiah Milbank, Trent Lott, Roger Milliken, Meldrim Thomson, Jr., William Rusher,
F. Clifton White, Thomas Winter, and David Keene.35
The Importance of the New Party Debate
In hindsight, nothing ultimately came of the new party debate. Knowing that, the
question that immediately presents itself is: did the debate have an impact? Since it
failed, is it worthy of such extended consideration? I argue that the answer is yes, for
reasons that have never been fully explored.
First, the new party alternative framed and structured coordinative discourse at a
critical moment in the conservative movement's history. It was tightly connected to and
helped to frame movement opposition targeted at the Republican Party and its moderate
and liberal factions. It was an integral part of discussions regarding the problem posed by
ideological heterogeneity with the ranks of the Republican Party in Congress, and it
helped to reinforce the idea that ideological heterogeneity had to be overcome in order to
effectively execute the coalition-building tasks that lay ahead. Arguments in favor of a
new party brought awareness to the importance of having a principled conservative
candidate like Reagan rather than Ford on the ballot in order to communicate the
conservative message in an undiluted format and reach key constituencies. In
conservative discourse, it was a carrier of the idea that Nixon, Ford, and other
unprincipled Republicans were destroying the reputation of the party as an institution and
alienating voters through their support of deficit spending and policies of détente. It also
shaped elite explanations for low voter identification with the Republican Party and for
its defeat at the polls on the heels of the great Nixon victory of 1972. In short, it was an
idea that structured elite discussions of context and strategy and infused those discussions
with considerations tied to the importance of ideology.
The new party alternative was also an integral part of dialogue that emphasized
and stressed the absolute necessity of building a strong, principled conservative platform
that would speak to the concerns of the latent conservative constituency and energize it.
Concerns about party system structure, the institutional roadblocks to a Reagan
candidacy, and talk of a third party alternative accelerated and reinforced the need for a
process of refinement and expansion of conservatism itself at the ideological-discursive
level. Regardless of the institutional vehicle conservatives chose, it would be necessary
either way to mobilize and tie together the same target activist and mass constituencies.
In this vein, amid his comments at CPAC 1975, Helms noted:
… we need to organize conservatives into a more coherent structure, and I
mean not only our trusty band of ideological conservatives, but
35
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nonpolitical people who are grappling in their own communities with
issues such as pornography, the right to life, school textbooks, community
control of schools, as well as those who are affected by economy issues
such as inflation, soaring social security taxes, and loss of jobs. We must
stop talking to ourselves in our own code words, and talk to people in
language they understand… we must begin working now and we must
work in different ways, with different groups, with different
constituencies….We can ill afford the luxury of turning away any
individual, any group of individuals whether a state party organization or
national party organization or any other body sharing the same basic
principles that we believe in. We must not forget that the most fertile
ground for political action lies with the millions who are completely
disgusted with both major parties. We must give them a solid
alternative….We must develop a program of principle, so that the
American people will know what we stand for…we must have a platform
convention not only to lay out the program that we intend to present to the
American people, but also to demonstrate the soundness of our political
organization. Is this platform convention the convention of a new political
party? It may be. Frankly, it is what we make of it… 36
If conservatives broke out on their own, they would be building a party truly from
scratch. It would be critical that they have in place a platform and a message that would
have strong appeal and attract a broad constituency to serve as a base of support. In fact,
discussions of the third party alternative led repeatedly into discussions of the policy
issues that would later be used to mobilize voters within the institutional framework of
the Republican Party.
For example, in the context of his speech arguing for the formation of a new
party, Kevin Phillips also made the following point:
Now in terms of what this means and how the whole idea of a third party
should be approached, let me retreat from that a little bit and say I would
not approach it very quickly or very vehemently at this point for the
simple reason that if it is precipitated too quickly and everybody's in a
great rush to set up an alternative structure, I think you run the risk of
being taken over by people who would over ideologize it in a way that
would not be sufficiently appealing to a large group of the American
people. I think that is especially clear in the economic area, where you
cannot sell what amounts to the old Kaiser-Fraser era brand of free market
conservatism in a situation when we have 9, 10, 11 percent
unemployment. I think anybody who tries is going to be in desperate
straits, and I think… to the extent of something set up as a third party
movement that builds quickly upon the conservative movement, it would
set itself in a fatal position in terms of economics, and it would foreclose
36
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flexibility and ability to present itself as responsive to the needs of what is
really middle America, which is not an affluent constituency. It’s a
constituency that’s having a lot of problems right now.37
Speaking on the same panel, Karl Rove made the same point, but he took the opposing
position and used it as yet another reason to oppose the formation of an alliance with
social conservatives:
[There is] a danger to the traditional conservative principles of the free
market by fusion with neoconservatives. Ron made mention of the Bob
Teeter survey conducted for the Republican National Committee. That
survey tried to find out what that majority of Americans who say they are
conservative really mean when they say they are conservative, and on all
the social questions they came out right: on the questions of pornography,
of drugs, of crime, they agreed with what conservatives would agree with,
but on the questions of the economy, they traditionally took, and in every
one of the poll samples that we took, they took the position of the New
Deal economics. They were in favor of government intervention, they
were against business, they were against the profit motive, some of them
of course were perhaps running opposite of that tide, but the
neoconservative is by and large a social conservative first and an
economic New Dealer second. As conservatives, we believe in the prime
point of economic freedom, that economic freedom is necessary to
political freedom, and by making a coalition, by making a compromise
with those who say that economic freedom is a baggage to be tossed aside
in times of economic difficulty, we're putting our conservative principles
up for a rather cheap sale.38
These issues were not resolved in any sense at CPAC 1975, but they were part of
an ongoing coordinative dialogue among conservative activists about how to
communicate their positions in ways that would resonate with and mobilize voters. They
also show that as concerned as conservative leaders were about developing a program of
principle, they were cognizant of the fact that their message needed to be refined in order
to speak to and effectively mobilize voters.
Discussions regarding the formation of a conservative platform also gave rise to
extended discussions of which target constituencies would be most critical and of what
message would effectively resonate with those constituencies. In his comments
supporting the creation of a new party, M. Stanton Evans noted:
…the issues are there: the issues are suggested by these polls, they're
suggested by the protests of the people. They are taxes, busing, welfare,
abortion, the energy problems, inflation, and so on. These are issues that
37
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have spontaneously arisen in the various communities around the nation,
and if candidates come forward and speak credibly on these issues, they
can reach this constituency…. . 39
Jesse Helms also speculated about the target constituencies that were necessary for the
success of the conservative coalition-building project:
I think we will find our majority by presenting our views in terms that are
easily understood by persons who are worried about what is happening to
them, but are outside of active political participation. We will find them
in families where parents are worried about state interference in their right
to educate their children according to their own values, whether it be the
values of their own community, their own neighborhood, their own
religious beliefs. We will find them among the people who can no longer
make ends meet because government interference with the economy and
ideological vendettas in the name of the environment have robbed their
localities of economic growth. We will find them among people who are
disturbed because they no longer have the freedom to arrange their own
lives according to their own means, who are alarmed over governmental
interference with their own privacy, and privacy of their families. Yes,
even the right to life itself has been called into question by an uncontrolled
judiciary that has constantly asserted more and more control over people's
lives.40
II. Discourse Analysis of CPAC Panel Discussions
CPAC 1975 was more than just a forum where elites discussed context and
strategy. It was also a site where the conservative message itself was refined and
sharpened. Conservative leaders were very forward-thinking. They were focused on the
coalition-building tasks that lay ahead, and they anticipated the package of policy planks
that would likely be critical for not only mobilizing traditional conservative
constituencies but also for speaking to the latent conservative majority. The planners
therefore organized panel discussions centered around policy issues that were of
importance to the conservative movement, as well as around issues that they anticipated
would be important for appealing to target constituencies.
CPAC issue panels were and are important, and an investigation of their
significance sheds fresh light on the very active role that intellectuals play in the process
of coalition-building. Political scientists have long noted the role of intellectuals in the
construction of political ideology. An area remains less explored theoretically, however,
is their role in the spread and dissemination of ideas beyond scholarly books, journals of
opinion, and the provision of advice to policy makers. The role that intellectuals played
during the early years of CPAC was unique and important, and it does not fit into any of
39
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these categories. During this time, CPAC was a forum in which intellectuals effectively
shaped the balance and flow of ideas within coordinative political discourse. It was a site
where they promulgated ideas that effectively blended, rationalized, and sharpened the
platform of the expanding conservative movement. An analysis of the proceedings of
CPAC 1975 helps to clarify and illustrate these points. The National Review and Human
Events publications were co-sponsors of CPAC, and prominent columnists, such as
Daniel Oliver, Alan Reynolds, William Rusher, and M. Stanton Evans, helped to shape
the selection of issues to be discussed and to create the list of speakers who would be
invited. Daniel Oliver of the National Review organized a panel on welfare reform, and
Alan Reynolds, also of the National Review, organized a panel on the economy, inflation,
and recession. These panel discussions were staffed by supply-side economists,
principled conservative politicians, and other scholars whose work was broadly
consistent with the brand of conservative ideology being developed and honed at the
National Review.
The experts who were selected to speak on these panels played an important role.
They helped to stake out and emphasize positions on contemporary and strategic issues
that resonated with and reinforced core conservative themes and principles. This process
of clarifying and reinforcing thinking on emerging and strategic policy issues aided in the
development and maintenance of an ideologically rationalized policy platform for the
conservative movement that had contemporary relevance. It helped to reinforce ideas,
themes, and patterns of thought among members of the conservative movement's eliteactivist coalition that were consistent with the ideology of the conservative intellectuals at
the helm. As the movement expanded and soaked up new groups during this critical
time, this process of refinement also meant that the arguments which rationalized new
policy planks in terms of core conservative principles were the very arguments that were
represented and reinforced at the CPAC conference. Conservative intellectuals and
scholars thus spread ideology not just by writing about it but also by expressing it aloud
and infusing it into an ongoing, interactive dialogue between elites and activists.
Surely, leaders such as Rusher and Evans envisioned the policy forums at CPAC
as refining the platform of a new conservative party, but their efforts ultimately
contributed to the expansion and refinement of a unifying discourse that facilitated the
assimilation of groups by the Republican Party. To reiterate the point, new party
coalition-building efforts potentiated relevant discussions of policy issues and had a
significant impact even though elite attitudes toward the Republican Party changed over
time.
The Socially Constructed Image of Modern Liberalism at CPAC 1975
As CPAC panel discussions unfolded and as the experts who had been assembled
spoke about their assigned topics, an image of modern liberalism was socially
constructed through conference discourse. When all was said and done, the image that
emerged through discourse was of an ideology that supported big, activist domestic
government across the board and that placed great faith in government. It was of an
ideology that sought to also use the instrumentalities of the state to transform the
economy, society, and the relationship between the state and society. Because of its
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transformative aspects and their negative consequences, modern liberalism was also
depicted as an ideology that caused great damage to the rights and dignities of individual
citizens, the traditions of society, and the health of the economy.
In the realm of foreign policy, the image that emerged was of an ideology that
was naïve, that contributed to national weakness on the world stage, and that caused
damage to national security interests. Expressions of opposition to big, activist
government were still part of foreign policy discussions, but they were applied to the
Communist menace and, in keeping with fusion conservative philosophy, were used to
rationalize an expansion of the national security state. They were also used to underscore
similarities between the domestic solutions of modern liberalism and Communism and,
by lumping the two together, to highlight the common nature of the dangers to freedom
posed by both.
Functionally, these themes were very effective for uniting conservative
constituencies with a diverse platform of grievances against a common enemy---modern
liberalism. Whatever the grievance– from worries about inflation to opposition to busing
to anger over the assault on family values to fears about national security and the growth
of the welfare state– the ideology of modern liberalism was the recipient of all of the
blame. Panel discussions also addressed the ways that these objections should be
conveyed to the American people. Strategy dictated that in order to win at the polls,
remote, general, economistic objections about the dangers posed by modern liberalism to
the economy needed to be reframed and connected to the impact on the individual.
Positive discussions of conservative policy solutions were also discussed. The
accompanying discussions of solutions revolved around the parallel objectives of: 1)
reducing the size of government; 2) reducing and decentralizing the authority of
government; and 3) strengthening the military and assuming an offensive posture on the
world stage. Solutions were focused upon promoting the status of: 1) the individual; 2)
the economy; and 3) national security. The core theme that tied the package of solutions
together– the idea that were at the heart of the conservative movement's message of
change– was the concept of freedom.
Ultimately, however, it was the negative formulation– the one that emphasized
the harm inflicted by liberal policies– that linked groups and their ideas together most
strongly at CPAC. Conservatives united through expressions of hostility toward their
common adversary.41 An examination of the discourse at CPAC shows how the dangers
posed by modern liberalism were articulated and reinforced across a series of policy
domains. I identify five that were critical: 1) welfare; 2) spending and deficits; 3)
regulation; 4) social issues; and 5) anti-communism. In each of these policy areas,
grievances were expressed and the effects of liberal policies were identified as problems
that demanded conservative solutions. In the pages that follow, I consider each of these
in greater depth.
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1. Welfare
Conservative objections to liberal welfare and social programs were tied, in part,
to the fact that these programs were costly and contributed to the growth of government
expenditures, deficits, and debt. Secondly, objections were tied to the fact that these
programs were inefficient and riddled with waste and fraud that raised levels of
government spending to amounts beyond those that would exist if government statutes
were efficiently administered. In this vein, a common argument was that people who did
not deserve welfare were nevertheless able to apply for it and receive it. Thirdly,
objections were tied to the fact that social programs destroyed the incentive to work and
made recipients dependent upon government aid. Discussions of welfare policy therefore
linked together three distinct kinds of conservative objections to big, activist government,
including: 1) the idea that excessive government spending caused damage to the free
market economy; 2) the idea that big government programs were susceptible to waste,
fraud, and inefficiency; and 3) the idea that big government programs intended to help
those in need often caused damage to the dignity of those same individuals and destroyed
their will to act responsibly.
Sen. Strom Thurmond, who spoke extensively about welfare at CPAC, touched
upon each of these themes. First, he emphasized concerns related to dependence created
by the welfare system:
The amount of unemployment and welfare has concerned me very much.
I've always taken the position that if there were people who were disabled
mentally or physically, they had to have some help some source. I think
primarily the communities in the states where it occurs ought to take care
of this problem. But so many people have gotten to depend upon the
federal government for everything. Well, even if the federal government
has to help that category of people who are disabled, I still say that they
don’t have to help people who are able to work and won't work and sit
down on their fanny. They ought to be put to work!42
Thurmond also made derogatory comments about fraud and waste in the food
stamp program and implied that government expenditures on social programs contributed
to increasing levels of spending, deficits, and debt. These comments are also interesting
because Thurmond isolates and identifies categories of people, including union workers
and students, as characteristic and undeserving abusers of the welfare system:
…several years ago, I introduced a bill, and Senator Helms introduced it
last year, and I joined him on that too, to provide that people who have
jobs and voluntarily go on strikes would not get food stamps. I've
introduced it again this year, and I think that Congress ought to pass this
bill. A lot of people don't have jobs at all, and people who have jobs and
walk away from them– why should Congress have to support that category
42
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of people? I say let the unions support 'em and not the tax payers of
America! And the number of college students now from moderate to
wealthy families drawing food stamps? This should be stopped! I'm
about ready to terminate this food stamp program altogether and just
provide the money rather than the food stamps. I think it's abused too
much, for the families that have to have help. Some people hide behind
food stamps. They'd be ashamed to take the money, but they're not
ashamed to take food stamps. It's abused. And let it come out in the open,
and let people see where the money is going and who's getting it, and
public opinion almost will rise up and take care of the situation if we do
that. Now, I've been in the Congress for 21 years. This is the 21st year. In
the 20 years, the budget has been balanced only four times. It's been
balanced only 6 times in 25 years. Now, ladies and gentlemen, we can't
keep on going like that either. Our present debt is 485 billion dollars. The
president now asking that be increased over 500 billion dollars. I have
never voted to increase the debt limit, and don't expect to. I realize it may
produce a crisis in this country, but maybe we need a real crisis to bring
people to their senses. We can't keep on spending, spending, spending.43
Thurmond then suggested that a continued path down the road to increasingly bigger
government would pave the road toward a bankrupt nation that would be susceptible to
socialism or communism:
I realize with some of the news media, it's very hard to get them to carry
the message of conservatives, for some unknown reason, they feel that the
trend is toward liberalism– more and more and more– but I warn you now
that we can't continue like we're going. We can't continue to spend more
than we take in, and if we do we're going to be a bankrupt nation, and you
know what'll happen. We'll end up with a socialist or communist type of
government, and the very people who are helping now to take us that way
will be the people who will suffer the most. It's difficult to understand the
thinking of some of the prominent people in this country and why they
don’t have the courage to stand up. America's a free nation, and we want
to remain free, but to remain free we've got to act with common sense and
wisdom and judgment and courage, and I hope we can stoke public
opinion along this line to do so. 44
Other speakers echoed Thurmond's criticisms of the welfare system. For example,
Ronald Reagan alluded to the inefficiencies of the California welfare system during his
keynote address, noting that prior to his substantial reforms, the system had been riddled
with waste and fraud. He noted:
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We went up and down the state telling the people what we had discovered
of what was going on in the area of welfare. One newspaper in San
Francisco tested our charges of welfare excesses, and when their reporter
came back and reported that he had gotten on welfare four times under
four different names in the same office on the same day, the paper joined
the crusade.45
Welfare Reform
There were also extensive discussions at CPAC about the steps that should be
taken to reform the welfare system. Yale Brozen, a conservative economist from the
University of Chicago, was invited to speak on the topic. During his comments, Brozen
made the argument that the statutory requirements for welfare were too lax and that many
people who did not actually need welfare benefits nevertheless qualified to receive them.
His recommendation was that requirements be scaled back and made more restrictive so
as to reduce the welfare rolls and limit the provision of assistance to only those truly in
need. Brozen noted:
There's enough money being handed out in the welfare programs, so that
the lower twenty percent of the population could have an income which is
double the poverty level, just from the welfare payments, including all of
the in-kind payments as well as the cash payments here. The problem is
not that not enough money is being provided. We only need half as much
money as is being provided to move everybody above the poverty line in
that twenty percent, even if they had no income from any source
whatsoever. Now of course they do have income from a good many other
sources, and with that income from a good many other sources, the lower
twenty percent of the population is not in poverty as measured by the
Bureau of the Census... It's only the lower seven percent. So, if we
concentrated welfare payments on the lower seven percent in need, in that
case we have the most richly funded program that anyone could possibly
conceive. We could put every one of those families in the lower seven
percent above the median income level in the United States– that is
$12,162 per family of four– is the median income level. Every one of the
nominally poverty stricken families which are actually there in terms of
income from non-governmental, non-welfare sources, could have an
income above the median level using present welfare payments. Well, this
suggests to me that the kind of reform we need in our welfare program in
addition to what's already been discussed here is simply slicing the
program in half and concentrating the money where it is really needed and
not sprinkling it everywhere to those not in need as well as to those in
need.46
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Strom Thurmond suggested a different kind of policy solution. He argued that
government jobs programs could be a substitute for the big government welfare system.
Interestingly, these ideas conflicted with the ideas expressed by the conservative
economists who also spoke at CPAC (see section 2, below, on spending and deficits).
Alan Reynolds of the National Review was highly critical of what he called "New Deal
nostalgia"– the philosophy which suggested that public jobs programs could somehow
bring the economy out of recession.47 Reynolds' concerns about public jobs programs
were, of course, economistic. They emphasized the fact that government spending was
ultimately still necessary in order to pay extra government employees. In his view, the
financing of government jobs programs entailed additional amounts of spending that
necessarily drained private capital markets, thereby reducing the number of jobs created
in the private sector. Government jobs were thus created at a huge cost to the private
sector and, in fact, reduced the number of private sector jobs created.
But these concerns were expressed at a different point during the conference.
Thurmond's contrasting views, which emphasized support for jobs programs, were of an
entirely different nature. They were not economistic but were rather highly moralistic.
Thurmond did not address the fact that public jobs programs would require an expansion
of the government's payrolls. Thurmond noted,
I want to say that with the unemployment today, instead of just paying out
unemployment from which nothing comes back, and people sit down and
do nothing, providing jobs doles and handouts, if we've got to do
something for this unemployment, why not build more ships, why not
build more power dams? We need the power! Why not build more
highways? We've got to have more roads eventually. Why not build
flood control projects, and why not build other projects of a worthwhile
nature, of a permanent nature instead of just taking this money practically
putting it down the rat hole and never get anything back again? In 1968,
did you know that only 243 ships have been added to the Navy while 710
have been retired, a loss of 467 ships? Did you know that we now have
the fewest number of ships in this country since the year 1940? Did you
know that we have 69 fewer fighting ships than the Soviet Union? Why
waste money when we can give people jobs and provide employment in
matters that really count and will help to provide for the safety and
security of this nation, instead of just giving handouts and doles, which in
turn destroys the very heart and soul of a man.48
Welfare and Federalism
In addition to the statutory reduction of welfare benefits, the other primary
solution emphasized at CPAC involved targeting and eliminating the waste and fraud in
47
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the system. Here, as with most of the policy planks in the conservative movement's
platform, discussions of reform stressed the utility of decentralizing administrative
authority and shifting additional responsibility from the federal level to the state and local
level. Reagan's welfare reform effort in California (mentioned earlier) was touted as a
prime example of what could be achieved when the states took the lead in welfare reform
efforts. Reagan had proven that fraud and waste could effectively eliminated by the
states. Reagan's California welfare director, Robert Carlson, stressed this point at length:
You can see that those states where there has been a positive effort to
tighten up and reform their efforts, those are the states where the rolls are
going down. In the states where nothing is being done or has been done
such as Ohio or Massachusetts, the rolls are still going up… I think that
the important thing… is to let your people at the state and local level know
that you know that they now have more tools than they ever have before to
run a good welfare system and that the old excuse that the federal law or
the federal court decisions won't let them clear up the system is no longer
valid. You want to effect the kind of change in your state that's been done
in other states in the Union… One of the reasons that I'm for keeping
government at the local level is because the bigger the organization you
have, the more waste you have. We found that the smaller counties in
California were doing a much better job of running welfare than the big
counties. And I've found nationally that the small and medium sized states
are doing a much better job of running their welfare system than the big
states… They haven't let themselves get into the mess that the large states
let themselves get into… We do have an answer to those people who say
that the system is hopeless and you're going to have to federalize it or
otherwise it won't succeed.49
Woody Jenkins, a state senator from Louisiana who would go on to become a
leader in the conservative movement and the Executive Director of the Council for a
National Policy in 1981, also emphasized the importance of reform at the state level:
Now the federal government's taken over a lot of welfare, but I'll tell you
what. We're never going to have welfare reform anywhere but at the state
level, because it's the local district attorneys who have to prosecute people
for non-support of children. If the local district attorney does not
prosecute people for non-support, then the people who have children will
not support their children, and the welfare rolls are going to continue to
grow. Unless the state has an effective system that encourages– almost
requires– district attorneys to prosecute those absent fathers in particular,
then the welfare rolls are never going to get smaller. They're always going
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to grow larger, because some people would rather live on a handout than
work for a living.50
Negative vs. Positive Formulations
Although these discussions of welfare reform efforts were prominent features of
the coordinative discourse at CPAC, there were still a lingering question as to what
would be most effective for mobilizing voters at the mass level. As I have argued,
discussions of strategy revolved around the ways that issues important to movement
conservatives ought to be condensed and packaged so as to mobilize the latent
conservative constituency. On the one hand, as Buckley argued, Reagan's success as a
successful reformer meant that he would be able to represent the success and value of
conservative policy solutions in a way that would energize voters. On the other hand,
there was a question as to whether negative rhetoric emphasizing waste, inefficiencies,
and damage associated with the welfare system would be more effective than positive
rhetoric emphasizing the necessary reforms.
M. Stanton Evans' touched on this question directly during his remarks. His
comments are instructive and are applicable beyond the policy domain of welfare. While
they were a source of debate and not everyone agreed with them, they nevertheless
represent the ways in which electoral strategy and concerns about communicative
discourse were distinguishable from the coordinative discourse at CPAC. Evans noted:
We don't need to invent our answers to the liberally defined problem of
poverty or pollution or whatever, we need to break through the tissue of
superficialities that liberals have opposed on our policies and talk about
the things that matter to us and that matter to the American people. This
means, above all, going on the attack. It means constantly criticizing,
holding up to objurgation all the things the liberals are doing. Most
elections are decided on that basis. They're decided on the basis of
somebody's discontent and the ability of a candidate or a party to reach
that discontent and to convince the people who share it that your opponent
is responsible for it…I think that we do, indeed, need practical linkages by
which we can put our program into operation. I'm talking about legislative
formulae, policy proposals in the executive branch if we ever have a
conservative president, ways in which to move from the condition we are
in to the condition we would like to be in… The welfare reform that Bob
Carlson who is going to be here speaking has enacted at the national level,
things like a youth wage or tax credits: things that can indeed move us
from where we are to where we want to be. But I think that those things,
although they have some utility in the electoral context, are less important
in getting yourself elected than they are in functioning after you are
elected. Elections are decided not on technical questions but on visceral
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questions. They're decided on these root issues of public discontent on the
cost of government as it is being conducted today.51
Evans’ call for conservatives to refuse to respond to problems as defined by liberals is
particularly important. In these remarks, Evans instructs conservatives to reject liberal
problem frames and to instead redefine and reframe problems in their own terms.
Specifically, he calls on conservatives to define the “problems” faced by the American
people as consequences of liberal efforts to transform the economy and the relationship
between state and society. This is the same point that was also famously made by Ronald
Reagan--- that government is not the solution (as defined in liberal discourses). It is, in
fact, “the problem” itself. In Evans view, conservatives had to work to facilitate that shift
in public discourse. They didn’t need to have well-formulated policy proposals in order
to win. They simply needed to encourage a shift in the ways that problems were framed
so that liberal “answers” received the blame for matters that were at the center of public
discontent.
2. Spending and Deficits
In the discourses at CPAC 1975, liberal social programs, expanded foreign aid,
wasteful and inefficient spending, Keynesian economic policies, and efforts by politicians
to over-stimulate the economy in order to win elections were blamed for contributing to a
dramatic growth of government expenditures and for producing increasingly large
amounts of deficit spending and debt.
Increases in expenditures, deficit spending, and debt were, in turn, framed as
policy consequences that: 1) necessitated higher taxes, 2) contributed to inflation, 3)
required government borrowing that resulted in the depletion of private sector credit
markets, and 4) led to declining levels of private sector investment and capital formation.
These policy consequences were, in turn, all framed as outcomes that imposed
heavy costs upon the productive sector of the economy and ultimately dampened rates of
economic growth. In short, a diverse array of spending policies and inefficiencies
associated with big government were blamed for inflicting harm upon the private sector
and for leading to a series of outcomes that caused damage to the overall health of the
economy.
These arguments laid the foundation for a package of "supply side" policy
solutions aimed at freeing business from the burdens thrust upon it by the spending
initiatives of big government and at incentivizing private sector investment and capital
formation through tax credits. In order to clarify the web of linkages between welfare,
Keynesianism, spending, deficits, inflation, recession, taxes, and supply-side policy
solutions, it is useful to break down these concepts and to consider the discussions that
surrounded each of these issues separately.
The Root Causes of Rising Government Expenditures, Deficits, and Economic Instability
51
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Social Programs First, it is important to recognize that liberal social and welfare
policies (described at length in the section on welfare) received most of the blame the
growth of government expenditures, deficits, and debt. Increases in spending were traced
back to social programs that originated during the New Deal and Great Society, and
criticism of the Nixon and Ford Administration budgets emphasized the acquiescence and
failure of these presidents to stem the escalation of trends that had begun years earlier.
Foreign Aid and Wasteful Spending Other policies that received blame for
contributing to the escalation of government spending were expanded foreign aid and
other wasteful and unnecessary government research. Governor Mel Thomson and Sen.
Jesse Helms criticized the provision expanded foreign aid to Red China and to mideastern countries that were not strong allies of the United States. Ronald Reagan joked
about wasteful government research studies that held no value and produced absurd and
obvious conclusions.
Keynesian Philosophy Keynesian economic theories were also blamed for
contributing to the mentality that deficit spending during recessions was acceptable and
that it could somehow be used to effectively spur economic recovery. As the argument of
conservative economists went, excessive spending policies pursued in order to stimulate
the economy are ultimately just inflationary, and they do not have lasting benefits. Any
modest benefits that increases in spending do have on employment are short term and
perfunctory. In the long term, they argued, increases in government spending during a
recession or period of unemployment do not encourage true recovery, since all sectors of
the economy eventually adjust their behavior to reflect increases in prices. According to
Alan Reynolds.
A new burst of inflation will reduce unemployment for a little while and it
does so in several ways… by tricking workers and small savers into
accepting less real compensation than they think they're getting. They
think 5 an hour isn’t really going to be 4.25 after inflation, so they take it.
The second way is that it reduces the real value of welfare and
employment benefits, and that makes you anxious to just take any old job
rather than hold out for the best one. This little rip-off of the little guy is
called the Phillips Curve, or liberal economics for short.52
What Reynolds termed "New Deal nostalgia" was also a scapegoat for several
speakers. As the argument went, the increased spending needed to support an increase in
public sector jobs requires corresponding increases in either deficit spending or taxes in
order to pay additional employees. The creation of public sector jobs can happen only at
the cost of inhibiting private sector capital formation and investment. If public sector
jobs are created, there's a good chance that private sector jobs that might have been
created will not be. Alan Reynolds noted:
Suppose we tried expanding the government payrolls. What are we going
to pay these people with? If the added payroll is financed by increased
52
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borrowing or by increased taxes, that will clearly decrease the
employment that would otherwise have been associated with the private
uses of those funds. There would be for example less funds available for
auto loans and mortgages if you borrowed it, or less after tax income with
which to make the payments on a new car or house, if you taxed it away.53
Another argument that was prevalent blamed Keynesian philosophy for the
misguided notion that government should try to "fine tune" or stabilize the economy
through policies designed to curb subsequent bouts of inflation and recession. The liberal
mindset, as conservative economists saw it, was that the economy is inherently unstable
in its natural state and that government should intervene in order to stabilize it.
Conservative economists saw governmental efforts to intervene and fine tune the
economy as an important cause of economic instability rather than a solution. Dr.
Norman Turé emphasized these points during his remarks:
Among the things that policymakers ought to unlearn is…[the notion] that
the private sector is inherently unstable, if left to its own devices will
oscillate extremely between booms and inflation and recession and
deflation, and that, therefore, government must lend a stabilizing hand and
only government indeed can keep the economy on a steady course. If
there is anything that the postwar record of the US economy demonstrates,
it is exactly, precisely the opposite. Every period of economic instability
since the war ended can be traced directly or just a tad indirectly to the
enormous disturbances imposed on the market system by one or another
set of governmental actions, primarily the federal sector.54
Here, as in Evans’ remarks, government was framed as being the source of the problem
rather than the solution.
The Political Cycle The re-election incentive of politicians was also blamed for
leading to increases in spending and deficits and for destabilizing the economy. The idea
here was that politicians have an incentive to stimulate the economy by passing risky,
poorly timed spending increases and tax cuts during the period just prior to an election,
even when those actions are not appropriate.
The Damage Caused by Spending and Deficits to the Economy
Tax Increases One reason for conservative opposition to high levels of spending
was that excess spending necessitates tax increases. Conservative intellectuals argued
that increases in taxes–particularly on business– carry negative consequences. As they
put it, this is because higher taxes reduce profits and translate into lower rates of private
sector saving, investment, and capital formation. This, in turn, results in lower levels of
economic growth and recovery than would be possible in a lower tax environment.
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Deficit Spending Of course, government spending not covered by tax or other
revenues is deficit spending. According to the conservative economists who spoke at
CPAC 1975, in order to finance deficit spending, government is forced to either: 1)
monetize its deficits through the expansion of the money supply; 2) borrow money from
the private sector; or 3) pursue a combination of debt monetization plus private sector
borrowing. Each of these alternatives carries extremely negative consequences for the
productive sector of the economy.
Debt Monetization and Inflation The economists at CPAC strongly criticized
the monetization of government debt as a means of deficit financing, arguing that
monetization invariably leads to inflation. As they explained to the audience, when the
government sells bonds in order to raise funds needed to finance deficit spending, this
tends to drive up interest rates. When interest rates rise, the Federal Reserve is invariably
pulled into the political cycle. It tends to print money and increase the rate at which buys
bonds in order to hold interest rates down. This activity, in turn, increases the money
supply and drives up prices, fueling inflation and creating an environment that
discourages investment and long-term economic growth.
Government Borrowing and the Depletion of Capital Markets The second
course of action for financing deficits– borrowing money from the private sector without
monetization– was depicted as no less problematic than the first. As conservative
economists explained it, government borrowing dries up credit that would otherwise be
available for use in private sector transactions. By soaking up sources of lendable funds,
the liberal policies of big government necessarily contribute to a decline in the rate of
private sector capital formation and investment. This "crowding out" ultimately inhibits
economic growth and recovery. In this vein, Alan Reynolds noted:
Suppose just for a hypothetical case all of the federal spending were
financed by borrowing from the private sector. That’s the ultimate tax cut.
No taxes at all, right? Does anybody think that would stimulate anything?
It would drain private capital markets completely. And what is ridiculous
in the extreme does not become brilliant by being adopted in part.55
Discursive Connections
Putting all of these points together, the inflation and recession that were
prominent in the 1970s were therefore depicted as negative implications of liberal, big
government policies and the resulting deficits associated with those policies, as well as of
misguided, interventionist attempts made by government to stabilize and control the
economy. Liberal welfare programs, deficits, inflation, and economic decline were all
tightly connected together and were all policy consequences of liberal ideology.
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Supply Side Policy Solutions
All of these arguments created a basis for the package of supply side economic
solutions advocated by conservative economists. Conservative economists rejected and
criticized the idea that there was a tradeoff between fighting inflation and fighting
unemployment or between fighting inflation and fighting recession. They argued that
both could be pursued simultaneously.
The package of conservative policy solutions advanced to solve the problems of
inflation and recession were focused primarily upon solutions that would increase
investment and promote capital formation. These were framed as the keys to economic
growth. Important components of reform included: 1) The implementation of
contractionary monetary policies and a return to a monetary rule to limit the discretion of
the Federal Reserve to adjust the money supply (monetary restraint); 2) A dramatic
reduction in government spending (fiscal restraint); 3) The cutting of corporate and
small business taxes, including an increase in the investment tax credit (tax credits for
capital investment were framed as being particularly important, since they would have
the important effect of directly stimulating the supply side of the economy); 4) The
indexing of personal income taxes so as to prevent inflation from pushing individuals into
higher tax brackets and forcing them to pay higher rates without increases in real income;
and 5) The decontrol of domestic energy resources so as to reduce dependence upon high
and destabilizing prices set by foreign suppliers.
During his remarks, Jack Kemp emphasized many of these solutions:
Last year, the federal government borrowed or preempted more than 65
percent of the total available private credit in the USA. To finance that
debt, it'll either take a 15-16 percent increase in the money supply or 80
percent preemption of the private credit in this country, and that leads to
disaster. It is disaster if it is not immediately reduced. If we do not grab
control of that runaway growth of federal deficits, if we don’t boost
production by finding those capital formation techniques, and I don’t
know, Alan, after hearing you speak if you came out for a tax cut or not,
but I believe one of the most important places where we need to cut taxes
is in that area of our economy that will boost productivity. I believe that
we need an immediate corporate income tax cut. We need tax reductions
for small businesspeople and farmers and small businesswomen too
(applause). I think the indexation of personal income tax rates is
extremely important, and I'm very much in favor of it, and we're going to
be talking about capital formation techniques with Dr. Ture, and thirdly I
personally believe that we need to if we can't abolish the ICC and the
CAB, we ought to. I think the presidents commission and the
Congressional desire to bring reform to the regulatory agencies that at one
time were set up to protect competition in fact today are inhibiting
competition is one of the most important aspects of this whole fight
against inflation. We talk about inflation being too many dollars facing
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too few goods, and we tend to come down hard on the side of monetary
restraint, which can only come of course after fiscal restraint. Not enough
of us including the president are talking about the other side of the
equation, which is boosting goods and services and production, and it
seems to me that this goes back to my second point– that the only way to
boost production, the only way to put people back to work in meaningful
jobs– not tax consuming jobs but tax producing jobs– are through the
private sector, and that means a permanent investment tax credit, not just a
one year rise in the investment tax credit, that’s really not going to mean
much as far as I can tell, and I'll let you amplify more on that Dr. [Ture],
but we need to decontrol of natural gas, we need, I'd like to see the
president immediately decontrol domestic crude oil. He doesn't need to
wait until April 1 if he wants to make this country independent or move
toward independence from Arab oil. We ought to decontrol our domestic
energy resources…56
Tax Policy, the Individual, and Income Inequality
Finally, conservative economists tended to emphasize the implications of
spending for the productive sector of the economy, and their policy solutions were aimed
primarily at reducing the tax burden on business. That said, it is important to note that
high individual tax rates were also criticized at various moments during the conference.
A common argument was that higher tax rates reduce the incentive to work, and tax
transfer policies designed to reduce economic inequality are simply inefficient, their
primary impact actually being to hurt business and contribute further to the decline in
rates of capital formation and investment. According to Norman Turé,
[Another thing] that public policymakers must unlearn is that tax and
expenditures, particularly transfer payment policies, are essential to offset
an inherent inclination in the economy for the distribution of income to
become more and more skewed– that tax transfer policies are needed in
order to reduce inequality in the distribution of income. If there's anything
that the historical record shows, not merely in the US but in every country
in the world, it is that tax transfer policies do not affect the distribution of
income or of wealth, a tittle or a jot. What they do do, however, if they
are implemented along the lines of most of the western democracies, is to
inhibit private capital formation and to keep everybody poorer than he
otherwise would have to be.57
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3. Regulation
Opposition to government regulation was also a prominent feature of the
discourses at CPAC 1975. Unfortunately, the panel entitled "The Regulated American,"
which included remarks by Congressman John Rousselot, Congressman Sam Steiger,
Yale Brozen, and James Davidson (Executive Director of the National Taxpayers Union),
was not recorded, and there are no records of the arguments that were made during that
session.
Nevertheless, it is possible to glean from other speeches delivered at the
conference some of the main themes that were used to express opposition to regulatory
policy. First and foremost, it is clear that regulations on business were opposed because
they interfered with free market competition. For example, Don Totten, a state
Representative from Illinois, argued that government regulations had interfered with free
market competition in Chicago– forcing bus and taxi companies out of business who
could not comply with government regulations and preventing competitive pricing by
business. Totten noted:
…it was very seldom pointed out that the failures of the free market in
transportation in Illinois were not the free market but were the regulations
that were put on by the various commissions, the ICC and so on…For
example, in Chicago, we have the Chicago Transportation Authority,
which is a monopoly. Suburban bus companies were failing continually
because they were not allowed to transport or pick up people once they
crossed the Chicago city border and take them into the loop. There was a
restrictive ordinance that prevented suburban bus companies from
surviving, there's restrictions on taxi cab licenses, there's restrictions at the
airport since the FAC and CAB have been regulating the airlines, we have
not seen a single new airline in this country, and the only thing they can
compete on is the movie they show and the number of drinks they serve,
and that's not a free market in transportation. The only surviving free
market transportation systems in the Chicago areas have been the Jitney
cab service on the south side… and that system which surrounds the city
which is a toll way which is relatively free and the users pay the charge…
and yet we say the free market fails, and it has been the restrictions of
government.58
Strom Thurmond echoed these same concerns during his comments, noting that
government regulations reduced business activity and therefore led to increased levels of
unemployment. Like others, he stressed that government was the problem and not the
solution:
If you will remove a lot of shackles away from a lot of organizations in
this country, a lot of business, there would be more employment. This
58
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OSHA bill which has created a lot of trouble, and some of the railroads
only allowed to operate a few hours a day. The way business has been
shackled by our government is one of the chief causes of unemployment
today. If you turn America free and return the true freedom again, you'll
see America like it was several years ago, and you wouldn't have this
unemployment.59
4. Social Issues
In the realm of social issues, conservative grievances were targeted not at the size
but the excessive authority of the federal government. One core theme was that the state
used its authority to intervene in the lives of individuals and that it disrupted the
traditional moral fabric of society.
Dr. Charles Rice, a Professor of Law at the University of Notre Dame and
Catholic scholar, was invited to speak at CPAC. Emphasizing a theme that would
become increasingly common in conservative discourse in the years leading up to the
1980 election, Rice referred specifically to the state's "attack on the family.” He warned
that government efforts to help by promoting “child development” only caused damage.
According to Rice:
The family is under attack today. You know that. That’s a cliché.
Sometimes we overlook the family aspect however of legislation which
we oppose on other grounds. The Community Services Act of 1974
included certain promotions of so-called child development. There have
been very massive proposals which have not yet been enacted to get the
federal government into this business on a large scale. When you analyze
this, you must conclude that this is a drastic assault on the prerogative of
parents because the family is the primary unit. Parents and children do not
exist for the state. Rather the family is the primary society. Child
development is one example. The serious proposals for psychological
testing, the actual practices of psychological testing of schoolchildren
without parental consent provide another example. If you've had anything
at all to do with the ludicrous masquerade that goes under the heading of
sex education, you know that this involves an interference with the
parental prerogative. It involves the intrusion between the parent and the
child of the state on the transmission of moral values concerning the most
important thing that we can do in terms of family life, and that is to
transmit new life. And, it's not the question just of lurid pictures or crazy
descriptions. We're not opposed to sex education, but it belongs in the
home. It belongs with the parents. It is something that the state ought to
keep its hands off. You have to look at this as a family oriented thing.60
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Rice then applied the same frame to the issue of busing. He framed the decision
of which school a child would attend as a "family oriented issue." In this context, the
state's use of its authority to promote balancing by forcing students to attend certain
schools was depicted as direct interference. At the same time, Rice linked this frame of
intrusion by government to a secondary frame emphasizing discrimination. Here, Rice
emphasized the idea of colorblindness, arguing that even though racial balancing was not
rooted in racism, it was nevertheless a kind of discrimination based on racial categories.
Rice's emphasis on the theme of colorblindness was reflective of a broader trends in
conservative discourse toward an emphasis on race neutrality:
Another of which is very definitely a family oriented issue, but the content
of which is so greatly obscured, is racial balancing in the schools. Now,
we have a concept in our Constitution which is given lip service by the
Supreme Court– colorblindness. But it is ignored, it is disregarded in so
many ways, and I could go into this in great detail. But if you look at
what is happening in this situation, you see the government arrogating to
itself as, for example, in Judge Garrety's orders in Boston, arrogating to
itself the capacity to classify pupils on the basis of race and shove them
around. Phase two will apply to the entire city of Boston. Shove them
around from one school to the other, in such a way that its designed to
promote the education of the children as conceived by the state. Now, no
state has any right, I submit, to discriminate on the grounds of race in the
allocation of any public facility. That ought to be quite clear– that
discrimination is wrong whether its discrimination which passes under the
heading of benign or whether it is some other kind. And it seems to me
that we tend to overlook these aspects of this particular problem. We tend
to regard it as solely a question of racist people on one side, and the
government on the other side. I think we have to realize that the primary
right to educate belongs to the parents. What's the remedy to that? Well,
a conservative party– or any party which proposes to offer an alternative–
shouldn’t tinker around with this thing. I suggest that the solution is to
return education to those who have the primary right for it, and the
primary responsibility for it, and that is to the parents. Through the
medium of a voucher program, or whatever, with appropriate measures
made to ensure a practical freedom of choice at the lower economic levels,
why can we not restore education where it belongs?61
Abortion as a Mechanism of Government Control
Opposition to abortion was another important theme in the arena of social issues.
As I noted in chapter four, conservative arguments made in opposition to abortion during
the mid-1970s tended to highlight and criticize the use by the state of abortion as a means
of controlling the population and of encouraging family planning. The frame of abortion
61
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as a mechanism of control cast abortion as the tool of an activist, interventionist, liberal
state. This aligned it neatly with other grievances related to the interference of the state
in the affairs of the family. This frame was prevalent in Dr. Charles Rice's comments on
abortion. In this vein, he noted:
What we are seeing under the leadership of such as Vice-President
Rockefeller, we're seeing the Government moving in- in what to me is a
genocidal enterprise to reduce by persuasion or by compulsion if
necessary the birth rate of the non-white people, particularly those in the
lower economic stratum. Now those who say that this is because they are
inferior. We want to maintain our gene pool, but I recall on one occasion
A. Rickenbacker, I remember discussing this with him… he said birth
control is race suicide, and that's true. And there are others who have taken
that position, and we as a nation have been rushing toward the brink of
self-destruction, and now we are enlisting the government to coerce,
persuade if possible, but coerce if necessary those segments of our society,
principally black, that we regard as somehow inferior, to keep them from
reproducing. To make them adopt the same contraceptive mentality, and
you can't have that without having abortion. And you can't have it really
without the attack on the family, and conservatives have to confront this
issue because there are economic conservatives that say birth control is the
greatest thing since paperclips because it keeps the welfare rolls down, and
I think we have to get away from that mentality.62
Significantly, in these comments, Rice notes the existence of contradictions within
conservative discourses on the issue of abortion. In fact, as he notes, some economic
conservatives supported abortion as a means of reducing the number of poor individuals
dependent upon the state. At CPAC, however, these ideas were not represented among
those who were called to speak. The conservatives who were invited to speak
emphasized moralistic rather than economistic arguments. Surely, this is an instance
where the "selection factor" I described earlier was at work. In movement settings, social
conservatives were given center stage and pro-abortion arguments were not only not
represented but were in fact vociferously opposed and repudiated.
It is also important to note Rice's emphasis on birth control. In fact, in other
portions of his remarks, Rice also tied the promotion of abortion by the state to the
promotion of birth control methods, such as sterilization and contraception. In Rice's
view, these were additional areas where the state encouraged immoral actions in order to
control the population. At the same time, state support of birth control, immorality, and
abortion were all things that encouraged immorality and promiscuity. In essence,
because the state subsidized these things and made them readily available, it actually
lowered the cost of immoral behavior and encouraged a breakdown of the "family values
of virtue and self-control." In other words, through its efforts to make these things
62
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available, the state lowered the costs of immoral behavior by society and therefore
indirectly encouraged and facilitated immorality:
You have the phenomena today of government, particularly with welfare
recipients, and here's where conservatives have to be very careful,
particularly with welfare recipients you have the phenomenon of
government actively promoting sterilization and contraception. The
concept here is that the government is not concerned about promoting the
family values of virtue and self-control. Rather, the government is
concerned about preventing the undesirable consequences, and that is
children. This is an area where there is a very definite genocidal aspect.
We've had problems in New York, let's lay it right on the line: When I
was with the Conservative Party, the Conservative Party took a stand
unambiguously in favor of a constitutional amendment to prevent
abortion. It's the only political party that has ever done so…There was
great opposition. The opposition included the so called economic
conservative. I don't just mean the libertarian types who call themselves
that, but the economic conservative. This is a way to solve the welfare
problem. Massive, governmental sponsored, governmentally sponsored
birth control, including not only sterilization and contraception, but
abortion. And we've got to face that problem if we're going to do anything
for this country, e've got to come out unambiguously in favor of life, we've
got to recognize that we don't have the right to subsidize immorality. We
don’t have the right to encourage promiscuity. 63
Abortion and the Right to Life
Another theme that was used to rationalize conservative opposition to abortion
issue was the "right to life." In short, the very straightforward idea was that the unborn
child was a person deserving of constitutional protections. Dr. Mildred Jefferson, a
Harvard-trained surgeon and President of the National Right to Life Committee, was
invited to speak at CPAC in 1975 and in several other years, as well. During her
remarks, she emphasized the "right to life" frame repeatedly. At the same time, she
framed Court decisions as creating different classes of citizenship. She argued:
.. in these Supreme Court decisions on abortion, the highest court of our
land joins that very strong team of the woman and the doctor against this
most defenseless member of our human family, and indeed creates that
third class of citizens I referred to, and referred to by Professor Rice, in
order to destroy the child, to end its life, necessary to declare a biological
being in existence as non-person, only to allow its life to be taken.
Following the path of the totalitarian countries, I wouldn’t want to count
how many people in Siberia … were declared non-person just to strip
63
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them of their political rights or their lives. And now, the highest court of
the United States has again taken us on this route.64
According to Jefferson, the Supreme Court had protected only the rights of the
woman and her doctor and had stripped the father and the unborn child of any rights
whatsoever.
When the highest court of our land handed down decisions on abortion on
January 22, 1973, that highest court which should uphold the Constitution
of the United States, indeed struck at the very foundations of our
Democracy. That high court created a special stratification of citizens, it
created three different categories of citizenship for these United Sates: by
granting a woman and a doctor that right of the private death contract, that
right of the private death decision, the highest court elevated two members
of our society to the rank of super citizens with the private right to kill.
And gave to the hand of the physician the almost unlimited right to end a
life. For those who have customarily worn trousers, those who are called
men or husbands or lovers or other strange names, they were reduced not
just to second class citizens, but a class lower than that– sub-citizens with
no rights at all, no defined rights in that decision to protect the lives of
their children before they are born, and lower courts since then have
underlined this loss of rights.65
Secularism and the State
In closing, it is interesting to consider Charles Rice's comments regarding a broad
series of other social issues, including pornography, homosexuality, and school prayer. It
is important to note that the glue that essentially connects this platform together is the
belief system of Christianity (perhaps more specifically, Catholicism). The theme that
tied these ideas (as strikingly different as they were) into coordinative political discourse
was the opposition expressed throughout to the various intrusions and dangers posed by
big, activist government. In this case, the damage inflicted by government was on the
moral fabric of society. These ideas grew out of a different strand of conservatism–
traditionalism. Rice argued:
What do you think pornography is? Pornography is just a manifestation of
the separation of sexuality from procreation. Gay lib, the homosexual
rights movement, is another manifestation, perhaps the most striking, of
the separation of sexuality from procreation. It's an inversion, a
perversion, it's contrary to nature, I don’t mean just that manifestation, but
the entire separation of those two intertwined aspects of sexual activity–
that is union and procreation– and our government now especially that
64
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who else but Nelson is the de facto leader of it? Our government is
promoting this concept with a vengeance. If we're going to do anything
about it, we've got to confront this issue…. I think this has a consequence
with respect to promiscuity among the young. If sex doesn’t inherently
have anything to do with babies, if you can willfully separate those two as
a matter of governmental policy, you don't have to be a Rhodes scholar to
conclude that sex doesn’t inherently have something to do with marriage,
and you don't have to be a Rhodes scholar conclude that it's just as well to
indulge outside of marriage. The whole thing hangs together, and it hangs
together because frankly it’s a Christian view of the family, and if we try
to reduce it to an economic thing, or if we try to reduce it to some kind of
mechanistic thing, we're going to get messed up. The error is
compounded because the Supreme Court in its school prayer decisions has
adopted for this country a posture of official governmental agnosticism.
As Justice Brennan said in the 1963 school prayer decision, government
has to be neutral, as between those, as among those, who believe in God,
among those who deny God, and those who don’t know whether he exists.
Government has to be neutral, but he says this doesn’t necessarily mean
that the words “Under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance are
unconstitutional, and these are his words– “they may merely mean that
this nation was believed to have been founded under God.” You have to
put these things together. We have a government which has cut itself off
from the higher law, cut itself off from the acknowledgement that there is
a standard of right and wrong higher than the state. We have a generation
of school children who are brought up in the public schools never once
seeing the official agent of the state acknowledge that there is a standard
of right and wrong higher than the state…66
5. Anti-Communism and National Defense
On one level, conservative discourse in the arena of anti-communism and national
defense took a familiar and consistent form. The conservatives at CPAC expressed
strong opposition to the defense policies advocated by liberals. In this case, the
conservative grievance, so to speak, was that by allowing a scaling down of America's
military force and armaments and by acquiescing to the negotiated policies of détente,
liberal thinking put America at a disadvantage. In short, liberal policies were leading to
the decline of America's standing on the world stage and creating a dangerous situation
that tipped the balance of power in favor of the Soviet Union. In this vein, Reagan noted:
We seem to be increasingly alone in a world that's grown more hostile.
But we've let our defenses shrink to pre-Pearl Harbor Level. And yet
we're conscious that in Moscow the crash buildup of armaments continues.
The SALT II agreement that we negotiated in Vladivostok, if not
66
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renegotiated, guarantees the Soviets a clear missile superiority in the near
future sufficient to make a first strike possible with little fear of a reprisal.
But too many of our Congressmen today are demanding further cuts in our
own defenses including delay if not cancellation of such weapons as the
B1 bomber.67
Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, the former Chief of Naval Operations, expressed similar
concerns:
They [the Soviets]… have developed a fantastic capability. They have
four times the number of ships that we have if you count their dangerous
small ones with cruise missiles. They have three times the number that we
have if you eliminate the smaller ones. As John Fisher suggested, Admiral
Moore and I, between us, have destroyed more US Naval vessels than any
enemy admiral in history. In the last five years, we have reduced your
Navy by 47 percent of its ships, by 24 percent of its aircraft, and 30
percent of its personnel. Why? Notwithstanding the conventional wisdom
… if one looks at the constant dollars eliminating inflation and the grossly
accelerated costs of personnel with the elimination of the draft, in
purchasing power and constant dollars, your defense budget each year has
dropped to a lower level. We're 15 percent below the level of
expenditures the year before the war in Southeast Asia. We're 33 percent
below the level of expenditures at the height of the war. We're at the
smallest fraction of the GNP for defense since 1950. We're at the smallest
fraction of the federal budget for defense since 1950. The defense fraction
of the federal budget has dropped from 53 to 27 percent. The human
resources fraction of the budget has grown from 30 percent to 45
percent.... While the Soviets have increased their manpower from 2.1 to 4
million, your manpower has dropped from 3.6 to 2.1. We've gone exactly
the reverse, and your Navy has the smallest number of ships since 1939.68
Of course, the conservative answer to these problems involved increasing the size
of the defense budget and increasing the size of the national security state. Sen. Strom
Thurmond was invited not just to sit on a panel but to provide a keynote address on the
subject of US foreign policy. During his extended remarks, Thurmond argued:
We've got to go forward with the trident, B1, more missiles, more
rockets… the best way to keep out of war and keep free is to stay strong
militarily, and if we do this we can survive as a nation. We can help the
free nations of the world to survive, and we can pass on the freedom, and
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if we don’t do this we can hide our heads in shame and feel that we never
should have lived.69
These arguments about the need for a strong defense posture were used to criticize the
liberal approach to foreign policy and emphasize the need to pursue peace through
strength. Thurmond's comments emphasized this theme, as well:
Now, we hear a lot about detente. It means, I believe to live in peace.
That's the effect, so they say. But I think if we're going to have a détente,
it ought to apply both ways. Any détente we have with the Soviets or the
Chinese is a threat today. Red China has invented the nuclear bomb, but
they don't have the means to deliver it. And they're not as aggressive as
the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is the immediate threat to the
freedom of the world. Detente is no stronger than the military force to
back it up. It means nothing so matter as the Soviet Union is concerned
unless we've got the power to back it up. Our foreign affairs will depend
on the military strength to back it up. If we've got the military
establishment, then we can conduct foreign affairs from a standpoint of
strength and not weakness and that’s the only language that the dictators
know. That's the only language the Kremlin knows, or the rulers in Red
China know…70
While these views certainly contrasted with the views of liberals, they
nevertheless also constituted a potential contradiction to other conservative discourses.
In every other policy arena, conservatives stressed the importance of less government
spending. In the area of anti-communism and defense, however, they advocated an
increase in spending and a corresponding increase in the size of the state itself.
As I noted in the last chapter, this contradiction was resolved in two ways. In
fusion conservatism, it was resolved through an emphasis on the theme of freedom.
According to fusions, a strong security state was compatible with a small regulatory and
welfare state because security was essential in order to secure an environment in which
citizens could exercise their freedoms. Secondly, this contradiction was resolved by
framing the fight against Communism as a fight against an ideology that advocated for a
strong, totalitarian state. In this vein, the fight against communism abroad and around the
world was cast as an extension of the fight against big, activist government on the
domestic front. Thurmond's comments regarding the need to provide aid to South
Vietnam in order to prevent the spread of Communism reinforced all of these ideas:
…the question now is whether we're going to let 17 million people go
down the drain, as well as whether we're going to let the whole of
southeast Asia go down the drain. It isn't as much a matter of helping the
South Vietnamese– which would be a noble cause to help them maintain
69
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freedom– but is it in our national interest? I think it is. I become more
concerned each year about the Communists. I'm just against Communists,
out and out wherever they are. It's being said now that we ought to
recognize Cuba, that we ought to recognize Red China. I'm against
recognizing either one of them, and furthermore if the Soviet Union had
not already been recognized, which I think was a mistake, I would oppose
recognizing the Soviet Union. One only has to travel in some of the
countries where I have travelled– East Berlin, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
and other places– to see how people live behind the Iron Curtain, and I
tell you that if they could go and see what happens there, how people are
depressed, how their freedoms are destroyed, the dignity of the individual
is not acknowledged, and where the government makes all choices for
people, I think they'd take a different attitude toward helping, to work
together with the free world. The people of South Vietnam have chosen to
remain in freedom… we told those people we'd give them a gun for a gun,
a bullet for a bullet, a tank for a tank, we made a commitment to them.
Now are we going to live up to that commitment? I think they can
survive… [extended lapse] I believe that it's our duty and responsibility at
this period of time in history that we have an obligation to preserve the
freedom of this nation and help preserve the free nations of the word. And
if not they'll be gobbled up one by one, and then we'll be isolated, and
what chance to survive will you have if all the rest of the world has gone
communist?71
Full Circle: The Importance of Ronald Reagan
The tensions in the air at CPAC 1975 posed a very real threat to the stability of
the conservative movement. National Review, Human Events, Young Americans for
Freedom, and the American Conservative Union were four of the most important
movement organizations of the day. Leaders of all four organizations sat on the COCA,
and three of the four formally endorsed the new party option at CPAC. Jesse Helms was
a rising star among movement activists, and his openness to the idea added tremendous
credibility. Its supporters were dead serious, and, had they proceeded, their efforts would
certainly have caused the conservative movement to split into separate factions working
within separate parties.
Of course, the conservative movement did not split apart. Reagan himself stepped
in and achieved what he alone could. He played the critical role of preventing a split
within the conservative movement and of holding activist forces within the Republican
Party. In what has since become a famous speech, he made the case that the Republican
Party could still be refashioned into an effective vehicle for principled conservatism and
that under his leadership, the party could articulate the ideas and planks necessary to
effectively mobilize a broadly based mass conservative coalition. It was an effective
71
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posture precisely because where Reagan went, the conservative movement would also
certainly go, and a third party effort not led by Reagan would never leave the ground.
Reagan's remarks to the audience at CPAC are worth quoting at length because
they struck a perfect balance. Coming as they did at the end of the CPAC conference, the
ideas included in his remarks were no doubt already familiar to conference participants.
In fact, what Reagan eloquently articulated was nothing less than the platform of the
conservative movement that had been elaborated in a very organic form through the panel
discussions at CPAC. He spoke to the hopes, fears, and concerns of those present,
reinforcing all of the ideas they had heard repeated over and over again, while also stating
his resolve to help conservatives do what they had wanted to do for years– to remake the
Republican Party as the party of conservatism in the United States. Reagan exclaimed:
I don’t know about you, but I am impatient with those members of the
Republican Party who, after the last election, couldn’t wait to rush into
print saying now that’s proof that we must broaden the base for our party,
when what they really meant was fuzz it up and blur even more the
difference (cheers begin) between (over shouts) the two parties …
(extended cheers, shouts, applause)…Our people look for a cause to
believe in. Is a third party the need, or is a new and revitalized second
party– raising a banner of no pale pastels, but bold colors which make it
unmistakably clear where we stand on all the issues that trouble our
people. Let me show you. Let's show them where we stand with that
banner on fiscal integrity and sound money. And above all, for the end of
deficit spending with ultimately the retirement of the national debt. Let's
also on that banner include permanent limit on the percentage of earnings
that government can take without the people's consent. Let our banner
proclaim a genuine tax reform that will begin by simplifying the income
tax so that workers can complete their obligation without having to
employ legal help. (applause)… And let that banner provide also a tax
reform that would give us indexing, adjusting the brackets to the cost of
living so that an increase in salary merely to keep pace with inflation
doesn’t move the taxpayer into tax bracket increasing the government's
share and making him worse off than he was before he got the raise. Let
our banner proclaim our belief in a free marketplace as the greatest
provider for our people. Let it call for an end to the nitpicking, the
harassment, and the overregulation of business and industry that restricts
expansion and our ability to compete in the world market. (applause) Let
it reply to those political demagogues who appeal to the worst in human
nature, telling us that we can having a bigger slice of the pie only if we
can help them reduce someone else's slice. Let our banner proclaim we
can all have a bigger slice of the pie if the government will get the hell out
of the way (shouts begin)… and let the private sector (Reagan's words
muffled by screams and applause)….Under our banner there will be
compassion for those who need help, but we will not sentence them to a
lifetime of hopelessness on the dole. We'll seek to make them self-
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sustaining with home in a future in which they can control their own
destiny. Let us explore ways to ward off socialism not by creating or
increasing government's coercive power but by increasing participation by
our people in the ownership of our industrial machine to a greater number
than we have so far. Our banner must recognize the responsibility of
government to protect the law abiding and to hold those who commit
misdeeds personally accountable (applause). And we must make it plain
to international adventurers that our love of peace stops short of peace at
any price. That we will maintain with whatever level of strength is
necessary to preserve our free way of life (applause). A political party
cannot be all things to all people. It represents certain fundamental beliefs
which must not be compromised for political expediency or to swell its
numbers. I do not believe that I have proposed anything here for our
banner that is contrary to what has been considered Republican philosophy
and principle. It is at the same time the very basis, the heart and soul of
conservatism. It is time to reassert those principles, that banner, and to
raise it to full view, and if there are those who cannot subscribe to that
banner or follow it, then let them go their way. (cheers, applause, shouts
of 'We Want Reagan, We Want Reagan').72
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CHAPTER 6
1976

If the opinion surveys are to be believed, most Republicans find themselves on the same
side of the issues as tens of millions of Democrats and Independents who find little in
common with the dominant thinking to be found within the Democratic Party. The fact is
that while the Republican Party represents a diminishing political base, it also represents
a latent popular majority– one that it has been able to mobilize into victories in two of the
three last three presidential elections…1
James Buckley, CPAC 1977

Expressions of opposition to Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Nelson Rockefeller
were commonplace within the coordinative discourses at CPAC 1974 and CPAC 1975.
At those early conferences, strategic considerations about what conservatives ought to do
in order to achieve victory as a coalition revolved to a very great degree around these
Republican presidents and vice-presidents and around the significant problems created by
their presence in the White House and as leaders of the Republican Party.
In fact, during the era prior to the 1976 election, liberalism as expressed and
supported by Republican leaders was a much more significant focal point in conference
discourses than was liberalism as expressed and supported by Democrats. In general, the
view expressed at CPAC was that by accepting large amounts of deficit spending, by
accepting liberal social programs, and by pushing for détente and trade relations with the
Communist world, Nixon, Ford, and Rockefeller failed to send the signal that movement
conservatives believed was so essential in order to associate the GOP strongly with
principled conservatism and attract the votes of detached Democrats and Independents.
In fact, these leaders were charged with tarnishing public perceptions of conservatism
and of giving the Republican Party a bad reputation by misleadingly associating
themselves with the conservative label while failing to deliver true conservative policy
solutions. Republican presidents– and especially Nixon–- were further blamed for
driving the Republican Party in Congress to the left by continually asking Republicans to
back their unprincipled policy agendas.
Ford and Rockefeller were also regarded as roadblocks to a successful Reagan
candidacy. A principled Republican like Reagan was seen as being essential in order to
send the strong signal that was believed to be necessary in order to effectively mobilize
the latent conservative majority and usher in the rise of a strong, conservative Republican
Party capable of controlling both the executive and legislative branches of government.
The general perception was that while a moderate like Nixon could win the
Presidency occasionally, elections would always be “hit or miss” as long as moderate
candidates were fielded, and winning would always depend on the selection of far left
1
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candidates by the Democrats. Also, a moderate candidate was not capable of strongly
changing the sour reputation of the Republican Party or of transforming it into an
organization that could attract a permanent majority. Nominating a principled candidate
was therefore not only important to conservatives from an ideological perspective; it was
also instrumentally advantageous. Only a principled candidate could draw large numbers
of detached, disaffected voters, win the permanent loyalties of those voters, alter negative
public perceptions of the Republican Party, and assemble a lasting electoral coalition
capable of carrying Republicans to power in both the White House and Congress.
Another focal point within coalition discourses involved the significant problems
posed by unprincipled leaders within the Republican Party's organization and within
Congress. The concern expressed at CPAC was that because the party was diverse and
because liberals held positions of influence within it, the GOP as a whole often came out
in support of moderate/neutral or liberal positions on many issues. Because the party did
not identify itself with bold, conservative policy solutions, it was not perceived by the
public as representing a clear alternative to the Democratic Party. Voters could not see
that the GOP stood for much, and so they saw few reasons to identify with it or support it.
In the discourses at CPAC, fine distinctions were not drawn between Republican
Party moderates and liberals. Speakers at CPAC used the label "liberal" broadly and
frequently to characterize those in the party who were outside of their coalition. Certain
individuals– especially Jacob Javits and Nelson Rockefeller– were singled out frequently
as examples of a much larger group that also came to include Nixon and Ford. In
conference discourses, there were just two general groups– principled, coalition
conservatives on the one hand and then liberals and their unprincipled allies on the other.
During 1974 and 1975, coalition political strategies (as developed and articulated
by affiliated elites) were therefore primarily structured by considerations related to
countering the roadblocks posed by moderate and liberal Republican leaders and by
settling upon effective methods for circumventing the problems posed by intra-party
ideological heterogeneity. In this vein, the succession of Ford and Rockefeller in the
wake of Nixon's resignation was cited as one justification by new party advocates for
breaking away from the Republican Party altogether to form a new political party. As I
argued in the last chapter, even though these arguments were a minority view, they
reinforced the severity of the problems posed by ideological heterogeneity within the
Republican Party's ranks, and they structured discussions of strategy by calling attention
to barriers to the expression of conservative ideas.
Changes in Context & the Refocusing of Coalition Discourses
With these trends firmly in mind, it is useful to move forward and take a brief
survey of the discourses two years later at CPAC 1977. During his keynote address at
that conference, James Buckley would note:
It seems to me that the next few years will offer the Republican Party, its
leadership in the Congress and in the Republican National Committee a
unique opportunity to reach out to [its target] constituencies with a
principled exposition of a distinctly Republican, inherently conservative

142

point of view…there will be ample opportunity for Republicans cast in the
role of the loyal opposition to define how their party would go about
addressing the major issues that will be coming before the American
people. If they define the Republican position with… target
constituencies in mind, there is no reason why they shouldn't be able to
break through the semantic barriers that have caused their party to be
perceived by too many as the party of privilege and big business. 2
As I will show in the subsequent analysis, this quote is reflective of a CPAC
conference that had a very different tone than the conference held in 1975. The level of
enthusiasm was greater. The new party rhetoric faded to a whisper.
So, what happened? Simply put, the events of the 1976 election season altered
context and prompted very significant changes in conservative discourses. During the
intervening two years, some of the intra-party barriers to the expression of coalition ideas
were removed. In addition, the relationship between the conservative political coalition
and the Republican Party changed, as did the representation of conservative ideas with
party discourses and party settings. In the wake of the election, conservatives occupied
higher ground– from which they sought to control and shape Republican Party positions
and to ensure that those positions were conservative. Jimmy Carter's election also
produced a new balance of power within the polity in which expressions of conservative
Republican opposition were likely to become more strongly targeted at liberals within the
Democratic Party than they had been in the past.
In order to interpret the discourses at CPAC 1977, it is first essential to
summarize the changes in political context that occurred during the election cycle and to
consider the impact of these changes on the relationship that existed between the growing
modern conservative coalition and the Republican Party. The first significant event came
on November 4, 1975. On that date, at Ford's request, Nelson Rockefeller– perhaps the
greatest symbol of liberalism within the Republican Party's hierarchy– announced that he
would not seek the Republican Party's vice-presidential nomination in 1976. The
growing strength of conservatives within the party was an important reason for Ford's
decision to ask for Rockefeller's withdrawal, but the decision itself was also a critical step
forward because it removed a key enemy and focal point of conservative discourses from
a position of great influence within government and within the party.
The next key event happened during the Republican Party's nomination contest
and party convention. In a primary challenge strongly backed by coalition conservatives,
Reagan challenged Ford for the Republican Party's presidential nomination. The race
was close, and in the end, Ford triumphed over Reagan at a hotly contested Republican
National Convention by a margin of just over 5% of the convention votes.
Reagan may have lost the nomination to Ford, but his campaign had a
transformative impact upon the balance and flow of ideas within the Republican Party
and upon the relationship between the conservative political coalition and the Republican
Party. Thanks in part to Reagan's presence, enthusiasm among coalition conservatives
was at a high. Coalition conservatives flooded into the Republican National Convention
2
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(a party setting) in large numbers, exerted a significant degree of control of the platform
committee, and helped to draft a much more conservative party platform than had been
passed in 1972. During his remarks at CPAC 1977, Patrick Buchanan would note:
The Republican Convention for those of you attended it was quite frankly
a conflict between modern conservatives and movement conservatives,
with the movement conservatives dominating the platform. 3
Reagan's campaign also facilitated a groundswell of involvement by Reagan supporters
within state and local Republican Party organizations in states such as Texas and North
Carolina.4 As a result of the Reagan candidacy, coalition conservatives strengthened
their grasp of the party's machinery and found fresh opportunities to cooperate,
coordinate, and communicate with each other in meaningful ways as conservatives within
party settings.
Increased participation by coalition conservatives led to changes in the balance
and flow of ideas within the party. The new platform was one example. In the wake of
the 1976 election, the new platform would galvanize conservatives, and it would become
a symbol of the inroads that conservatives had made during the election. Reagan's
challenge (as well as participation by a greater influx of conservative Congressional
candidates and political activists) also facilitated a fresh infusion of conservative ideas
into party discourses. This, in turn, set up a context in which coalition conservatives
could more strongly embrace their identity as Republicans.
I use the phrase "more strongly embrace" deliberately. I do not mean to suggest
that during the years prior to 1976, many coalition leaders and Reagan activists did not
identify as Republicans. Many– but not all– of the committed coalition conservatives
who were active in the Reagan Campaign in 1976 had been Republicans for years, and
some had been active as far back as the Goldwater campaign of 1964. Rather, I mean to
suggest that higher levels of participation brought about by the Reagan campaign and the
corresponding infusion of conservative ideas into party discourses created a context in
which coalition conservatives could make stronger ownership claims of the party and
begin working to rebrand and transform it in more aggressive ways. In the wake of the
election, there was a new environment in which coalition conservatives could point to the
new platform and to the ascendance of conservatives who supported Reagan's campaign.
They could assert that principled conservatism was becoming synonymous with
Republicanism and that outsiders in the party who were not conservatives were worse
than misguided– they were out of place. Congressman Robert Bauman's comments at
CPAC 1977 are indicative of a broader trend:
This is the party that set the black man free, although you didn’t hear it
mentioned during Roots… this is the party of the Constitution and of the
American Revolution, what have we always stood for us, those who claim
to be Republicans. We said that we believe in ordered liberty, limited
3
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government, and the rights of man regardless of race, creed, or color… in
other words, the ideals of our Founding Fathers. That’s what our party
was founded upon. Now obviously that doesn’t apply to all Republicans
today. Some of them don’t believe in any of those things. They're quite
opposite in their views. Others seem to believe in nothing at all. If it were
within my power, I think I'd say to them what William Lloyd Garrison
said to the states of the Confederacy as they left the Union– "let our erring
sisters go in peace." If they want to go– I'd like to have them stay– but
that have to cease to be the tail that wags the elephant. 5
I will return to this narrative and the distortions encapsulated within it later. For the
moment, it is useful because it shows that in the transformed context brought about by the
election, claims of conservative ownership of the GOP grew from a whisper to an
enthusiastic, fevered pitch. Conservatives also actively used the 1976 platform to claim
ownership of the party label and express the idea that Republicanism was synonymous
with conservatism. During his remarks at CPAC 1977, Congressman Phil Crane would
note:
…it's important to recognize that that so called Reagan platform that was
drafted at that convention was drafted in spite of the fact that the Ford
supporters controlled the platform committee. I think what this indicates
is that that was not a Reagan platform that was drafted at the Republican
Convention, rather it was a Republican platform, embraced by Ford
supporters and Reagan supporters, and to confuse that as the media has
endeavored to do is to confuse the electorate again on where we stand, as
they attempt to try and suggest that Ronald Reagan somehow is
representing some minority fleet within the Republican Party seeking to
impose its will on the majority. 6
Of course, the platform had really been a source of profound tension, but the changes that
had been pushed by Reagan forces were a critical piece of ideational capital in the drive
to redefine Republicanism as being synonymous with movement conservatism. Ronald
Reagan would similarly use the 1976 platform as a reference point for defining the
platform of what he envisioned as the "New Republican Party" during his address at
CPAC 1977. He was able to define the conservative ideas that had been represented at
the convention and injected into the platform as core Republican principles:
What will be the basis of this New Republican Party? To what set of
values and principles can our candidates appeal? Where can Americans
who want to know where we stand look for guidance? Fortunately, we
have an answer to that question. That answer was provided last summer by
the men and women of the Republican Party – not just the leadership, but
5
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the ones who have built the party on local levels all across the country.
The answer was provided in the 1976 platform of the Republican Party.
This was not a document handed down from on high. It was hammered out
in free and open debate among all those who care about our party and the
principles it stands for. The Republican platform is unique. Unlike any
other party platform I have ever seen, it answers not only programmatic
questions for the immediate future of the party but also provides a clear
outline of the underlying principles upon which those programs are based.
The New Republican Party can and should use the Republican platform of
1976 as the major source from which a Declaration of Principles can be
created and offered to the American people. 7
A third critical event happened when Ford ultimately lost to Carter in the general
election. As a result of Carter's victory, a second adversary of the emerging coalition was
removed. Ford was swept away from his position of party leadership by the tide of
history. Reagan may have lost in the primary, but with Ford gone, the top spot would be
open in 1980. Some conservative leaders even framed Ford’s loss as a positive
development for the GOP. During his remarks at CPAC 1977, Phil Crane noted:
I remember having a meeting with some of my friends who were urging
third party route, and I suggested to them that if their goal, as they had
indicated, was to destroy the Republican party as quickly as possible…
that probably their efforts should be directed toward guaranteeing that
Gerald Ford would be elected rather than defeated…. The fact of the
matter is that… with this overwhelming Democrat control and more
specifically union control of the Congress of the US, we would have a
man who had no deep roots, philosophical roots, occupying the White
House– a man who tended in his political career to get along and be
amiable–- trying to make certain compromises with the Devil, and, in the
process, he would be compromising the Phil Cranes out of their House
seats just as I think during the Eisenhower years, we saw a 1952 election
send a majority of Republicans to Congress dominated by hard charging
conservatives who over the span of the Eisenhower years were
compromised out of their seats. They were compromised out of their
seats… because in the perspective of the average voter, what he saw
portrayed out of the White House was something totally different from the
positions taken by some good activists in the Senate and the House, good
solid conservative Republicans, and so I think having a Republican
president and this kind of control of Congress would create a situation
where the unperceptive, and that's probably millions of voters in America,
identify with the Republican Party with that individual who has the
Ronald Reagan, “The New Republican Party,” (Speech at the 4th Annual CPAC Conference on
February 6, 1977), accessed March 13, 2015.
http://reagan2020.us/speeches/The_New_Republican_Party.asp
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highest profile in the party, and to the extent that that is a Gerald Ford …
getting a great deal of his input and policy making from the wrong
element of the party, or even a Richard Nixon… I think we have been
compromised…8
Putting these developments together with my discussion of pre-1976 discourses, it
is easy to see that the departures of Rockefeller and Ford were important because their
exit removed what had been perceived by some to be insurmountable intra-party barriers
to the ascendance of conservatives. Their departure left an important leadership vacuum
in the GOP as well as a party structure that would prove to be more malleable by
conservatives in the years to come. Where intra-party barriers to the expression of
conservative ideas had existed at the top of the GOP before the election, there was an
opening for conservatives, and there was an opportunity to focus coalition/party
discourses upon new enemies and new coalition-building tasks.
Of course, at the Congressional level, the party remained diverse. Coalition
conservatives still had to contend with party moderates and liberals in Congress. But
once the barriers at the top were removed, the signal sent by members of Congress was–
by itself– not as problematic for the coalition-building project or for the re-branding of
the GOP as when it had been combined with the strong and confusing signal that had
been sent by Nixon, Ford, and Rockefeller.
In the wake of these changes, during the 1976-80 period, the re-branding of the
GOP would become a new, key focus in coalition settings. With Rockefeller and Ford
gone, conservatives could devote more of their time to discussions of how to
constructively re-brand and reorient the party, and they could do so more boldly and
enthusiastically without having to devote as much concern to confusing elite signals as
they had in the past. During his comments at CPAC 1977, Robert Bauman would note
that with Republicans out of power, there was less pressure on members of Congress to
support liberal policy initiatives:
We don’t know yet it the Republican in the Congress will talk straight, if
they'll talk tough to the American people about things such as the Soviet
arms buildup is making us a second class power in a world where only the
first class survives, but I'm glad to report to you that more of my
colleagues on the Republican side of the aisle are now willing to admit
that… now that they don’t have to worry about offending Henry Kissinger
and his several presidential employers. 9
At CPAC 1977, Patrick Buchanan would emphasize that Republicans should completely
disavow the Nixon-Ford years and move forward to become what he called "political
warriors of the New Right":

8
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Let's look at the Ford-Nixon years, which have been talked of recently…
It is true that we promised fiscal responsibility and added more to the
federal debt than any other administration in peacetime history. It is true
that we promised again and again that we'd do something about quotas on
campuses and forced busing in public schools, and yet during the eight
years of Republican rule, there were more quotas imposed, more busing
decisions handed down than any previous years in our political
history…So we did many things wrong. We are responsible for overselling the benefits of détente with the Soviets to the American people.
How do we as conservatives handle that? It's a difficult problem that calls
to mind the situation some 30-40 years ago. I think back to 1932, when
Franklin Roosevelt had gone to Pittsburgh, and he delivered a speech in a
campaign against Hoover, when he called Herbert Hoover a profligate
Wall Street spender, and he said when we take office, we're going to cut
the budget by 25 percent– we're going to have balanced budgets in the
Roosevelt years. Mr. Roosevelt got in the White House, and they began
to throw that Pittsburgh speech at him, and he called Sam Rosenman, and
he said how are we going to handle that Pittsburgh speech on balanced
budgets, and Sam came back in after a day's work and said, Mr. President,
I think there's only one way to handle that Pittsburgh speech, and that's to
deny we were ever in Pittsburgh. So I suggest we deny we were ever in
Pittsburgh quite frankly with regard to the previous eight years. 10
Again, these comments were possible precisely because Ford lost. They are reflective of
the transformed context brought about by the election and of the potential for
conservatives to reshape and redefine the party free from the pressure that had been
exerted by Nixon and Ford.
The shift in party control of the executive branch also facilitated a fourth change
in context that would also prove beneficial to conservatives. Just as a series of new
opportunities emerged to re-brand the GOP– in the form of the leadership vacuum, the
upward shift in the locus of cooperation, coordination, and communication by coalition
conservatives to the level of party, and the stronger infusion of conservative ideas into the
party's platform and policy discourses–- there was also a new Democratic president
available to become a new focal point for conservative opposition.
At the end of the 1976 election season, there was therefore an entirely new
political context in which conservatives had a better foothold in the party and could
mount a stronger insurgency to re-brand the GOP while also focusing a greater amount of
the opposition to liberalism upon Democrats, upon Carter, and upon the liberal
progressive-liberal political coalitions working within and through the Democratic Party.
It was a context in which conservatives could work to express and shape Republican
critiques of the Democratic Party (which had won united control of government), and it
was a context in which they could fight to make those critiques strongly reflect the ideas
10
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and narratives of their political coalition free from interference by a Republican
president.
In this vein, during his comments at CPAC 1977, James Buckley would note:
I am intrigued by the suggestion that the Republican National Committee
form a shadow cabinet for the purpose of tracking and commenting upon
the policies and programs that will be offered by the Carter administration.
This would provide the members of such a cabinet with a continuing basis
for articulating alternative approaches based upon the 1976 presidential
platform, which is the most recent statement of specific Republican
principles and positions… I [also] believe the Senate and House
Republican Policy Committees should become just that: instruments for
the definition of a Republican position on each of the major matters to
come before the Congress. I am not suggesting that the positions
hammered out in debate and adopted by a majority of the respective
caucuses be binding on all their members. Rather I propose that
Republicans on each side of Capitol Hill set about defining and adopting
specific positions and programs, even if some of their members find they
cannot go along with it. Only in this way can Republicans on Capitol Hill
develop and present to the nation those constructive alternatives that
everyone is urging upon the party. Only in this way can the party, as such,
launch its own legislative initiatives and have them so identified in the
public mind. 11
The outcome of the initiatives proposed by Buckley in these comments is not as
important as the general thrust of his words and of what he felt conservatives were poised
to achieve. In the new environment, conservatives were energized and were free to
actively reshape the Republican Party without having to focus attention and contempt
upon the overpowering and conflicting signals of the Ford-Rockefeller White House.
Conference discourses were mostly cleansed of the “new party” rhetoric and were
increasingly becoming oriented around strategies for transforming the Republican Party
into a vehicle for principled conservatism.
The Conservative Majority: Mounting Doubts and Criticisms
Paradoxically, at the same time that these new opportunities emerged, the election
also generated a good deal of skepticism about the viability of conservative ideas and
strategies. If there was truly a vast, latent conservative majority as conservative leaders
claimed, then why did Reagan lose to Ford, and why did Ford lose to Carter? Why had
Democrats won united control of not only the presidency but of both Houses of
Congress?
John Ashbrook’s introductory remarks at CPAC 1977 are a reminder that these
questions were, in fact, swirling around in conservative political discourses of the day:
11
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… the basic question I am asked as I travel the country is, well, if
conservatives really are the majority in our country, why is it we do so
poorly at election time? Why is it every time we organize the Congress,
or in every state legislature, or add up the governors, or add up the elected
officials, and somehow or other the liberals have synergism. You know
the sum of the parts always is more than what you put into it. For some
reason or other they’re synergistic, and we seem to not be able to even
have simple addition, to add up our numbers that we have into spokesmen
and representatives. Obviously we're failing somewhere. If we're a
majority in the country, which I think every poll indicates …12
There were skeptics in the broader political arena, as well. William Rusher began
his remarks at CPAC 1977 by referring to an article published by Jeane Kirkpatrick in
Commentary magazine. The article, entitled “Why the New Right Lost,” was a six page,
frontal assault on the entire conservative majority concept. In the article, Kirkpatrick had
identified William Rusher, Ronald Reagan, Patrick Buchanan, and Kevin Phillips as
leading proponents of a flawed theory. She described their characterizations of the
majority and refuted them point by point, boldly arguing that “New Right” conservative
intellectuals were distorting facts and that a series of electoral losses were proof that
arguments about the existence of a vast conservative majority were fallacious:
This theory [of the existence of a conservative majority] is mistaken, first,
because it is based on an oversimplified conception of ideology in
contemporary American politics; second, because it overestimates the
electorate’s ideological inclinations; and third, because it misunderstands
the nature of political organization. Each of these errors helps to explain
why the expectations of the New Right intellectuals were disappointed in
1976 and also why their disappointment is probably a chronic condition.13
According to Kirkpatrick, the New Right intellectuals erred by tying together the
economic, cultural, and foreign policy dimensions in American politics and by lumping
voters who took conservative positions on any one of the three dimensions into a single,
diverse group. In fact, she argued, “a great many voters support an active role for
government in the economic sphere, oppose challenges to the authority of government,
distrust the Soviet Union and support a strong defense posture, or adopt some other
combination of ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ positions.”14 In other words, she argued that
the conservative majority theory distorted complex realities and created an illusory group
by lumping a large number of moderate voters with a variety of complicated and mixed
policy views into a single category.
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Kirkpatrick went on to challenge the assertion made by conservatives that
articulating bold alternatives (of the type advocated by Reagan at CPAC 1975) was an
appropriate strategy for mobilizing and assembling the imagined conservative majority.
As evidence, she pointed to the failure of the Goldwater and McGovern candidacies and
emphasized that extreme, ideological candidates were historically rejected by American
voters.
Those who believe in the conservative majority argue that it can be
mobilized for the purposes of electoral victory by a leadership that
articulates the ‘basic” disagreements separating liberals and
conservatives… It is an undeniable fact that each party has tried the
strategy our in the recent past and that the two candidates– Goldwater and
McGovern– who provided the desired kind of leadership were
overwhelmingly defeated by opponents who advocated and practiced
consensus politics…The “moral” of the Goldwater and McGovern
debacles is not that the American electorate is neither as “conservative” as
Barry Goldwater nor as “liberal” as George McGovern, but that the voters
will repudiate candidates who offer a narrowly ideological rhetoric and a
divisive appeal.15
Finally, Kirkpatrick went on to point out that “these theorists seem to believe that
organizations can and should be only vehicles for the expression of political ideas.”16 Of
course, this is exactly what conservatives believed and wanted. Indeed, in 1975, debates
at CPAC were oriented around selecting an appropriate institutional “vehicle” for their
version of principled conservatism. But in Kirkpatrick’s view, this strategy was bound to
fail. She argued that:
The ideological perspective in politics….breeds intolerance of diversity,
impatience with compromise, and the kind of intransigence characteristic
of sectarian, rule-or-ruin politics. Ideological purists encounter persistent
and probably insurmountable difficulties in building institutions through
which to achieve their political goals, not only because their clearly
defined programs cannot attract more than a minority, but also because
their inclinations and habits are the opposite of those required to maintain
large, inclusive democratic political organizations.17
Indeed, as an example of the flawed intractability of conservatives, Kirkpatrick cited the
fact that movement conservatives refused to support “Republican loyalists like Gerald
Ford who share most of their conservative views.”18 In her view, the road to political
success was paved through consensus and moderation.
15
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At the beginning of 1977, then, it is important to note that within the arena of
public political discourse, there were strong criticisms of the conservative majority thesis.
Even within the evolving political coalition, there was some confusion about what the
1976 election results implied. Criticisms were swirling around that challenged the basis
premises of affiliated conservative politicians and intellectuals. Also, there were elites
and intellectuals outside of the conservative political coalition who were offering
competing visions and alternative strategies for the future and who were advocating for a
politics of consensus and moderation.
Of course, as Kirkpatrick rightly noted, this was the exact opposite of what the
politicians and intellectuals who were associated with the evolving conservative
movement believed to be necessary. It was precisely a “rule-or-ruin” perspective that
conservative leaders stepped up to advocate in the post-election context as they
excoriated Ford and other Republican Party moderates and sought to transform the GOP.
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CHAPTER 7
CPAC 1977 & CPAC 1978
…there is…in the case both of the New Right and the New Politics, an imperviousness to
empirical disproof. Defeat of their position never demonstrates that the putative hidden
majority does not in fact exist; it only proves that the cause was sabotaged by the media
and betrayed or at least failed by its leaders. The belief in a hidden majority, indeed, puts
an especially heavy burden on leadership, while sustaining partisans in the face of
repeated losses and providing a sense of solidarity with "the people.” 1
Jeane Kirkpatrick, January 1977

At the close of the 1976 election, the politicians, activist leaders, and intellectuals
affiliated with the Old Right-centered political coalition had their proverbial work cut out
for them. There was a proliferation of groups who had been mobilized into politics and
who were emerging around opposition to modern liberalism, but these forces had to be
harnessed, cultivated, and channeled. The Republican Party structure was more
malleable, and, as I have argued, this created a series of new opportunities for
conservatives to re-define the party in more aggressive ways. However, methods for
doing so still had to be worked out and executed. Coalition narratives still had to be
refocused and updated with new interpretations to explain the tide of events, to quell
mounting confusion and skepticism about the causes and implications of defeat, and to
dispel alternative strategies supported by some Republicans that advocated for a politics
of consensus and moderation. Moreover, the path forward for the coalition had to be not
only worked out by leaders but also communicated to coalition activists.
In this chapter, I argue that in the wake of the shifts in the political landscape
brought about by the events of the 1976 election, politicians and activist intellectuals
stepped up to take advantage of changes in context and to provide just this type of critical
guidance and leadership. Just as they had in years past, the leaders who organized and
spoke at CPAC 1977 and 1978 helped to interpret, explain, and frame changes in
ideological and political context in ways that reinforced a sense of coalition identity, and
they helped to recommend political strategies based upon their interpretations of context
that were designed to enable the coalition to advance its ideas and its policy agenda
through the party system.
Updating the Conservative Majority Thesis
Following the 1976 election, conservative leaders went to great lengths to update
and reinforce the validity of the conservative majority thesis. As I argued in the last
chapter, the thesis that the electorate was conservative was called into question by some
1
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after the 1976 election. There were obvious reasons for doubt. Reagan had lost. Carter
had won. Democrats continued to control both Houses of Congress by extremely wide
margins. To the casual observer, the public certainly seemed at the very least to be
moderate to somewhat liberal in its outlook. In turn, this also seemed to suggest that
there was a degree of prudence to be found in a politics of moderation by the
Republicans. The argument that there was no conservative majority was reinforced by
opponents of conservatives, who characterized both Ronald Reagan and the conservative
movement as a small minority seeking to capture control of the Republican Party.
From the standpoint of Ashbrook, Rusher, Buchanan, Reagan, and others,
however, the characterization of the electorate as consisting of a conservative majority
was important. The conservative majority theory was really a characterization of the
electorate– one that lived within and structured coordinative discourses of the
conservative movement throughout the 1970s. The idea that the public was basically
conservative served as an important foundation for interpretations of political
developments, for the elaboration of coalition narratives about the course of events, and
for the formulation of strategies by conservative politicians. It also helped to justify and
rationalize the entire conservative coalition-building project. After all, conservatives
were fighting a noble fight. According to the theory, they were not a small minority at
all– they were aligned with and were speaking for an unorganized majority of the
American people.
During his remarks at CPAC 1977, Ronald Reagan called on those present to
reject the characterizations that cast conservatives as a minority and that denied the
conservative nature of the electorate. He noted:
Let us lay to rest, once and for all, the myth of a small group of ideological
purists trying to capture a majority. Replace it with the reality of a
majority trying to assert its rights against the tyranny of powerful
academics, fashionable left-revolutionaries, some economic illiterates who
happen to hold elective office and the social engineers who dominate the
dialogue and set the format in political and social affairs. If there is any
ideological fanaticism in American political life, it is to be found among
the enemies of freedom on the left or right – those who would sacrifice
principle to theory, those who worship only the god of political, social and
economic abstractions, ignoring the realities of everyday life. They are not
conservatives. Our first job is to get this message across to those who
share most of our principles. If we allow ourselves to be portrayed as
ideological shock troops without correcting this error, we are doing
ourselves and our cause a disservice. Wherever and whenever we can, we
should gently but firmly correct our political and media friends who have
been perpetuating the myth of conservatism as a narrow ideology.2
In these comments, it is possible to see exactly what Kirkpatrick meant when she
noted that the belief in a hidden majority contributes to a sense of solidarity with "the
2
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people.” Reagan’s picture of a majority trying to assert its rights against a minority
conflates the principles of conservative politicians and activists with the views of a vast
majority of voters who, as Kirkpatrick noted, have diverse, conflicting, and, in many
policy areas, no developed views whatsoever about the proper role of government
relative to society.3 Kirkpatrick argued from a realist perspective–and correctly, in my
view–that the notion of a conservative majority oversimplified the complex nature of
public attitudes toward public policy and that it also overestimated voters’ levels of
political and philosophical awareness and sophistication.
That said, I am not concerned with identifying all of the contradictions and
distortions that were inherent within coalition discourses. Instead, I am primarily
interested in identifying the interpretations, narratives, and characterizations that were
repeated in coalition settings and in understanding how these elements of discourse
brought conservative activists together, structured their thinking, and shaped their
behavior and sense of identity as a coalition.
For the purposes of my analysis, it is of little consequence whether Reagan or
Kirkpatrick was correct. What is important is that conservatives repeatedly stated that
they represented and were speaking for a majority of the electorate and that they put this
idea to work and used it as a basis for understanding their work as a coalition and for
formulating coalition strategies.
Another important factor concerns the way that events actually unfolded relative
to what the conservative majority theory suggested would happen. At any point in time,
the beliefs of conservatives did, albeit vaguely, anticipate that politics would unfold in a
particular way. For instance, they believed that a Reagan candidacy would be successful.
When Republicans lost severely in the 1974 election, when Reagan lost to Ford in 1976,
and when Ford lost to Carter, these events required leaders to amend narratives and
strategies in order to explain how these events were consistent with past narratives and
interpretations. Through flexible logic, they were able to effectively rationalize these
adverse outcomes. However, it must be noted that this process of rationalization changed
the discourse and thus disciplined it as leaders amended and extended existing narratives,
even though it did not overturn basic assumptions. I would argue that this is a pattern
that always holds true, not just in the conservative case but for all political coalitions.
History a primary driver of discursive change. As history unfolds, it forces leaders to
amend discourse and refine elements of it in order to accommodate new realities. When
events happen that contradict existing predictions, this requires public intellectuals,
politicians, and other thought leaders to go to work in order to explain events and
preserve core ideas and assumptions.
For example, while speaking at CPAC, William Rusher aggressively defended the
conservative thesis, and, in doing so, he addressed Jeane Kirkpatrick’s criticisms directly.
Rusher noted:
Among many… mistakes that Dr. Kirkpatrick makes, is to announce that
it is a myth, she describes it as a familiar myth, that there is a conservative
majority in the United States. She cites various things that lead her to
3
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suppose there isn't one, and that comfort her in that reflection, and the first
point I want to make to you is that I very definitely think that… providing
we are not talking about a highly ideologized, narrowly construed
conservative majority, but a broad, general agreement on large principles–
provided that is what we understand by conservatism in this context– then
I do think there is and has been probably for at least fifteen years a
conservative majority in the United States. That is not the same thing by a
longshot as saying that it has been effectively mobilized or that it has been
politically successful, or that over that period of time it has run the United
States. It hasn't. I merely said that there has been– inchoate, so to speak–
embryonic, but there– a conservative majority. I think it was there, I said
fifteen years, I think it was there in one of the years that Dr. Kirkpatrick
cites as evidence of its nonexistence– 1964. Because I think that only a
Lyndon Johnson, from Texas, representing as he did on the 1960
Democratic ticket the conservative wing of the party, could have
confronted and defeated Barry Goldwater as Goldwater was defeated in
that year. But the conservative majority, as so often in this country was
divided, with part of it behind Goldwater and a very important part of it
behind Johnson in that election. I think the majority was there in 1968,
and again, I think it was split, with a very large part of it behind Nixon and
very nearly ten million people behind it in the Wallace camp, although in
certain cases in the Wallace Camp I would not argue that they were all
conservatives, but I do think the majority of the Wallace Camp in 1968– a
majority of those ten million votes were basically, in the sense in which I
have used the word, broadly conservative. But the majority, again, was a
split majority. I think the majority was still there in 1972, and this time it
did register itself, ironically in the one election of the law in which the
Republican Party had the least cause to expect conservative support.
Richard Nixon after four years in office had imposed wage and price
controls, had backed the Family Assistance Program that would put
millions more Americans permanently on welfare, had invoked détente
with Red China, had invoked détente with the Soviet Union, had started
the SALT talks. But still, as against the candidate that the Democratic
Party was kind enough to give us that year, he got the unified support of
the American conservative majority and won with 49 of the 50 states. I
think the majority is still there, and I think it was there again in 1976,
although more familiarly split. Because now the politicians themselves
had begun to feel the presence of the change of opinion in the country, and
the Democratic Party moved accordingly in response and picked a man
who, in the Democratic context, most definitely was not on its liberal side,
and who repatriated them from the great Nixon majority of 1972– a large
number of the so-called social conservatives, the southerners particularly,
and specifically the Protestant and still more specifically Baptist vote in
the southern United States– to the Democratic Party, so that again the
majority was seriously split. And it may, as I will remark at the end,
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remain split. But I don't think it needs to, and it certainly is none of our
business to see to it that it does. Our business is to put it, if we can,
together. I think we can, and I think we should…4
Explanations for Conservative Losses in 1976
One issue addressed at CPAC concerned the reason why conservatives had lost
the election to Carter and the Democrats if the electorate was, as they asserted, basically
conservative. The most commonly recited explanation for the paradox of Republican
losses in 1976 can be found at the end of the narrative offered by Rusher. It was that
liberals had won the election because they recognized the conservative trend in public
opinion, and they pivoted to the right in response. The assertion was that Carter had been
deliberately selected and backed by the liberal Democratic establishment because he
demonstrated a potential to appeal to conservative constituencies in the South and to
effectively pry them back away from the Republican Party. In the words of Jesse Helms:
The bottom line of 1976 was that it was a year of conservative
campaigning. Even the Democratic nominee– a promising politician who
promised everything– talked of balancing the federal budget, and
deregulating our energy resources, and restraining big government, and
the importance of the family as the basic unit of our society– not the
federal government… he campaigned as a conservative, and he won
because millions of Americans believed that he was.5
Indeed, the notion that Carter had run as a conservative and had captured the
support of the conservative majority neatly vindicated and reinforced the conservative
majority thesis and all of its corollaries. As the argument went, the country was
becoming so conservative that even the Democratic Party was encouraged to abandon its
liberal principles in order to ride the conservative wave in public opinion and harness it in
order to win. Sen. James Buckley also linked Carter’s victory and Democratic victories
to the use of conservative, values-oriented rhetoric and to Carter’s ability to appeal to
conservative voters in language that they understood and appreciated. Buckley noted:
It is… ironic in the extreme that [the American people] elected to the
presidency and to the majorities in the Senate and House last year, men
and women who represent the very philosophy that is falling into disrepute
among free people everywhere in the world… part of the blame, I fear,
rests with us…Last year, we saw a Democratic presidential primary
campaign succeed because the candidate stirred his audiences by speaking
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over and over again such words as decency, honesty, compassion, faith,
morality, values, and love.6
During his remarks at CPAC, Rusher also commented on the significance of Carter’s
conservative rhetoric. In Rusher’s view, Carter’s rhetorical appeals were guided by the
conservative environment in which he was operating. By positioning himself as a strong
supporter of conservative initiatives, Carter was practicing “very sound politics.” In
Rusher’s words:
I think that the concept of big government as a bad thing has come into its
own in the last three or four years in this country, very much in the way
we have been talking about it for forty years. I think the liberals have…
retreated… So, now it is a very nearly common ground among the
American people. President Carter knows this with all of his symbolic
efforts to reduce White House staff, to project a more modest image. This
is very sound politics because it is majority American belief, a very large
majority, I think.7
Conservatism in the Democratic Party as a form of Deception
Inherent within both Buckley and Rusher’s remarks is a general argument that
Carter’s appeals were manipulative, symbolic, and primarily rhetorical rather than
substantive and deeply felt. In the discourses at CPAC, Carter’s conservative rhetoric, as
well as the moderate-conservative positions taken by the Democratic Party during the
1976 election, were pegged as forms of deception rather than as evidence of a true faith
in conservative principles. When explaining the reasons for conservative losses in 1976,
John Ashbrook noted:
I think you have to make the first postulate the absolute hypocrisy and the
just outright deception of the liberal leaders in this country… in election
after election, the liberals, rather than standing on principle, like putty
apply their principles to what seems to be popular at the time…1974 …
most liberals in our country ran against inflation. They had created
inflation. 1976? They ran against big government– they who created big
government. So there is a degree of deception on the other side which has
been a significant part of our loss.8
While speaking at CPAC 1977, Orrin Hatch noted that Carter used conservative
rhetoric and claimed to stand for many conservative ideas and values while also
supporting liberal policy initiatives that defied that rhetoric. He noted:
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It concerns me that the promises to the people in this country made by the
Carter administration seem, to me, to be contradictory. On the one hand,
President Carter promises that he will "fight" to keep excessive
government spending under control, and thus relieve the taxes imposed by
the Washington establishment. Yet Mr. Carter proposes to support and
sign a national health care insurance bill …He promises support for the
Humphrey Hawkins bill which will cost us 20-40 billion dollars a year
because it will make the government the employer of last resort, at a cost
of great sacrifice to the free enterprise system. It will also provide for a
centrally planned economy that will determine what type of raw materials
we get in what section of the country at what time… things that hardly
sound like conservative talk. I might mention that he's promised to
federalize the welfare system. If he can balance the budget as he says by
1980, I don’t think we have to look for the second coming of the savior
anymore, he'll be here in the form of Jimmy Carter… He can't deliver on
the promises that he has made.9
Blaming Ford and GOP Moderates for Carter’s Victory
Nevertheless, even though his promises were characterized as inflated and
contradictory, Carter succeeded in preempting the Republican Party and harnessing
conservative trends by working through the Democratic Party. Why were Carter and the
Democrats able to preempt the high ground that, according to Buckley, Reagan, Rusher,
and others belonged to conservative Republicans? Why were Carter’s symbolic efforts
and weak rhetorical appeals to middle class values relatively effective?
In the discourses at CPAC, it was Gerald Ford and the moderate-liberal
Republican Party factions aligned with him who were blamed for allowing Carter and the
Democrats to succeed in their efforts to capture the support of the conservative majority.
According to conservative leaders, Ford did not advocate for the conservative ideas and
policy solutions that had been written into the 1976 platform. He did not follow the bold
colors strategy advocated by Reagan and conservative leaders. Indeed, he could not do
so because he was not a true conservative. Instead, he embraced a politics of moderation.
As a result of Ford’s moderation, Carter was able to position himself as the more
conservative of the two candidates on the ballot in 1976. Conservative voters selected
the most conservative option available to them– the candidate who spoke in language that
they understood and wished to hear. That was Carter, and so he won the election. In this
vein, Helms noted:
Thanks to the dedication and hard work of hundreds of Republican
delegates, the Republican Party produced a noble platform [in 1976] that
was much more specific, much more forthright, than any other party
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platform in recent memory …If our party’s nominee had stuck to the
platform, he very well might be the President of the United States…10
Of course, even with Ford as the candidate, the presidential race had been close. The fact
that it was a close race was not, however, cast a result of Ford’s personal appeal.
According to the leaders who spoke at CPAC, Ford’s levels of support fluctuated based
upon the extent to which Carter was perceived as a conservative and upon the extent to
which voters came to identify the Republican Party with the ideas and positions
articulated by Ronald Reagan during the party’s primary campaign. Speaking at CPAC
1977, Pat Buchanan explained:
Jimmy Carter ran his strongest in the primaries with 52 percent of the
voters saying he was as conservative as or more conservative than Mr.
Ford. In the Fall election, Jimmy Carter's collapse, which was the worst
collapse of any candidate in political history, with the loss of 30 points
between August and November, came about because as the pollster
Ankilovich and others have said, Jimmy Carter suddenly began to be
perceived as a traditional big spending liberal… So I think it's that
perception of Carter as a liberal that enabled the Republican party to do as
well as we did.11
Here, Carter and the Democratic Party are depicted as the primary force shaping the
outcome of the election. Ford is depicted as being little more than a shallow, content-free
alternative to Carter. His levels of support are depicted as fluctuating based not upon his
own personal appeal or upon the appeal of his ideas and policies but rather as a byproduct
of fluctuations in public perceptions of Jimmy Carter as a conservative.
It is important to note that this is also consistent with the characterization of Ford
inherent within Rusher’s remarks (quoted above). In Rusher’s narrative, the GOP is
treated as a passive and almost powerless participant in the electoral process throughout
the 1960s and 1970s. In each successive election, the GOP’s electoral fortunes are
framed by Rusher as being highly dependent upon the behavior of the Democratic Party.
In this vein, Rusher ties the success of the Republican Party in 1972 not to the appeal of
Nixon’s message or of Nixon’s record but rather to the selection of an unviable, liberal
candidate by the Democrats– George McGovern. In 1976, Rusher describes Jimmy
Carter as winning the election because he ran as a conservative and because he was
therefore able to mobilize the conservative majority. For Rusher, the weakness of the
GOP was due to its poor reputation among conservative voters. This, in turn, was mostly
tied to its reputation as the party of big business. Because of this reputation, the party as
an institution was not a particularly effective vehicle for attracting votes from the middle
class, and it tended to win the presidency under circumstances when Democrats
nominated unviable far-left candidates
Jesse Helms, “Keynote Address of Senator Jesse Helms to the Conservative Political Action
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Optimism in the Wake of Defeat
That said, by 1977, Rusher was a lone wolf, and many of the leaders who spoke at
CPAC 1977 openly disagreed with him. Ronald Reagan, Phil Crane, James Buckley, and
Pat Buchanan all openly noted during their remarks at CPAC that that the GOP was the
vehicle that conservatives should work within and through. Not a single leader stepped
up to support Rusher’s contention that there should be a new party. Even Jesse Helms,
who had entertained the idea in 1975 and who had led an exploratory effort aimed at
founding a new party, displayed a fresh sense of optimism about the prospects for
winning in 1980. At CPAC 1977, Reagan emphasized to the audience:
I have to say I cannot agree with some of my friends – perhaps including
some of you here tonight – who have [said that] this nation needs a new
political party…Rather than a third party, we can have a new first party
made up of people who share our principles.12
James Buckley noted:
Whatever its past flaws and problems, the Republican Party represents the
instrument by which the necessary political realignment of this country
can be achieved, and a new sense of direction and purpose articulated.13
The resolve to work through the GOP grew, in part, out of a perception that if
Reagan had been the GOP nominee instead of Ford in 1976, Carter’s weak appeals would
never have worked. Voters would have seen the Republican Party as offering a
principled conservative alternative, and the party would have won the election. The
perception was that conservative trend in public opinion was as strong, if not stronger, in
1977 than it had been before the 1976 election. The potential for Republicans to harness
the trend toward conservatism had not been realized because, as I noted earlier, Carter
came to be perceived as more conservative than Ford. By extension, the feeling was that
conservative Republicans could still win in 1980 by fielding a true conservative like
Reagan and by providing voters with a philosophically principled alternative to the
politically motivated, contradictory, and unprincipled conservative rhetoric offered by the
Democrats.
In this vein, Phil Crane’s remarks at CPAC reinforced the passive characterization
of Ford that I noted earlier, but they also indicated that Reagan’s involvement in 1976
had a positive effect and suggested even more potential for the future. In Crane’s view,
it was Ronald Reagan– not Ford– who was primarily responsible for the fact that 1976
was a reasonably close race. His contention was that Reagan’s bold articulation of
conservative principles during the primary election campaign had significantly improved
the image of the GOP and had helped to increase perceptions of the party as relatively
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conservative. Reagan’s involvement had led some voters to support Ford and the
Republicans who would not have done so otherwise. Crane explained:
I think another encouraging note is the fact that while the polls indicate
only 18-20 percent of the electorate will define itself as Republican today,
it is obvious that Republican candidates can draw heavily from
Independents and Democrats alike, and even, perhaps in one of the most
inept presidential campaigns waged in many a year and even with a
candidate who I think, as Gerring Moose said, is the singularly most
inarticulate man to run for the office, we still got 48 percent of the vote.
So, with all of those handicaps, I think it is a tribute to the public's
growing awareness that the Republican Party does have some basic
fundamental principles and principles that the average voter can embrace,
and I think that came about as a result of the Reagan campaign. The
Reagan campaign was what finally began to dramatize some of these
points to the American voter, and even though Reagan lost that
nomination, they said, “well, if Reagan's there, and he's in that party, then
there has to be a residue of support for those principles…”14
Jesse Helms carried this line of thinking one step further. During his address at
CPAC, Helms stated outright that if Reagan had been the nominee in 1976, the
Republicans would have won the election. Moreover, under Reagan’s leadership,
Republicans could certainly win in 1980. Helms stressed to the audience:
We all know how close Ronald Reagan came to winning the nomination.
We all know how closely Ronald Reagan was identified with the platform.
It is very interesting, therefore, to look at the results of the CBS-New York
Times Poll taken on election day among voters who had just voted…in
three sections of the country, more people who had just voted said they
would rather have voted for Reagan than for Ford; and, in the fourth
section, the number was equal…It is especially interesting to note that the
CBS poll showed that among Independents, 51 percent said they had voted
for Ford, while 53 percent said they would like to have voted for Reagan.
Among southern Independents, 53 percent said they had voted for Ford,
but 63 percent said they would like to have voted for Reagan. Among
Democrats, 20 percent said they had voted for Ford, but 25 percent said
they would have voted for Reagan against Carter. Now, where are all
those professional party spokesmen who kept telling us that the principles
of the Republican platform and of Ronald Reagan represented a narrow
base among Americans? Every one of these poll results shows that
Governor Reagan had a greater following….even without campaigning.
Does this not tell us how to “broaden the base of the Republican Party?”
Just supposing that Governor Reagan had been the candidate, and that he
14
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had been on radio or TV day after day, night after night, with his great
talent for communicating on the issues– what would have been the result?
I think I know. I think you know. Certainly it is the clearest possible
message that the Republican Party has the opportunity right now to reach
out to the American people, to broaden its ranks, and to win over those
Independents and Democrats who are already disposed to our principles
by making Ronald Reagan its preeminent spokesman on the crucial issues
facing this country today….for no one can any longer doubt that the mood
of the American people is turning on key issues… 15
Here, it is possible to see Helms’ remarks as yet another response to skeptics– as a
vindication of the conservative majority thesis and as a reaffirmation of coalition political
strategies calling for the type of “rule-or-ruin” politics so strongly denounced by
Kirkpatrick. In the discourses at CPAC, the middle of the road strategy that Kirkpatrick
advocated and that Ford ostensibly embraced was cast as the very reason why Ford lost to
Carter.
In this context, the race to win in 1980 would be a race to appear as the most
conservative party on the ballot. Only by nominating a true, principled conservative like
Reagan could the Republican Party fully position itself as a party of conservatism and put
a stop to the Democratic Party’s ability to harness conservative impulses arising within
the polity.
This is precisely why Ford and Rockefeller’s departure so strongly galvanized
conservatives– even in the midst of significant defeat. With Ford and Rockefeller gone,
there was suddenly an opening to mobilize behind Reagan or another conservative, to
take possession of the Republican Party, to reaffirm the new platform that had been
drafted with the support of Reagan delegates in 1976, and to reposition the GOP so as to
offer a philosophically principled and more conservative alternative to the appeals
offered to voters by Carter and the Democrats.
Transforming the GOP: Appealing to Social Conservatives
At CPAC 1977 and 1978, leaders also stepped up to define key conservative
swing constituencies with greater precision, characterize the specific values and concerns
of those constituencies, and delineate the steps that would be necessary in order to reach
them and bring them into the GOP. This process involved more than stating the specific
rhetoric, language, and policy positions that seemed likely to appeal to target
conservative constituencies. It also involved identifying the ideas and elements within
the Republican Party that repelled them and that needed to be altered in order to make the
GOP seem more hospitable to them. In this vein, CPAC became a forum for discussions
of the rhetorical strategies and language that would be necessary to appeal to and
mobilize a winning coalition of voters.
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Analyses of the nature of Carter’s successes and conservative rhetoric– especially
the reasons for his sweeping victories in the South– were integral to this evaluative
process. Carter’s victories and the nature of his appeal helped to bring greater awareness
to the importance of religious voters and the impact that religious rhetoric emphasizing
traditional values could potentially have for Republicans.
During his remarks at CPAC 1977, Reagan called for the merging of social and
economic conservatives under the auspices of what he called the New Republican Party.
Reagan told the audience:
You know, as I do, that most commentators make a distinction between
[what] they call "social" conservatism and "economic" conservatism. The
so-called social issues – law and order, abortion, busing, quota systems –
are usually associated with blue-collar, ethnic and religious groups
themselves traditionally associated with the Democratic Party. The
economic issues – inflation, deficit spending and big government – are
usually associated with Republican Party members and independents who
concentrate their attention on economic matters....In fact, the time has
come to see if it is possible to present a program of action based on
political principle that can attract those interested in the so-called "social"
issues and those interested in "economic" issues. In short, isn't it possible
to combine the two major segments of contemporary American
conservatism into one politically effective whole? I believe the answer is:
Yes, it is possible to create a political entity that will reflect the views of
the great, hitherto [unacknowledged], conservative majority… 16
Again, Carter’s campaign had helped to raise awareness of the language that was
effective for mobilizing social conservatives and for assembling such a coalition. During
his comments at CPAC 1977, James Buckley made specific references to Carter’s
campaign rhetoric and recommended that conservatives learn from it. His comments
may be seen as recommending a rhetorical approach for reaching out to middle class,
socially conservative and predominantly religious voters and for assembling the kind of
mass party coalition described by Reagan. Buckley explained:
Last year, we saw a Democratic presidential primary campaign succeed
because the candidate stirred his audiences by speaking over and over
again such words as decency, honesty, compassion, faith, morality,
values, and love. Now for those of us who were brought up to prize
reticence in ourselves and others as a virtue, it is not easy to utter those
words from a political platform. But we live in a period in which those
words are what millions of Americans are yearning to hear.
For what those words connote is something larger than mere politics and
economics. They connote nothing less than that total system of beliefs
and values that we call the Judeo-Christian tradition– the system which
16
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structures our society and orders our lives and gave us political freedom.
We, too, should be using those words, for the beliefs and values they
represent are central to every conservative thought and principle. We
must not allow our political opponents to preempt that high ground which
by very definition belongs to conservatives. But it is we who must
demonstrate that it is we who belong on that ground. Morality, decency,
honesty, values: define these terms and you have defined the philosophy
which we call conservatism. Compassion, love, caring. Here again, we
are discussing essentially conservative concepts. Each of our principles
grows out of an absolute and unshakeable belief in the primacy of the
individual and the primacy of the liberty in the social, political, and
economic life of America… what could be more compassionate, or loving,
or caring than to attempt to help every American become self-reliant and
by so doing to ensure him of a dignified, respectable, and rewarding life?..
There are those who accuse us conservatives of making a god out of
economics to the exclusion of concern for human beings. We must let
them know once again therefore that our concern for economics is concern
for individual human beings– precisely that!17
It is important to note that at the end of these remarks, Buckley alludes to a
prominent liberal characterization of conservatives as uncaring. He responds to this
characterization directly and stresses that conservatives do, in fact, care. These
irresolvable differences rest on the fact that conservatives and liberals frame problems
differently and therefore arrive at very different solutions. Liberals frame inequality and
poverty as a problem that demands government-funded welfare solutions; conservatives
frame the problem to be solved as dependency on government and a decline in the values
of hard work and self-reliance brought about by years of social welfare programs. For
Democrats, government assistance is the solution. For Buckley, it is the problem. The
struggle between the two sides—and the struggle to which Buckley is addressing his
remarks--- is a competition over which frame will be accepted by the voting public. In
these remarks, Buckley calls on conservatives to combat the liberal definition of the
problem and to reinforce the conservative definition of the problem. He stresses that they
must do so by packaging their position with the same value-oriented words and rhetoric
that was used effectively by Carter and the Democrats.
It is also important to note that the remarks by Reagan and Buckley cited above
are primarily focused upon the strategies for assembling a winning coalition of voters–
not political activists. As is evident in Buckley’s remarks, strategies for mobilizing
voters involved the incorporation of language that would resonate with basic value
systems and that would explain how conservative policies would be more effective than
liberal policies for producing an environment in which individuals’ basic needs would be
met.
As I have argued extensively, the important process of clarification at the
ideological-discursive level that was necessary to fuse the Old and New Right political
17
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coalitions together was something different. This process was happening at sites such as
CPAC. Amid the ongoing dialogue among conservative leaders and activists, the
salience of common opposition to modern liberalism shared by Old Right and New Right
activists was being emphasized, and arguments that rationalized an unofficial platform
for the coalition from a variety of different angles were being articulated and absorbed.
Through interactions in shared settings such as CPAC, members of the two political
coalitions– one of which included libertarian economic conservatives and the other of
which contained mostly social and religious conservatives– were learning to work
together, to appreciate the common ground centered around their mutual opposition to
modern liberalism, and to rationalize in their own ways and in terms of their own
worldviews the policy platform of the expanding and increasingly interconnected modern
conservative coalition.
It is therefore important to distinguish between the self-conscious strategizing that
politicians were engaged in at CPAC (exemplified by these remarks) and the organic,
coalition-building process at the elite-activist level that was being pursued at CPAC in an
unstated, less obvious, and more organic way. In hindsight, it is also important to note
that these two processes were both essential in order to create the new party that Reagan
envisioned. In order to connect voters together, politicians and activists also needed to be
united. The process of platform construction that was happening at CPAC was essential
in order to send the signal necessary to assemble the kind of mass voting coalition that
conservative leaders envisioned. Without the merging of elites and activists, the
communicative strategies discussed by conservatives would not have been possible.
Re-branding the GOP as the Party of Small Business
At CPAC, leaders also engaged in self-conscious strategizing aimed at improving
the image of the Republican Party and at making it more appealing to target swing
constituencies (again at the mass level) who would be critical for victory. According to
leaders at CPAC, a lingering problem for the GOP was the common perception that it
was the party of big business. This was an image that alienated the middle class. In this
vein, William Rusher, who was the lone proponent advocating for a New Party in 1977,
exclaimed: “We are the country club of America at the polls. [The GOP] is perceived by
the vast majority of the American people as simply the spokesman of business and
nothing but! You and I know it isn’t true, but it's the image…”18
For Rusher, the image problem was so great and so entrenched in the public
mindset that it could never be overcome. Rusher still advocated for forming a new party.
Other leaders disagreed with him on the new party issue but expressed the same general
concerns about big business. During his remarks at CPAC 1977, Pat Buchanan
remarked:
There are certain things I think that need to be done. There's nothing
wrong with the basic message of the Republican Party, or its basic point of
view. There's a great deal wrong with its performance in Congress, there's
18
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a great deal wrong with the image we present to the country…We know
today that the Republican Party is identified as the party of big business,
and a lot of big business [has been bad] recently….So how do we react
here?...I think the Republican Party needs to alter its point of view. We
need to be the spokesmen for those particular businesses and
businesspeople who do not have large lobbying divisions in the nation's
capital. We need to represent small business.. (applause)… small
businesspeople quite candidly…I believe that the working class should be
the backbone of the new Republican Party.19
During a discussion panel, William Rusher reinforced Buchanan’s remarks. His words,
which brought a loud wave of applause from the audience, clearly reflected the
sentiments of many who were assembled in the room:
I agree entirely with Pat Buchanan's point. That there are businesspeople
out there with their money and their effort and their brains digging the
grave of conservatism in this country and knowing what they are doing,
and I say to hell with them! (strong applause)20
According to James Buckley, the method for correcting the perception of the GOP as the
party of big business in the public mind was rhetorical. In Buckley’s view, the GOP
needed to refocus its dialogue with target middle class and blue collar constituencies in
mind and to explain “its economic policies in terms of jobs.” During a press conference
held at CPAC, Buckley noted:
[The Republican Party’s] number one task [is] to identify the constituency
that … [it] must appeal to–- not in order to change its own beliefs, historic
beliefs and principles–-but to be able to focus its dialogue, focus what it
talks about. I think if you look at the fringe, swing group that has given
the Republican Party its strength– people who– groups who are normally
associated as Democrats–- when you talk about the blue collar worker,
talk about the Catholic ethnic groups–you can see that [if] the Republican
Party, unlike what some people propose it broaden its ideological appeal
by speaking out of both sides of its mouth… if it concentrates and explains
its economic policies in terms of jobs, the kind of jobs that people want–not government make-work jobs–- but on an assembly line, in the stores,
and the factories, on the farm–- that… the Republican Party– can begin to
demonstrate that it is for the little people. That it is for small business, not
big business. That it is opposed to a concentration of power. That it is
opposed to government telling other people what to do…21 [sic]

19

MSS 176, LTPSC, Box 114, Tape 44
MSS 176, LTPSC, Box 114, Tape 44
21
MSS 176, LTPSC, Box 114, Tape 47
20

167

In other words, the method for reaching out to and mobilizing the conservative
majority and for re-branding the Republican Party with a more modest and less
elitist image was to focus on blue collar and middle class voters and to speak to
them (as Carter had) using language that they would understand and in terms that
would resonate with their values and concerns.
Ronald Reagan reached a similar conclusion. Like Buckley, he spoke of
the importance of re-branding the Republican Party as the party of small business
and of refocusing the party’s discourse so as to speak directly to the common
man. This would be necessary in order to make the party a palatable alternative
for middle class and blue collar swing constituencies. Reagan noted:
The New Republican Party I envision will not be, and cannot, be one
limited to the country club-big business image that, for reasons both fair
and unfair, it is burdened with today. The New Republican Party I am
speaking about is going to have room for the man and the woman in the
factories, for the farmer, for the cop on the beat and the millions of
Americans who may never have thought of joining our party before, but
whose interests coincide with those represented by principled
Republicanism. If we are to attract more working men and women of this
country, we will do so not by simply "making room" for them, but by
making certain they have a say in what goes on in the party. The
Democratic Party turned its back on the majority of social conservatives
during the 1960s. The New Republican Party of the late ’70s and 1980s
must welcome them, seek them out, enlist them, not only as rank-and-file
members but as leaders and as candidates.22
Re-branding the GOP as the Party of the Middle Class
In sum, the conservative majority that leaders imagined was important because it
would serve as the basis for the new Republican Party envisioned by Ronald Reagan and
other coalition conservatives. There was a concerted effort at CPAC to characterize and
define the boundaries of the conservative majority more precisely, to think about the
values and concerns of middle class voters, to establish what language would help these
constituencies to feel at home in the GOP, and to talk deliberately about how to re-brand
the party so as to make these voters feel comfortable with the Republican Party as an
institution.
The strategies for repositioning the party suggested by politicians (and especially
by Buckley) involved refocusing the party’s communicative discourse with these
constituencies in mind, and they involved orienting the party’s dialogue around messages
and themes to which middle class voters were expected to easily relate. By incorporating
values-oriented rhetoric similar to what had worked for Carter, placing greater emphasis
on the social issues, highlighting the importance of family, and explaining the
conservative message in terms of its potential to create economic opportunities,
22
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conservatives sought to re-brand the GOP as an organization that could attract middle
class voters. In another section of his remarks at CPAC, Buckley stated candidly:
If the Republican Party is to recapture its old place in the sun, it must do
so by preempting its logical constituency, and to do this, it must identify
its principles and positions and priorities with the interests of its natural
allies. This will require more than talking about principles and the fact
that Republicans care about people. It will require defining those
principles and explaining plausibly why Republicans can be trusted to
apply them in building the kind of society that most Americans still want.
And who are these natural allies? They have been defined by Kevin
Phillips and Bill Rusher as social conservatives, or producers. And their
key importance is confirmed by any analysis of the swing constituencies
that brought Richard Nixon and almost returned Gerald Ford to the White
House…The Republican Party's natural constituency is to be found…
among the ranks of blue collar workers, the union members whose votes
can no longer be arbitrarily commandeered by distant bosses, among those
struggling to get by on low to middle incomes and know what it is to be
caught between high taxes and high inflation. Among people who are
neither so poor as to be totally dependent on government favors nor so
rich as to be able to escape the reach of a federal judge. Among the
increasing members of blacks and other minorities who are entering the
middle class and find the same economic and social interests to protect
and problems to resolve that confront other middle class Americans in
their day to day lives. Among those who by tradition and circumstance
feel strong roots in the family and in the communities and neighborhoods
in which they live. Among the millions of small businesspeople and
women struggling to translate dreams into success in the face of another
increasing burden of taxation and regulation. It seems to me that the next
few years will offer the Republican Party, its leadership in the Congress
and in the Republican National Committee a unique opportunity to reach
out to those constituencies with a principled exposition of a distinctly
Republican, inherently conservative point of view… If they define the
Republican position with these target constituencies in mind, there is no
reason why they shouldn't be able to break through the semantic barriers
that have caused their party to be perceived by too many as the party of
privilege and big business.23
It is also significant to note that in Buckley’s speech, perhaps the clearest
description made at CPAC of the groups that comprised the so-called conservative
majority, he included union members who were “no longer…arbitrarily commandeered
by distant bosses.”24 At CPAC, several speakers also sought to distinguish between
23
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union workers (an important part of the conservative majority as envisioned by coalition
leaders) and the political action committees of organized labor (bitter enemies of the
coalition). During his remarks at CPAC, Rusher noted:
It isn't by a longshot clear to me that American conservatism has a lifelong
enmity with the concept of unions or union workers as… we let
businesspeople persuade us that we have… One reason why the unions
back the Democratic Party is that it is the only party that has ever paid any
attention to them. Now unions can be wrong, and unions can also be overweaning, but they can also be very good….on the social issues: busing
,and abortion, and the rest , or even on economic issues, we don't have all
that much disagreement with a great part of the Union movement.25
Perception vs. Reality
In conclusion, it is important to recognize that Rusher and his fellow coalition
leaders never quite escaped the fact that the conservative majority did, in fact, contain
many moderate voters who– precisely because they were non-ideological– were
susceptible to appeals from moderate politicians.
As Rusher even admitted in his reply to Kirkpatrick, many of the union and other
blue collar voters who he and others lumped into the so-called conservative majority had
been easily persuaded to vote for Lyndon Johnson (who implemented the Great Society)
and for Jimmy Carter (who, as Hatch noted, openly supported national health care and the
federalization of welfare). The fact was that many of the voters coalition conservatives
were targeting were aligned with conservative positions on some issues, but on others
(especially issues in the economic realm), they displayed a persistent willingness to
accept the big government policies advocated by the Democratic Party. The conservative
majority was indeed a heterogeneous group of philosophically unsophisticated voters
who did see a positive role for government in some circumstances.
The Importance of the Conservative Majority Thesis, Revisited
The fact is that characterizations and other elements of discourse need not be
valid or perfectly true in an objective sense in order to shape perceptions of the political
universe and structure political action. By their very nature, characterizations, narratives,
and interpretations, as well as the strategies that are based upon them, are carriers of ideas
and encourage ideologically tinted and sometimes skewed perceptions of the political
universe to develop. In my view, it is important to note that advocates of the
conservative majority concept– Rusher, Reagan, and others– believed in its veracity, and
they used the theory as a basis upon which to interpret events, formulate strategy, and
build cohesion and momentum.
Over time, through its repeated use, the conservative majority thesis evolved to
become much more than a simple belief that the American people were conservative.
25
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Elaborate narratives, embellishments, and strategies were developed around the basic
construct as it was articulated, repeated, refined, and used by multiple leaders to respond
to and interpret a series of political developments. Over time, it grew to become a
conglomeration of multiple elements of discourse that served as a lens through which
conservatives perceived the world outside of their coalition. It came to shape and
structure coalition identity and collective consciousness. Coalition strategies for focusing
discourse and re-branding the Republican Party also emerged around it. It comes as no
surprise that in the wake of the 1976 election, politicians defended it, used it to analyze
the way in which events unfolded, and relied upon it almost exclusively to define a path
forward for the transformation of the Republican Party.
At the post-election CPAC conferences, piecemeal additions to the conservative
majority theory were made and bundled organically with prior formulations as the
concept was used by multiple politicians to interpret and explain recent political
developments and to chart a course for the coalition. In my view, no single expression or
use of the conservative majority concept– no single quote that I have mentioned in this
chapter– was itself a critical or decisive statement of the concept. It is not possible to
credit any particular speaker with single-handedly refuting critics like Kirkpatrick or with
fully defining the concept or vindicating it from attacks by skeptics.
It is more accurate to say that in the post-election context, the fluid, organic
iteration of the conservative majority concept that was already living within coalition
discourses was extended, refined, and updated gradually through the interactive and
compounded contributions of the multiple elites that I have cited. This process of
discursive refinement was propelled by history and the need of leaders to refine discourse
in order to account for new developments. It happened as the concept was used,
referenced, and recited over and over again as it was used to interpret the election
outcome and subsequent events and as multiple elites tried to steer the coalition in the
directions that they thought best. In the process, the concept had a pervasive, multidimensional influence, and, when viewed from a broad perspective, it helped to tie the
expanding elite-activist coalition together and define a sense of coalition identity. The
ongoing dialogue among politicians and activist intellectuals (of which an analysis of the
discourses at CPAC provides only a momentary glimpse) was essential for holding the
coalition together and for steering it along the path that it ultimately followed.
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CHAPTER 8
CPAC 1979 & CPAC 1980
If you haven’t noticed it, liberals are stealing our issues! 1
Sen. James McClure (R-ID)
Jerry Brown in California has shown us right wing extremism is a big tent.
Congresswoman Snowe of Maine has said there only two things she doesn’t like about
Jerry Brown. His face.2
M. Stanton Evans
There is a main tide in liberalism itself to rethink the very meaning of the liberal tradition
and to regain the ancient tradition of being anti-state… Just as you’re beginning to win,
your enemy is changing.3
Michael Novak

During the conservative political action conferences held in 1977 and 1978,
politicians and intellectuals sought to frame Carter’s victory over Ford as positive proof
of the strong conservative impulses arising within the polity and of the tremendous
potential for transforming the Republican Party into a vehicle for their ideas. Two
important interpretations that elites reinforced during these years were that: 1) the
Democrats nominated Carter because they recognized the conservative trend in public
opinion and sought to harness it; and 2) Carter won in 1976 because he used
conservative rhetoric and positioned himself to the right of Ford.
These interpretations came to serve as important, supporting evidence for
strategic formulations which stressed that Republicans could win the White House in
1980 if they rejected the moderate politics practiced by Nixon and Ford and nominated a
true conservative like Ronald Reagan who could speak credibly and forcefully to the
conservative majority. As the argument went, this approach would inevitably succeed
because the Democrats had not actually become conservatives and because Carter
himself was not a true conservative. If Carter were faced by a Republican challenger in
1980 who faithfully represented the Republican Party’s new conservative platform, then
the shallow, conservative rhetoric of the Democrats would be exposed, and Carter would
certainly lose his bid for re-election. As noted in the last chapter, Jesse Helms made this
exact argument at the CPAC in early 1978.
As Carter’s presidency unfolded, however, a growing number of Democratic
leaders and spokesmen also adopted conservative rhetoric and positioned themselves
1
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behind conservative policy initiatives, and a sense of discomfort began to creep into
conservative circles. Even as conservatives celebrated the growing popularity of
conservative domestic policy initiatives, such as tax limitation, a balanced budget
amendment, and de-regulation, and even as they sought to collaborate with conservativeleaning Democrats to pass initiatives that they supported, they also watched with
trepidation as their political opponents mobilized behind the issues and ideas that they
had long-championed and as those opponents increasingly capitalized upon these stands
in order to win and maintain political office.
For instance, two core components of Carter’s plan for fighting inflation involved:
1) support for de-regulation and 2) support for significant reductions in federal spending.4
In October 1978, Carter appointed Alfred Kahn, a Cornell University economist who was
a well-known champion of de-regulation, as his special adviser on inflation. In that role,
Kahn advocated de-regulation as a solution for combating inflation. These efforts
reinforced and strengthened Carter’s ability to position himself as a conservative. Also,
for instance, Governor Edmund (Jerry) Brown Jr. (D-CA) came out in support of a
balanced budget amendment during his 1978 gubernatorial campaign and positioned
himself as a vigorous supporter of cuts in government spending.5 In Massachusetts,
Edward King ran for governor in 1978 as a conservative, pro-life Democrat and also
favored fiscally conservative policies.
The label that was applied to describe liberals who had recently gravitated away
from liberal positions and adopted conservative positions and rhetoric was the term born
again conservative.6 While there were clear differences between the so-called born again
Democrats and born again liberal Republicans (who had recently become conservatives),
the conservative southern Democrats (who had always been conservatives), and the
liberal Democrats, it is important to note that the common thread among all of these
loosely defined categories of actors was that they supported a variety of conservative
policy positions and made use of conservative rhetoric during the late 1970s. In 1978 and
1979, even liberal stalwart Edward Kennedy became a strong advocate for de-regulation
in the airline and trucking industries. Another Democratic Party faction–the
neoconservative Democrats associated with the Coalition for a Democratic Majority–
were supporters of a strong anti-Communist foreign policy and had also been in existence
since 1972.
4

I will argue that stronger differences persisted between liberals and conservatives on the foreign
policy front. Also, it is important to note that reductions in spending in a period of high inflation
are consistent with Keynesian fiscal policy. Conservatives advocated for reductions in spending
as part of a program that also called for reductions in taxes. In conservative discourses, spending
cuts were embraced as part of a broader “supply side” program intended to spur economic growth
rather than to simply fight inflation. Nonetheless support for decreased spending was an
important component of both, and Carter’s support for spending reductions threatened a key
distinction that conservatives drew between the ideas of their coalition and the ideas of the
Democrats and liberal Republicans.
5
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The trend toward greater fiscal conservatism in the Democratic Party was so
pronounced in 1979 that the New York Times dubbed the Congress elected in 1978 the
“Less is More Congress.” The paper noted:
Not only conservative Republicans but liberal Democrats won re-election
[in 1978] on promises to cut spending and Congressional leaders, such as
Robert C. Byrd, Senate majority leader, and Thomas P. O’Neill Jr.,
Speaker of the House, forecast success for Administration budget-cutting.7
Thus, by early 1979, many of the various policy positions supported by movement
conservatives were also being expressed by actors who were situated in and around the
Democratic Party. Of course, the various positions were only selectively embraced and
applied by actors who were not participants in the conservative movement’s discourses.
They were not bundled together by outside actors and communities as they were in
movement discourses or necessarily embraced for the same philosophical reasons.
Instead, they were represented and bundled to varying degrees with other conflicting
policy positions and ideas. Many Democrats (with the exception of conservative
Democrats) did not all share the underlying conservative principle that big, activist
government as represented by liberals was a bad and dangerous thing. As Democrats,
many of the actors who adopted conservative rhetoric and positions during the late 1970s
still embraced the government social programs of the New Deal and combined support
for those programs with support for a select and dissimilar mixture of approaches and
ideas. The reasons why they did so varied. Some probably did so for electoral effect.
Some may have done so for pragmatic reasons. Others may have genuinely found their
way to policy positions that were also taken by movement conservatives by relying on
their own distinct belief systems.
As great as it was for conservatives to finally see their ideas and proposals gain
some outside support and traction, these developments posed a strategic dilemma. There
was a possibility that Carter might win again in 1980 and/or that some of the so-called
born again Democrats might well be able to harness conservative trends in a manner
similar to what Carter had achieved in 1976 and thus pull more voters into the
Democratic Party. In doing so, they might even be able institutionalize a new coalition
around a new platform of ideational and political commitments. Jerry Brown was vocal
about his presidential ambitions. He ran against Jimmy Carter in 1976 and then again in
1980. But Brown was decidedly not a movement conservative. As a governor, he
reduced government spending, but he also liberalized marijuana laws, decriminalized
homosexuality, came out as a vocal supporter of the Humphrey-Hawkins bill (which
created additional government jobs in order to boost employment and spur economic
recovery), and supported a greater degree of government regulation in some areas such as
environmental policy.8 A Brown presidency might have moved American politics and
Adam Clymer, “The Nation: A ‘Less is More’ New Congress Gets Ready,” The New York
Times, January 14, 1979.
8
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the Democratic Party farther to the right, but it would not have brought movement
conservatives to power, it would not have meant the full implementation of the
conservative movement’s platform, and it could have plausibly dealt a blow to the
Republican Party and aided instead in the revitalization of the Democratic Party. There
was also a risk that during future elections, movement conservatives might not be able to
differentiate themselves as effectively from outside actors and communities that
embraced some of their ideas and spoke in terms that partially overlapped with their own.
Meanwhile, Jimmy Carter also posed a direct threat to the conservative
movement’s agenda. On the one hand, Carter advocated for the types of conservative
policy solutions that I have indicated (such as spending limitation and de-regulation). He
had also displayed an ability to win public support on the basis of that rhetoric. On the
other hand, Carter supported certain liberal programs and initiatives that were important
to entrenched Democratic activist constituencies and administrators. He certainly did not
represent the platform of policy solutions and ideas that were embraced by the
conservative movement, and his rhetoric, though conservative in that it called for a
reduction in the size of government, was often applied to justify and rationalize the
continuation rather than the repudiation of the liberal New Deal and Great Society social
programs. His emphasis on multi-lateral peace talks and disarmament were also
extremely incompatible with the conservative movement’s aggressive, anti-Communist
platform.
The Task of Conservative Leaders in 1979 and 1980
Of course, in 1979 and in early 1980, these were current events. Movement
conservatives were not able to look upon developments from such a removed perspective.
Carter’s apparent ability to position himself as a conservative while advancing certain
key liberal policy objectives, as well as the shifting rhetoric and commitments of
Democratic Party politicians and communities of discourse, were a cacophonous jumble
of political developments. The future of conservatism and of the country were unclear
and were still dependent upon actions that had not yet been taken. Movement
conservatives had no doubt that conservatism was on the rise. They took the
conservative language used by Democrats as clear evidence of the salience of their ideas
and positions; however, at the same time, it was not at all clear that Reagan would be
nominated by the GOP in 1980 nor was it clear that movement conservatives would be
triumphant in bringing their particular variant of conservatism to fruition as a new
dominant public philosophy.
A major task of the conservative politicians and intellectuals in 1979 and 1980
was therefore to do exactly what they had done in the past. That was to provide
important clarity– to elaborate characterizations and interpretations of outside actors and
factions, to provide interpretations of Carter’s behavior, leadership style, policies, and
true philosophical leanings, to demystify the nature and implications of the rifts and
communities the co-existed within the Democratic Party, and to offer characterizations
The article looks at the evolution of Brown’s views over time and includes an excellent summary
of his positions during the 1970s.
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and draw distinctions between the good conservative Democrats (who were important
target constituencies of the expanding coalition) and the deceptive and unacceptable
Democrats (who threatened to derail conservatives and introduce unsatisfactory ideas and
positions that could lead to fragmentation). There was also a need to adjust conservative
narratives in order to account for the rightward movement of Democrats and to refine and
reinforce strategies for holding the coalition together and for transforming the Republican
Party into a vehicle that could carry movement conservatives to power.
There was a very fine line that movement conservatives needed to walk.
Conservatives needed to work with the so-called born again conservative Democrats (and
born again Republicans) in Congress, but at the same time, Jerry Brown, Jimmy Carter,
and others who were presidential contenders posed a threat. They certainly couldn’t
stand as representatives of the conservative movement’s platform of ideas and policies in
the way that Ronald Reagan could and did. These distinctions had to be drawn and
reinforced.
The mood of the 1979 and 1980 CPAC conferences reflected the unusual political
situation. On the one hand, there was a sense of jubilation in the air and a sense that
conservative ideas and policy solutions were beginning to strongly shape the discourses
of both parties. On the other hand, this optimistic mood was tempered by a growing
awareness that unless conservatives managed to strongly associate the Republican Party
with a conservative platform and message, their coalition could ultimately be preempted
and swept aside by a class of new Democrats like Jerry Brown who might find a way to
ride the conservative wave in public opinion and manipulate it so as to keep the
Democratic Party in power. In the context of 1979-1980– a context in conservatives
believed that the most conservative candidate would win and in which Democrats were
moving aggressively to the right– moderation by the Republican Party was indeed the
greatest danger of all and a pathway toward potential defeat in 1980 despite what they
perceived as a great opportunity.
Interpretations of Political Context at CPAC 1979-1980
All of that said , the rightward shift of Democrats during the late 1970s did not
precipitate a major shift in conservative discourses (at least insofar as they were reflected
at CPAC). The problem that lay before the movement was explained by leaders exactly
as it had been during the years 1976-1978. Simply put, Democrats were using
conservative rhetoric to appeal to voters, and voters were susceptible to those appeals
because they were increasingly conservative and because the GOP failed to associate
itself with a bold conservative message. The solution was also the same. The GOP had
to field a conservative candidate in 1980 in order to speak strongly to the conservative
majority and pull conservatives away from the Democratic Party and into the Republican
Party.
During his keynote address at the opening remarks of CPAC 1979, James
McClure began by telling the audience:
I [want] to talk to you… about building a majority based on principle…
I’d like to be in the majority. I’m not talking about that in purely partisan
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terms, although I am a reasonably partisan Republican. I’m talking about
that in terms of principle. I’m talking about building a coalition in this
country that will translate into effective political action those ideals that
brought you all together in the first place. Because it isn’t enough any
longer for us to harbor our ideas, uphold them, or even to urge them on
other people. It has to be translated into action that will build a majority.
Why do I say that? Every poll that is taken in this country today indicates
to us that the people of this country are becoming more conservative. That
their viewpoint on public issues is more conservative. That what they ask
their representatives and senators to do is more conservative. But that
political majority that I’m talking about will not be forged because we sit
back and say “now we’re going to have our day.” Because if you haven’t
noticed it, liberals are stealing our issues!9
McClure quickly turned his focus toward the threat that liberals who adopted
conservative rhetoric and took conservative positions posed to the conservative coalitionbuilding project. Specifically, he noted that by adopting conservative positions, liberals
threatened to fragment the conservative movement. While “born again” liberals used
conservative rhetoric, they weren’t really conservatives, and they therefore shouldn’t be
welcomed into the movement. McClure asked rhetorically:
Why do I say the liberals are stealing our issues? Well, it is Ted Kennedy
that is leading the fight to deregulate the trucking industry. It was Ted
Kennedy who last year led the fight to deregulate the airline industry.
He’s also the same senator who is scheduling hearings on ways to limit
federal spending… Senators like Senator Church and Senator Javits, who
want to protect Taiwan, and Senator McGovern wants to invade
Cambodia! Governor Brown wants a balanced budget constitutional
amendment, and he wants to ride that theme all the way into the White
House. Senator Muskie’s name has become synonymous with sunset
legislation, and its George Meany who cautions the country on the SALT
treaty. Don’t forget that it was Jimmy Carter who promised a balanced
budget some time ago. I’m not concerned about whether they are going to
identify the issues. They have already identified the issues and are talking
about the issues! I am not concerned that they may vote with us on those
issues. I’m concerned that we don’t want to allow the conservative
movement to be fragmented among people like that who will not apply the
principle broadly but will select given high points for political effect while
never accepting the underlying principle that has brought us together.10
In the context of these comments and in the subsequent portions of his speech, the senator
implied that the core, underlying principles to which he alluded were that big, activist
9
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government was a bad thing and that the preservation of freedom and a strong antiCommunist foreign policy were essential. He continued by asking rhetorically:
How sincere are these new conservatives? How real is their commitment
to a limited government? To the preservation of freedom? To the
limitation of the size of government and the limitation of the invasion of
government into your pocketbook and into your paycheck? How sincerely
are they concerned about your ability to determine your own life in your
own way? Or are they just picking a few issues that they can parade
before the electorate before the next election so that they may continue in
office so that … they can continue to vote for most of the things that we
are opposed to? Today’s friends of Taiwan were last year’s sponsors of
the Panama Canal treaty. Today’s SALT treaty opponents are the ones
who last year were the enemies of Rhodesia. Those who talk about a
balanced budget today are the ones who helped to create the unbalanced
budget and the federal debt that we don’t enjoy today. Those who seek
now to deregulate some portions of our economy and who have sponsored
sunset legislation are the very ones who created the laws which they now
tell us they want to limit…I suspect that many of these newly born
conservatives, whether they be fiscal conservatives or otherwise, really
still have mischief in their hearts concerning broad, general policy. Just
by chance, sunset legislation will have to include tax expenditures, we are
now told. The pro-Taiwan resolution will reconfirm our new friendship
with Red China, and the Kennedy concern for spending limitations will be
well expressed in public hearings, not in public bills…I think we have to
be not only aware of what they’re going to do but on guard against
allowing them to succeed in deluding and diverting the American people’s
attention away from the failure of their actions to protect the interests of
the United States. The leopard hasn’t changed his spots. He merely wants
to get elected. For each of us who supports deregulation, there are a dozen
others trying to stick it to private enterprise in some other way. For every
airline deregulation bill or every effort to deregulate the trucking industry,
they support a dozen different efforts to regulate other portions of our
economy. You see they pick out a few issues upon which to highlight
their objections, and their appeal to the conservatives in this country, but
really their heart is not in it. They don’t believe the SALT will bring
peace any more than you or I do. But if it means less money for defense,
then there will be more money for social programs.11
To return briefly to the general theory that I have outlined, what is significant about these
remarks is that they show that McClure painted a rich portrait for the audience of outside
actors. He did not simply express conservative ideas and positions. He juxtaposed the
ideas, positions, and goals of movement conservatives to those of movement outsiders.
11
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He defined enemies by name and characterized their behavior and underlying objectives
by drawing sharp distinctions between their true goals and the ideas of the conservative
movement. In this vein, he argued that they didn’t really believe in the SALT treaty.
They supported it only to save money for their liberal social programs.
It is especially interesting to note that even in this speech in which he expressed
strong opposition to the “born again” Democrats, McClure did not target conservative
Democrats by name. In fact, Rep. Phil Gramm (D-TX) was invited to CPAC and
introduced to the audience as “living proof of the bipartisanship of the conservative
movement.”12 Senator Russell Long (D-LA) was also invited to speak at the conference
on the topic of welfare.
In his remarks, Gramm expressed what seems, at first blush, to have been an
attitude contrary to that of McClure, and it is therefore especially important to compare
their remarks. During his remarks, Gramm advocated in favor of welcoming and
working with the so-called born again Democrats and in favor of pushing for reform in a
piecemeal fashion. He noted:
I think we conservatives have a bad habit, and the habit is to sort of bare
our breast about how conservative we are. I think it’s a habit about trying
as people move towards our position– because of the overwhelming
weight of facts, which has accumulated in the last 30 years–- basically the
weight of the facts is that big government does not work. That
government cannot solve problems. That spending more of the taxpayers’
money can’t turn bad programs into good ones. I think we have to
welcome the reborn or newborn conservatives into our fold. I think we
have to be willing to accept them as equals in our move. I think its very
important, something that I intend to try to do in the new Congress, is to
try to build coalitions with anybody. The Fabian socialists took over great
Britain, which at the time was the greatest nation in the world, by setting
out their program as what they wanted to achieve and forming coalitions
on a gradual basis to achieve those goals, and in the process they achieved
things that if one had started at the beginning and set out their program,
one would have thought that it could have never been accepted, but in fact
it was, and they started out by picking a single issue which appeared to
them to be the most acceptable. In their case, it was the socialization of
health care, and they fought and built a coalition, achieved that goal, and
then they went on to something else. I think that’s something that
conservatives need to do in the 96th Congress and in the future. I think
that we have a better Congress than we did during the period of the 95th
Congress, and I think we have a real opportunity to see that things
change…13
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In part, the different tone and approach may be seen as reflective of the fact that Gramm
was a southern Democrat from Texas who was committed to working with other
Democrats in his party in order to accomplish his own legislative goals. Elsewhere in the
speech, he joked that his preference “would be for all the Republicans to come back into
the Democratic Party,” stressing that in the South, it was essential for conservatives to
continue to compete within the Democratic Party where they could win rather than
moving into the Republican Party, where they risked losing their seats and creating
opportunities for liberal Democrats to replace them.14
On a deeper level, however, Gramm’s remarks may also be seen as reflective of a
tension between conservatives’ need to work in a bipartisan manner in Congress to
pressure for reform (as reflected in Gramm’s speech) and their simultaneous need to keep
their movement pure and send a strong signal to the electorate (as reflected in McClure’s
speech). Ultimately, as I argued before, they wanted to somehow do both. At another
point during the conference, William Rusher made a similar observation. He noted:
I think we conservatives for all that we may function best in opposition
really because we’ve spent so long there, would be well-advised to
recognize when things begin to go our way and let them come our way.
Don’t then be blind to change, or don’t refuse to acknowledge that
anybody ever has begun to move away from mistaken positions. They
have begun to move. Encourage the move. Pressure for more.15
Still, at the same time, conference discourses were filled with rhetoric that was more
consistent with McClure’s words– rhetoric that characterized Democrats who embraced
conservative ideas and positions as deceptive and as politicians who sought only to ride
the conservative wave in public opinion and maintain control of government institutions.
Interpretations of the Carter Presidency
Although Jerry Brown was often a scapegoat for this kind of rhetoric, it was
Carter who was the main target. As I noted earlier, Carter’s conservatism only posed a
threat to the growth of the GOP and to a Reagan candidacy.
At CPAC, the President was pegged by conservative leaders as a strategic,
manipulative politician who sent out conservative and liberal messages simultaneously
and who balanced between competing conservative and liberal Democratic Party
factions. The point upon which coalition leaders unanimously agreed was that Carter was
not a true conservative and that the path forward for conservatives meant working to
ensure the nomination of a strong conservative Republican who could defeat him in 1980.
Curiously, they also tended to unanimously characterize Carter not as an incompetent
leader but rather as a leader who was constrained by conflicting pressures within his party
and, more broadly, by conflicting pressures between his party, his own preferences, and
what they saw as a strong conservative tide of public opinion. Michael Novak noted:
14
15

MSS 176, LTPSC, Box 118, Tape 140
MSS 176, LTPSC, Box 118, Tape 140

180

I think we’ve been experiencing government by pinball. But what I mean
by that is that for two years every time somebody slaps the machine on
one side, Mr. Carter bounces over, hits a light, a bell rings, a light goes on,
and Jimmy smiles. Someone hits the other side, and he bounces back
across the machine, and again, a bell rings, a light goes on, and Jimmy
smiles.16
The pinball analogy, of course, was part of a broader characterization of Carter as
waffling and trying to respond to pressures from liberal and conservative party factions as
well as the pressures exerted by public opinion. Novak went on to stress that Carter did
not have a coherent or constrained political philosophy and that he therefore made
decisions on a case by case basis. He characterized Carter as being perhaps wellintentioned– that is, not exactly as a covert agent for liberal forces– but at the same time
certainly not a conservative. Novak stressed to the audience:
There is no strategic concept, either for domestic policy or for foreign
policy, and Jimmy Carter smiles. There is no sign of it. He faces issues
one by one. He is a very religious and a moral man, but he comes out of
no tradition which enables him to see the moral and religious connections
between an act over here and an act over there. He faces each issue as a
moral issue all by itself… his great ambition is to leave office as a great,
good, religious man– to be a missionary to the world for the rest of his
life. … He doesn’t face the substantive issues or the interconnections of
these issues and what will happen in the real world by making this
decision or that.17
As a result of this lack of philosophical constraint, Novak suggested that Carter had been
unable “to define where we are as a nation to anybody’s satisfaction.” He managed to
anger conservatives and liberals alike.
Meanwhile, John Ashbrook characterized Carter as an unprincipled politician who
sought to reflect and serve the needs of entrenched liberal Democratic constituencies
while harnessing conservative trends in public opinion through the use of conservative
rhetoric. His characterization was different from the one offered by Novak in that he
depicted Carter as intentionally manipulative and as more grounded philosophically in
the policies and ideas of modern liberalism. He stated:
I have a theory about Carter… I think a few years ago a number of people
sat down, fed into a computer what the people wanted, what they wanted
to hear, what they wanted to see, where they wanted him from… the
rhetoric that they wanted in the campaign, they pressed the buttons, and
what came out is precisely what Jimmy Carter was, said, did, etc. In my
16
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way of thinking, he was a computerized candidate. He said the right
things and most of what he said appealed to the constituency that you
represent [conservatives] and not the constituency that he has represented
during the last two years. He is the greatest two level president we’ve
ever had– sending one message beam out to you, while at another time a
message keeps going out to this other group we were talking about
[liberals], because all said and done, he still has to appeal to the basic
productive conservative American to get elected.18
Ashbrook continued by further characterizing Carter as a shrewd and manipulative
Democratic politician– a representative of liberal Democratic constituencies who only
used conservative rhetoric in order to manipulate the public and shield his true intentions.
Of course, these characterizations of Carter as only using conservative rhetoric to win
votes were consistent with those made by McClure, and they were consistent with
characterizations of Carter’s rhetoric that I traced during the 1977-78 conferences. They
also continued the basic theme that the public was conservative and that a strong
conservative message was essential in order to win support in the court of public opinion.
Ashbrook noted:
If you establish the reputation of being the sincere outsider against the
Washington establishment, honestly trying to bring this behemoth under
control– you establish that reputation– it really doesn’t make a darn bit of
difference what you do because a great number of people are going to
believe it. That’s how the man has balanced the two constituencies, in my
opinion. He has the big, bulk constituency–- the average conservative,
productive American, and he says I’m with you– [meanwhile] … a
thousand telegrams have gone out repeatedly to the other groups saying
I’m really with you, too. I’m really with you, and stick with me, because I
have to say a lot of things to convince this other constituency, but my
heart is really with you, and you know, two years have shown where his
heart really is. His heart is not with you. It’s not with the productive, taxpaying American. It’s not at all on that side. It is the same old liberal
point of view– using you and making the ends of government– our
government– fit the purposes of the [liberal] constituency…19
During his remarks, M. Stanton Evans made points that resonated with both the
pinball analogy provided by Novak and the image of Carter as trying to manipulate
conservative impulses in order to keep Democrats in power that was provided by
Ashbrook. As Evans put it, a combination of forces emanating from the conservative tide
in public opinion and Carter’s position as leader of an increasingly fractured Democratic
Party constrained the President and forced him to pursue a kind of balancing act. Carter
therefore appeared to “drift” continuously back and forth in a seemingly incoherent and
18
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“confusing” manner as he sought to be all things to all people. But he was not confused
or incompetent. He was forced by his position to tackle policy issues on a case by case
basis, to make decisions that often conflicted with each other substantively and
philosophically, and to act in ways that contradicted his own prior rhetoric– ultimately
satisfying no one in the process!20 Evans noted:
…to an objective observer of Carter’s performance… has been without
direction, without proficiency.. But I think these faults are intrinsic to his
situation because Carter in his election and in his method of governance,
at least in domestic matters, is symptomatic of a condition– that condition
is the phenomenon of liberal collapse, at least as that word has been
understood in domestic politics for the last generation. The disintegration
of the liberal orthodoxy in American politics is perhaps the leading
political fact of our time. The leading political question of our time is
what will emerge to replace that orthodoxy. Mr. Carter’s domestic policy
may best be described as an attempt to maneuver among the ruins of that
orthodoxy. If we’re at midpoint [in Carter’s presidency], I think it’s apt to
be describing this endeavor because his maximum effort appears to be that
of situating himself at the exact geometric center of his own increasingly
diverse and splintered political party and also, if he can manage it, at the
geometric center of American politics. He is therefore situated as best he
can manage it at the vector sum of forces and is thus a prisoner of those
forces. Through this method of proceeding, he can offer no alternative to
the liberal system that has been in the process of collapse. He is simply
attempting manipulate it through rhetoric and partial remedies… to
manipulate the conservative impulses arising in the body politic to the
benefit of established liberal institutions, because to the degree that he
does pacify through words or placebos he creates the illusion of something
changing when in fact nothing does change very much… and it seems to
me this method of proceeding accounts for the randomness and lack of
direction.21
Significantly, then, Evans sought to reinforce the characterization that Carter was not an
incompetent leader who made erratic decisions. He was simply constrained.
The “impulses” to which Evans alluded symbolized an ineluctable tide in public
opinion toward preferences for less government. In order to harness these impulses, it
was necessary for politicians to take conservative stands and reject the big government
programs of the past. Carter recognized these impulses and the need to respond to them,
but he could not respond in the way that was really called for because he was positioned
as the leader of the Democratic Party and its coalition, and he was therefore unable and/or
20
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unwilling to fully repudiate (to use Skowronek’s highly compatible terminology) the
policy commitments of the Great Society and the New Deal.
But certainly, the trends toward conservatism in the Democratic Party indicated
that even though Carter seemed unable to offer a strong alternative, another Democrat
like Jerry Brown might eventually be able to do so. Evans continued by reinforcing the
concerns that had been raised by McClure. Evans noted:
Mr. Carter himself is I think an obvious forerunner…[of] events and
people to come. He is not in and of himself capable of working any deep
[change] in our domestic political system because of [his] philosophy and
practice of drift. But he certainly suggests that it is going to be possible
for Democratic candidates and Democratic officeholders to position
themselves to appeal to these new impulses within our political system,
and other Democrats are arising who seem more willing to grapple
substantively with the problems that have given rise to Carterism than
does Mr. Carter himself. We have in California the face of Governor
Brown, not suggesting that he is a philosophical conservative, but he
certainly sees what is happening to the political terrain in the United
States, and he is moving to position himself, I think, to appeal to this
latent, conservative, tax-cutting majority, whatever you want to call it, that
is so obviously out there waiting for some kind of leadership. Governor
King, who is the elected Governor of Massachusetts, obviously appeals to
the same constituency that Governor Brown is looking at… The
possibility certainly exists that Mr. Carter is the first of a long series of
Democrats who are going to attempt to manipulate– to reach– this new
majority and convert it to the advantage of the Democratic Party, and if
the Republican Party does not get its own philosophical priorities in order,
I think that we will see more and more such Democrats ascending to high
office (emphasis mine).22
To Evans, then, the victory of the conservative movement in 1980 was not
inevitable. The rise of a conservative Republican Party was not inevitable. As of 1979,
the future was still very unclear. It seemed entirely possible that conservative Democrats
would be able to mobilize and institutionalize the conservative majority in the years to
come as the base of a restructured Democratic Party and, by doing so, to succeed in
maintaining control of the nation’s political institutions. That said, efforts by Democrats
did not suggest a radically new course but rather reinforced the importance of the
strategies that leaders such as Buckley, Evans, and Rusher had been recommending all
along. It suggested the need to nominate a strong conservative as the GOP presidential
contender in 1980 who could articulate a bold conservative message. If the party would
simply do so, the Republicans would win, and the Democrats’ weak conservatism would
fail to gain traction as it had in 1976. Evans echoed the words of Jesse Helms at CPAC
1978. He noted:
22
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Mr. Carter’s cosmetic manipulations could not possibly have succeeded in
1976 and could not possibly hope to succeed in 1980 if the Republican
Party had spoken clearly and credibly for the aspirations of the new
majority that is expressing its discontent with established liberal ideas and
institutions…if the Republican Party–- even now– with all its problems
and the aftershocks Watergate and so forth and so on– even with the rise
of these new Democrats who are trying to steal conservative and
Republican [support]… I think it is still possible if the Republican Party
presents itself forcefully and credibly to the American public as a vehicle
for the aspirations of this discontented group that has arisen in recent
years. For the Republican Party to reach out and crystallize that latent
majority into an actual majority and transform the momentum of political
events in this country and perhaps in time restore this nation in to the ways
of freedom intended for it by its founders.23
Significantly, both McClure and Ashbrook made the same points. Ashbrook sarcastically
noted: “we have a particular knack at fouling things up when it comes time to have a
nominating convention. Who knows what’s going to happen? If that hard-fighting, twofisted, anti-communist Howard Baker gets in there, we’re going to really be in trouble!”24
Meanwhile, McClure warned that while there were “false prophets on the left”
who had to be carefully watched, the Republican Party was displaying a “case of
timidity” and that its leaders sought to “appeal to the left.” He chastised the Republican
leadership represented by Congressman Rhodes and Congressman Anderson, who
refused to support the balanced budget amendment, and he stressed that conservative
Republicans had to mobilize behind a strong program of principle and support those
policy initiatives that were consistent with conservative principles. He even
recommended that the GOP mobilize behind state-led efforts to pressure for a
constitutional convention that would force the deliberation of a balanced budget
amendment to the Constitution. As he put it positioning the GOP behind strong,
principled initiatives was the way to appeal to the conservative tide in public opinion and
to build a majority based on principle.25
The strategy that McClure, Evans, and Ashbrook outlined in 1979 was thus really
not very different from the one outlined in the wake of 1976. The goal was to brand the
GOP as a party that stood for strong conservative principles and to mobilize behind a
strong conservative in 1980 who could reach the conservative majority.
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CPAC 1980
CPAC 1980 was held on February 7-9, 1980– just two weeks after George Bush
defeated Ronald Reagan in the Iowa Caucuses. At the conference, there was a sense of
fear that Bush could win the nomination instead of Reagan, and there was a sense of
urgency that conservatives had to mobilize behind Reagan in order to prevent that from
happening. During his remarks at CPAC, James Lacey, the National Chairman of Young
Americans for Freedom, noted: “the results of the Iowa caucus and several major polls
released since then have hung over the Conservative Political Action Conference like a
dark cloud.”26
He went on to stress that Ronald Reagan had the “proven ability and executive
capacity to transform conservative ideas into public policy” and that he “must become the
Republican nominee for President.”27 Lacey also called for Representative Phil Crane,
another conservative movement hero and the outgoing President of the American
Conservative Union, to withdraw from the race. His remarks were bold, especially since
the ACU was one of the primary sponsors of the conference and since Crane was in
attendance. Lacey noted:
I ask Congressman Phil Crane to withdraw from the race for President and
work with us in a unified conservative effort to elect Ronald Reagan
President in 1980…unlike Ronald Reagan, Congressman Crane has not
demonstrated the ability, as measured by the national polls, to capture the
Republican nomination and to defeat president Carter in November. It is
my concern, and the concern of many who seek a conservative victory in
November, that Congressman Crane’s continued presence in upcoming
Republican primaries will divide conservative efforts and hand the
Republican nomination to George Bush, Howard Baker or John Connally,
candidates who have not demonstrated consistent allegiance to our
cause.28
During his introductory remarks at CPAC, Mr. Robert Heckman, the Executive
Director of Young Americans for Freedom and the head organizer of the 1980
conference, expressed a similar sentiment. He noted:
Conservatives have labored long and hard since our disastrous defeat in
1964– the last time a true believer in liberty was nominated for the
Presidency. We have fought for the privilege of once again holding high
the clear and unmistakable banner of conservatism through the nomination
of a philosophically committed Presidential candidate. Throughout that
fight, our leader has been one of the most widely respected men in
America–Governor Ronald Reagan of California. Governor Reagan came
26
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close to carrying that banner of conservatism–a platform, he called it, of
“Bold, bright colors…not pale pastels” for the Republican Party in 1976…
We need to recognize that there is one conservative spokesman with the
wisdom to analyze those events and provide for their solutions…one
candidate with the energy to see those solutions through…and one
candidate with the nationwide appeal and respectability to be victorious in
1980. That candidate is Governor Ronald Reagan… We call upon
conservatives now… to unite their organizational and human resources in
a complete and dedicated effort to elect Ronald Reagan President.29
Congressman Jack Kemp, who was charged with delivering the keynote address, also
emphasized that he had endorsed Reagan and assumed a similar posture. Kemp stressed:
The country desperately needs a candidate with bold, aggressive
prescriptions. It is not the time to be timid. Of the leading contenders,
Reagan is alone in advocating an across-the-board reduction in marginal
income-tax rates, to rebuild incentives that have been torn down by
inflation. He is alone in his belief that the American people would
respond with greater production, sufficient even to increase the solvency
of the government’s finances. Reagan hopes to bring the rates, which now
go as high as 70 percent, down to no higher than 40 percent by the end of
his first term…30
In the remainder of his speech, Kemp stressed that it was also Reagan who understood
the true problem facing the country– the “collision of inflation on the progressive federal
tax system”– and that he alone embraced the level of tax cuts necessary to reduce
inflation and simultaneously boost the productive capacity of the economic and spur
economic growth.31
Significantly, in their endorsements of Reagan, both Heckman and Kemp made
references to Reagan’s stand behind “bold” ideas. In 1980, this reference was still
strongly connected conservative majority narrative and to the notion that bold ideas were
necessary to speak to and mobilize the conservative majority. In the same speech, Kemp
stressed:
In this country, a majority of Americans define themselves as conservative
in their beliefs and values about economic and political freedom and a
strong national defense. What we conservatives must explain is why we
have not elected a majority of conservative leaders. As long as Americans
are faced with a choice between two philosophies, one of which appears to
offer high unemployment and low inflation and another which offers low
unemployment and high inflation, Americans are forced to choose
29
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constantly between the lesser of the two evils… Americans want someone
who knows how to end inflation and restore full employment at the same
time. But they can only indicate their choice if there is someone actually
out there proposing to do it. Americans are demanding–begging for us to
give them… a true and radical vision for the 1980s… First, a departure
from the usual or traditional, a departure from the orthodox range of
policies which are causing our 13 percent inflation and unemployment
which is rising toward 8 percent…and second… to conserve are the basic
principles of economic and political freedom on which this country was
founded, and without which we get the sort of mess we are in today….32
In conservative discourses, bold ideas were precisely what would carry Reagan and
conservatives to victory. Conservative policy prescriptions that were rooted in supply
side economics offered a positive vision– a version of conservatism that was not
reactionary but rather positive and change-oriented. It was a very different public
philosophy that offered an alternative to the policies traditionally offered by both the
Republican and Democratic Parties who worked within a paradigm oriented around
Keynesian fiscal policy.
This is what set Reagan apart not only from the Democrats but also from other
Republicans. George Bush was unacceptable precisely because he was not a true
believer. Unlike Reagan, he did not believe that the American people would respond to
lower marginal income tax rates with greater production sufficient to make government
solvent. Kemp noted:
I’m told George Bush–God bless him–has been openly critical of the idea
that lower income-tax rates would be good for the economy, in and of
themselves. Now it is true that George has proposed to cut taxes 20
billion. But the truth of the matter is that taxes are going to go up at least
41 billion next year unless we do something about it. In effect, a 20
billion tax cut is a 21 billion tax increase. George, whom I’ve always
respected, was also quoted in the Washington Post as saying of president
Carter’s budget, “generally, it’s not a budget you can be excessively
critical of.” If the quote is accurate, I feel let down.33

II. Discourse Analysis of CPAC Panel Discussions

At CPAC 1979 and CPAC 1980, the primary issues that were examined during
panel sessions can be grouped into four categories: 1) the social issues; 2) anticommunism and national defense; 3) taxes and spending; and 4) welfare.

32
33

Jack Kemp, Remarks at CPAC 1980, MSS 176, LTPSC, Series III, Box 9, Folder 13
Jack Kemp, Remarks at CPAC 1980, MSS 176, LTPSC, Series III, Box 9, Folder 13

188

1. The Social Issues
During the social issues panels held at CPAC 1979 and CPAC 1980, New Right
leaders expressed a series of grievances against big, activist government as managed by
liberals. The grievances expressed during these panels may be divided into two
categories: 1) a series of objections to the means by which liberals used government to
regulate private activities and exert control over private institutions where values were
cultivated and disseminated; and 2) a series of objections to the ends that liberals sought
to accomplish by using the instrumentalities of the state to regulate private activities and
exert control. The former included objections to abuses of constitutional authority by the
courts and administrative state as well as objections to infringements upon individual
liberties by these institutions. The latter were connected to a series characterizations and
narratives about the intentions of the courts and the administrative state.
Characterizations of the courts and the administrative state suggested that these
institutions (along with the executive branch) were under the control of liberals and that
they served primarily as agents for implementing liberal policy objectives. As defined at
CPAC, these objectives involved implementing the plans of liberal social engineers and
ideologues. The plans of liberal social engineers and ideologues were, in turn,
characterized as being part of an extensive effort to reshape the values of the public at
large and to manufacture the liberal vision of a good, just, and equitable society through
positive state action. This liberal vision was one of a society without gender, racial,
economic, religious, and other differences. It was one without inequalities that
conservatives believed to be natural. According to CPAC panelists, positive state actions
that were used to implement the liberal social vision included the imposition of
affirmative action and quota systems designed to eradicate or– at the very least– to
restructure private educational institutions. They included busing policies designed to
facilitate racial mixing in the schools. They also included efforts to reshape education so
as to indoctrinate youth in the philosophy of secularism, eliminate gender differences,
reshape gender roles, and weaken the prerogatives of the family (as it was traditionally
defined) in educating and teaching children traditional Christian standards of moral virtue
and good character.34
Put differently, at CPAC, social conservatives expressed strong opposition to the
courts and the administrative state and characterized both as institutions that were used
34
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by liberals to interfere in private institutions such as the family and religious schools
where values and morality were taught and reinforced. New Right activists depicted the
efforts of liberals as efforts to use the instrumentalities of the state in order to destroy the
traditions of society and reshape society according to their own vision for it.
The discussions during CPAC panels were infused with moralistic rhetoric about
the importance of patriotism, good character, and the preservation of the traditions of
society; however, what they lacked with a few rare exceptions were expressions of the
idea that the state should be used by conservatives to enforce virtuous behavior in a direct
sense. In conservative discourses as they were reflected at CPAC, good character,
morals, patriotism, and so on were things that were cultivated by private institutions such
as the family, churches, and religious schools. Good public policy involved rolling back
state regulatory authority and liberal social engineering initiatives and eradicating federal
influence over private institutions so that these institutions could flourish and do their job
of encouraging, cultivating, and teaching traditional standards of morality and virtue.35 It
involved removing federal control over public education while, at the same time,
supporting the passage of laws that would encourage local governments, communities,
and private citizens to determine educational policies and curricula. It also involved
supporting the passage of laws intended to cultivate and encourage the development of
the family and religious centers where morality was taught and developed. Such policies
included tax incentives which encouraged families to save and build wealth that would
enable them to make choices without a need for government assistance, and they included
policies that encouraged and rewarded actions by the private sector to strengthen and
support families. Under conservative policy prescriptions, the state would not enforce
morality in a heavy-handed way. It would gently encourage the natural development and
spread of morality and character (as defined by conservatives) through distributive
policies intended to nurture and strengthen private institutions and through measures
intended to reduce governmental efforts to engineer social change.
Significantly, conservatives were able to oppose various forms of liberal
governmental interference, demand a rollback of state authority, and position themselves
as defenders of individual liberties while at the exact same time defending tradition and
efforts that liberals were---from their own perspective--- taking in order to expand and
preserve freedoms. Expressions of conservative opposition to state action and
expressions of conservative support for a wide-scale rollback of governmental authority
were, in effect, characteristic of de facto resistance to liberal methods for expanding
minority rights and freedoms and of a de facto defense of tradition. By framing positive
state actions initiated by liberals in order to bring about their vision of equality as
infringements upon individual liberties and as efforts to destroy centers of traditional
morality such as the family, it was actually possible to resist the very policies that were
being pursued by liberals to ostensibly expand freedoms for minority groups and create a
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more just society.36 This as an instance where liberals and conservatives subscribed to
different combinations of problem and solution frames.
The conservative vision of state and society represented at the CPAC conferences
in 1979-1980 was thus neither libertarian nor purely traditionalist. It was most consistent
with the fusionism of Frank Meyer. The New Right conservatives who spoke at CPAC
harshly criticized trends toward immorality within society. But as things stood at the
time, the effort to achieve the good society would not and could not come through
extensive, positive state action. Crime policies, drug policies, and other positive uses of
state regulatory authority to crack down on the types of activities that Christians and
traditionalists regard as immoral and sinful simply were not discussed or demanded to a
great extent in the late 1970s (though I will note a few caveats and exceptions). Instead,
it was the anti-statist principle and the corresponding principle that morality should be
cultivated through private institutions in a free and minimally regulated environment
which prevailed. It was a vision of a minimal state that would gently encourage the
development of a moral and virtuous society (and restore the traditions of society)
through the reduction and decentralization of federal authority.
Private vs. Public Education
In order to bring these arguments into sharper focus, it is helpful to examine the
panel discussions that took place at the CPAC 1979 and 1980 in greater detail.
One issue around which social conservatives mobilized was the state attack on
private education. Race was an important aspect of these policy discussions.
Conservatives argued that by advancing what they felt was an unconstitutional policy of
racial integration through affirmative action policies, courts and administrators were
destroying private education. But insofar as their public statements went, this criticism of
affirmative action was not rooted in opposition to hiring black teachers or admitting black
students. It was not rooted in racist statements. Instead, quotas were criticized on the
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grounds that they were being used to make unrealistic demands that carried severe
consequences for noncompliance that would result in the destruction of private schools.
Objections to the means of government influence over private education
One objection to the racial hiring and admissions quotas imposed upon private
Christian schools by the Internal Revenue Service was that the requirements involved
unrealistic demands that the schools could not reasonably meet. Specifically, according
to IRS rules, if schools did not hire a certain percentage of black teachers and admit a
certain percentage of black students, they could lose their federal tax exemptions. The
IRS policy was characterized as unfair and unrealistic. For instance, during his
comments at a panel at CPAC 1979, Lou Ingram of the Foundation for Law and Society
noted:
At the Briar Crest school in Memphis Tennessee, 3500 students attend…
there is not a black student on campus. Quite understandable, right?
Wrong, according to the Internal Revenue Service… The IRS descended
on the school to audit it in an effort to tag it as segregationist… After
several weeks of auditing the school and going through the black
community and taking depositions, the IRS was forced to conclude that
the Briar Crest Christian School– with not a single minority student on its
campus– was in fact not segregationist but entitled to its tax exemption
and had an open admissions policy and was aggressively trying to
encourage minority applications. Under the proposed revenue procedure,
the Briar Crest Christian School would have to go out and produce 800
minority students in order to keep its tax exemption. Now that gets right
to the bottom of what this proposal is all about. They established a set of
guidelines for affirmative action…37
The point, of course, was that the school was trying to attract black students but that
black students had no interest in attending the school. Conservatives argued that forcing
schools to attempt to generate interest among black students where none naturally existed
was an extreme financial and logistical burden that was also entirely unrealistic. Ingram
went on to note a similar objection to hiring quotas for teachers:
Only make those things mandatory which that person can reasonably
control… In the appointment of minority teachers, if I offer this
gentleman a job…he has got no obligation to accept my offer. Black
teachers, because of affirmative action programs… in public schools are,
in fact, the favored group for hiring. And that is why they have a higher
entry level salary. Public school salaries range from 10,000-13,000
dollars today…private school salaries range from 6000-9000 dollars…so
there is an enormous disparity between the bottom of one and the top of
37
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the other, and that means that in trying to force the schools to hire these
teachers, you are burdening them with an enormous financial
responsibility at the very time you tell them that you are going to take
away their tax exemption.38
Ingram added that the mere threat of taking away private school tax exemptions caused
the schools significant financial harm and threatened to put them out of business
altogether. As he explained it, this was so because the schools were heavily dependent
upon charitable donations. The threat of the removal of tax exemptions by the IRS scared
away donors and threatened to cause a drop in donations, even if the schools were not
actually affected in the end. As Ingram put it, if a private school were to lose its tax
exemption, a person who had donated to the school would then be forced to go back and
amend his/her tax return and pay back taxes on any donations that had been made during
the previous two years. In addition, the individual donor would then also have a greater
likelihood of having his/her taxes audited. The mere risk of having to go through an
audit and back payment of taxes was enough to scare away individuals from making
donations in the first place. This damaged the schools’ ability to raise the funds needed
to stay in operation.
Another objection that was voiced to regulatory requirements imposed upon
private schools was that decisions associated with the implementation of regulatory
requirements were arbitrary and subject to the whims of administrators. During a panel
on education at CPAC 1980, William Ball, who was an attorney for private schools,
noted:
I put on the stand the chief of accreditation of the Kentucky Department of
Education, and I said, “you have to pass this 100 percent right?”… And
he said, “no, no, no. We work with the schools. We aren’t trying to
hound anybody.” You see this is the benign face of the administrator.
“We want to work with them.” “Well, then they don’t have to all be
obeyed right?” “No no!” I was a little surprised by that because our
people were in court because they’d been threatened with being shoved
into jail if they disobeyed. I asked, “well what percent do you have to
pass to make the grade, to get approved? He said, “we look for your
intent, a bonafide effort.” “I said well who does that?” He said, “well we
do.” I said, “certain public servants that make that determination… what
percent permits you to be approved?” “Well, we said percentage wise,” he
said, “I guess 30 or 40 percent.” I said, “you guess?” And he said, “well
that’s just off the top of my head.” Well, you see here, you have two
things. You have homemade law. That’s a subjective individual
interpretation or statement of a private individual. It has no character as
law whatever. It was never authorized by the legislature and of course is
never tested for constitutionality. The second feature is that you can see
it’s the government of men concept. He has a toy accordion which he can
38
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contract or expand according to his own whim, and that’s exactly what it
is. He makes a determination of your intent, and then you see again the
whole concept of regulatory vagueness. Vagueness of language and
vagueness of concept, and my point is, why must people be put to
obedience to that kind of law?39
Although Ball made these comments about a state administrator in this case, the
comments were made in the context of a broader discussion of acceptance of the
“principle that government knows best” and of the move toward a “unified national
education,” which he described as “extremely dangerous.”40
Conservatives also argued that the IRS used its control over tax exemptions to
attempt to control schools and force integration. In doing so, it exceeded its statutory
authority. At CPAC 1979, Ingram made a plea for more juridical public policy:
They’re claiming that the public policy is that all education must be
integrated. Ladies and gentlemen… you cannot find that phrase
anywhere. There is no statute law that makes that requirement…what the
IRS is saying is that the 1964 Civil Rights Act requires that all those
schools… that get federal money, must all be integrated… and how do
you get federal money? That is a tax exemption, meaning a federal
subsidy. These are questions with which the Congress must deal... It is
absolutely mandatory that the Congress close up the possibility of the
bureaucracy arrogating its power ….41
During his remarks at CPAC 1980, Orrin Hatch noted:
Domestically, we face another disaster….the effective seizure of political
power in this country by the regulatory agencies, and above all the
extraordinary assault that has been launched in the last 15 years upon the
American way of life under the slogan of “affirmative action.” Since the
Civil Rights Act was passed in 1964, the federal bureaucracy has literally
turned it inside out. The Act, and the whole Civil Rights movement, was
directed at the abolition of institutionalized racial discrimination. The
federal bureaucracy has interpreted it to legitimize racial discrimination,
and is imposing racial quotas with increasing ingenuity and arrogance
upon every area of American life. This represents an unprecedented
growth in state power. It also represents the end of the principle of
freedom, the principle of equal protection and the principle of rewarding
merit, that distinguished America from the caste-ridden, inflexible and
unjust societies of Europe, and indeed most of recorded history. A
powerful caste has sprung up vitally interested in affirmative action, and
39
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unfortunately there are signs that the Supreme Court is yielding to its
pressure…this is government of men, not laws. It is a flagrant breach of
the principle of separation of powers. Not just freedom, but the integrity
of our legal system, is threatened by affirmative action. The ultimate
irony of affirmative action is that it’s not even an effective way of aiding
minorities, any more than the expropriation of the rich and the state
seizure of industry is an effective way of helping the poor… Quotas are
illegal, immoral, and they won’t work, and we have to say loudly and
fearlessly, so that the message gets through to the legislators, the courts
and ultimately to the bureaucracy.42
Characterizations of the ends of government influence over private education
According to conservatives, why was government trying to insert itself into the
activities of the private schools? Why was it so intent on imposing such onerous
requirements on them? Was it merely to bring about racial harmony? This was
definitely not so according to the panelists. The true goal behind government
intervention was to make private schools into copies of public schools– to control their
composition, faculty, and curricula in order to advance the agenda of liberal social
engineers. Failing that, the secondary goal was to destroy them altogether in order to
bring children back into public schools controlled by the state. During his remarks at
CPAC 1980, Ball noted:
The state has to assure that everybody is getting what it calls a good
education… Now of course part of the mischief in the educational field is
the fact that government today in our country has become a tremendous
industry. It’s become an enormous enterprise. It’s become the source of
the employment of millions of people at local, state, regional, and national
levels. And its basic dynamic is to expand or die. And in the educational
field where the drop in births has meant some contracting of public school
enrollments, and where all of a sudden there is new vigorous competition
arising by the creation of more private schools. The public schools in
some states have gone on a very, very aggressive offensive… in
Kentucky…parents all over the state were told that they must enroll their
children in state approved schools. These fundamentalist parents who
were involved said they couldn’t possibly do that. They couldn’t subject
their schools to state approval because the state approval meant complying
with a vast catalogue of regulations to comply with which would convert
your private school into a carbon copy of a public school. The state
presumed– would you believe it– the state presumed to say what you shall
teach, the very textbooks you would use– think in terms of the right to
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know– the very textbooks you would use would have to be approved by
the state. In fact, you’d have to choose them from the state list.43
At CPAC 1979, Ingram noted: “The public school system, of course, is the instrument of
the egalitarian state. And the only conceivable way to make everybody equal is to make
them universally ignorant.”44
The plans of social engineers were generally defined as making everyone exactly
the same. During his comments at CPAC 1979, the evangelical minister Rev. Robert
Billings of the National Christian Action Coalition (a close associate of Jerry Falwell
who would also go on to serve as the Executive Director of the Moral Majority and as
Ronald Reagan’s liaison to religious groups in 1980) noted:
Part of the philosophy is that… the reason that there are so many problems
is because there are differences in people, and if we remove the cause of
the differences, we will remove the problem. So they like to put everyone
into molds… and there, at the push of a button, everyone will be smart like
Pavlov’s dog. If everyone has got the same education, the same
curriculum, the same training, and therefore we all think alike, and if we
remove all the differences, we have also removed all the problems. Now
you know, that’s not so. I told you it was part of their philosophy
because… they teach people that we want one sex, one guaranteed annual
income, we want one race, we want one banking system, one library
system, we want one army, we want one language… everybody on one
level…45
Billings went on to note that the IRS tax policy procedures were being used to bully
private schools into compliance with state-defined standards for what schools should look
like and what they should teach. He also argued that there was a danger that the same
principle could be used to tax other private institutions and to impose a liberal vision of
morality through tax policies defined by liberal bureaucrats. Billings said:
The arm of the federal government is trying to force its will on religious
institutions. The consequences of this are frightening. If they can tax
private schools, why not tax churches, and why not tax the particular
church with which the government disagrees? Why not tax, for example,
the Quakers on their pacifism? Why not tax the Catholics on their
opposition to abortion?46
Thus, threats to take away private school tax exemptions if those institutions did not
comply with racial hiring and admissions quotas were characterized not as attempts
43

ACU Audio Collection MSS 176 Box 118 Tape 134
MSS 176, LTPSC, Box 116 Tape 105
45
MSS 176, LTPSC, Box 116 Tape 105
46
MSS 176, LTPSC, Box 116 Tape 105
44

196

simply to create racial equality or to undo the effects of segregation but rather as efforts
to bully, shut down schools at will, assert control over curricula, and influence the values
that were being taught. This is what Ball meant when he said IRS rules were a “pretext
of using the tax laws as a device to create or implement governmental social policy,” and
it was the reason why he objected so strongly to the fact that administrative law was so
easily changed to fit the goals of the regulator.47 The objection was that rules could be
shaped and adjusted in order to force schools to implement the liberal social agenda and
in order to selectively shut down those institutions that refused to conform.
Other speakers reinforced this. William Stanmeyer, the President of the
conservative Institute for Legal Studies and a conservative intellectual who collaborated
closely with the New Right, argued:
These… schools are commonly established by faith communities, Baptist,
or evangelical, or other Christian denomination, very limited funds.
Almost universally, their students perform better on standardized tests…
but they do not meet some contrived social policy goal of government and
thus the IRS wanted to take away their status.48
Ingram made the same claim at CPAC 1979. He noted:
I want to emphasize that the state is determined to close these schools
because they [challenge] the state’s role as God. That’s what the issue
really is all about. Strategically putting them out of business because they
don’t adhere to the state’s religion.49
Private Schools as Centers for Morality
Of course, as I noted at the outset, there was plenty of moralistic rhetoric during
the CPAC panels, especially from Billings (who was an evangelical minister associated
with Falwell) and Charles Rice (who was a Catholic scholar). Private schools were
defended by both as centers where Christian values and morality were taught, and public
schools were characterized as centers where secular values and bad character were
encouraged in keeping with the misguided, ungodly, and destructive agenda of liberal
social engineers. As “instruments of the egalitarian state,” public schools were pliable in
the hands of liberals in a way that private schools were not.50
During his remarks at CPAC, Rev. Billings argued that the private Christian
schools taught moral values and Christian beliefs. For instance, they were taught that
evolution (which Billings characterized as being patently absurd) was wrong. In the
47
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private Christian schools, children were also taught they key values of discipline and
respect for others. He noted that during his work in private schools, he had paddled
students because it “develops discipline and character!” He added that private schools
were also places where children were held to much higher academic standards than in the
public schools and that they were taught not only “how to make a living but also how to
live.” Private Christian schools were places that helped children to “develop some kind
of character…To know what they need to get out of life and then how to get it.” In
addition, he added that private schools had “an emphasis…upon patriotism.”51
In sum, the private Christian schools were institutions that taught Christian
beliefs, Christian values, and that cultivated good moral character and love of country. In
the context of his remarks, Billings emphasized the fact that private schools taught and
encouraged good character and morality and that state-controlled public schools
encouraged bad character and a lack of morality in their efforts to adhere to federal
guidelines. Specifically, the public schools taught the values of “secular humanism,”
they did not teach the values of discipline and respect, and they taught students to satisfy
their physical desires at every turn instead of seeking spiritual fulfillment and God’s plan
for their lives. Billings noted: “happiness is not something you search for, its something
we stumble over on the pathway to duty.”52
During his speech, Billings also emphasized that the private Christian schools
were growing rapidly and that thousands would likely form by the turn of the century.
His vision of a society was one in which private education would come to overshadow
public sector education altogether.
Desired reforms
In the context of these panel discussions on education, it was therefore not the
case that all of the panelists spoke extensively about the need to reform public education
or about methods for doing so. Public schools were seen by Billings and Rice as
instruments of the state. During his remarks at CPAC 1980, Charles Rice noted:
I don’t think the public schools are worth saving. I think the best thing
that’s happened in this country is the Christian school movement …The
state, especially the secular humanist state, cannot educate children
without imbuing them with its own religion, and I don’t think the state has
any capacity to educate children.53
Rice added that the solution was to build more private schools and overwhelm public
education altogether. He noted:
I think what we’ve got to do is build institutions, which is why the
Christian school movement is so important, and why its so important for
51
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us to focus on such issues as Mr. Ball was raising… The issues of
overwhelming government power, when imposed upon the family and
imposed upon school children... The school prayer issue, I don’t want to
minimize it. I don’t want to portray it as something that would be a cure
all for public schools, either, because nothing’s going to save the public
schools, I think. I think they’re careening toward extinction, and I’m glad
to see it... provided, and I think this is a very important proviso, this will
be a good thing provided that there are– through private initiatives,
through properly limited tax credits… provided there is some way to build
the alternatives, to build good education under private sources, particularly
religious sources.54
Tax credits were thus a very limited way in which public policy could be used to
encourage and cultivate private education. Significantly, educational voucher programs
were not mentioned at either CPAC 1979 or CPAC 1980, despite the fact that education
panels were held at both.
The Family
Conservatives stressed that the most important institution where Christian values
and moral standards of right and wrong were taught and learned was the traditional
family. New Right conservatives placed great emphasis upon the family precisely
because it was a “moral matrix.” At CPAC, discussions of the family centered on its
importance and upon the dangers posed by positive state action to existence and to its
prerogatives. During his remarks during the panel on “the American Family” held at
CPAC 1980, William Stanmeyer noted:
The family, the traditional family– one man married to one woman– and
frequently with children, is a moral matrix. It is the only way that people
can be trained through experience to the acculturation of responsibility. In
other words, they learn to do what is right, and they have people loving
them– with them– constantly helping them along as they begin to find
themselves and find their proper role in society… where else would that
happen in our society if it were not for families that encourage children to
go home, do their homework, study, save their money, work summer jobs,
work vacation period jobs during the school years, and so on. The family
has an economic dimension in training people to take it as part of life, and
one has to postpone all that he wants for the sake of developing himself
and working for others. The family has a religious dimension… The
family is a place where you find out about God and respect and authority
that is other than the state– either your parents, or God, or both…Destroy
the family, put the children as wards of the state… and you’re going to
end up with no sense of allegiance to anyone but the state, because there’s
54
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no alternative authority figure in the child’s life. It is not an accident that
the Communist nations always attempt to disrupt the internal
independence and autonomy of the family when they take over a country.
Psychologically, the family gives the girl and the boy children role
models. What the father is, and what the mother is, and that they are
different…The young boy can learn about manliness from his father and
womanliness in the best sense of that word from his mother, and the child,
the girl, will learn the same from her parents and the appropriate roles if
they have a father and mother… much of our problem is that the Playboy
philosophy of our time keeps men and those women who adopt it in a state
of perpetual adolescence. Even the name– Playboy. Get out in your
sandbox, and play with your toys, but don’t face the hard life. Play with
you sexual toys day by day, run around with your motorcycles, and your
stereos, and your girlfriends–the Playboy philosophy. 10, 12, 14 year
olds. Immature, however much money is involved in it. Manliness means
more than playing around. Finally, the family is an educational place. All
the schools can do is build on what the family has done or try to build
despite what the family has not done. I believe this will be the domestic
fight of the 1980s. There are philosophical, almost ideological, almost
religious, almost fanatical currents flowing in this country– winds
blowing, of people who want to destroy this traditional role of the family.
Sometimes they’re well motivated but just stupid. Other times, one doubts
their good faith. Nonetheless their goal is the same.55
During the CPAC panel on the family, discussions centered on the ways in which
liberals sought to redefine the institution of the family and therefore destroy it in its
traditional sense. For example, Rosemary Thompson, an activist from Phyllis Schlafly’s
organization, the Eagle Forum, stressed that three million tax dollars had been allocated
to implement the recommendations of the White House Conference on Families.
Thompson noted:
If you want a little background on [the conference], I have one
pamphlet…which is a reprint from a magazine article called “Suffer the
Little Children to Come Under the Federal Government,” which is exactly
what they had in mind.56
Thompson went on to describe in a highly critical and sarcastic tone the
recommendations of the White House Conference. She stated:
ERA, abortion on demand, gay rights, the federal government assumes a
major role in child development, national health insurance, guaranteed
annual wage for everyone. This is now in the name of strengthening the
55
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family. You know they don’t even let you define families. The national
gay task force has taken credit for that…They convinced the national
White House officials not to define families. In one of the regional
hearings, a homosexual minister said that they wanted laws that would
allow the gays who have meaningful relationships and long term
commitments to file taxes just like married couples, to adopt children, all
this kind of thing [sic], and so the national gay task force seems to be
having quite an impact. Eleanor Smeal testified that families should be in
the inclusive sense of people who over time have established a lasting
relationship involving living, loving, working together for their individual
and mutual benefit, sharing mutual benefits, responsibilities, values, and
goals.57
Significantly, then, her criticisms were not just of state action that would curtail the
liberties of individuals but also of state actions that would redefine families and expand
rights to populations with alternative lifestyles. As I noted before, through opposition to
government programs such as the White House Conference and through opposition to
uses of government authority targeted at creating (or finding) individual rights that were
not already enjoyed, conservatives defended tradition. Of course, putting Thompson’s
comments together with those of Stanmeyer (cited above), the conservative defense of
the traditional family was rooted in the fact that it was a moral center where values were
taught. By redefining the family, the government caused damage to the institution and
therefore allowed alternative versions of the family to develop which would not centers
for the cultivation of bad morals and bad character. Thompson added that Eleanor Smeal
also called for “explicit sex education beginning in kindergarten all the way through high
school or the school loses federal funding” and stressed, “now that give you an idea of
some of the people who are calling the shots!”58
Thompson also spoke extensively about state-led efforts to not only redefine the
family but also interfere with its prerogatives and moral choices. Thompson gave several
examples of state interference, including the example of an HEW-managed workshop in
which a panelist stated that “if you teach your child about Jesus Christ and Christianity
without teaching him any other options for choosing a religion, that that would be
discrimination and… should not be legal.” She also gave the example of a woman in
New Jersey who was bullied by school officials and forced to take her daughter to a
psychologist chosen by the state because her daughter didn’t weigh enough.59
Solutions
William Stanmeyer offered the most detailed remarks for redressing the problems
created by the state attack on the family. Among Stanmeyer’s policy recommendations
were the following:
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Tax deductibility of mortgage payments, which would help families to buy homes
Removal of federal funding of education, unless laws are enacted to allow
voluntary prayer in public buildings
Denial of federal funds to states unless they allow parents and the community to
review textbooks prior to their use in public schools
The removal of the authority of HEW to determine policies regarding the sexual
intermingling of boys and girls in schools and the return of that authority to state
and local authorities
The establishment of a family savings and education plan to allow families to
create a special savings account to save for their children’s education.
Provision of tax incentives to corporations which would encourage them to
establish daycare centers near the workplace for mothers60

He noted that the purpose of provisions was to restore “the proper natural order of things”
that were “destroyed by earlier actions of government.” 61 As I argued earlier, the list is
reflective of a vision of public policy that would gently support the traditional family,
reduce the heavy-handed control of government, and decentralize state authority in the
area of education. It is a public policy that would not directly regulate private activity or
reshape schools according to a different moral vision but rather one that would empower
private individuals to take an active role free from government influence and control.

Court-Ordered Busing: an Unconstitutional Policy of Racial Integration
At CPAC 1980, Lino Graglia, a professor of Constitutional Law at the University
of Texas-Austin, was invited to speak on the issue of busing. During his remarks, he
argued that busing was a policy created not by Congress but rather by the Supreme Court.
Specifically, it was a policy that was pursued by the Court at the urging of liberal groups
such as the NAACP in order to accomplish a social policy goal of racial integration. In
Graglia’s view, racial integration, which was a policy that was pursued via positive
discrimination on the basis of race, directly contradicted the requirements of the 1964
Civil Rights Act, which specifically required that government not assign students to
schools on the basis of race.62
According to Graglia, the objective of the busing policies (as pursued at the
urging of liberals) was to create greater racial harmony and educational opportunities for
minority students. Graglia denied that they achieved this purpose. While he made
arguments against the policy on constitutional grounds, he added that busing did not
achieve its intended objective at all but in fact did the opposite. According to Graglia, the
threat of busing devastated school systems and led to greater racial homogeneity in
60
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schools, since middle class and wealthy families simply moved or pulled their children
out of public schools altogether when they faced the threat that their children would be
bused. In addition, busing created greater racial hostility among students who were
forced into environments where they did not prefer to be.63
During his remarks, Graglia also strongly criticized the method by which the
Court pursued the policy. He argued that the Court concealed its true intentions and by
framing its efforts to mandate busing only as efforts to further implement its Brown vs.
Board of Education decision and thus undo the effects of segregation. By doing so, it
lured a majority of the public outside of the South into a false sense of complacency that
busing would only be applied to others. As a result, the initial policy was advanced by
the Court without much public opposition. Once it was applied to schools outside of the
South, those in areas that had already been destroyed by it were unwilling to mobilize
behind the efforts of other states to oppose the policy.64
Conclusion
In sum, just as the IRS was blamed for seeking to implement social policy
through its tax exemptions, and just as the White House Conference on Families was
accused of seeking to alter the definition of the family at the urging of liberal interest
groups, so too was the Court accused of seeking to implement social policy at the urging
of Civil Rights groups. In all three issue areas, conservatives mobilized against state-led
efforts to pursue social change. In doing so, they opposed what they characterized as
abuses of state authority while also expressing strong opposition to the liberal ideologues
and interest groups who were depicted as using the instrumentalities of the state to enact
change. Expressions of opposition to the state were therefore also tied to strong defenses
of tradition.
2. Anti-Communism and Defense Policy
At CPAC 1979 and CPAC 1980, the discourses in the area of anti-communist and
defense policy were not markedly different from what they had been in prior years.
Panelists argued that it was important to: 1) expand the US arsenal of conventional
weapons and 2) assume a tougher posture with regard to US-Soviet relations. The two
points were tightly connected. Superiority in the area of conventional weapons
capabilities was regarded as essential in order to assume a tough rhetorical posture
toward the Soviets. Assuming a tough rhetorical posture meant rejecting the policies of
détente and making irrational and misguided agreements to reduce armaments. Stronger
weapons systems and a tough rhetorical posture were both considered to be essential in
order to discourage the Soviet Union from further expanding its influence in the countries
of Africa and the Middle East– particularly over countries that controlled oil and other
natural resources upon which the United States depended.
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Without strong weapons capabilities, conservatives stressed that the Soviets
would simply ignore American warnings and that they would continue to expand their
sphere of influence without any fear of retribution. Indeed, panelists stressed that a great
imbalance already existed in the area of conventional weapons and that the Soviets
already took American threats to their advances lightly. Soviets did so because they
recognized that the Americans would not risk a nuclear war in response to small advances
in small countries and that the Americans did not have the weapons to back up their
threats in a war of conventional weapons. During his remarks at CPAC 1980, Jesse
Helms noted:
If the US strategic nuclear arsenal cancels out the Soviet strategic nuclear
arsenal, and vice-versa, then the country with the largest conventional
force has the advantage. And that country is the Soviet Union.65
He added:
The Soviet union has out-maneuvered us, out-thought us, and moved
ahead of us. Being number one does mean something!... Short of nuclear
war with the United States, the Soviets now feel that they can do pretty
much as they please in the world. They [know] that the US will do
essentially nothing. And they have Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and
Iran to prove it. Because the United States seems powerless to deal with
the Soviets in conflicts below the strategic level, the Soviets will continue
their activities. Will the United States risk nuclear war with the Soviets,
say, over Angola? Or Ethiopia? Or Iran? Or Rhodesia? Or South
Africa? Or Saudi Arabia? Or Abu Dhabi? Or Kuwait?66
The answer, of course, was no! Soviets knew that Americans would not risk nuclear war
over those countries, and with its weak rhetorical posture, it allowed to Soviets to expand
their sphere of influence.
The decline in weapons capabilities was blamed on the weak defense posture of
presidential administrations stretching all the way back to Eisenhower. In this vein,
President Carter’s decisions to cancel the B-1 bomber, the MX missile, and other
weapons systems were cast not as radical departures from the missteps of earlier
administrations but rather as misguided moves that made an already serious problem far
worse. At CPAC 1979, Congressman Steve Symms (R-ID) noted:
Within a few months after his inauguration, Jimmy Carter began to show
his timidity and lack of resolve and redress in the emerging strategic
imbalance. In my opinion, Carter’s decision to cancel production of the
B-1 was one of the most outrageous and far-reaching decisions made
today by this administration…the neutron bomb has been all but
65
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cancelled. The Trident submarine construction program is behind
schedule, the cruise missile program is not only falling behind schedule
but there’s a growing concern that the little missiles may not be as
invisible as advertised to the public. With regard to the MX mobile
ICBM, the Carter Administration has repeatedly delayed decisions…
thereby further delaying the date of its initial operational capability so that
even if a production decision was made today, it would be at least 1987
before that system could be operational. It’s my personal opinion that this
administration has no intention of ever deploying the MX in a land mobile
mode, which is the way the missile was … required to be made so that it
would be effective. I’m of the belief that the administration is just
stringing the Congress along. Once they get SALT II signed by the Senate
and ratified, the trap will snap shut on the US Senate, and the Carter
administration will then cancel the MX program, just like they’ve done
with all the other strategic programs.67
In this context, conservatives also harshly criticized the national security
bureaucracy. This bureaucracy was characterized as the instrument of a coalition of
liberal ideologues and other interests who sought to shape the direction of foreign policy
and mould it to meet their own strategic purposes. In conservative discourses, it was this
bureaucracy (not just carter) that was responsible for the continued decline of US strength
and armaments over multiple administrations. . It was accused of influencing the
decisions of presidents from both parties and forcing its will on the American people,
even when its will was entirely contrary to public opinion. One example of this was the
treaty to give away the Panama Canal, which was unpopular with the public and which
weakened US interests by relinquishing control of a key “choke point” through which the
world’s natural resources moved. Another example involved the actions of the US
Commerce Department which, despite clear prohibitions by Congress, worked to
aggressively export American technologies to the Soviet Union. During his comments at
CPAC, William Rusher noted:
I would suggest to you that as we gear up to announce the Carter foreign
policy, if that’s what we’re about, let us have the grace to remember that
the policy we will be denouncing was the Ford foreign policy and the
Nixon foreign policy and the Johnson foreign policy, with, as I said,
individual modifications. For example, the whole disgraceful giveaway of
the Panama Canal was negotiated and pursued at least as far back as the
Johnson administration, and there are those who would trace it to the
Eisenhower Administration. Mr. Kissinger laid down the fundamental
tenents upon which it would be, upon which it would be followed,
pursued, and was pursued to its triumphant conclusion under Mr. Carter.
This was not, therefore, a Carter policy any more than it had been the
policy of his predecessors. As a matter of fact, he got the vocal support of
67
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I believe at least Mr. Ford and Mr. Kissinger and could have had that of
Mr. Nixon if anybody had thought it would do good instead of harm. This
same bipartisan establishment engineered you know perfectly well the
recognition of Red China. That was on the cards. I was told by officials
of the Republic of China and Taiwan in 1976 and early in 1976 at that that
they had been told by officers of the US State Department– this was the
Ford State Department, if that’s what you want to call it– that the
recognition of Red China was coming in the next administration regardless
of who was elected president of the United States. That was just on the
tracks… gonna happen! Might not have, would not probably have
happened as ruthlessly and undiplomatically as it happened under Mr.
Carter, but it was there and on its way, and that, too, had been engineered
as far back as the Nixon Administration by this bipartisan foreign policy
establishment. Both of the SALT treaties are the products of the same
crowd. SALT started under Mr. Nixon, marched forward under Mr. Ford,
and then negotiations for SALT II were brought to their culmination by
Mr. Carter. In fact, the whole concept of détente, which I think is little
more than the word, the code word for appeasement … That whole
concept moved forward under the bipartisan establishment …. So let us
not, as we embark upon our war dance, suppose that what is wrong with
American foreign policy and has been, and there’s plenty, is necessarily
the possession of any one party. What we are dealing with is a group of
people– some banks, some multinational corporations, their lawyers, their
friends in the foreign service, and certain members of the Congressional
offices– who together make up this bipartisan foreign policy
establishment, and they care very little about the policy or the views of the
American people.68
For these reasons, Rusher and M. Stanton Evans both argued that the simple
removal of Carter and the election of a conservative president would not be enough. In
order to reverse the dangerous course in US foreign policy, it would be essential to
dismantle the national security bureaucracy of which he and other presidents had been an
agent by ousting those leaders who were responsible for pursuing irresponsible and
misguided policies.
Conservatives also argued that the US should assume a more aggressive posture
toward the Soviet Union. As they had been in the past, the SALT II talks were an
important topic of conversation. These talks were characterized as ill-advised because
the Soviet Union could not be trusted to follow through on its agreements. In fact, the
participation of the Soviets in the SALT talks was characterized as little more than a ploy
intended to mislead and create the illusion of attempts at cooperation while masking
efforts to expand armaments and expand influence in countries of strategic importance
behind the scenes. The President was depicted as naive in the sense that he believed in
68
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the talks and in that he thought he could somehow negotiate with the Soviet Union.
Helms noted:
Iranian oil is vital to a number of US allies, not the least of which are
South Africa, Rhodesia and Israel. Europeans buy large quantities of
Iranian oil. We do too… While the Soviets moved decisively in Iran, the
United States again stood idly by. When the Soviets warned that events in
Iran were not a matter of US concern, the Carter Administration
acquiesced in the Soviet view…Instead of telling the Soviets and that the
shah was our ally, and that the Soviets had better stay our, President Carter
told them “you stay out, and we will stay out.” We stayed out, but the
Soviets didn’t. In doing so, Iran was lost.69
Negotiations and arrangements were therefore treated as an impossible and futile
because the Soviet Union’s tactic was to achieve domination. By reducing American
armaments and by engaging in the talks with the Soviets, Carter essentially allowed them
to succeeded in their deceptions, and he facilitated the continued decline of US strategic
superiority, and he put the United States and its economy at an even greater risk. It is
significant to note that this context also gave rise to extensive discussions of the
importance of harvesting and developing domestic energy resources and the importance
of US energy independence generally. By harvesting natural resources domestically, this
enhanced national security by making the country and its economy less susceptible to the
aggressive actions taken by the Soviets.
3. Taxes and Spending
As in years past, the cornerstones of the conservative movement’s economic
agenda involved: 1) implementing spending and tax reductions; and 2) rejecting
Keynesianism as the theory best suited for guiding the development of public economic
policy and replacing it with an entirely new public philosophy rooted in the theories
supply side economics.
There was a particularly strong push for a balanced budget amendment to the
constitution. This had been a major issue during the 1978 campaign, and as I already
noted, a number of Democrats had also come out in support of the initiative while the
Republican leadership in Congress had balked at it. One after one, the conservative
leaders who spoke argued that such an amendment was absolutely essential in order to
enforce fiscal restraint and reduce spending. Standing strongly behind the amendment
was also an important step that could help to more strongly associate the GOP with a
conservative message in the public mind. As the argument generally went, a balanced
budget amendment would not just require Congress to balance the budget– it would
actually force them to reduce government expenditures. It would have this effect because
Congressmen would be reluctant to balance the budget by raising taxes. They would
therefore balance it by reducing spending.
69
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That said, there was a slight tension between the great push to restrain spending
via a balanced budget amendment and the second piece that I mentioned– the importance
of supply side economics. The great push to restrain spending risked overshadowing the
supply side message which emphasized tax cuts. During his remarks at CPAC 1979, Jack
Kemp sought to reinforce the idea that while reductions in spending were important, tax
cuts were an essential part of the conservative message that would help them to
distinguish themselves. Kemp argued that supply side theory offered enormous political
potential for conservatives. It enabled them to articulate a positive message and a
positive vision that carried the potential for not only reducing inflation but also building a
stronger economy and therefore creating greater wealth. Budget balancing and spending
reductions were only effective for explaining what conservatives were against. Supply
side theory would help conservatives to explain what they were for in a positive sense.
Kemp noted during a discussion of supply side theory:
I think there’s political value. I think we have a chance as never before to
bring to the American people the hope that they’ve been waiting for for so
long– that there is an answer to this Keynesian dilemma of high inflation
and slow growth at the very same time. And I think that’s what we need
to bring to them. I think that is what really we must do if we are to
respond to the needs… of the American people, and I think it is all
wrapped up in the idea of individual liberty, individual freedom, and
reducing the level of government spending by encouraging the growth of
the greatest economic experiment in human freedom that mankind has
ever designed… it is more threatened today by some of these outdated,
outmoded economic models than anything I can possibly imagine.70
Another important task undertaken at CPAC involved not just advocating for
reducing tax and spending cuts but also characterizing and criticizing the initiatives of the
Democrats and the Carter administration and stressing the fact that the administration’s
policies were not really conservative. During his remarks at CPAC 1979, Congressman
Mickey Edwards stressed that despite his conservative rhetoric, Carter’s budget, which
was described as “lean and austere,” was actually anything but. He noted:
[Carter’s] budget of half a trillion dollars, and that deficit of 29 billion
dollars, is described in the press as ‘lean’ and ‘austere.’ At the rate we are
going, our federal budget is increasing by 11 percent a year, and by 1986,
we are going to, unless we turn it around, have a budget of a trillion
dollars a year.71
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4. Welfare
There was very little that was new about conservative discourses on welfare at
CPAC 1979 and CPAC 1980. Welfare policies were opposed for the same combination
of reasons that they had been in previous years. One important speech that is especially
worthy of note was delivered by Reagan’s former welfare director, Robert Carlson, who
had also spoken at CPAC 1975. During his remarks, Carlson sought to characterize the
true intentions of the welfare bureaucracy, who he described as including “the people in
HEW [and] the professional welfare people at the state level and at the county and local
level.”72
As he put it, the intentions of this welfare bureaucracy was to engineer change
within society and to implement its own flawed vision of a society without inequalities.
Carlson noted: “those who want to develop an efficient income redistribution system …
felt… if they could take the welfare system and demonstrate that it’s a mess, call it a
mess, and so forth” that they could “then replace it with not just a guaranteed income but
an efficient system for redistributing income” and that “in a very short time they could
level income in [the] country.” He went on to explain how the welfare bureaucracy
systematically pursuing and seeking to implement this vision of a country with level
income by fighting for universal welfare eligibility, the centralized determination of
benefits by the federal government, and the provision of welfare benefits to citizens in the
form of cash payments.73
Conclusion
In 1979-1980, the various conservative constituencies who were involved in
CPAC conference proceedings were concerned about a variety of different things. Some
like Robert Carlson were concerned about welfare policy while others like Rev. Robert
Billings were chiefly concerned about the IRS attack upon private schools. The
important tie that bound all of these actors together was that they shared a group of
common enemies– President Carter, the liberals in Congress, the Courts, and the federal
bureaucracy. These individuals and institutions were opposed because they sought to
destroy the traditions of society, to destroy the economy, to alter the balance of the power
in the world to suit their own goals and interests, and to enact their own vision for society
through administrative law. Just as the welfare bureaucracy sought to impose its vision
for a society with equalized income distribution, the IRS conducted a frontal assault on
private schools in order to eradicate social differences and promote standard educational
curricula. Just as the HEW bureaucrats bullied parents by forcing their children to
needlessly visit school psychologists, the national security bureaucracy sought to force
the enactment of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. The examples and specific
actions that were opposed by the various activist constituencies differed from issue area
to issue area, but regardless of the issue, what brought conservatives of all stripes
together was their opposition to big, activist government as conceived, advanced, and
72
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managed by liberals. In this context, conservatives argued strenuously for the reduction
of judicial and bureaucratic power in a broad range of issue areas. When Reagan said,
“government is the problem,” the various conservative constituencies all had their own
ideas about what that meant, but they all embraced the words with great enthusiasm.
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CHAPTER 9
Conclusion

In this dissertation, I have argued that CPAC played an important role in the life
of the early conservative movement, and I have clarified the nature of that role that it
played through an examination of conference proceedings held between 1974 and 1980.
In this concluding chapter, I argue that this investigation sheds fresh light on the process
by which the modern conservative coalition developed and evolved and that it offers
insight into the nature of ideational transitions and the variables that shape them.
Broader Implications: The Development of Modern Conservatism
The Role of Public Intellectuals There is a broad consensus among scholars that
by working out reasons why the anti-communist, free market, and traditionalist strands of
conservatism were consistent with each other philosophically, fusion conservatives at the
National Review helped to set the stage for different types of conservative politicians and
activists to also join together as part of a single political coalition.1
While this is certainly true, most accounts of the work done by public intellectuals
do not consider the coalition-building role that these individuals also played. As the
history of the ACU and CPAC demonstrates, activist conservative public intellectuals did
not just write about ideas; they served as aggressive advocates for them in the political
arena. They went out into the world to build organizations designed to encourage
political action and cultivate the development and expansion of the conservative
movement.
In that vein, the American Conservative Union (ACU) was formed in 1964 by a
coalition of politicians and public intellectuals in order to encourage conservative
political action within the Republican Party. Among its founders were William F.
Buckley, Frank Meyer, and many other writers at the National Review. Ten years later,
William Rusher and M. Stanton Evans worked through the ACU to build CPAC. In
doing so, they recruited many other public intellectuals, including Lee Edwards, Daniel
Oliver, Alan Reynolds, Norman Turé, Bill Rickenbacker, and others to join the ongoing
dialogue that they facilitated at the conference. Through their contributions to the
discourse at CPAC conferences, the public intellectuals assembled by Rusher, Evans, and
their peers helped to elaborate narratives, recommend strategies, and apply ideas in
constructive ways and, in the process, helped to steer discourse. In doing so, they helped
to bridge ideational gaps between diverse interests, help the coalition to navigate
ideational and institutional opportunities and constraints, and encourage the development
of greater unity within the conservative movement.
Of course, the activities of conservative intellectuals at the ACU and CPAC are
reflective of a much broader role that they played throughout the era that I have studied
1
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and even today. Rusher and Evans actively traveled around the country advancing ideas,
interpretations, and strategies as they spoke to a broad range of conservative audiences.
Evans wrote a regular opinion column for the Indianapolis Star News. In the future,
scholars should consider investigating the role of activist conservative intellectuals
further and examining the role that these individuals have played in not only connecting
ideas in books and opinion pieces but also representing ideas and assembling coalitions in
the world of politics.
Communicative vs. Coordinative Discourses Other scholarly accounts of the
rise of modern conservatism have focused on the process by which ideas and themes
were linked together rhetorically by Republican politicians such as Strom Thurmond,
George Wallace, Barry Goldwater, and Richard Nixon in collaboration with conservative
public intellectuals during the early years of the conservative movement. These accounts
tend to focus upon the cumulative efforts of GOP politicians as they sought to pry racial
conservatives in the South away from the Democratic Party’s mass voting coalition and
harness the backlash of voters against cultural and social changes of the 1960s.2
Such accounts help to explain the ways that ideas were communicated and used to
assemble key swing voting constituencies by politicians. They say very little, however,
about the background processes of coalition formation and platform construction that
undergirded these rhetorical appeals. In the case of the conservative movement, the
background dynamics of coalition formation involved the blending of multiple, bounded
discursive communities, single issue groups, intellectual interests, and politicians. The
diverse commitments and ideas of these communities and interests were blended together
not only by the work of public intellectuals but also through more organic discursive
processes as these interests interacted with each other, exchanged ideas, and found their
way onto common ground. These organic processes happened at sites of discourse like
CPAC. Through these discursive exchanges, a diverse platform of policy commitments
was assembled and rationalized, and a movement coalesced that ultimately came to serve
as a critical support base for Ronald Reagan. The rhetorical appeals made by politicians
are often reflective of and are made possible by background processes of coalition
formation. This is especially true in the modern era where party organizations are weak
and where election contests between candidates of competing political parties may, at a
deeper level, become competitions between the candidates of competing political
coalitions, their agendas, and the package of problem and solution frames that they have
come to represent.
The New Right Certainly, the most important change between 1964 and 1980
was the growth of the New Right in the 1970s and the fusion of the New Right coalition
and its many traditionalist elements with the Old Right Goldwater coalition and its
predominantly libertarian elements.
There is a vast literature in political science that describes and analyzes the
mobilization of socially conservative and religious constituencies (commonly referred to
as the New Right and the New Religious Right, respectively) between the 1970s and
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1990s.3 The problem is that most accounts tend to blur the boundaries between the Old
Right and the New Right and conflate the two. Accounts of the rise of the New Right fail
to make careful distinctions between the ideas, principles, and philosophies of what I
have argued were actually two partially conjoined political coalitions, and they therefore
fail to isolate and examine critically the processes by which the two were consciously
merged together. Accounts of the rise of the New Right also say very little about the
themes, narratives, and frames that connected social conservatives, religious
conservatives, economic/libertarian conservatives, and small government conservatives
together into a single coalition.
Through my analysis of CPAC discourses, I have shown that these groups were
united through their opposition to a common enemy---modern liberalism. Modern
liberalism and its transformative properties were, in turn, framed as the problem
responsible for the all of the diverse grievances of the groups that became bound up
within the conservative movement. The agendas of the Old Right and the New Right
were merged together as they expressed their hostilities in shared settings and as an
image of modern liberalism was socially constructed through discourse.
Partisan Realignment Finally, in the realignment genre, scholars have gone to
great lengths to explain changes in the partisan composition of the electorate that
occurred between the 1950s and 1990s. The question they address is a straightforward
one: if partisanship tends to be mostly stable over time (as we know to be the case), then
why did many voters switch parties during this era? The most convincing explanations to
date are those that have linked improvements in the Republican Party’s electoral fortunes
between the 1950s and the 1990s to the collapse of the Democratic Party’s inverted class
coalition (which had been held together by race), to economic growth in the South, and to
party-switching behavior by an expanding American middle class. Without the issue of
race conservatism to hold middle class and wealthy white southerners in the Democratic
Party, many became Republicans in proportions roughly consistent with trends in the rest
of the country. In essence, as mainstream thinking goes, the South ceased to be
exceptional, and the reshuffling of partisan attachments benefited the GOP.4
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Unfortunately, while empirical accounts that attribute realignment to the parties’
positions on race and to economic change are convincing, they are also limited in the
scope of what they are able to explain. Economic explanations can help to explain the
growth of the Republican Party’s electoral base, but they offer limited insight into the
complex dynamics of the ideational transformation of the Republican Party and its policy
commitments. For that, one must look not at trends in mass voting behavior and
realignment but at the perceptions, calculations, and strategic choices made by political
elites and activists in their quest for political power and influence. As I have shown,
conservatives made many thoughtful and strategic decisions about what to say, about
what to stand for, and which groups to welcome into their coalition as they sought to
expand their base and transform the Republican Party into a representative of their
philosophy. The decisions and activities of small communities of actors had an impact
that is not captured by behaviorist, economic accounts of the rise of modern
conservatism.
The Nature of Ideational Transitions
My analysis also sheds fresh light on the nature of ideational transitions and the
complementary roles that ideas and discourse, interests, and institutions play in their
development.
Ideas and Discourse I have argued that discourse plays an important role in
bringing groups of actors together and in fostering stronger relationships between them.
Discourse is a medium through which ideas and other ideationally laden elements of
discourse (including characterizations, narratives, and interpretations) are exchanged
among a community of actors. Ideas and elements of discourse are created, expressed,
and circulated among the members of a coalition as participants express their ideas and as
they cooperate, coordinate, and communicate with each other. Certain ideas can live
within the discourses of a coalition and can ultimately come to function as the basis for
shared perceptions of the political world as well as the foundation for shared strategies
and commonly defined problems and goals which can, in turn, enhance group cohesion.
Through my analysis of CPAC proceedings, I have identified some of the
characterizations, narratives, and interpretations that were carriers of ideas in
conservative discourses during the 1970s and have been able to trace the development
and usage of these elements over time. I have shown that the characterization of the
voting public as being inclusive of a conservative majority served as the basis for a series
of shared strategies that were expected to help conservatives transform the Republican
Party into a vehicle for their ideas. In movement discourses, President Nixon and
President Ford were depicted as poor Republican leaders who contributed to the decline
in popularity of their party because they failed to articulate a conservative message and
therefore alienated the conservative majority. Ford’s loss to Carter was attributed to the
fact that Carter positioned himself to the right of Ford and therefore won the partial
support of the conservative majority. Carter’s conservative rhetoric was depicted not as
true conservatism but rather as a deception and an effort to manipulate conservative
impulses arising within the country. Ronald Reagan was characterized as a strong
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candidate precisely because he embraced core conservative principles and could speak to
the conservative majority.
Other characterizations, narratives, and interpretations of the era connected a
series of grievances against modern liberalism together and targeted them–- first at
liberalism as expressed and represented by the Republican Party and then at liberalism as
expressed and represented by the Democratic Party. It also focused hostility upon the
courts, the bureaucracy, and the coalition of liberal ideologues and social engineers who
were purported to be using state institutions to restructure the economy and enact their
vision of a good society through “judicial edict” and administrative law.
Prior to 1977, Nixon, Ford, and the liberal Republicans were criticized for
supporting deficit spending, détente, and New Deal social programs. During 1977 and
beyond, hostility became increasingly focused upon liberals outside of the GOP. The
bureaucracy sought to destroy private schools, control public school curricula, redefine
the family, redistribute income in order to eliminate economic inequality, force the
giveaway of the Panama Canal, and force misguided efforts to pursue the SALT talks
with the Soviet Union. The national security bureaucracy was characterized as being
under the control of an unelected and dangerous bipartisan defense establishment, and the
courts, HEW, and the rest of the Executive Branch were characterized as instruments of a
coalition of entrenched liberal interest groups who sought to destroy American values and
culture and restructure society to fit their own vision for it. The idea that big, activist
government as conceived, developed, and managed by liberals was a bad and dangerous
thing was a powerful idea that connected the grievances of a diverse community of
activist constituencies together and united them in opposition to a common enemy.
These connections were forged– and this coalition of interests found its way onto
that common ground– as they interacted and exchanged ideas with each other at sites of
discourse like CPAC. The characterizations, interpretations, narratives, and strategies
that flowed through the discourses at CPAC were more than just neutral descriptions of
the motives of political actors or sterile accounts of the causes of the political
developments of the day. Ingrained within CPAC discourses were evolving definitions
of what it meant to be a principled conservative, of what it meant to be a liberal, and of
which groups of actors were working under which label at which time. The ideas and
elements of discourse that were exchanged among conservative elites, intellectuals, and
activists who interacted with each other at CPAC thus served as the foundations for a rich
and ideationally laden portrait of the political universe to which each conference
participant was exposed and ultimately free to interpret and apply in his or her own way. 5
Interests By definition, a political coalition includes a diverse group of interests
who have a diverse series of ideas, grievances, and policy objectives. The discourses of a
5
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coalition take shape and evolve as those interests interact with each other and exchange
ideas. The ideational formulations that ultimately develop within a community of actors
are a product of those interactions. They are a reflection of the ideas and grievances of
the participants in a community’s discourses. In this vein, I have argued that as new
groups join a political coalition, discourses expand and evolve as the ideas that those
groups represent become infused into the discourses of the coalition. The policy platform
of a community of actors and the ideational linkages that emerge to rationalize that
platform and ultimately become the core principles around which the community is
oriented are products of the interests that are involved.
Ideas may be used by elites to mobilize new interests and encourage them to join
a coalition (so the arrows may also point in the other direction), but, as I argued in
chapter 2, the mobilization of new interests still has the potential to bring new ideas into
the discourses of a coalition and to expand the platform of issues and grievances to which
a coalition is committed. As new grievances represented by newly mobilized interests
are rationalized in terms of established and widely accepted principles, the collective
identity of an entire coalition can change and assume new connotations in the process.
The flow of ideas within a community of actors– including the elements of
discourse that take root and the discursive connections that are forged and rise in salience
over time– do not do so because they naturally occur in those combinations or because it
is inevitable that they must be linked in a particular way according to the laws of the
universe. Rather, ideas develop and become tied together within the discourses of a
community based on the ideas that are ultimately represented by the conglomeration of
interests that are involved. The fact that the modern conservative coalition came together
behind a platform that stressed opposition to social engineering, opposition to the welfare
state, and opposition to internationalist foreign policy (among other things) was a result
of the fact that the particular groups who cooperated, coordinated, and communicated
with other and who participated in its discourses had those particular grievances.6
Through a time series analysis of CPAC proceedings, I have shown how the
inclusion and mobilization of new conservative constituencies led to the expansion of
coalition discourses over time. In 1975, there was relatively limited discussion at CPAC
about the importance of morals and character, and there was very little racially charged
rhetoric. Charles Rice and Mildred Jefferson spoke about the use of abortion by the state
to manipulate and to encourage family planning. Rice also spoke about state-led efforts
to impose its own vision of morality on children in the public schools. By the late 1970s,
however, the New Right had expanded to include the Christian Right and with it many
Lowndes, New Deal, 157-159. Lowndes makes a similar argument. He notes: “In the case of
the modern right, nothing necessarily links the positions of states’ rights, more punitive
sentencing, opposition to welfare, neo-liberal economics, and “family values’ into one political
identity. Actors began articulating these themes into an associative chain in opposition to the
New Deal order. Over time and through continual efforts to recombine political elements in ways
that would have traction among voters, the regime builders of the modern Right successfully
crafted a coherent political identity….This new political identity had valence to the degree that
different groups came to share a sense of common opposition to the existing political regime as
such.”
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more vocal advocates of these ideas such as the Rev. Robert Billings became involved in
conservative politics. Billings, an evangelical pastor, was welcomed at the CPAC
conference along with others who were associated with the Christian school movement,
and as a result, moralistic rhetoric about the importance of character and Christian values
became much more strongly represented within conference discourses than they had been
before. During his remarks at CPAC 1979, Billings shouted:
We have a lot of folks who travel around this country– the Rap Brown’s,
and the Stokley Charmichael’s, and the Angela Davis’s, and the Joan
Baez’s– who go around peddling their trash and their pointers. Listen, as
grassroots Americans we have as much right to speak out loud, and if they
can jump high, we can jump higher. And let ‘em know that we…
believe… in America! This country is right!7
These remarks prompted an outburst of thunderous applause from the audience that
masked the next few lines of his speech. These highly moralistic and racially charged
characterizations simply were not a part of the discourses at earlier CPAC conferences.
They were brought into the discourses at CPAC as the coalition expanded and as new
actors like Billings joined the effort and began to express their own ideas and grievances.
Institutions Political coalitions exist outside of the boundaries of the established
political parties, and so the actors who want to create and maintain them must necessarily
set up independent institutions and mechanisms to facilitate their own cooperation,
coordination, and communication. Institutions that are set up to serve in this capacity
necessarily structure the interactions of participants. By extension, they shape the
expression and flow of ideas and determine the pathways through which involved actors
find their way onto common ideational ground.
I have shown CPAC was established by intellectuals and political leaders to serve
as one such mechanism for the conservative movement. Specifically, the purpose of
CPAC was to bring conservatives together and unite them behind common goals and
common understandings at a time when the conservative movement was highly
fragmented. Since its inception, the conference has become an institution. Even today, it
helps to strengthen and reinforce the independence of conservatives as a distinct
discursive community within the Republican Party. At CPAC, conservatives are able to
hone arguments and sharpen a distinctive platform of ideational and policy commitments
that is not Republican but conservative. In the discourses at CPAC, participants also
share characterizations, narratives, and interpretations of political context which reinforce
an "us vs. them" mentality with respect to other groups of actors and institutions within
the political system.
I have shown that during the 1970s, CPAC emerged as a setting where
conservative leaders constructed and popularized highly stylized understandings of
ideological and institutional context. Through these shared understandings of context,
they promoted the development of a shared sense of conservative identity, complete with
7
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shared understandings and language regarding the behavior and intentions of other
political actors, the significance of events, and the coalition-building tasks that lay ahead
for conservatives. In short, CPAC served as a distinctive forum that enabled conservative
elites and activists to coordinate with each other and to develop and thrive as a cohesive
group separate from the broader Republican Party coalition of which they were also a
part. In 1975, especially, CPAC provided an environment in which movement
conservatives expressed their hostility to the leaders of the Republican Party and
considered whether or not they should form a separate party altogether. The discussions
that took place at CPAC 1975 could never have occurred at a Republican Party
convention or political rally.
The investigation of CPAC also highlights an important function that politicians
and intellectuals play in the coalition-building process. Specifically, they create
institutions like CPAC, and in doing so, they create environments which facilitate
discourse and structure the flow of ideas. By creating CPAC, leaders like William
Rusher and M. Stanton Evans were not only able to bring various groups of conservative
interests together but also to determine which interests would be included and which
ideas would be expressed and reinforced. By creating the institution, they were also able
to shape the environment in which discourse happened and in which ideational
connections were forged. They further influenced the process by recruiting speakers for
the early conferences from the National Review and other think tanks and by actively
participating themselves.
Over the years, part of the coalition-building process has involved inviting a
select blend of conservative groups to participate in the discourses at CPAC and to
express their ideas before the crowd that is assembled there. The choices that are made
regarding whom should be invited and whom should speak determine the ideas that are
ultimately received by attendees. At the early conferences, groups that were considered
to be racist were not invited to be cosponsors. Even today, by organizing the conference,
the ACU, YAF, and others who help to organize the conference collaborate to exert
influence over which ideas will be represented. In 2013, the organizers of CPAC refused
to extend an invitation to Gov. Chris Christie (R-NJ) because he adopted positions as
Governor that were considered to be unrepresentative of the conservative movement.
History and Context As groups coordinate and share ideas with each other, they
do so in response to the particular political context in which they are situated. As history
slides ineluctably along, however, political context changes. New issues emerge, and
new leaders arise. New opportunities to achieve success may become evident, and new
political and institutional barriers may suddenly appear where none existed before. The
emergence of new issues can prompt the development of new interest groups and, with
them, new opportunities for a coalition to expand in size. New political developments
can pose a sudden challenge to the characterizations, narratives, and interpretations
around which a coalition has become united. This can easily happen when expectations
are not fulfilled and/or when events occur for which there is not an obvious explanation
or response based in current discourses.
Over the course of the decade, political developments happened that forced elites
to update and amend coalition narratives. In the wake of Ford’s loss, outside critics and
even some in the conservative movement began to doubt that there really was a
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conservative majority as leaders claimed. If there was a conservative majority, then why
was government suddenly under the united control of the Democratic Party? In this
context, it was the intellectual and political leaders of the conservative movement who
helped to frame interpretations and explanations of political developments in order to
amend coalition narratives and keep the coalition united behind a common set of
strategies and goals. By analyzing the discourses at CPAC, I have shown how elites
worked to preserve and maintain unity over the course of the 1970s and how they sought
to preserve core ideas and elements of discourse. Changes in historical context thus
disciplined conservative discourses and drove changes in them, even though their basic
assumptions were never overturned.
Changes in political context also altered the political opportunity structure faced
by conservatives on two occasions. This happened when Ford ascended to the
Presidency (taking the slot that had been open for Reagan), and it happened again when
Ford lost to Carter and conservatives were able to partially reshape the GOP platform
(thus opening up a new opportunity to re-brand the party and mobilize behind Reagan).
In both instances, there was a need for elites to adjust conservative discourses to explain
these developments and to recommend strategies that would hold the coalition together.
As I have shown, they did just that.
Finally, changes in historical context facilitated the rise of new constituencies that
offered both new potential for coalition-builders to expand the size of the commitment.
Specifically, the sudden imposition use of IRS rules to challenge Christian school tax
exemptions created new problems where none had existed before and served as an issue
around which new communities of religious issue activists were mobilized. At the
invitation of CPAC planners, these new groups and actors joined the coalition and began
contributing to the discourses at CPAC. As they did so, they carried other ideas with
them and infused more moralistic rhetoric into the discourses at CPAC. In this vein,
historical context also drove the expansion of the coalition and led to the infusion of new
and diverse ideas into movement discourses.
Tracing Changes in Discourse Finally, I have shown that when seeking to
discern the processes by which coalitions become connected together at the ideologicaldiscursive level, there are advantages to conducting an extremely focused, time-series
analysis. By focusing on coordinative discourses as represented at CPAC conferences
only, it has been possible to identify ideas and elements of discourse that played an
important role in tying the coalition together and to look at how these ideas were
expressed as actors spoke to each other at a very granular level. It has also been possible
to consider carefully how in this one case the institutional environment in which
discourse happened structured the substance and flow of ideas.
I have also shown that when seeking to understand the dynamics of the process by
which a political coalition comes together, it is important to look beyond books and
journal articles and to examine the substance of spoken political discourse and organic
discursive interactions. In the context of such exchanges, ideas are combined with other
elements of discourse as actors react and respond to each other and try to make sense of
the world around them. Journals of opinion such as the National Review play an
important role in that they help to connect ideas together and help to rationalize policy
positions in terms of core philosophical principles. However, political coalitions are
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composed of real people who must ultimately come to trust and relate to each other in the
real world. As they do so, they rely on certain ideas and concepts– such as the
conservative majority thesis– to frame developments, characterize their opponents, and
defend their ideas and strategies.
While it is possible to look back and identify the conservative majority narrative
in books and articles written by conservatives during the 1970s, it only becomes clear
how important the idea was for building enthusiasm and for defining political strategies
when one hears the frequency with which the idea was repeated and used as
conservatives spoke to each other and built up corollaries around it to explain events and
make sense of the political developments that were happening around them.
Political coalitions are ultimately forged not in books or journals but by real
people as they interact with each other and share ideas. By tracing and examining the
substance and flow of ideas in settings like CPAC, it is possible to gain deeper insights
about what brings people together as a community.
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APPENDIX
CPAC 1974: January 24-26, 19741

Panels and Sessions (Chronological)*
A. The Conservative Community in Washington
B. The Role of the Party in the Campaign
A. Budget Control
B. Campaign Management
A. The Women’s Movement and Equal Rights
B. Issue Development in a Campaign
A. The Nixon Presidency
B. Polling and Direct Mail
A. National Health Care Legislation
B. Campaign Finance and Reform
A. Energy
B. Precinct Organization
Strategy for ‘74
A. Détente and Red Trade
B. Youth Campaigns
A. Busing
B. Campaign Media
A. Taxes
B. Women in Politics
*A/B denote sessions that were double tracked. Every CPAC also included an awards
banquet and a series of separate addresses delivered by prominent conservative leaders.
For a comprehensive list of all meetings that were on CPAC agendas between 1974 and
1980, consult the conference programs, all of which are available in the American
Conservative Union Archive, located at Lee Library, Brigham Young University, Provo,
UT.
Affiliations of CPAC 1974 Speakers**
Organizations
American Conservative Union
Buckley for Senate Campaign
Cardinal Society of Virginia
Commission on Foreign Policy
Committee for Responsible Youth Politics
1

CPAC 1974, Official Program of the Conference, MSS 176, LTPSC, Box 2, Folder 30
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Council of Medical Staffs
Hannis County (Texas) Republican Party
Human Events
Indianapolis News
National Review
New Guard
New York Conservative Party
Reagan for Governor Campaign
Republican Party of Oklahoma
Republican Party of Virginia
Republican Steering Committee
The Right Report
The Schlafly Report
Speakers Bureau of America
Young Americans for Freedom
Young Republican National Federation
Government
State:
California (Governor)
New Hampshire (Governor)
Ohio (Senate)
Wisconsin (Senate)
Federal:
US Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
US House of Representatives
US Office of Economic Opportunity
US Senate
US White House
Universities
Georgetown University
University of Maryland
Texas A&M
** Includes only organizational affiliations specifically listed in the official conference
program. Some speakers chose not to list their affiliations.
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CPAC 1975: February 13-16, 19752

Panels & Sessions (Chronological)
What are Conservatives to Do?
A. Defense and Foreign Policy
B. Welfare Reform
The Economy: Inflation, Recession, or Both?
A. The Regulated American
B. The Social Issues
Have the States Become Irrelevant?
The Republican Party: Does it Have a Future?
A. Taking the Offensive
B. The Mechanics of a New Party
A. Forming a State Conservative Union or YAF Chapter
B. Working Within the Republican Party
Affiliations of CPAC 1975 Speakers
Organizations
American Conservative Union
Americans for Effective Law Enforcement
American Security Council
Citizens Committee for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms
Hoover Institute of California
Human Events
Indianapolis News
Republican National Committee
National Review
Mississippi Republican Party
National Right to Life Committee
National Right to Work Committee
National United Taxpayers Union
New Guard
New York Conservative Party
Public Service Research Council
The Right Report
Rule 29 Committee
Stop-ERA
TV Guide Magazine
Washington Star
2

CPAC 1975, Official Program of the Conference, MSS 176, LTPSC, Box 3, Folder 16
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Welfare Reform Office
Young Americans for Freedom
Young Republican National Federation
Government
State:
California (Governor)
Illinois (House of Representatives)
Louisiana (House of Representatives)
New Hampshire (Governor)
Oklahoma (Senate)
Federal:
US Senate
US House of Representatives
Universities
Catholic University
Georgetown University
University of Maryland
New York University
University of Notre Dame
University of Virginia
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CPAC 1976: February 13-15, 1976*3

Panels & Sessions (Chronological)

A.
B.
A.
B.
A.
B.

Our Vanishing Rights
Free Market Solutions
Federal Laws and Campaigns
The Ford Presidency
Détente and Foreign Policy
Campaigning
Creative Federalism
Attack on the Family
Taking the Offensive in the States

Affiliations of CPAC 1976 Speakers
Organizations
American Conservative Union
Americans for Effective Law Enforcement
American Foreign Service Association
American Legislative Exchange Council
California Conservative Union
Citizens Committee for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms
Citizens for Ronald Reagan
Committee for Responsible Youth Politics
Conservative Digest
DIRACTION
Governor George Wallace, Campaign
Hoover Institute at Stanford University
Human Events
Illinois Conservative Union
International Monetary Fund
Iowa Conservative Union
National Coalition for Children
National Review
National Right to Life Committee
National Right to Work Committee
New Guard
Newsweek
New York Conservative Party
3
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Stop-ERA
TV Guide Magazine
US Chamber of Commerce
Young Americans for Freedom
Government
State:
California (Assembly)
New Hampshire (Governor)
Ohio (Senate)
Oklahoma (Senate)
South Carolina (Governor)
Federal:
US House of Representatives
US Senate
US Welfare Reform Office
Universities
University of Chicago
*This conference is not analyzed in the dissertation because audio recordings were not
preserved.
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CPAC 1977: February 3-6, 19774

Panels & Sessions (Chronological)

A.
B.
A.
B.
A.
B.
A.
B.

The Media
The Carter Presidency
Options for Conservatives
Marketing Free Enterprise
Taking the Offensive: The Challenge of Big Labor
The Social Issues
Lobbying to Influence Your Legislators
National Defense
The Crisis in American Education
Free Market Initiatives
Local Campaigning
How We Won

Affiliations of CPAC 1977 Speakers
Organizations
Accuracy in Media
American Association of Physicians and Surgeons
American Conservative Union
American Legislative Exchange Council
American Security Council
Americans for Effective Law Enforcement
Barrons Magazine
Citizens for Reagan
Committee for Responsible Youth Politics
Conservative Digest
Defense Intelligence Agency
DIRACTION
Florida Conservative Union
Human Events
Illinois Conservative Union
National Review
National Right to Life Committee
National Right to Work Committee
New Guard
New York Conservative Party
Public Service Research Council
4
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Republican National Committee
STOP-ERA
Texas Conservative Union
TV Guide
Young Americans for Freedom
Government
State:
Arkansas State University
Illinois (House)
New Hampshire (Governor)
Federal:
US House of Representatives
US Senate
Universities
Texas A&M University
University of Maryland
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CPAC 1978: March 16-19, 19785

Panels & Sessions (Chronological)
Communicating the Conservative Message
A. America in Retreat
B. The Conservative Soviet Dissidents
A. The Growing Tax Burden
B. Influencing Your State Legislature
A. Attack on the Family
B. How to Win
A. Salt II and a Strong America
B. Achieving Quality Education
Conservative Initiatives
The Carter Presidency
A. Toward Labor Reform
B. Building the Conservative Constituency
Regional Political Action Seminars
Affiliations of CPAC 1978 Speakers
Organizations
American Conservative Union
American Legislative Exchange Council
Bruce W. Eberle and Associates
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Chase Manhattan Bank
Committee on the Status of Women
Consumer Alert Council
Defense Intelligence Agency
Florida Conservative Union
Fund for a Conservative Majority
Hoover Institution
Jim Baker for Attorney General of Texas
Long Advertising Agency
National Right to Life Committee
National Right to Work Committee
National Tax Limitation Committee
Phillips Publishing Company
Public Service Research Council
Republican National Committee
5
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Richard A. Viguerie Company
Rhodesian Information Service
Second Amendment Foundation
Young Americans for Freedom
Young Republican National Federation
Government
State:
Arizona (Legislature)
California (State Legislature)
Illinois (Legislature)
New Hampshire (Governor)
Washington (Legislature)
Federal:
US House of Representatives

Universities
University of California- Los Angeles
George Washington University
Georgetown University School of Foreign Service
University of Maryland
Pepperdine Law School
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CPAC 1979: February 8-10, 19796

Panels & Sessions (Chronological)
A.
B.
A.
B.
A.
B.
A.
B.

A.
B.
A.
B.

The Battle for the Equal Rights Amendment
Health Issues and the Prospects for National Health Insurance
D.C. Amendment
Private Education vs. Government Edict
Tax Limitation
Prospects for Welfare Reform
Terrorism, Internal Security, and Intelligence
Fighting for Free Enterprise
How I Won the Special Constituencies
Federal Tax Reform
The Tax Issue
SALT II and National Defense
SALT II
Carter at Mid-Point
Prospects for 1980
Lobbying Initiatives
A Look at the New Congress
The Burden of Government Regulation

Affiliations of CPAC 1979 Speakers & Sponsoring Organizations with Booths*
Organizations
*Accuracy in Media
American Conservative Union
*American Conservative Union- Education and Research Institute
*American Council for World Freedom
*American Enterprise Institute
American Legislative Exchange Council
*Citizens Committee for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms
*Conservative Caucus Foundation
*Conservative Digest
*Conservative Victory Fund
Coors
Dart Industries
*Devin-Adair Publishers
Foundation of Law and Society
*Frank Enten (Button Man)
6
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*Freedom Leadership Foundation
*Green Hill Publishers
*The Heritage Foundation
*Hillsdale College
Human Events
*Initiative America
*Intercollegiate Studies Institute
*National Alliance of Senior Citizens
National Christian Action Coalition
*National Conservative Political Action Committee
National Review
National Right to Work Committee
National Tax Limitation Committee
*The Phyllis Schlafly Report
Pink Sheet on the Left
Postal Rate Commission
*Public Service Research Council
Senate Republican Policy Committee
STOP-ERA
Taxpayers United of Michigan
Young Americans for Freedom
*Young America’s Foundation
Government
State:
Delaware (Senate)
Ohio (House, Senate)
Tennessee (House)
Federal:
US House of Representatives
US Senate
Universities
University of Maryland
*Biographical data for speakers in 1979 are abbreviated in available documentation, so
the list of speakers is not as comprehensive as the lists for other conference years. I have
supplemented the list with the names of participating organizations and outside
cooperating groups. These are distinguished by asterisks.

232

CPAC 1980: February 7-9, 1980*7

Panels & Sessions (Chronological)
Outlook for the 1980s: The American Family
Outlook for the 1980s: Education and the Schools
The Conservative Alternatives to American Foreign Policy
Outlook for the 1980s: Nuclear Power
Outlook for the 1980s: Options for Energy Development
Outlook for the 1980s: Taxes, Spending, and the Budget
Media and Lobbying Workshop
Outlook for the 1980s: A Critique of Carter Foreign Policy
Outlook for the 1980s: America’s Position in the World
A. Outlook for the 1980s: America Reevaluates SALT II
B. Outlook for the 1980s: Conservative Responses to Big Labor Initiatives
Outlook for the 1980s: Our Collapsing Intelligence
Outlook for the 1980s: Our Struggling Allies
Affiliations of CPAC 1980 Speakers
Organizations
American Conservative Union
American Legislative Exchange Council
American Security Council
Chicago Tribune- New York News Syndicate
Committee for Responsible Youth Politics
Eagle Forum
Fund for a Conservative Majority
Hofenblum, Mollrich, and Lacy Inc.
Lee Edwards and Associates
Lincoln Center for Legal Studies
National Review
Phyllis Schlafly Report
Pink Sheet on the Left
Public Service Research Council
Young Americans for Freedom
Government
State:
Ohio (Senate)
7
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Illinois (Senate)
Indiana (Senate)
Massachusetts (Governor)
Federal:
US House of Representatives
US Senate

Universities
Catholic University
University of Haifa-Israel
University of Notre Dame Law School
University of Texas-Austin
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